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“Signaling Through the Flames: Theatre Fires and Disaster Sociology” re-examines archival 
evidence relevant to three of the most destructive and deadly fires in American theatre history: 
Richmond, Virginia in 1811, Brooklyn, New York in 1876, and Chicago, Illinois in 1903. 
Through the use of the theories of disaster sociology, “Signaling Through the Flames” positions 
disaster as an inherently theatrical process of disruption, after which various parties, constructed 
as “grass-roots” communities and “elite-level” institutional groups, compete to gain control of 
the narrative of the disaster event and, in doing so, contribute in significant ways to creating and 
disseminating an “official” history of the disaster. This official history often comes at the 
expense of the memories and experiences of the grass-roots group; “Signaling Through the 
Flames” works to make these acts of remembering and forgetting visible through reclaiming 
historical accounts that dispute or resist the accepted record. “Signaling Through the Flames” 
argues that the narrative and rhetorical tropes used to construct these official histories reinforce 
and reinscribe the systems of social order that were disrupted and made visible by the disaster 
event, and thus contribute meaningfully and importantly to the necessary negotiation of 
sociopersonal identity in the post-disaster paradigm. The dissertation is organized 
chronologically in three parts, each of which is broken down into chapters. Each part provides an 
analysis of pre-disaster culture, and a recounting of the disaster event; however, the majority of 
each chapter focuses on cultural production in the post-disaster paradigm, and how that 
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Introduction: Theatre History through Conflagration 
 
“This awful catastrophe is not the end but the beginning. History does not end so. It is the way 
its chapters open.” 
-St. Augustine1 
 
 The history of theater is rife with examples of the tendency of theatre buildings to burst 
into flames. These fires are particularly prevalent in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and seem to occur without regard for season, or location, or time of day. 
Although destructive and deadly fires dropped off as the twentieth century moved along — 
helped in no small part by the continued development of technologies of hazard mitigation and 
emergency response — it would be incorrect to infer that theater fires are no longer an issue. 
Instead of being foregrounded by a system of concern for potential destruction, theatre fires lurk 
as dangers, underscored by the very measures intended to prevent them. 
The nineteenth and early twentieth century produced three fires that stand out as worthy of 
study, owing to their destructive and deadly nature. These three fires form the core case studies 
of this dissertation: 1) the Richmond Theatre fire in Richmond, Virginia in 1811; 2) the fire that 
destroyed the Brooklyn Theatre in Brooklyn, New York in 1876 and; 3) the Iroquois Theatre fire 
in Chicago, Illinois in 1903. These fires share several of the same situational causes created by 
similar social contexts stemming in part from the convergence of the industrial revolution with 
concomitant episodes of urbanization. Among these causes are emerging technologies of 
theatrical production, with a specific focus on technologies of spectacle, poor architectural 
design, badly over-estimated hazard-mitigation paired with badly conceived risk assessments, the 
human tendency towards panic in disastrous situations, and civic mismanagement and 
managerial negligence. These three fires are given special precedence over a litany of other 
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theatre fires for their particular devastation: they stand out as the most destructive and deadly 
events in American theatre history, causing thousands of deaths, and millions of dollars in costs.2  
“A Stubborn Refusal to Learn from the Past” 
 
Safe and unchallenged narratives have developed and stick to each of these three fires. While 
some scholars have returned to the sites of these fires for study, it is often in an attempt to make 
a point about the relationship between fire’s consuming (disappearing) nature, and theatre’s 
similar relationship to disappearance, exemplified by Ellen MacKay’s 2009 article The Theatre 
as a Self-Consuming Art: 
The catastrophe is swiftly transformed into an indictment of theatre management and city 
government, and becomes a rallying cry for the reform of fire and building codes that are 
still in place today…one way of understanding these events is as a series of contingencies 
that have shaped theatrical practice into a progressively safer, more conscientious art.3 
 
 
 MacKay identifies the problematic nature of reading theatre history according to an 
evolutionary paradigm that pays attention chiefly to the development of safety precautions and 
technologies, noting the “grotesque sameness” to conflagrations  “that undermines any 
progressivism in the progression” of theatre’s evolution towards safety.4 “What links fourteenth-
century Paris to seventeenth-century London to twentieth-century Chicago,” MacKay writes, “is 
a stubborn failure to learn from the disasters of the past.”5 MacKay argues against the simplistic 
narrative of safety measures by underscoring the ontological connection between calamity and 
theatre, and that “disaster sets the stage for theatre’s history to be told.”6  MacKay’s overarching 
point is summed up thus:  
The reforms implemented to make the theatre safe — like exit signs and fire curtains — 
have never proved as successful at protecting audiences as they have at reminding 
audiences that the theatre is marked for burning. Since by its ontological disposition 
theatre happens by disappearing, and never so unforgettably as when it goes up in smoke, 
the safeguards to theatrical disaster are also the signifiers of performance’s contract with 
oblivion, warning us that the only certainty those safety measures can effect is the 
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theatre’s emergent occasions will from now on occur under the sign (‘Emergency Exit’) 
of their own risk.7 
 
 That is to say, the evolutionary narrative of increased safety in theatre is simultaneously 
perpetuated and destabilized by the persistence of the issue itself: despite the implementation and 
enforcement of technologies of safety and hazard mitigation, theatres continued to burn down, 
and people continued to die. In MacKay’s argument, theatre buildings don’t become safer so 
much as they come to be marked by their tendency to mirror the practices that take place within: 
if theatre is marked by the ontological condition of its continual disappearance, the historical 
tendency of theatre buildings to burst into flames mirrors that condition. The narratives afforded 
by burning theatres, then — the ones that stick — are cautionary tales and moral examples, 
attempts to “restore an equilibrium to the order of things that fire jeopardizes.”8 The irony is that 
it is the very absence of a theatre that marks the disaster event as worth remembering. The 
archive is rich with information about disasters because disasters were remarkable events. 
Scholars often are forced to turn, in the absence of information about the “normal” operations of 
theatre, to these disastrous events in order to write their histories. As MacKay writes, “the 
habitualness with which scholars extrapolate the practices of the theatrical past from scenes of 
theatrical catastrophe,” suggests “the theatre’s sudden absence makes more of an impression than 
its unmolested continuance.”9   
 Allowing MacKay’s theoretical points about the relationship between disappearance and 
the archive to stand, I aim to take a different view on theatre disasters, to gather evidence under a 
different rubric to yield a new maxim about the intersections of theatre, disaster, memory, and 
identity.10 The most troubling aspect of MacKay’s article is the handling of memorial of the 




More fundamentally, what dictates Bluebeard’s excessive recordings is its grip on public 
memory; the show’s cumulus of documentation underscores by how much the theatre’s 
sudden absence makes more of an impression than its unmolested continuance. In the 
case of “The Great Chicago Theatre Disaster,” as the Iroquois fire is habitually called, we 
can trace the impression upon the cityscape, for that fire comes down to us as a matter we 
are enjoined never to forget by the civic commemoration of its obliterating event. There 
is, for instance, the granite marker in Montrose Cemetery, “Sacred to the memory of 600 
people who perished in the Iroquois Theatre Fire.” There is too Loredo Taft’s Beaux Arts 
bas relief, once the centerpiece of the Iroquois Memorial Hospital’s grand entrance, now 
installed in Chicago’s City Hall. Along with their pietistic remembrance, what these 
monuments preserve is a quality of historicity that is particular to theatrical performance; 
with all the concreteness of urban landmarks, they imprint upon the city, and upon those 
who travel through it, a version of the theatrical past that conveys nothing so much as the 
volatility of the stage. Of particular salience to this argument is the way they trace the 
footprint of the theatre as a spectral history, according to which stages that are 
irretrievably gone loom larger in the public eye than those that remain. The effect is 
nicely rendered by Anthony Munday, another antitheatricalist from early modern 
England, whose gaze is drawn to the ruinated spaces where theaters have been, by God’s 
flaming finger (he says), decamped: “neither be Theaters where in times past they 
were.”11 
 
 MacKay’s suggestion, that disasters convey “nothing so much as the volatility of the stage” 
can be resisted by a new theoretical framework through which to view disasters; a framework 
which suggests that it is not only what is destroyed or disappeared by disaster that contributes 
significantly to meaning, but also what is created to fill the void. It is my goal to use the thinking 
provided by the field of disaster sociology to re-examine fires from theatre’s past and, in doing 
so, to demonstrate that an interdisciplinary paradigm informed through a sociological framework 
can re-position destruction, death, and disaster away from a citational performance of theatre’s 
historical and ontological relationship to disaster, and towards an understanding of “the volatility 
of the stage” as playing a vitally contributory role in the on-going processes of social and 
individual identity creation. To do so is to read “signals through the flames” of theatre’s past in 
order to (re)construct evidence about how theatre disasters — understood both as disaster events 
and processes related to theatre buildings, and as the inherently theatrical nature of disaster 
events and processes — create a post-disaster paradigm full of rich cultural production, a 
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definition for which follows in this introduction. An analysis of these products, through the lens 
of disaster sociology, reveal the contested negotiations of memory and identity for individuals, 
communities and societies alike that occurred between elite-level governmental organizations 
and grass-roots communities, terms pulled from Celesta Kofman Bos, Susann Ullberg, and Paul 
’t Hart’s 2005 article The Long Shadow of Disaster.12 The tactics for negotiating these contested 
memory narratives is what links these fires together in a way considerably more significant than 
a “stubborn refusal to learn from the past.” How these fires were written about, how evidence 
was organized, and what ideological agendae shaped the practices of recording the evidence 
about these fires that can be found in the archive determined how, in the very early post-disaster 
paradigm, these events would be remembered or forgotten.  
Defining Disaster 
 
 There are disputes in the field of disaster sociology about what, exactly a disaster is. The 
term is, to mirror the insight of Mary Strine, Beverly Long, and Mary Francis Hopkins’s 1990 
essay Research in Interpretation and Performance Studies: Trends, Issues, Priorities about 
performance, an “essentially contested concept, meaning that its very existence is bound up in 
disagreement about what it is, and that the disagreement over its essence is itself part of that 
essence.”13  
 Ronald W. Perry’s chapter What is a Disaster in the 2007 Handbook of Disaster 
Research offers an excellent examination of various competing definitions of the term. “What 
becomes important is the specification of the audience for the definition,” Perry argues, “bearing 
in mind the use to which that audience will put the definition.”14 I believe the use of the term in 
theatre history is under-theorized, typically used as either explanation the application of a 
qualitative judgment — “that show was a disaster” — or as a term denoting a specific and 
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discrete historical event in which destruction of property and/or human life are among the major 
outcomes. Treatment of disasters in theatre scholarship has been consigned to monographs of 
single incidents, encyclopedia entries, a handful of scholarly articles, and one 1986 work by 
Gyles Brandreth, Great Theatrical Disasters, that focuses primarily on the qualitative definitions 
of the term. The prevailing definition of disaster in theatre scholarship is typically citational and 
temporal; we pick and choose disastrous events in history to mark moments that stand out from 
the rest of the archive — the 1613 fire at the Globe Theatre, for example — often without 
context for understanding the pre-disaster sociological factors that contributed to the creation of 
a disaster-prone environment, or for the broad, post-disaster effects of the events. When the 
effects are mentioned, they are treated as causal and discrete examples within the larger narrative 
of the evolution of safety. The events are often summed up in simplistic terms that ignore the 
patterns that underlie their reality: disasters, like theatre, are socially constructed. 
 Disaster sociology contends that disasters cannot be constructed through a simple appeal 
to cause and effect. Disasters are not defined by their linear progression; rather, disasters are 
rooted in social change, a point first articulated by L.J. Carr in 1932’s Disaster and the 
Sequence-Pattern Concept of Social Change, repositioning disaster from being defined as “a 
product of its consequences” to “the collapse of …cultural protections.”15 Carr’s insight would 
largely dominate the construction of the term: more than death or destruction, disaster is defined 
by its tendency for disruption. This simple shift in thinking challenges a broadly held definition 
of disaster as a “negative, agent-caused event” and suggests that revisiting historical disasters 
may yield new readings as making productive contributions to individuals and societies alike 
through disasters’ socially disruptive power.  
 
 7 
 Anthony F. C. Wallace’s 1954 report to the Committee on Disaster Studies, Human 
Behavior in Extreme Situations, further challenges a traditional definition of the term as 
indicating a temporally discrete event, positing a definition of disaster as “an interruption of 
normally effective procedures for reducing certain tensions, together with a dramatic increase in 
tensions, to the point of causing death or major personal and social readjustment…”16 This 
reconfigured definition positions disasters not just as “breaks in pattern,” but as,  
A class in themselves, about which generalizations can and should be made…viewed not 
as a type of event, but as isolated and annoying interruptions of norms, they present 
themselves only as unique happenings, hanging in a sort of conceptual limbo…17 
 
 Wallace’s point, here, is two-fold: first, disasters defy easy categorization into a single field 
of study, and only an interdisciplinary approach can properly handle the manifest difficulties in 
disaster theorization; second, “the social readjustment following these interruptions was also 
cited as part of the definition of disaster,” suggesting that disasters are not temporally discrete 
events, but ongoing processes of adjustment to newly created social paradigms.18 Lewis Killian 
contended that the negative aspects of the definitions of disaster had to be retained, “because 
people must cope by departing ‘from the pattern of norm expectations.’”19  These disagreements 
are productive, because they point out the insight articulated by Gary Webb: 
When disasters occur, people interpret them in different ways. Some people view 
disasters as the result of divine intervention. Others regard them as failures of 
government. And still others see them strictly as natural phenomena. Given this diversity 
of views, it is clear that disasters are social constructs.20 
 
 While there is considerable disagreement over what qualifies as a disaster, there is some 
agreement between the various competing definitions. All seem to agree that disaster, at its core, 
is a disruption of normative social functions. Second, all agree that disaster should not be 
understood in terms of temporal limits, but as the adjustment and readjustment of individuals to 
newly developing social norms; as Enrico Quarantelli argues “disaster is rooted in social 
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structure and reflects the processes of social change.”21 Third, disasters are best understood in 
terms of human interaction: “disasters stem not from the agent that causes the disruption” — for 
the purposes of this dissertation, fire — “but from the social structure of norms and values…”22 
Scott G. Knowles articulates this another way, writing, 
Disasters are not external in some magical way to the realities of the human-shaped 
environment or political culture in which they occur. In fact, it is probably best 
understood the other way around. In the patterns of property destruction, in the 
communities damaged and those protected, in the technologies and policies available to 
limit or avoid them, a disaster mirrors the prevailing values of the society in which it 
occurs.23 
 
 This methodological repositioning of disasters from temporal events to processional 
societal phenomena suggests that, in the studying of disaster, it is not only the reconstruction of 
the narrative of the event itself that matters, but also how the narrative reflects the difficult but 
necessary process of social change as a result of the disaster. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, it may also be said that, in analyzing the evidence found in the archive, as well as 
monographs that have already undertaken the narrativizing of the archival evidence to 
reconstruct the disaster event, it is not the narrative that counts but what the narrative — and, 
therefore, the evidence within the archive — reveals about the shifting “prevailing values of the 
society” in which the disaster occurred.  
 Some of the terms I use within this dissertation reflect the process-based construction of 
the term disaster. It is useful to define specifically what I mean: pre-disaster refers to the social 
and cultural contexts within which normal social systems seem to be working effectively. It is 
worth noting that these systems are considered effective only until the disaster event occurs, and 
it is the inefficiencies of these systems that contribute in meaningful ways to creating an 
environment that favors the development and occurrence of a disaster event. Disaster event refers 
to the temporally discrete occurrence of the theatre fire. It is in the use of this term that cause-
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and-effect carries the most weight, as I work through numerous survivor narratives to form 
chronological descriptions of the events. Post-disaster paradigms should be understood to refer to 
the period following a disaster that lasts for an undefined length of time, in which cultural and 
memorial production occurs; the term “paradigm” is meant to signify a recognition of the 
pervasive effects of the disruptive nature of disaster on life and existence in the community 
affected by the fire that require the creation of new and significant organizational strategies for 
productive social existence. Civic investigations, funeral services, performances of social 
mourning, religious responses, survivor communities, negotiations about defining the event 
between elite-level and grass roots memory work, and strategies for constructing and placing 
memorials to the dead mark the post-disaster paradigm. It is difficult to identify an endpoint for 
the post-disaster paradigm, but generally I identify endpoints as the disappearance of the 
significance of post-disaster paradigmatic production to the point where they are accepted within 
a newly ordered cultural milieu as normal. 
Researching and Writing Disaster Histories: Methodologies from Disaster Sociology 
 
 The relative youth of the field of disaster sociology has produced a tight, self-conscious 
collection of scholarship about methodologies for disaster research, and about the history of 
disaster research. Much of the meta-scholarship about the field yields to the convention of 
sociological research called “snow-balling,” wherein advances are suggested based on perceived 
identification of the direction of the field; one idea leads to the next, and to the next, and so on, 
so that the field “snow-balls.” This means the methodologies articulated by disaster sociologists 
are inter-related and self-referential. Reading one essay or article on disaster sociological 
methodologies inevitably leads to citations of numerous other sources. The evolution of the field 
is extremely easy to track, and presents an ease of access to new researchers. Presently, the field 
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is moving towards interdisciplinary constructions of disasters, which has opened up access to 
disaster research to historians, cultural theorists, and memory studies scholars, among others. My 
dissertation participates in this scholarly evolution by suggesting new vistas for disaster 
sociology provided by approaches to theatre history, historiography, and performance studies. 
 “Disasters are, by their nature, interdisciplinary problems, and cut across jurisdictional 
boundaries,” writes Scott G. Knowles.24  Although Knowles’ statement was more concerned 
with jurisdictions defined by institutional response teams, the point can be made just as easily to 
the academic study of disaster phenomena. Disasters offer significant opportunities for 
interdisciplinary scholarship, and disaster sociology calls for a broad application of the definition 
of evidence to studies of disaster history. To date, little work has been done in the area of theatre 
history of disaster aside from single-event, narrativized monographs. While these books often 
present a strong index of evidence, they resist the sociological perspective of disasters as 
processes, presenting instead a purely chronological reconstruction of the fire as a discrete 
temporal event.  
 The chronological narrative also resists the broad definition and use of cultural production 
as evidence that reveals narrative negotiation in the post-disaster paradigm. Sociologists have 
made note of this limited use of evidence, as well. Knowles terms the period between the 1860’s 
and the 1940’s as ”the Conflagration Era…the time of the most rapid growth in the history of the 
American city.” Knowles writes, “fire…was the most consistent, costly, and widely-experienced 
risk to both life and property” during this time.25 The underlying idea of this organizational 
strategy is that fire was a persistent and pervasive existential threat, and so may be used as an 
organizing theme in the writing of history. Following along the insights offered by disaster 
sociology, to read history as “signals through the flames” is to identify whatever patterns might 
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underlie theatre fires as disaster processes, and to produce insights to the unique sociological 
tensions that develop in disaster’s wake. Always, the cry that follows social disaster is that “we 
must not forget” the disastrous event, lest the victims have died in vain, and the event repeat 
itself. However, over the course of almost one hundred years, three deadly conflagrations erupted 
at three different locations, in three different performance circumstances. History did repeat 
itself: the similarity of patterns that underlie their occurrences, as well as the patterned behavior 
of each society in the post-disaster paradigm produces a reading of history that resists sententious 
refrains for memory as a operant force of social change. Fire is used within this dissertation as a 
thematic way to explore the cultural production of memory in the post-disaster paradigm. 
 There are obvious methodological issues in re-constructing disaster narratives, but perhaps 
none bigger than the idea that the archive cannot capture phenomena that is, by its nature, 
ephemeral, found not in solid evidence but in processes of change. Too, in the days and weeks 
following the event, a plurality of narratives emerge, often with contradictory evidence, from 
victims and governments, both working to define the terms of the disaster and, in doing so, gain 
power over how the disaster is remembered. T. Joseph Scanlon specifically addresses these 
methodological concerns and more in Rewriting a Living Legend, and I found many of his points 
productive when considering strategies for organizing my evidence.26  
 One of the major issues between positing a crossover between disaster sociology and these 
events is that the DRC is primarily interested in contemporaneous disasters that allow for 
fieldwork to be accomplished. Historical disaster studies are obviously more complicated 
because, as is certainly the case with my three case studies, there are no survivors left to tell their 





Historical research has limitations. Records are lost or destroyed. Some sources are 
dead…however, there are also advantages…some statistics and comparative data will 
exist only because time has passed. Sophisticated methods of analysis may reveal things 
that were not evident years ago.27 
 
 Among the statistics that exists now is empirical data afforded by disaster sociology that 
demonstrates that typical disaster event narratives of destruction and decay can no longer be 
cited because such narratives are outdated. Indeed, disaster sociology proves nothing so much as 
the fact that social formations — configured either as institutional (“elite”) or victim 
communities (“grass-roots”) — behave in remarkably patterned ways in the days and weeks 
following the disaster event.28 These patterned behaviors allow for generalized claims to be 
made. What is difficult, according to Scanlon, about historical research, is locating these patterns 
without the possibility of empirical fieldwork:  
Tracking [evidence] down means poking around in basements or vaults. It also means 
using unconventional techniques, making one’s interests known, and following trails 
from family, friends, professional colleagues, or even strangers to written sources, then 
trying to fit the material into a pattern.29 
 
 Faced with these concerns, a sociological reading of theatre disasters calls for new 
interpretive strategies of evidence contained in the historical records relevant to each fire. Local 
newspapers offer “an overview of what happened” and offer the opportunity “for creating a list 
for follow-up later” despite their “notorious…errors of detail.”30 Newspapers also provide a way 
to understand the competition between elite-level groups and grass-roots efforts to control the 
narrative of the disaster, as the narrative that emerges from the reporting on the institutional 
investigation is often in stark contrast to the lush descriptions of tragedy that adorn the front 
page. Newspapers provide coverage of funeral processions and memorials. Sometimes long after 
the disaster event, newspapers continue reporting on related topics: articles covering memorial 
construction, dedication, and the event’s anniversary provide valuable opportunities to read into 
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shifting cultural contexts. Local newspapers are by no means the only place to look for evidence. 
Newspapers from other areas of the country (or world) also reveal information about significant 
social operations: after the occasion of each of these three fires, major metropolitan newspapers 
around the world published stories about the relative safety of the theaters in their own cities. 
Newspapers are a valuable point of departure, but cannot encompass the whole of the event. 
What other sources of evidence may be used to re-create the processes before and after the 
disastrous event, as well as the event itself?  
 One answer is disaster books, narrative collections of newspaper articles, trade journals, 
and first hand stories collated and presented back to the audience. Disaster books have plenty of 
concerns embedded within them; they are often simply reprints of newspaper sources, and often 
report second and third hand information as truth. They are often pulpy and graphic in their 
detail, published as soon as possible after the event in order to capitalize on public memory and 
sympathy, marketed to a community of interested citizens, so the narrative is often one of 
outraged indignation, especially in the case of engineering and architectural deficiencies and 
evidence of managerial incompetence. The value of disaster books as evidence comes from 
precisely the same concerns for accuracy and legitimacy that may give an historian pause. 
Disaster books often include evidence from newspapers to which the researcher would not 
otherwise have access. The second and third hand information reported as fact can provide 
valuable insight into the cultural production and dissemination of urban mythology that occurs in 
the post-disaster paradigm. The pulpy, graphic detail, and the resultant outraged indignation 
provide an understanding for the researcher of the immediacy of the event, and of the emotional 
condition of individuals in the post-disaster paradigm.  
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 Trade publications offered insight through professional, industry-based responses to the 
disasters. Often, engineering journals and magazines had valuable information about the 
practices underlying the building of theaters. Medical journals took up the problems of 
emergency response times in urban settings, and fire publications offered valuable insight into 
technologies of fireproofing and the practices of firefighting at the time of the event. 
Entertainment magazines often featured biographies of individual actors and managers involved 
in the disastrous events, providing valuable insight into the “characters” involved in these stories. 
Legal journals analyzed the reasoning behind court decisions related to the disaster events, 
offering productive agreements or disputes with the elite-level processing of the disaster. 
Another place were religious screeds and sermons, often published after the events in 
newspapers and in sermon collections. These sermons articulate a particular vista on the nature 
of the disaster as it relates to the theatre within the context of socially shared morals. What these 
reveal is the contentious but shifting nature of the relationship between religion and theatre 
across the century, as well as the tendency for victim communities to seek solace and comfort 
from the disrupted social orders in strict, religiously ordered systems. Other sources included 
personal diaries, letters, and biographies.  
 There are obvious crossovers here between memory, performance, and sociology that 
will be articulated in greater detail in the following section, but for the moment I will focus on 
how the sociological perspective opens up interpretive possibilities for the sources of evidence 
listed above. In Remembering: Community Commemoration After Disaster, Anne Eyre notes that 
the, 
Sociological approaches to the study of ritual as symbolic actions makes an important 
link for disaster researchers between the physical or biological status of death and the 
social. They highlight that in considering the nature and meaning of disaster rituals, we 
need to look at their deeper significance and purpose, and the transition they mark 
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between one state of individual and social being and another. They suggest that disaster 
rituals might also be as much about social and political identity and change as about 
individual expressions of loss, change, and status.31 
 
 Eyre also calls for a careful consideration of how the post-disaster paradigm plays out in 
terms of the struggles for memory between the personal and the social: “remembering is an 
inherently political activity, which can be manipulated for the purposes of socially constructing a 
community’s past and the design of its future.”32 This point would be taken up in greater detail 
by Celesta Kofman Bos, Susan Ullberg, and Paul ’t Hart in the 2005 article The Long Shadow of 
Disaster in which the question — which closely mirrors the question at the heart of this project 
— is posed: 
Why are some mass catastrophes more or less ‘forgotten’…whereas others are so vividly 
remembered in monuments, commemorations, and public discourses?…How and to what 
extent [are] people and communities victimized by disasters able to shape and correct 
‘official’ governmental efforts at disaster investigation and remembrance [?]33 
 
 The point Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart make is that “the extent and nature of disaster 
remembrance is not solely a equation of physical characteristics such as the number of casualties, 
nor the degree of social disturbance they cause at the time of their occurrence,” but instead exists 
“as a product of a political encounter between grass-roots memory and the elite-level, political 
‘processing of disasters.”34 Functionally, then, in the sociological construction, memory is a vital 
part of trying to move on from disaster events, but memory is also configured as site of 
contestation between the personal and the social. I find this kind of contestation happening in the 
historical records about these three theatre fires a great deal; disaster sociology provides the 
vocabulary for articulating this contestation as an historiographical issue:  
When we talk about the past and ‘organize history’, we should more carefully ask which 
parts of the past, whose memories, and what histories are involved. The social process of 
remembering — here referred to as memory-work — refers to both grass-roots, cultural, 
and elite-level political practices that shape a society’s understanding of past events in 
light of present-day conditions (and vice versa)…memory work is not a self-evident or 
value-neutral activity. In fact, key questions that arise in the wake of a disaster — “what 
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happened?" “why?” and “how did we react?” — are likely to be a source of dispute and 
negotiation. We should therefore explore the “entangled process” of political 
remembrance a little more closely, with particular reference to the remembrance of 
disasters.35 
 
 The implied questions about disaster and memory, then, are less about the event itself, and 
more about the processes of re-constructing the event inherent in the act of memorialization or 
remembering. The contested nature of the event suggests that, in order to understand narrative 
reconstruction of a disaster, the questions we ought to ask — the questions that inform the 
organization of this dissertation — are “how do political actors…remember the past? How do 
they organize memory and ‘make history?”36 Whose history is being remembered? 
 The wide variety of sources afforded by the framework of disaster sociology extends 
evidence beyond written archival material and presents opportunities to look for evidence in 
unexpected places. Researching these events, I would often come across contradictory 
information, anecdotal stories that refuted a majority of the rest of the evidence. Even these — 
narratives like Richmond’s Lt. James Gibbon, Jr., explained in Chapter 2 – stories that are 
demonstrably untrue, can be valuable pieces of evidence in exposing the social processes at work 
in memory and forgetting. Taken this way, both the true and the untrue — the convergence of 
documentary fact and the construction of mythology — can be productive contributions to 
articulating narrative tensions in the post-disaster paradigm for theatre disasters; as Scanlon 
writes, “dramatic events inspire fiction, some of it autobiographical.”37 The value of evidence in 
this case is not the relative truth or untruth, but the ability of the evidence to reveal systems of 
social order, what Scanlon notes is the “fitting information into patterns and using inferences to 
increase its meaning [that] takes research away from mere description.”38 Thus, the patterns of 
behavior that are disrupted can be understood through the performances undertaken within the 
new post-disaster event paradigm as contributory to the creation of identity.  
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 From a practical standpoint, trying to narrate the disaster events presented some unique 
challenges that speak to issues of historical evidence and memory. When sources reinforced and 
informed each other, the construction of the event was easy. More often, sources challenged and 
contradicted each other and, sometimes, themselves. Anniversary issues of newspapers covering 
the fires presented a single source that directly contradicted statements that same source had 
made previously, including sometimes vital information about who was onstage doing what at 
what time. Sometimes, narratives were included in the archive despite their unlikelihood or 
outright impossibility. The disruptions caused by these fires created opportunities for myth-
making, and urban mythologies got passed down as fact through the archive in spite of the lack 
of supporting evidence.  
 Other issues in this research were establishing discrete timeframes for the events. Notably, 
all of the disasters occurred with alarming rapidity, lasting, in most cases, no more than half an 
hour from the first spark to the final ember. In these scant few minutes, an incredible amount of 
things happened. Most of these events must have happened simultaneously; reading through 
coroner’s inquiries and testimonies presents a plurality of stories that aren’t about the same 
single event. Thus, building a start-to-finish chronological narrative proved challenging. In the 
interest of transparency, I cannot state that these narrative reconstructions will not contradict 
some of the archival evidence. This is only because the evidence so often contradicts itself. 
Every attempt has been made to cite the sources for these narratives, and to present a cohesive 
timeline of what happened inside of each of the theaters.  
Remembering, Forgetting, and Historiography: At the Intersection of Performance and 
Sociology 
 
 Performances reveal social systems, while social systems organize performances. The 
crossovers between the fields of theatre history, performance studies, and disaster sociology are 
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numerous. This section notes productive crossovers through similar methodological approaches 
and rhetorical devices used in the field of theatre studies in order to argue that, while disaster 
sociology forms the major theoretical framework, this dissertation still contributes towards, and 
advances, the practice of writing history in the field of theatre and performance studies.  
Primarily, in writing a work of history, I take Thomas Postlewait’s straightforward 
explanation of theatre historiography in the form of twelve cruxes from The Cambridge 
Introduction to Theatre Historiography to provide a way to narrativize the archival material for 
these disasters. “Certainty,” Postlewait writes, “is often attained in matters of who, what, where, 
and when. But answers for how and why usually remain open to debate among historians.”39 
Postlewait recognizes that archives participate in “the contemporary processes that identify an 
event as noteworthy and significant, thus giving it historical status, often to the exclusion of 
other events,” and that interpretation of those documents is involved in “the rhetorical tropes and 
narrative schemes that historians use to construct the past.”40 In the act of narrativizing the 
evidence in the archive, I tried to resist developing themes I had seen in other works on the same 
topics, allowing instead the themes to occur naturally as a result of the evidence. For example, 
the 1811 Richmond Theatre fire came at the end of a long, strange year for young America, and a 
series of natural disasters, and rising political tensions, had left the country with a feeling of 
apocalyptic certainty. In the telling, the fire felt almost inevitable, the horrible cap to a disastrous 
year. In the archive, I kept finding thematic evidence of fate, and that influenced my organization 
of the narrative of the fire based on the evidence located in newspaper articles, disaster books, 
and religious sermons. In turn, the trope of fate influenced my interpretation of the evidence for 




The major theoretical insights I will use from performance studies to complete this study 
come from Joseph Roach in Cities of the Dead, Marvin Carlson in The Haunted Stage, Diana 
Taylor in The Archive and the Repertoire, and Odai Johnson in Absence and Memory in Colonial 
American Theatre. The insights offered by these scholars are built upon Richard Schechner’s 
argument for the broad-spectrum approach to the use of performance theory, and each work 
engages in vital ways with questions about identity and history.41 These sources provide modes 
of thinking about the construction of historical narratives and how those narratives interact with 
the public’s ability to remember and forget. There are obvious rhetorical and theoretical 
similarities between a disaster sociological framework and the thinking produced by these 
scholars.  
 Joseph Roach’s Cities of the Dead puts forth the argument that culture and identity are 
ongoing processes of remembering and forgetting undertaken within the context of re-production 
and re-creation he calls “surrogation,” the attempt to “fit satisfactory alternatives…into the 
cavities created by loss through death or other forms of departure.”42 This process, Roach notes, 
is rarely successful, and usually results in the taking up of new sets of performances in an 
attempt to selectively “forget” the departed. This tragic but necessary forgetting is the heart of 
cultural and identity creation, recognized as “an ever-shifting ensemble of appropriated 
traditions.”43 This major theoretical insight has created a subsequent wave of scholarship using 
performance studies to evaluate the “social processes of remembering and forgetting” which 
Roach identifies as constitutive of culture and identity. Understood through this insight, social 
actors are the result of a collection of struggles to remember and attempts to forget. The 
similarities between Roach and Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart are striking. Both sources suggest that 
identity is a process always already bound up in cycles of remembering and forgetting. What 
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Bos, Ullberg and ’t Hart offer is way to read the tension inherent in the act of surrogation 
through a nexus of the personal and the political. In the case of this dissertation, the traumatic 
departures that have created loss through death are fires – the disastrous agent – while 
“appropriated traditions” are the cultural and memorial production created in the post-disaster 
paradigm.  
 In The Haunted Stage, Marvin Carlson builds upon Roach’s insight, noting the inherently 
“close association of the theatre with the evocation of the past, the histories and legends of the 
culture uncannily restored to a mysterious half-life.”44 Theatre, Carlson argues, is forever 
obsessed with recreating a disappeared past. Carlson extends this ontological obsession from the 
physical theatre building to the metaphorical condition of the art form in a process he dubs 
“ghosting”: the process of using the memory of previous encounters to understand and interpret  
Encounters with new and somewhat different but apparently similar phenomena…plays a 
major role in the theatre…. within the theatre, however, a related but somewhat different 
aspect of memory operates in a manner distinct from…the other arts…[theatre] presents 
the identical thing they have already encountered before, although now in a somewhat 
different context. Thus, a recognition not of similarity…but of identity…45 
 
 Spaces and bodies, Carlson argues, contain significant, but perhaps invisible, histories 
waiting to be interpreted. Ghosting operates in theatre through the notion that bodies and spaces 
are haunted by mental associations with past occurrences that indisputably color the reception of 
those bodies and spaces. The implications of Carlson’s argument are widespread, and offer 
methodological insight into connecting the present with the past. I find this insight useful when 
considering the century long arc of these fires; there are important connections that tie these 
events together that are not readily apparent in the archive, but that exist, nonetheless. This can 
be illustrated partly by the way newspapers always offer comparisons between a 
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contemporaneous fire, and fires of the past; the disastrous event is “haunted” by similar events 
that have preceded it.  
 Diana Taylor’s The Archive and the Repertoire concerns itself with the transmission of 
cultural memory and identity through the practices of performance. Performance is “an episteme, 
a way of knowing, not simply an object of analysis.”46 Taylor finds this definition of 
performance, as a method of transmission, vital because of the body’s ability to transmit that 
which is beyond the capability of the archive to capture. To these embodied forms of knowledge, 
Taylor assigns the term performatic, arguing “instead of focusing on patterns of cultural 
expression in terms of texts and narratives, we might think about them as scenarios that do not 
reduce gestures and embodied practices to narrative description.”47 Taylor’s take on the 
performatic foregrounds the political consequences of ignoring performance as a method of 
knowing and transmitting knowledge, a form of resistance against archival violence. In a disaster 
sociological framework, the performatic may contain significant links to the disastrous event. 
Taylor’s argument points to the constructed nature of the archive as privileging certain narratives 
at the expense of others, a point similar to the contested narratives between the “elite-level” and 
“grass roots” efforts to control narrative and memory identified by Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart. 
Taylor suggests that these disappeared narratives continue to exist, but that they can only be read 
in a unit of cultural knowledge transmitted and received via the body: a performatic. In essence, 
this argument follows Roach and Carlson. The performatic is a haunted, but invisible, 
performance that exists in the physical repertoire of the body, and is made invisible, because of 
its exclusion from the archive. Taylor argues that this tactic is vital is transmitting knowledge 
about trauma, because trauma “exceeds the archive’s ability to capture it.”  
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 Odai Johnson’s argument in Absence and Memory… suggests that the archive is a 
function of historiography in and of itself because it is constructed by means of a set of 
assumptions about the value of what is included, which immediately points to the fact that things 
are left out. Johnson argues these archival absences may offer counter-narratives to the work 
created through archival research, but that the archive, once constructed, tends only to include 
items that meet the standards of reinforcing its dominant narrative. Johnson, then, undertakes a 
study of colonial American drama by identifying the “traces and residues” left behind by 
“floating ephemera” that did not meet archival standards in order to challenge the dominant 
narrative of colonial American drama as “player vs. puritan.” Johnson’s argument is that having 
“an absence of evidence is not the same as having no evidence” and that by using contextual 
information, an historian may make assumptions and insights based on what was not included in 
the archive, and why.  
 The crossovers between these four works are numerous. The significant performances of 
remembering and forgetting, understood as surrogation, then, can be understood as a performatic, 
ghosted by their association to the disastrous and destructive fire. To Roach, culture and identity 
constructions are the result of ongoing processes of surrogation — remembering and forgetting 
— as the performers attempt to create a continuity of their own existences. The performances 
undertaken in these paradigms of loss become normalized to the point of invisibility and remain 
invisible until another trauma requires the creation and implementation of new performances 
functioning as acts of surrogation. However normalized and invisible these performances may 
become through repetition — from tiny, though powerful, performances rife with the fresh stings 
of the complex interplay of remembering and forgetting to everyday gestures and embodied 
practices — that invisibility does not mean they lose their significant link to loss. These 
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performances remain ghosted by their originary association to disaster as they are undertaken in 
somewhat different contexts. To identify these performances, and to trace them to their origins, 
is to highlight their significant link to loss, and to point out that the disruption caused by disaster 
contributes to the process of identity creation, as understood by disaster sociology.  
In addition to the methodological insights provided by disaster sociology, and the 
intersections afforded thereto by performance studies, I also draw from Paul Ricoeur and Pierre 
Nora’s significant theories about the constructions of history and memory. In Between Memory 
and History, Nora makes productive distinctions between memory and history and the need 
societies have to create memorials to the dead. Real environments of memory — milieux de 
memoire — no longer exist because history is constantly slipping into the past, and that slippage, 
Nora argues, is accelerating.48 Real memory is “social and unviolated, exemplified in but also 
retained as the secret of so-called primitive or archaic society,” while history “is how our 
hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organize the past.”49 These sites of 
history are termed lieux de mémoire, and are vain attempts perpetrated to make present the ever 
receding past. Memory is lived and dynamic, “blind to all but the group it binds” while history is 
“fact, sifted and sorted,” belonging to “everyone and no one.”50 Nora’s classic work on 
environments and sites of memory provide ways to tie together the vocabulary of performance 
studies and memorial as a sociological concept, as well as present an avenue for considering the 
tensions inherent in the act of memorialization between what disaster sociologists recognize as 
“grass-roots” and “elite-level” memorial efforts. 
 Each of the three case studies is organized around Paul Ricoeur’s argument for three 
phases of “doing history.” First, the “documentary phase…that runs from the declarations of 
eyewitnesses to the constituting of archives, which takes as its epistemological program the 
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establishing of documentary proof”; next, “the explanation/understanding phase…that has to do 
with the multiple uses of the connective ‘because’ responding to the question ‘why?’”; and, 
finally, “the representative phase…the putting into literary or written form of discourse offered 
to the readers of history.”51 Ricoeur’s organizing principles recognize that the objective of 
history is to answer the question “why” through a series of “becauses” — history as an 
examination, then, of the cause and effects of events. Like Postlewait, Ricoeur notes “there is 
interpretation at all three levels of historical discourse…Interpretation is a feature of the search 
for truth in history that runs across these three levels. Interpretation is a component of the very 
intending of truth in all the historiographical operations.”52 Ricoeur argues that the ultimate 
historical absence is death, writing  
At first sight, the representation of the past as the kingdom of the dead seems to condemn 
history to offering to our reading no more than a theater of shadows, stirred by survivors 
in possession of a suspended sentence of death. One escape remains: considering the 
historiographic operation to be the scriptural equivalent of the social ritual of 
entombment, the act of sepulcher…. not only a place set apart in our cities, the place we 
call a cemetery and in which we dispose the remains of the living who return to dust. It is 
an act, the act of burying. This gesture is not punctual; it is not limited to the moment of 
burial. The sepulcher remains because the gesture of burying remains; its path is every 
path of mourning that transforms the physical absence of the lost object into an inner 
presence. The sepulcher as the material place thus becomes the enduring mark of 
mourning, the memory-aid of the act of sepulcher. It is this act of sepulcher that 
historiography transforms into writing.53 
 
 The very act of memorial implies that, without losing the necessity for individual 
memory, identity can be and is a shared and social concept, as well, a point Pierre Nora makes in 
Between Memory and History. The need for lieux de memoire (“sites of memory”) exists only 
because, as history accelerates into the past, we are sociologically no longer able to exist in 
milieux de memoire, real environments of memory. The suggestion is essentially that a society 
that knows how to make the past eternally present — a society that knows how to transmit and 
live their “collectively remembered values” — has no need to construct memorials.54 Yet those 
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memorials indisputably exist, and the process that leads to their construction, and, sometimes, 
negligence, illustrates a significant source of negotiation between elite-level and grass-roots 
memory-work in the post-disaster paradigm. 
 Nora makes the argument that the “collapse of memory” as a method of living is the 
result of globalization and democratization of culture. If we take this point as read, the 
insinuation is that cultural colonization is the heart of the issue at which Nora wants to get. “If 
we were able to live within memory,” Nora argues, “we would not have needed to consecrate 
lieux de memoire in its name. Each gesture, down to the most everyday, would be experienced as 
the ritual repetition of a timeless practice in a primordial identification of act and meaning.”55 
Thus, Nora’s argument is that we build memorials to mark absences because we no longer have 
the means to live in such a way that the past is always present in our lives. Memorials offer a 
physical marker — a citation — of the past and of the dead. By tying together the physical and 
sociological acts of sepulcher, Ricoeur argues that the past cannot simply be considered “the 
kingdom of the dead,” but that the act of sepulcher provides an enduring mark of mourning. The 
“path of mourning that transforms the physical absence of the lost object into an inner presence” 
is similar to Carlson’s ghosting; memorials and actions contain significant links to past trauma, 
and to excavate and analyze those links is to represent the past as more than a theater of 
shadows.56 To write a disaster history is to renew an invisible, entombed historical event, to 
identify “traces and residues” of the disaster event that may have escaped archival inclusion. 
 Both performance studies and disaster sociology recognize the disruptive nature of their 
use afforded by their ephemeral nature; as Peggy Phelan argues in Unmarked, 
“performance…becomes itself through disappearance.”57 The same is obviously true of disaster; 
it is in the act of traumatic disappearance and disruption that a disaster event is defined. 
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However, both theoretical fields also recognize the necessity of processional rebuilding that must 
take place in the void created by that disappearance. For performance studies, this process of 
creation can be read through surrogation and ghosting, through reading absence as a productive 
contribution to the performatic undertaken in the void. For disaster sociology, the void is, itself, a 
part of a larger disaster process through the way it reveals the traumatic disruption of social 
systems of order. In both theoretical paradigms, absence demands careful consideration.  
 Disasters are disruptive. So is theatre. Disasters produce a phenomenal environment 
similar to that which is produced by theatre, so the writing of theatre history through the lens of 
disaster must identify the operations of performances of remembering and forgetting, of burial 
and sepulcher, that occur within the post-disaster paradigm. If theatre’s history is defined in part 
by its disasters, then it must also be noted that interpreting evidence linked to a disaster’s history 
must pay attention to disaster’s inherent theatricality. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
 This dissertation is organized into three large case studies, one for each disaster event: 
Richmond in 1811, Brooklyn in 1876, and Chicago in 1903.  In general, I organize these case 
studies around pre-disaster social and historical contexts, reconstructions and descriptions of the 
disaster event from archival evidence, and analysis of early cultural production within the post-
disaster paradigm.  
 Writing disaster history is difficult, and it is often the case that the evidence I located 
contradicts other evidence from other sources. I find these contradictions extremely productive, 
and argue that their value is in how they reveal the disrupted practices of normalized social 
systems. Often, this evidence is even demonstrably falsifiable. I embrace the contradictions and 
contentions that result from the historical research of disasters, and address these contentions 
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directly, even if it means hampering the discrete chronology of the event.  Each case study starts 
with a description of life in the pre-disaster period. I try to establish these practices because 
methodologically defining the effects of a disaster is often a function of tracking social change. 
Robert Stallings notes, “descriptions of conditions, procedures, or typical activities before 
disaster serve as the logical equivalent of a control group. Differences between pre-impact and 
post-impact patterns are inferred to have been caused by the disaster rather than by some 
unknown spurious factors.”58  
 The historical research undertaken for each fire makes up a significant portion of each case 
study. What is remarkable about the accounts of the fires is how well many of them inform and 
reinforce one another, and how easy it becomes to identify accounts that are productive in 
creating a historical recreation, and accounts that could more appropriately be considered 
examples of cultural production. In Rewriting a Living Legend, T. Joseph Scanlon remarks upon 
the importance of reading disaster accounts critically: 
People create records, and the same rules apply for resting validity as apply to checking 
personal stories. Does the material have internal consistency? Is there any corroboration? 
Is the account something that reasonably could have been known to the person who 
created the record? If it is not evident, it is important to ask, “how do you know 
that?”…Some stories are easy to verify…Other accounts are credible because one meshes 
with another…Other accounts do not mesh so easily…Some material is credible because 
the source has no apparent or conceivable reason for bias…Sometimes material is useful 
because it helps establish credibility of other accounts. The fact that something is not 
credible does not make it useless.59 
 
 My narrative reconstruction of the disasters is based on what I have identified as credible 
accounts of the events of the fire, based on the tendency of such accounts to “mesh” with one 
another. Each case study also contains descriptions of accounts that don’t “mesh” with other 
accounts, and I undertake an analysis of these accounts in order to determine what about them 
can be useful for a theatre historian. I argue that these accounts are useful not so much for their 
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relationship to the truth of the event, but for how they have colored our understanding of the 
wide-reaching impact of disaster, and how they reveal the narrative and rhetorical strategies used 
to define the disaster event in the early post-disaster paradigm. 
 Worth noting are the numerous similarities in the descriptions of each fire. The 
descriptions of panic provided herein should be noted for their similarity to the stories that 
developed from Brooklyn and Chicago. These similarities may be considered as evidence of the 
use of stock narrative tropes to write about theatre fires, but the fact that these similarities exist 
may suggest another explanation that informs an understanding of theatre fires through a 
sociological lens: one goal of disaster research is to produce generalizable principles based on 
collection and interpretation of evidence. Significantly, these similarities can be seen as narrative 
tropes when considered as part of the cultural production in the post-disaster paradigm, but it’s 
also likely that the similarities may serve to establish a generalized, modeled understanding of 
human panic in historical disasters.  
 Anne Eyre argues that “following disaster, when a fundamental sense of order and security 
can feel threatened, the potential values of…rituals in establishing feelings of control, belonging, 
and social solidarity within and beyond one’s immediate community is understandable.”60 
Understood through this insight, personal and social rituals can be interpreted as performative 
attempts to regain “order and security” over life in a newly chaotic social paradigm. In the wake 
of disaster, official institutions always attempt to make sense of what occurred. Eyre suggests 
that this is about “more than acknowledging suffering and giving survivors an opportunity to tell 
their story through commemorative rituals,” and suggests that it is simultaneously, and to a 
greater degree “about establishing legal and political processes to address objectively, openly, 
and honestly the causes of events and the accountability of all involved.”61   
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 A broad survey of performative responses forms the next section of each case study. These 
responses reveal insights into the severity of the social order’s disruption, and into the methods 
through which individuals and societies try to re-establish control. This symbolic interactionist 
view of the post-disaster paradigm recognizes that “disasters impact culture, and culture 
contributes to disasters.”62 One method to study how disasters have contributed to social 
disruption and, thereby, to social re-organization, is to evaluate the cultural products of disaster. 
These products may include memorials, urban mythology, religious sermons, and legal 
responses. Analyzing how these products negotiate and use the tropes of memory that come to 
define the post-disaster paradigm reveals how performances of remembering and forgetting, 
understood to exist at the intersection of dispute between elite-level and grass-roots processing of 
the disaster become reintegrated into a new social order, and contribute to “official” and 
“accepted” narratives of the disaster. 
   30 
Part I, Introduction: 
 
A Winter of Fear and Trembling: Richmond, 1811 
 
 High above the Earth, C/1811 F1, the Great Comet of 1811, arced through the sky.1 The 
comet had been discovered in March and its brightness increased as autumn changed to winter; it 
remained visible into late December. The New Madrid fault line, in New Madrid, MO, first 
shifted early in the morning on December 16th, 1811. These natural phenomena seemed to 
punctuate a year of social and political unrest. “Nature appears to have been prodigal in the 
exhibition of her phenomena, during the present year,” reads an article in the December 27th 
Pittsburgh Gazette; “a fiery Comet has for many months appeared in continual view. - - 
Tornadoes have ravaged the continent from Maine to Georgia. - - The Ocean has been the 
subject of Volcanic terror; and new Islands have raised therefrom.”2 The magnitude of the quake 
was epic in scale, and it ranks as the most powerful earthquake ever to hit the continental United 
States of America, eventually being rated on the Richter scale at 8.1. Its impact and aftershocks 
were felt up and down the Eastern seaboard, and it is said that the quake famously rang church 
bells in Boston, cracked sidewalks in Washington, DC, and reversed the course of the mighty 
Mississippi. “The great scale upon which Nature is operating,” continues the Gazette article, 
“should be a solemn admonition to men…to abandon the pitiful, groveling, schemes of venality 
and corruption in the prosecution of which they are so ardently engaged…Nature appears, in 
spasmodic fury, to no longer tolerate the moral turpitude of man.”3 Taken together, the 
earthquake and the comet must have felt like signs of the coming apocalypse. 
 Thomas Brown, a resident of Richmond, Virginia, and the future Governor of Florida, later 




This was a winter of fear and trembling, especially with the superstitious and weak 
minded. A large comet had appeared in the fall accompanied by a long season of warm 
dry and sultry weather, and many speculations were made in the paper about it, some 
contending that it was approaching the earth and might come near enough to destroy it. 
There were some severe shocks of earthquakes, the severest ever experienced in Virginia. 
In Richmond some houses rocked and chimneys fell. The house I lived in so sensibly 
moved that I sprung out of bed not suspecting the cause. To complete the whole, a crazy 
man or a knave, wrote a prophecy published in pamphlets that the world would be 
destroyed on a certain day and many believed it.  Some actually died of imagination and 
fear.4 
 
 In a winter of fear and trembling, when anxieties related to man’s moral turpitude were 
already heightened, the sociopolitical centrality of Virginia in general, and Richmond, in 
particular, created an environment in which the desire to escape, for a few hours at least, the 
inescapable problems of everyday life sent over six hundred people to the wooden theatre in 
Richmond, located on the North side of H Street, in-between College and 12th Streets on a cold, 
windy Thursday night in December of 1811.  
 Richmond in 1811 was a prime environment for a truly powerful disaster to occur because 
the normative systems of order the underlie social operation were already disrupted, and while 
the young country had certainly dealt with fires on small scales before, it would be difficult to 
point to a single conflagatory disaster process that preceded the Richmond fire. A year of dealing 
with Nature’s spasmodic fury, and with the economic calamities that resulted from the growing 
military tensions between Great Britain and America, suggest that life in 1811 was out of joint, 
as the underlying systems of political, economic, and social order that guided life struggled to 
meet the demands of rapidly shifting reality. Already destabilized by nature’s spasmodic fury, 
reality would cap off the year with a brutal disaster event that would come to mark American 
trends of expansion, urbanization, and technological advancement: the conflagration.  
 That the Richmond Theatre fire came at the end of a “winter of fear and trembling,” 
contributed to the narrative devices that would be used to mark the event in the post-disaster 
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paradigm as significant to remember. The natural and disastrous phenomena that marked the year 
were seen by many as the building rage of a God incensed by “the pitiful, groveling, schemes of 
venality and corruption” in which Americans were engaged. A year of political struggle and 
social disruption created an environment pregnant with the opportunity for the creation of 
religious narrative tropes of judgment and divine justice. When the Richmond Theatre fire 
occurred on that night in December, preachers rushed to fill the void created “by loss through 
death” with Christian themed narratives. In Part I, I argue that the early and proactive religious 
responses to the Richmond fire successfully marked the memorial strategies that would follow, 
and have largely defined how the event is remembered.   
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Part I, Chapter 1: The Theatre at Richmond 
 
The Old Academy 
 
 The first chapter of this dissertation is about the social conditions in Richmond as they 
relate to the space upon which the theatre sat, the theatre itself, and the social practices of 
theatrical production that helped create an environment prone to disaster. I first recount the 
history of the space and the building to demonstrate the central importance of theatre to 
Richmond in 1811. Then, I attempt to reconstruct the physical features of the building considered 
against the context of normal practices of theatre architecture of the time, in order to illustrate a 
sense of the danger inherent to audiences in attendance at the theatre. This is by way of creating 
a framework for reading and interpreting evidence related to the fire at the theatre on December 
26th, 1811, and for the memorial religious responses that were generated in the post-disaster 
paradigm.  
 The location of the theatre was a space of shared significance by 1811, commonly called 
“Theatre Square,” marked in part by its history, and in part by the popularity of the companies 
that the building would house. By the time the Richmond Theatre was built in 1806, the space 
had already been marked by fire. The space had originally housed Chevalier Quesnay de 
Beaurepaire’s Academy, an attempt at “improving” America by introducing “French culture and 
the fine arts,” whilst simultaneously improving relations between the USA and France.5 
Quesnay’s project required the raising of almost sixty thousand francs in the form of 
subscriptions and donations, and the academy gained the support of notable Virginians, 
Americans, and Frenchmen alike, and went by the title the Academy of the United States of 
America. Quesnay made ambitious plans to expand the Academy up and down the East coast, 
with locations in Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York. Quesnay broke ground on the building 
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that would become the Academy in the summer of 1786, and returned to Paris in order to drum 
up further support for his Academy. Though the building was incomplete, it was already being 
used to house theatrical productions: by that Fall, the building was used by the Old American 
Company, which opened Richard Sheridan’s School for Scandal there in October. Quesnay, in 
Paris, continued to fundraise and make plans for his Academy, but time was not kind to his 
vision of a grand Academy of learning. Upon the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789, 
fiscal support and goodwill for the project dried up quickly. 
 Now stripped of its originally intended educational purpose, the building itself became 
known, alternately, as the Richmond Theatre, and as the Old Academy. Thomas Wade West, a 
British import who arrived in Philadelphia in 1790 with his wife Margaretta, his daughter Ann, 
and his son-in-law John Bignall, had worked to establish a brand new circuit of touring theatrical 
performances in the less developed South. West and Bignall’s group established the Southern 
circuit, and for many years were the dominant troupe of performers in that part of the country. 
This regional popularity, and a rough 1796 season in Charlottesville — itself marked by civic 
fires and a yellow fever epidemic — led West and his crew to explore other cities in Virginia, 
where he built and operated theaters in Fredericksburg and Petersburg, while he also assumed a 
managerial role over others.6 West and Bignall installed their troupe — who adopted the name of 
the state in which they were performing, and thus would transform periodically from the “South 
Carolina Company” to the “Virginia Company” and others — into the Old Academy building, 
which, constructed of wood, was a terrible fire hazard, and a requisite stop for the thieves of 
Richmond: West saw fit to keep the company’s costume stock in his own lodgings.7 
 As it had never been only a space for performance, the building also famously hosted, in 
June 1788, the Virginia Convention, with notable political luminaries like James Madison, John 
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Marshall, George Wythe, George Mason, and Patrick Henry, in attendance, among others. 
Theatre Square was obviously a space of considerable political, social, and artistic importance in 
Richmond and, indeed, in the young United States. The Academy building was eventually 
retrofitted to better function as a theatre space, but burned down in January 1798, in an event that 
Richmond historian Samuel Mordecai described as almost predestined: “the Academic, Forensic, 
Dramatic Theatre maintained its latter character and was thought to maintain it well for several 
years, but it met the fate of almost all similar edifices. Conflagration, but without other 
disaster.”8 Mordecai’s historical note illustrates how prone to fires theatre buildings were, and, at 
the same time, how little danger a fire in such a building typically posed: these buildings only 
burned, “without other disaster.” This lack of death concomitant with the destruction of the 
Academy building contributed to a feeling of safety and security for audience members, despite 
the obvious and well-known dangers wooden buildings posed. As the Academy was a popular 
spot for social gathering, when it burned down, calls went out for a less flammable theatre to 
replace it immediately. The practice of theatre was clearly important to the people of Richmond.   
 West probably saw the 1798 fire as a blessing; the building was a complete loss, and he 
had long desired to build the perfect theatrical building. He commissioned famed architect 
Benjamin Henry Latrobe to design a brand new theatre and hotel building to take the place of the 
Old Academy at the top of Shockoe Hill.  Latrobe’s designs were ambitious, beautiful, and far 
too expensive. They called for a complex hybrid, featuring an inn, housing for the theatre troupe, 
a tavern, a shopping arcade, and a performing space with three tiers of box seating and a 
completely brick facade. Latrobe’s theatre was never built, deemed far too expensive. That 
Latrobe’s theatre complex couldn’t be funded serves as an early example of the idea of fate that 
dominates memory and history about the Richmond fire. Latrobe was a visionary of Greek 
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revival architecture, and his designs may have contributed to a re-formulation of the space away 
from its ghosting of histories of disaster, theft, and loss, towards a space of unique historical 
theatricality, performatively referencing theatre’s Greek past, while simultaneously serving the 
immediate needs of Richmond’s citizens. At the very least, as well, the expansive and expensive 
designs would have required a significantly safer construction of the building than the wooden 
theatre that was eventually built, and it may be the case the brick edifice on the proscenium, in 
combination with a sturdier roof, would have been enough to successfully staunch the spread of 
the flames, and allow for audience members to make a safe exit.  
 Whether Thomas West intended to ever complete a new theatre for Richmond is 
unknown; in a sort of cruel irony, West died in 1799 after he had moved his family north to 
Alexandria to live in a theatre under his purchase that was still being constructed. Waking early 
in the morning on July 28th, evidently fearful that another fire had broken out, West travelled into 
the painting gallery and fell to the stage, and to his death.9 Although he escaped one 
conflagration, fire — imaginary though it may have been — did indeed cause West’s death.   
A Gloomy Passage 
 
 Instead of West and Latrobe’s ambitious, city-defining theatrical complex, a smaller 
wooden theatre was built on the spot of the Old Academy in 1806. Information about the 
physical structure of the Richmond Theatre is sparse, but a functional description can be 
constructed through first person accounts of the theatre and the conflagration. Here I attempt to 
use historical evidence to reconstruct, through description, the layout of the building. Doing so 
will provide the reader with a model for the theatre, and can help explain how and why the 
design of the building contributed to the panic and death that occurred on December 26th, 1811. 
Significantly, the themes of panic and death that emerged in survivor narratives contributed to 
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constructing the event as a form of divine judgment through their capacity to illustrate the 
instability and fleeting nature of safety in the theatrical space. Understood this way, the design 
and layout of the theatre contributed greatly to death and destruction during the disaster event, 
and to religious responses that developed in the post-disaster paradigm. The evidence I use 
comes primarily from descriptions of the building given to newspapers and the civic 
investigational panel by survivors following the fire.  
 The building was three stories high and made primarily of wood on the exterior, with brick 
supports. It sat in a footprint of ninety feet by fifty feet, and was surrounded on four sides by 
forty yards of grass. Rows of windows adorned the front of the building, and the highest among 
them was a bull’s eye window, a semicircular window near the top of the gable end. Most 
audience members entered into building through the North side front door — there were separate 
doors for access to the gallery and the stage — pushing the door inward to find themselves in “a 
gloomy passage, between two naked brick walls.”10 This “gloomy passage” served as lobby for 
the theatre, and terminated in “a partition door where checks were received.”11 The gloomy 
passage also provided access, via a narrow and angular set of stairs to the first and second levels 
of box seating. Supported by wooden pillars that creaked under the weight of audience members, 
the stairs terminated at half-stories in small landings before a ninety-degree turn continued the 
ascent. That the box seats and pit shared a common entrance and exit was something of a 
curiosity in theatrical architecture at the time, being designed often with an attention paid to the 
theatre’s role in social consciousness and class stratification.12 It was also extremely dangerous, 
and it guaranteed that, in the event of an emergency, an enormous portion of the audience would 
be competing for egress in the same small lobbies and stairway. Access to the particular boxes 
on each level was provided via a small lobby and two small hallways, each built so narrowly that 
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“two persons could scarcely pass at the same time.”13  These lobbies probably faced the front 
gable of the building, and a Richmonder standing in the lobby would have been able to look out 
onto H Street.  
 The interior of the building reflected mostly typical theatre arrangement of the nineteenth 
century: a semicircular row of benches formed the pit of the theatre, where the average citizen of 
Richmond would have found himself or herself. Over the pit, in the ceiling, was a dome. The 
ceiling itself was exposed wood, wrapped with canvas, and painted to match the box seats. 
Across the ceiling, exposed wooden collar beams supported the roof. In front of the benches, 
there was an orchestra pit where musicians would play along with productions, and for the 
popular and bawdy intermezzo songs and dances that broke up long evenings of performances. 
Along the sides of the theatre, suspended in the air by wooden pillars, were two rows of box 
seats, their fronts wrapped in painted canvas. Level with the uppermost box seats was gallery 
seating, a place reserved for the lower-class citizens of Richmond, which sat the poor, 
prostitutes, free blacks, and slaves. The gallery had a separate entrance and exit, built so these 
patrons would not have to be seen nor interacted with by Richmond’s more “morally sound” 
population. This separate exit provided the gallery patrons with a remarkably quick, easy, and 
safe escape from the theatre, and would inadvertently contribute to the conspiracy theories that 
developed and circulated in the post-disaster paradigm. Behind the proscenium arch of the stage 
was a system of pulleys that hoisted set pieces and backdrops into the air, supported by one of 
the collar beams built into the ceiling structure. A green room, dressing rooms, and an office 
were also housed in the backstage area, and a private stage door provided the actors with a quick 
and safe exit outside.  
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 As was typical of many early nineteenth century theatre buildings, the Richmond Theatre 
was cheaply and quickly constructed. The roof and walls were unsealed and un-plastered, being 
instead wrapped in canvas and painted for the sake of aesthetics, and the pine of the roof, 
pregnant with resin, had sweated its contents over five long, hot, humid summers. Virginians 
were aware of the cheap, poorly built quality of the theatre, and most considered its continued 
existence as something of a curiosity. It was assumed that it would be just a matter of time before 
the building met “the fate of almost all similar edifices.”14 After the disaster, the Committee 
appointed to study the fire at the theatre would ask, in its official report,  
How numerous were the occasions on which it had long before been said, as the crowd 
was slowly retiring at the end of a play, “Suppose the house were on fire, what should we 
do?” Yet we slept with too fatal security over the evil — we trusted and we are ruined. 
New doors were not opened; the winding stair-case was not straitened; the access to the 
avenues of the theatre was not enlarged.15 
 
  It is easy to read the Richmond Theatre fire as the third part of a trilogy of spectacular 
natural phenomena related to the public display of God’s fury. When the Pittsburgh Gazette 
noted, on December 27th, just days before the Richmond Theatre fire, that the Great Comet and 
the New Madrid Earthquake should serve as “a solemn admonition to men…to abandon the 
pitiful, groveling schemes of venality and corruption in the prosecution of which they are 
ardently engaged,” and warned such signs indicated a rejection of “the moral turpitude of man,” 
it was issued as a warning: change your ways while you still can. That the Committee of 
Investigation noted the “too fatal security” over the evil of complacency that marked social 
attitudes towards improving upon the buildings’ obvious flaws suggests a way to view the fire as 
the inevitable result of vainly refusing to heed God’s spectacular warnings; the Richmond 
Theatre fire was the doom portended by the Comet and the Earthquake, the fruition of man’s 
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ruinous trust. The theatre was a virtual deathtrap in waiting, a tinderbox ready to explode, an 
inevitable inferno. All it lacked was a spark.  
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Part I, Chapter 2: From Candle to Inferno 
 
The People Are All Dead, or Fast Asleep 
 
 This chapter is primarily concerned with describing the events within the Richmond 
Theatre that occurred when the flames began to spread, and panic set in, as based on what I have 
identified as survivor narratives collected by the Committee of Investigation and the Richmond 
Enquirer.16 This method of research and interpretation is a typical example of the kind of writing 
demanded by disaster histories, which involves significant on-going analysis of the credibility of 
survivors’ narratives. Later, I identify in-credible narratives, and analyze how and why they 
entered into the historical material relevant to the fire, and how they hold, in some cases, a 
significantly more powerful allure to researchers and historians than credible survivor narratives.  
 Louis Hue Girardin served as principal of the Hallerian Academy, a private school housed 
in “a large and ugly block of brick buildings” founded by the “impudent” “German or Swiss 
adventurer” C.S.L. Haller in 1807 at the corner of Eighth and Cary St. in Richmond.17  Mordecai 
writes that the one redeeming quality of Haller’s existence was his ability to “select good 
teachers,” so it’s no surprise that Girardin, Professor of Modern Languages, Geography and Civil 
History at William and Mary, was brought in to run the Academy for Richmond’s elite youth, 
including Caroline Homassel, a sort of adopted niece/daughter to the prominent Gallego family, 
and others. David Doyle had formerly aided Girardin in his job, and the two men remained close 
friends. Girardin was responsible for the translation of Denis Diderot’s The Father, or, Family 
Feuds that the Placide and Green Company was premiering that night, and was in attendance at 
the theatre with his wife, as well as his friend David Doyle, and many of the members of the 
Hallerian Academy board.  
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 On the board of the Hallerian Academy sat some of the most important names in Virginia 
and national politics, among them John Jay Marshall, former Secretary of State, Virginia 
Representative, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; former Governors of Virginia 
William Cabell and John Page; John Wickham, who acted as defense attorney during the treason 
trial of Aaron Burr; former Mayor of Richmond, pioneering surgeon, and City Postmaster 
William Foushee; former Mayor, distinguished physician and Philadelphia Convention Delegate 
James McClurg; Richmond Enquirer publisher Thomas Ritchie; and former Representative, 
Senator, and President of the Bank of Virginia Abraham B. Venable, among others.18 The 
Academy was a significant nexus of Richmond’s social life, and it is not surprising that many of 
the aforementioned individuals would be present at the theatre on the evening of the 26th of 
December. It was equally as unsurprising that many of them contributed significantly to the 
religious and memorial narratives that developed in the post-disaster paradigm through their 
social positions by financial contribution to, and social support of, a subscription scheme to fund 
and build a Church that would serve as Monument to the dead.  
 The theatre was packed the night of the 26th. The Richmond Committee of Investigation 
later reported, “there were in the pit and boxes 518 dollar tickets and 80 children — exclusive of 
the 50 persons who were in the galleries,” well over capacity for the relatively small building.19 
It was an exciting time in the Capitol: the legislative season was preparing to get underway, so 
representatives from all over the Commonwealth were in the Richmond area, and the city was 
pregnant with post-Christmas excitement and merriment. Many in the theatre represented the 
best of the Richmond elite: in addition to Girardin and his wife, were newly-elected Governor 
George W. Smith, Bank President Abraham Venable; Benjamin Botts, the lawyer, who had 
served with John Wickham during Aaron Burr’s trial, and his wife Jane. Many of the youth of 
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the city were present, as well; the war hero Lt. James Gibbon, Jr., who had served on the USS 
Philadelphia during the Barbary Wars, was at the theatre, and so was the woman he loved: the 
beautiful and popular Sarah Conyers, described as “the fairest flower of Virginia in the sprightly 
morning of its youth” and many of their friends, among whom was Miss Caroline Homassel, a 
sprightly woman of eighty-nine pounds.20  
 That theatre was not particularly well regarded from a religious point of view is 
inarguable, a fact I examine in detail in the following chapter. The tensions between the religious 
construction of theatre as participating in the moral decay of humanity, and the presence of the 
politically and socially powerful at the Richmond Theatre the night it burned down reveals 
vulnerability in the religious conception of the Richmond Theatre fire as God’s justice: all of the 
people noted above bestowed an air of legitimacy and propriety on the theatre and its offerings, 
reducing, or even eliminating, any trace of moral impropriety. Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart argue, 
“the bigger the disjunction between victim-level memories and claims, and the government’s 
post-disaster policies, the more likely it is that the history of a disaster will be revised over 
time.”21 The Richmond fire was fundamentally defined, in the post-disaster paradigm, by the 
powerful rhetorical tropes used in religious responses to the event, to the point that 
distinguishing between governmental and religious policies is almost impossible. In the broad 
reconstructive strategies undertaken through memory-work relevant to the disaster, religious and 
governmental responses tended to define the audience as a cohesive whole, as opposed to 
individuals.  
 Homassel and Conyers were socialites, of a sort, and sisters of another sort. Homassel 
was the child of French immigrants who settled in Philadelphia, the fourth of five children. The 
Yellow Fever epidemic in 1798 wiped out the entire family, save Caroline and her father 
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Charles, and Caroline was sent to live in Richmond with her uncle John Richard and his wife 
Mary Dixon Richard, while her father returned to France.22 Charles died in 1806, and young 
Caroline continued to live happily in Richmond, often spending time at the home of neighbor 
Joseph Gallego and his wife, Mary Magee Gallego, who had similarly adopted a “niece” of their 
own in Sallie Conyers.23 The Gallegos had been friends of the Richard family in Philadelphia, 
and when Joseph Gallego moved to Richmond to be nearer his wife’s family, the Richard family, 
Caroline in tow, made the move as well, and the families went into business together at the 
Gallego Flour Mill, one of the antebellum world’s finest producers of flour. In the box behind 
her sat the merchant John Lynch, and his close friend Lt. James Gibbon, Jr., a war veteran and 
officer of the Navy who had suffered a year of imprisonment at the hands of Tripolitan pirates 
when the USS Philadelphia ran aground during the First Barbary War in 1803. Upon his return to 
America, Thomas Jefferson subsequently promoted Gibbon to Lieutenant in 1807, a family 
friend. His parents set there, too, his father, James Gibbon, the famous hero and leader of the 
Forlorn Hope at Stony Point, now a pensioner owing to injuries sustained during his military 
service, and his wife Anne Phyle Gibbon.24  
 People were excited about the slate of productions for that evening. A letter had been 
published in the Virginia Patriot on Christmas Eve extolling the virtues of The Father as 
translated by Girardin, prefiguring it as a return to a “true and legitimate Drama” from “the 
degeneracy…of the London Theatres”: 
We have perused this interesting Drama [The Father]. It breathes throughout the whole 
the most purest morality and the most affecting pathos; in short, it is a family picture of 
masterly design, and exquisite coloring…It would be sufficient evidence of the merit of 
The Pere de Familie that it has been noticed with approbation even by the fastidious La 
Harpe in his Cours de Literature, “a monument” says a writer of celebrity, “raised to the 
glory of the French nation” & that it has been praised by Voltaire and other eminent 
critics; but a still higher evidence is, that is has enjoyed, and still continues to enjoy, in 
the country of its birth, the most flattering applause. We therefore congratulate the public 
 
 45 
on the refined banquet thus prepared for them…the translator of this celebrated Comedy 
needs no eulogium from our pen. He has already acquired such marked distinction by the 
purity and classical elegance of his English style, that any farther praise from us would be 
superfluous. The public however will be gratified to learn that the peculiar adoption of 
the character of the play, to the talents of the performers, is such, as to enable each to 
display his best stile of acting.25  
 
 Note that the anonymous author of the Patriot opinion piece builds Diderot’s play as 
making a positive contribution both to theatre and to the Richmond community, perhaps 
anticipating a religious resistance to the performance. The Father went off without a hitch, and 
“all were gratified with its successful representation.”26  The intermezzo consisted of four parts: 
a comic song, sung by Thomas C. West, son of the late Thomas Wade West, a dance by 
Placide’s daughter Eliza, another song by Cornelia Thomas, and finally, a hornpipe by “Miss 
Placide.”27 George Wyeth Munford, a young resident of Richmond at the time, reports the song 
was “Major McPherson and Miss Lavinia Scout,” a wistfully violent but funny tune from the 
1807 Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, production of False Alarms; Or, My Cousin by James Kenney, 
with music attributed to M.P. King.28 
 It was during the final performance of the evening, the pantomime of Raymond and 
Agnes, known also as The Bleeding Nun, when things went wrong. Raymond and Agnes was 
adapted from the popular novel The Monk by Matthew Gregory Lewis, which had experienced 
considerable controversy and popularity after its initial publishing in 1796. What was most 
probably the script for Placide and Green’s adaptation of The Monk, written by Henry William 
Grosette, seems to have circumnavigated the controversy concerning the novel’s depictions of 
sexual violence by excising many of the characters and plots that would have been involved: 
absent is the main thrust of the plot involving Ambrosio, the outwardly devout titular monk who 
harbors deeply seeded impulses of sexual violence, and the numerous women he seduces. About 
the play, George Wythe Munford writes, that Raymond and Agnes “had never been performed in 
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Richmond. It had rarely been performed anywhere, for it was supposed to be a covert attack 
upon the institution of nunneries and the religion of the Roman Catholics.”29 Munford’s 
suggestion is that the work was at least well-known enough to be recognized for its controversial 
subject matter, and this reinforces the idea that what was presented at the Richmond Theatre was 
a version of the popular Grosette script. 
  Examining the plot of Raymond and Agnes is important for its ghosted association with 
the disaster and, thus, it’s contribution to what Gary Webb calls “the popular culture of 
disaster.”30  Webb notes, “a growing body of research,” in the field of disaster sociology, 
“focuses on the ways in which culture puts people at risk.”31 Raymond and Agnes must be 
understood as such a play, and applying Webb’s insight produces a quadrivalent and productive 
understanding of the term “risk.” From a physical standpoint, the Richmond Theatre was a 
known environment of deadly risk; risk that was not mitigated by reconstructing exits, widening 
and straightening stairs, and building larger vomitoria. From a spectacular standpoint, the 
atmosphere demanded by Raymond and Agnes’ dark and foreboding plot contributed directly to 
the fire through the respective lighting and extinguishing of candles to meet the needs of the 
shifting scenes. From a religious standpoint, theatre as an institution put the souls of its patrons at 
risk through its contribution to moral decay. From a critical standpoint, the play critiqued and 
attacked religion as an institution, and Munford identified the perceived attacks embedded within 
the text of the play upon religious institutions. These four examples of culture that “puts people 
at risk,” illustrate how the lurid and violent content of the play may have contributed to the 
religious fervor that marked the post-disaster paradigmatic responses to the fire. Given the 
popularity of the piece, evidenced by the large turnout for that evening’s performance, it seems 
likely that the play’s thematic explorations of sexuality, violence, and religious hypocrisy would 
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have greatly encouraged clergy to point to the conflagatory fate of the theatre as an example of 
God’s judgment of acts of blasphemy the script performs.  
 Grosette’s Raymond and Agnes is rich in irony and foreshadowing, both given the content 
of the story and its position on stage that night in Richmond. Claude (Mr. Burke), seemingly a 
kindly traveller, comes upon the broken-down carriage of Don Raymond and his servant, 
Theodore (James Rose). Claude brings Raymond and Theodore to the house of Baptiste (Placide) 
and his wife Margaretta (Charlotte Placide) that they share with their sons, Robert (William 
Twaits) and Jacques (William Anderson.) When admonished by Raymond to knock at the door, 
Claude replies, “I will try again; but I believe the people are all dead, or fast asleep,” issuing an 
ironic foreshadowing of the disaster to come.32 Baptiste finally answers the door, and tells 
Raymond and Theodore, “I hope you will excuse my not opening the door before; but this forest 
is infested with a desperate gang of banditti…Truly, signor, you were fortunate in having my 
friend Claude with you, or you would have run some risk of falling into their clutches.”33 
 When Jacques and Robert enter the cottage, Raymond remarks that they are well armed 
with daggers, and Robert suggests that, though they’ve never been the victims of roughness, it’s 
better to be safe than sorry. Jacques suggests “no person can tell what may befall him, even when 
he thinks himself most secure,” a mirror of the “too fatal security” with which the Committee of 
Investigation treated the known dangers of the Richmond Theatre.34 Of course, Baptiste and 
Claude are in league with each other, and Baptiste, who earlier complained he was left to “prowl 
alone and seek my prey” without a victim, is eagerly preparing to murder both Raymond and 
Theodore with the aid of his sons. Margaretta, meanwhile, has been suffering a bout of 
conscience, and exclaims that she doesn’t know how much further she can go on with this 
violent lifestyle and helps Raymond thwart numerous assassination attempts undertaken by 
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Robert before spiriting him away. Meanwhile, in the forest, Agnes (Mrs. Young) and her servant 
Ursula, returning from the convent of St. Clare to Agnes’ family home, have lost their way. 
Accompanied by Conrad, they are stopped and offered help by Claude.35 Agnes, Ursula and 
Conrad follow Claude back to Baptiste’s house, where they meet Raymond and Margaretta, as 
well as the murderous Baptiste, Robert, and Jacques.  
 Baptiste’s cottage is described by Grosette as “a miserable Chamber in the cottage - a 
door, RUE - a window, with iron bars, CF - a bed, L3E, with a chair and a table close to it.”36  
The scene was lit by a chandelier, “apparently hanging from the ceiling of the cottage, but in fact 
suspended by cords, which worked over pulleys inserted in the collar-beam of the roof of the 
theatre.”37 The chandelier was only partially lit — “it was fixed with 2 wicks to it; one only of 
them had been lit” — possibly in order to signify that occurrences of the play at nighttime, and 
possibly to heighten the frightful nature of the play, and the darkness of the cottage chamber.38 
 After she is tricked into drinking poisoned wine, Agnes passes out and Raymond, saved 
from this same fate by a timely warning from Margaretta, feigns unconsciousness. Seeing his 
opportunity, Baptiste draws his dagger and approaches both Agnes and Raymond, when 
Margaretta yells “now!”39  Ending his feigned sleep, Raymond springs to his feet and arrests 
Baptiste’s arm; they struggle together until the dagger drops, and Margaretta retrieves it, 
stabbing her husband in the stomach. Margaretta and Raymond make plans to escape and gather 
up Agnes, Theodore and Ursula, and they proceed into the night. Robert, Jacques and Claude re-
enter, and, upon seeing the dead Baptiste, kneel, crossing their swords over the dead body, and 
swear revenge for his murder. The first act ends in this tableau as the curtain drops. 
 “Here is the first link in the chain of our disasters,” reads the Committee of 
Investigation’s report on the fire. The one-candled chandelier — “this fatal lamp” — remained 
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lit, and the violence foreshadowed by the banditti’s dialogue in the first act would come to harsh 
reality: “no person can tell what may befall him, even when he thinks himself most secure.”40 As 
a cultural product, the fire at Richmond would forever ghost Raymond and Agnes. It is clear, 
though, that the ghosted association should not be understood only as an “identical thing…in a 
somewhat different context” as Carlson argues.41 Instead, Raymond and Agnes must be 
understood as a piece of culture that puts people at risk, and that contributed to the disaster 
process at Richmond through its inherent relationship to risk, making the significant link to the 
disaster not simply a matter of contextual recognition, but of contextual contribution.  
Thirty Perches 
 
 Pierre Nora articulates the difference between memory and history by explaining that real 
memory is “social and unviolated, exemplified in but also retained as the secret of so-called 
primitive or archaic society,” while history “is how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, 
propelled by change, organize the past.”42 In Nora’s estimation, societies build memorials 
because their ability to remember the past continually slips into oblivion. Memory binds groups 
together. The narratives relevant to describing the fire at Richmond support this insight for their 
tendency to overlap and reinforce each other in significant ways. This section is concerned with 
the immediate memory produced by the Richmond Theatre fire, and attempts to build a 
description of the events of the fire by combing through this litany of survivor narratives. In 
doing so, Richmond is configured as a milieu de memoire — a real environment of memory — in 
the immediate post-disaster paradigm, in which the immediate memory narratives contribute 
through a “social and unviolated” nature to the creation of identity in the disrupted society post-
disaster. The narratival solidarity illustrated by the overlapping and reinforcement of the 
numerous narratives serves as a mirror to the social solidarity that disaster sociologists argue 
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develops following disaster events.43 In the next chapter, I’ll illustrate how the construction and 
development of memorial tropes contributed to the slippage of memory into history.  
 Girardin left at intermission, intending to return home. There in the lobby, he found his 
friend David Doyle, and invited Doyle to join him at his house. They left the building into the 
cold December night. “We had not gone thirty perches,” Doyle wrote, “when we heard a 
confused noise; on looking around, we perceived the Theatre, for the most part enveloped in 
flames.”44 At some point prior to that night’s performance, probably during a rehearsal for the 
scene shift between Acts I and II of Raymond and Agnes, company member William Anderson 
stood in the wings, waiting to make his re-entrance in Act II, Scene 2 as Jacques, alongside Billy 
Twaits and Thomas Burke. Anderson must have craned his neck upwards as the carpenter 
hoisted the chandelier fifteen feet into the air, and saw the device swaying. Anderson noted that, 
because of the poor pulley mechanism designed to lift the lamp, the chandelier’s movements 
were “unskillful” and the pulley caused it to “ride circularly ‘round.”45 If he remarked upon this 
to anybody, it was ignored.  
 After the curtain fell on Twaits, Burke and Anderson at the end of Act I, that scene shift 
occurred. There’s a curious jump in time of at least several hours in Grosette’s version of 
Raymond and Agnes, and Act II picks up with Raymond, Theodore and Margaretta being led 
outside the Castle Lindenberg, having safely delivered Agnes and Ursula back home. Moving 
from the inside of Baptiste’s cottage to the outside of the gates, late in the middle of night, called 
for different lighting and sets, and the order was given to raise the chandelier from Baptiste’s 
cottage; one candle remained lit. There’s an issue with the evidence about the fire here that has 
never been properly explained: the danger posed by a candle in a mostly wooden theatre seems 
obvious, especially given that the location of the building would have been haunted by the fire 
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that destroyed the Old Academy in 1798. Given this obvious danger, why it was not established 
with the crew of the theatre that the chandelier was to be lowered, and it’s candle extinguished 
between acts is unknown. I suspect there are two ways to answer the question. First, because 
Raymond and Agnes was a premiere, it’s likely that the scene shift had never been fully executed 
in rehearsal, and what Anderson reported to the Committee of Investigation about the 
chandelier’s tendency to oscillate circularly was most likely observed during a time when the 
candle was unlit. Second, there was probably an issue of expediency as the crew worked to 
complete the change as quickly as possible. The testimony of the unnamed stagehand that was 
charged with the operation of the pulley system reinforces this explanation, as he was repeatedly 
ordered to raise the chandelier despite his protestations about the candle.  
 It’s also unknown who gave the order to raise the chandelier. The stagehand reported that 
the voice came from behind him, and that he supposed the voice was “authorized to direct 
him.”46 In spite of his arguments about the danger of the still-lit candle, the order was repeated.47  
When Mr. Rice, the property-man of the Richmond Theatre, saw what was happening, he 
demanded the stagehand lower the chandelier, saying thrice “lower that lamp and put it out.” 
However, because he was involved in the hectic backstage area during the scene shift, Rice was 
too distracted to ensure that the lamp was properly extinguished.48 Thomas C. West was 
backstage, preparing to enter in the role of the Old Servant, when he heard Rice make those 
demands, and saw the lit chandelier dangling high in the air above the stage.  
 Mr. Cook, the theatre’s head carpenter, saw the young stagehand trying to follow Rice’s 
orders to lower the chandelier, but the pulley system tangled, the cords slipped off of the rollers, 
the ropes got stuck, and the chandelier swayed back and forth several inches, precisely as it had 
done when Anderson had noted the issue earlier. Another of the theatre’s technical staff, Mr. 
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Yore, watched as the stagehand struggled to lower the stuck chandelier, commenting that the 
stagehand “jerked it and jostled it, that it was thus swerved from its perpendicular attitude, and 
brought into contact with the lower part of one of the front scenes.”49  There were thirty-five 
scenes hanging in the fly-loft, depictions of skies and roofs and trees, all of which were painted 
on canvas, and covered, in the back, by hemp fibers; the same rope that that held aloft the 
chandelier. Jerking, jostling, and swinging, suspended aloft in a fuel-rich environment of hemp, 
wood, and flammable grease-painted canvas, the candle probably didn’t even have to come into 
direct contact with one of the scenic paintings in order to ignite it. The fire immediately, and 
aggressively, crept upwards towards the unfinished, exposed wooden ceiling. As it heated and 
displaced air, the flame sought more oxygen and was pushed upwards, “tapering above it to a 
point… [and] reached the roof, which was elevated 6 or 7 feet only above the top of the scene.”50  
 Hopkins Robertson had seen the fire begin, but thought little of it — it was “no bigger 
than his handkerchief” — and such flare-ups were common in early nineteenth-century theatre.51 
Thomas C. West reinforces this commonality of disaster: as he entered the stage, ready to begin 
his part, he recalled having heard “some bustle behind the scenes,” but was unworried about it, 
figuring it to be a fight between members of the company.52  Even the cry of fire from backstage 
did not stop him, because “little accidents of this description had often taken place,” and when 
another cry came from the wings — “don’t be alarmed” — he repeated this to the audience. 
Robertson entered behind West, and trying not to panic the packed house, motioned for them to 
leave the stage. He must have looked back to check on the status of the fire: surely, such a small 
fire was no problem to extinguish. When he saw how large, and how rapidly, it had grown, 
Robertson dropped his pantomimic performance, and yelled, “the house is on fire.”53  Cook ran 
to the carpenter’s gallery and tried to cut down the set piece that was in flames, and while “he did 
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succeed in letting down some of the scenes upon the floor…he could not distinguish the cords of 
the scene, that was then on fire,” and, fearing for his life as the flames reached the roof, was 
“compelled…to fly for his life.”54 In trying to help, Cook succeeded only in providing for the fire 
easy access to the stage. It must have looked like it was raining fire in the theatre, a spectacular 
and thrilling special effect of stage magic. Flakes of burning scenery began to fall from the fly-
loft. It was a moment of elation and confusion: “the alarm of fire was immediately succeeded by 
a cry of, ’tis a false alarm, there is no danger,’ and as we did not imagine any, both Lieut. Gibbon 
and myself, endeavored to quiet the apprehensions of the ladies in the box,” wrote John Lynch.55  
 “The house is on fire!” 
 M.W. Hancock fought through the crowd to retrieve his niece, a friend of Conyers and 
Homassel, but by the time he made it to the box, the fire Lynch and Gibbon “did not imagine” 
had become reality; Hancock found the box empty. Conyers had been taken by Lynch and 
Gibbon, Homassel by Thornton, and the others had done their best to escape. Finding the seats 
empty, Hancock noted, “the flames were approaching with a degree of fury and rapidity that 
perhaps was never exceeded.”56 The theatre transformed from “a scene…all bustle, confusion 
and consternation” into “one of awful horror and desperation that beggars all description.”57   
 Hancock’s description offers the first example of phenomena that would come to mark 
the way in which information about theatre fires was recorded. The use of the term “scene” to 
describe the building suggests a way to think about the event as inherently theatrical. It is no 
accident that, when describing the Brooklyn Theatre fire in 1876, actor Kate Claxton invokes the 
same metatheatrical language. It is similarly no accident that the Chicago Tribune describes “two 
audiences” present at 1904 reopening of the Iroquois Theatre a year after the building was 
gutted. The invocation of metatheatrical language in all three fires found in the archives reveals 
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descriptions of human struggle to come to terms with the traumatic unreality of the disaster event 
through the invocation of a more easily explicable framework of theatrical unreality. By its 
nature, theatre tends to operate within an agreed upon contract between audience and performer 
in which audience members willingly abide by the disruptive qualities embedded in theatre’s 
reproduction of unreality as reality. The violent shift from unreality back into reality that 
characterizes the rapid onset of a disaster event leaves residues of theatre’s contract with the 
audience embedded within the disaster process. Metatheatrical narratives of the disaster pick up 
on these residues. In the use of a metatheatrical language to describe the event, theatre serves as 
a convenient framework to offer a method for navigating the unbelievable reality of the disaster 
event. 
 Hancock’s narrative reinforces this narrative phenomenon. By terming the interior of the 
Richmond Theatre “a scene…. that beggars all description,” in which “all ceremony was 
forgotten in conforming to the first law of nature,” Hancock theorizes how the transformative 
power of disaster operates upon normative definitions of space and identity: the disaster 
extended beyond the boundaries of the stage, into the house, and out into the Richmond 
community.58 By suggesting the forgetting of ceremony, Hancock illustrates how the 
performances of survival undertaken by patrons of the Richmond Theatre significantly disrupted 
their common humanity. Hancock moved for the windows, using his sword cane to vault himself 
on top of the crowd, “providentially” reaching a window.59 As Hancock tried to slip himself out, 
the sash came down and trapped his foot. The crowd behind him, terrified, began to climb over 
top of him, exiting over the topside of the window. He thought he was done for: “I gave myself 
up as lost…the flame, however rushed over my head, and the introduction of fresh air at the 
bottom of the window, gave me new life.”60 Hancock managed to extricate himself, 
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reinvigorated by the sudden blast of air, and half-jumped, half-fell through the window to the 
ground below. 
 Lynch fought against the rushing sea of humanity to return to the box in time to see the 
flames flash from one end of the theatre to the other, rushing “with the rapidity of lightning from 
the stage, along the facing of the upper boxes, taking both sides at the same time…”61 As the fire 
found greater and more abundant sources of fuel — the resin-coated pine board ceiling, the 
canvas painted box front coverings — the thick black smoke began to permeate the hallways, 
suffocating people. Lynch was able to make his way to the window, where he saw Hancock 
trapped. Not wanting to continue the inhumane climbing over of Hancock, Lynch, 
“undetermined” was “pushed away towards the west wall of the theatre…suffocation 
threatened…my hair caught fire…hope deserted me.”62  In a last desperate act of salvation, 
Lynch bolted toward the window, waving his hands over his head, hoping to fan away smoke 
and flames that licked at his scalp, even as bodies dropped to the ground around him. Lynch 
reached the window, heard an enormous crash behind him, and threw himself out towards the 
street.63 
 Outside the theatre was Gilbert Hunt, an enslaved blacksmith in the city who had been 
sent to the theatre by his owners upon news of the conflagration with the directive to save Louisa 
Mayo, daughter to George and Elizabeth.64 Hunt was a man with a broad, powerful body, 
wrought from years of brutal ironworking, and when he arrived to the scene, his strength served 
him well. He ran to nearby houses looking to borrow a mattress onto which survivors might 
jump but, finding none, returned to the scene only to find a similarly well-built man, Dr. James 
D. McCaw — “a man who might have been chosen by a sculptor for a model of Hercules” — 
had fought his way to a window, smashed it out, and climbed inside.65  
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 McCaw had been indentured to John Bell of Edinburgh, the famous surgeon and lecturer 
who revolutionized vascular surgery, and upon his return to Richmond set up a busy medical 
practice.66 Seeing Hunt, McCaw began to pass women out the window, lowering them by their 
wrists into the slave’s waiting arms. Six times he did this, with the final woman he passed out 
being his sister. As McCaw prepared to jump, Hunt noticed the wall of the building was 
beginning to totter, weakened by flame. As he jumped, McCaw’s leather gaiter was caught upon 
a hinge. He hung precipitously by his foot, and, when the gaiter finally gave way, McCaw 
crashed hard upon the ground, shattering his femur, tearing muscles from bone, his skin 
blackened horribly by fire. McCaw told Hunt to drag him towards the near-by Baptist Church 
and, once there, was able to fashion planks from a fence into a splint. He would never walk 
comfortably again.  
 Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, was also present at the theatre, and 
reported “the stairways were immediately blocked up — the throng was so great that many were 
raised several feet over the heads of the rest.”67 This horrible decision probably caused numerous 
suffocations as people were lifted directly into the thick smoke, creating great dead weight on top 
of the already panicked, choking crowd. Underfoot, many bodies were being trampled, skulls 
crushed and bones snapped, as great numbers of people tried to exit through a hallway not wide 
enough to fit more than a person and a half. The panic and trampling was bad, but the greatest 
horror came when the stairway, sagging under the weight of dozens, collapsed. John George 
Jackson, a delegate from Harrison County in town for the Virginia Legislative season, had 
waited when the cry of fire went up, perhaps thinking it a false alarm, or perhaps hoping to give 
the obviously crowded box seats a chance to clear out before he attempted his exit.68 By the time 
he did make his attempt, the hallways were generally clear, and he was able to get half the 
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distance to the stairs, when he came upon Mary Scott, wife of Fairfax delegate Richard Scott 
and, with her, had already begun to cover the remaining distance to when they heard the call of 
“false alarm.” Jackson retreated back towards one of the boxes to see “the scenery in full blaze 
and the canopy on fire,” emitting a “very vivid…light.”69  
 Jackson tried crowd control, not wishing the put too much physical pressure upon the 
audience of “chiefly Ladies” who were “greatly alarmed and cry for relief.”70  Jackson believed 
that the fire was behind them and contained within the theatre, but he “found my hopes were 
illusive - a black thick smoke rushed upon us, so instantaneously suffocating, that those who had 
yielded to their fears by crying, sunk without a groan.”71 With asphyxiated bodies dropping 
unconscious or dead around him, Jackson was able to advance forward by the moonlight pouring 
in through some windows. He was staunched in his attempt to escape by a mass of bodies with 
the same idea, and Jackson must have, instead, headed back towards the stairs, reaching at least 
the first few steps when the smoke overtook him, later reporting that the smoke was “so 
intolerable that I could only make one convulsive struggle to advance and then I sunk 
senseless.”72  
 Jackson reports the last thing he can recall was “my feet were descending.”73  The poorly 
designed, narrow staircases were not built to withstand the force and weight of several hundred 
bodies at once, and, weakened by flame, they gave way with a horrible groan, removing the only 
source of “safe” exit from the second level of seating, and strewing bodies about the bottom floor 
of the theatre. Jackson, miraculously alive, managed to lift himself up, and immediately tried to 
help a woman exit along with him.74 The scene was carnage: thick black smoke and flame 
surrounded him as people, bereft of a staircase and finding the windows too crowded for a timely 
exit, began to jump from the box seats into the pit, landing with sickening thuds, cracks, and 
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crunches. Jackson didn’t hesitate and, feeling a blast of fresh air, followed it to find the exit. As 
he left, fire was beginning to blast out of the front windows, and, within a few steps, the roof 
caved in. He must have been one of the last to escape the inferno. In ten minutes, more than 
seventy people had died violently, and Richmond, Virginia became the sight of America’s first 
great urban disaster  — “a calamity unknown in the annals of our country,” — and fertile ground 
for the construction of memory-work by competing groups of actors.75  
We Parted in Silence; We Parted by Night 
 
 Although many of the accounts of the fire corroborate each other, there are a handful of 
accounts that stick out for their bizarre inconsistencies. This section will evaluate one such 
example of reality bending in the archive in order to illustrate the allure of mythologizing 
disaster events, and how the post-disaster paradigm creates a system in which cultural production 
focused on grief gives way to the production of what I term traumatic mythology, formed from a 
desperate need to construct understanding where there is none to be had. This process is similar 
in origin and effect to the burial of the dead, and to Richmond’s legislation against public 
performances insofar as it appears to be a regular phenomenon in each of the post-disaster 
paradigms of these three theatre fires. These examples illustrate the significant ritual value in 
institutional responses while doing little to respond to the true danger: a treatment of the 
symptoms, but not the underlying cause of abiding poorly constructed theatre firetraps. This 
precipitates the slippage of memory into history through the loss of its “social and unviolated 
nature,” as memory is violated by post-disaster traumatic coping mechanisms meant to find 
meaning in carnage and destruction and death. 
 By reading a contemporary understanding of cultural production in post-disaster event 
paradigms, some of the traumatic mythologizing that mark theatre fires can be studied through a 
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symbolic interactionist perspective that recognizes their importance not because of their 
relationship to historical truth, but because of their status as artifacts of cultural production with 
direct relation to disaster and to the negotiation of memory. In the gulf between civic 
engagement, and the personal need to handle the stresses of trauma, urban rumors and myths 
provide a way to identify the socioemotional trauma that marked community members long after 
the flames had died down. While this is by no means the only strategy for constructing 
understanding — the next chapter addresses the extremely influential and fiery rhetoric espoused 
in the pulpits around the country towards the theatre a considerably more successful strategy — 
this section concerns itself with a narrative description that simply does not fit in with the rest of 
the evidence, but still persists through the power of myth. I undertake this analysis to suggest 
how and why urban myths evolve and spread, and how these myths contribute significantly to 
developing an understanding of disrupted social life in the post-disaster paradigm. 
 The most pervasive myth of the Richmond Theatre fire concerns the young and beautiful 
Sally Conyers and the war hero James Gibbon, Jr.76 There is relatively little information about 
precisely what happened during the fire, but the most direct, first-person account comes form 
John Lynch, a merchant in Richmond, and friend to both Gibbon and Conyers. According to 
Lynch’s narrative, provided directly after the disaster, when the fire began to spread, Sally 
Conyers fainted in the box before them. Lynch and Gibbon reached over and grabbed her, 
hoisted her up, and prepared to exit the theatre. Meanwhile, Caroline Homassel seemed more 
interested in the men fighting to rescue her than in the immediate danger presented by the fire: “a 
quarrel ensued between [Thornton] and a friend of mine, of long standing, Charles Hay, which 
should save me, and all was fire, flame, smoke and confusion…I was bourne along by 
[Thornton] to a window…”77 Conyers’ head slumped against Lynch’s left arm as he and Gibbon 
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dragged her towards the stairs. She appeared dead, and Gibbon told Lynch to go back and rescue 
someone else. “I am strong enough to carry her, she is light, and you can save somebody else.”78 
Lynch acquiesced, pointed Gibbon to the stairs, and began his return to the boxes, looking for 
someone else to help to safety. It was the last time anyone would see Gibbon or Conyers alive. 
Lynch, meanwhile, would next be seen offering aid to Hancock, who was hanging from a 
window. This is generally accepted to be the “official” story of Gibbon and Conyers. However, 
some years after the fire, another version of the Gibbon/Conyers story emerged, one that has 
since gained cultural purchase on the event, and is based primarily on two sources: Mary Gibbon 
Carter’s diary, and a newspaper story written by Susan Archer Weiss that allegedly recounts a 
fateful meeting between Weiss and an elderly Carter in a Richmond lodge years after the fire.  
 Carter’s diary, and Weiss’ article, have exerted tremendous influence over a popular 
understanding of the events of the fire, and simultaneously succeeds in constructing a kind of 
spooky logic behind the event. This influence holds in spite of the fact that there is no hard 
evidence for the story about Gibbon and Conyers the diary recounted; in fact, the only evidence 
still available of the contents of the diary is through the citations of newspapers, in particular a 
1937 article in the Richmond Times-Dispatch that notes the diary was “preserved by [Mary 
Gibbon’s] great-granddaughter Mrs. Louis Minigerode of Richmond.”79  There have been few, if 
any at all, references made to the diary beyond that.  
Susan Weiss’s article, reprinted in the Richmond Dispatch in 1899, presents a narrative 
that is functionally identical to what would later reported by the Times-Dispatch, though with 
considerably more narrative framing. The contents of Weiss’ article form a much more thrilling 
story about Gibbon and Conyers, and seems to be the primary source of the super-heroic actions 
ascribed to Gibbon that night. However, even a slightly skeptical reading of the article confirms 
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the incredibly problematic account put forth, which I will recount here. Given that, the story 
illustrates how a theatrical construction of the disaster process yields fictional cultural production 
that may gain powerful purchase in the historical and narrative reconstruction of the disaster 
event. 
 “Would you like to hear a story,” the elder Carter asks the young Weiss. 
 “A true story?” 
 “A true story of the old times of which I have been speaking, and the people and events 
which I remember. A sad story, but which it sometimes does me good to tell.”80 
 In the article, Susan Archer Weiss recounts meeting “thirty years ago…an old lady with 
soft, white hair and delicate hands” who reveals herself as Mary Gibbon Carter, and who informs 
Weiss that they are, at that moment in the Mayo family house.81 Weiss begins the article with an 
invocation of death that overhangs the rest of the piece, effectively foreshadowing the themes 
and events she will describe, as Carter first references her famous father, reading from an entry 
in the American Almanac for 1835: “Died on July 1st, at Richmond, Va., in his seventy-seventh 
year, Major JAMES GIBBON.”82 While this invocation of death may suit the thematic needs of 
the story, it’s problematic because, first, no obituary appears in the 1835 American Almanac; 
Gibbon’s death is reported in the 1836 edition, the almanacs being usually published at the 
beginning of the year, as opposed to the end of it.83 While this might seem like petty squabbling 
over dates, I argue that, if themes of death and loss frame the following narrative, it can also be 
read through a framing theme of a theatrical response to the horrible reality of the disaster, and 
should be understood not as hard fact of the event, but as a fictional device that opens up avenues 
of understanding the traumatic loss of life at the Richmond Theatre.  
 Carter describes to Weiss the beauty of Sally Conyers: 
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She had an almost Grecian profile, with clear, creamy complexion, and those soft, liquid 
brown eyes, which the French call velours. I never saw eyes so expressive, sometimes 
arch and laughing, then dreamy and sad. Her figure was slender and perfect, and she 
carried herself with an easy grace, her head well poised, and shoulders back - a beauty 
which few women possess. She seemed to care little for admiration, though always sweet 
and winning, and was a favorite with young and old alike…her first appearance [in 
Richmond] took all hearts by storm. “La Belle Conyers” she was called, and there was no 
end to the poems and epigrams addressed to her, according to the fashion of the day.84 
 
 The poetry is, in fact, true. Following the fire, numerous poems were published in the 
Richmond Enquirer about the tragedy and beauty of the young Southern belle. Carter goes on to 
describe to Weiss how Gibbon and Conyers first met at a dinner party the night in November 
1811 he returned from his military duty in Norfolk: 
 “Mary,” he asked, “who is the young lady by the window in white with roses in her 
hair?” 
 I replied: “Miss Conyers, niece of Mrs. Gallego. Is she not lovely?” 
 “Lovely,” he answered quietly …with such evident admiration that I said laughingly: 
 “Take care, brother, or you, too, will become a victim. People say that Sally Conyers 
has no heart.” 
 “How can any one look at her and say that?” he replied. And Mr. Professor Maxwell, 
of William and Mary, who was standing by, remarked: 
 “She is the sleeping beauty, but she will waken when the right knight comes.” 
 Just then Miss Conyers turned, and her eyes and James’s met. I saw a faint blush 
tinge her cheek and she looked down and trifled with her fan. In memory I can still 
behold her as she appeared at that moment, with her graceful attitude and her delicate 
profile turned toward us. She wore a dress of Indian muslin embroidered to the knee and 
edged with a narrow flunk, a narrow, white satin ribbon sash, ruby necklace and 
bracelets, and crimson roses in her dark-brown hair. The dress was made very low, 
according other fashion, but she wore a scarf of delicate lace slightly crossed over her 
bosom and fastened with a rose, for she was as modest as she was lovely.  
 Later in the evening I saw my brother and Miss Conyers dancing together, and 
everybody, even the old Chief Justice, was admiring them and declaring that they had 
never seen a handsomer couple. 
 Some people deny that there is such a thing as love at first sight. But my conviction is 
that by some mysterious influence which may possibly be called destiny these two loved 
each other from the moment in which their eyes first met. I think it was so with Miss 
Conyers, and I know it was so with James.85 
 
 Note that Carter foreshadows Gibbon’s impending status as “a victim” due to his love for 
Conyers, and the construction of Conyers as simultaneously a heartless villain and a princess 
waiting to be saved. Note also, despite the fact that Homassel reported that Conyers had 
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“numerous lovers,” Carter instead argues that Conyers was “as modest as she was lovely.” The 
invocation of the mysterious force of destiny coloring their meeting and time together is notable 
for the way it abides by the religious construction of the disaster as an act of God, an argument 
put forth in considerable detail in the following chapter. 
 Significantly, the quoted passage says nothing of the fact that the existence of letters 
between Gibbon, Sr. and James, dated August 1807, make specific reference to Conyers, 
implying that Gibbon and Conyers would have known each other well before November of 1811. 
One letter, written in late August 1807, while James was serving with the Navy in Norfolk, was 
donated to the University of Virginia’s Alderman Library by Miss Lillian S. Carter in 1948, and 
feature Colonel Gibbon mentioning “Miss C” to his son. An accompanying letter from Lillian 
Carter bears the enticing note that, “Miss C was Miss Sally Conyers of South Carolina…became 
engaged to Liet. G. The 26 Dec.: 1811.”86 While the particulars of what Major Gibbon was 
writing to his son are unclear, owing to the significant degradation of quality of the letter from 
photocopying, what is clear is that the Gibbon family, and James by extension, were, at the very 
least, already familiar with Conyers in 1807, years before Weiss’ story suggests they initially 
met.  
 Nearing Christmas, Gibbon was given the order to return to his military service in Norfolk 
on the 27th of December, and his family had him sit for a portrait on Christmas day. “We 
remarked,” Carter recounts, “that in giving the finishing touches the artist, Mr. Sully, 
unintentionally changed the former expression and caught something of that tender sadness 
which naturally enough marked his countenance at this time, on the eve of parting with all whom 
he loved.”87 Again, the sly invocation of death and departing marks this passage — James is 
returning to the dangers of active military duty, particularly dangerous given the tensions 
 
 64 
prevalent in young America preceding the War of 1812 — suggesting a premonition of the doom 
to come by the young Lieutenant.  
 Carter called that social season “the gayest winter Richmond had ever known,” and that, 
because of the carousing, “a fanatical Methodist preacher compared the city to Sodom and 
Gomorrah, and predicted for its gay and sinful inhabitants a speedy and terrible punishment.”88 
Again, if the foreshadowing of “a speedy and terrible punishment” for Richmonders by “a 
fanatical Methodist preacher” seems narratively convenient, that’s because it probably is; in 
truth, behind the pulpit, preachers were often prophesying citywide destruction, this particular 
season’s carousing aside, and such rhetoric would have been pointed in late 1811, given that the 
appearance of the Comet of 1811 that fall, still streaking across the night sky, the recent New 
Madrid earthquakes, and the political issues that were leading up to the War of 1812 were all 
constructed as late-year portents of doom to come.  
 Weiss also recounts, according to Carter, a popular urban legend involving Richmond 
native Edgar Allan Poe, and his familial relationship to the Richmond Theatre. Carter notes that 
“Mr. And Mrs. Poe had belonged to” the “fine company of players in Richmond,” but that “Mr. 
Poe had just died in Norfolk…” while his wife lay ill in Richmond. The truth about Edgar Allan 
Poe’s father is a complicated one, and while it may have been true that his father had just died in 
Norfolk — although it is worth noting that it is only Weiss who makes that claim — David Poe, 
Jr. was hardly a factor in his children’s lives after he abandoned the family in 1809, and certainly 
was no longer working with the Placide and Green Company by 1811. Eliza Poe, however, did 
work with the Placide and Green Company that season, and her death was, at the time, a recent 
development. Soon after their arrival in Richmond, Poe, a  “chief ornament” of the Placide and 
Green Company, began to show signs of tuberculosis; on December 8th, she died. She left her 
 
 65 
children to various friends and family members, and the well-known Richmond family of John 
and Frances Allan adopted little Edgar, just shy of three years old. A theatrical benefit was held 
for her at the Richmond Theatre just days later.  
 Further historical inaccuracies show up. Weiss writes, “on Christmas-Eve the theatre 
managers announced the play of ‘Hamlet’ for the day after Christmas with the after-piece of 
‘The Bleeding Nun.’”89 This problematically ignores the fact that the theatre was supposed to 
remain dark on the 26th of December, as the company had originally intended to leave Richmond 
after the 23rd, and was forced to stay longer in the city when their newly contracted player, 
George Frederick Cooke, failed to join up with them in Richmond. It also misidentifies the 
performances that were scheduled to take place: Hamlet was never on the docket for that time 
period in the Placide and Green Company’s repertoire, and what occurred in the Richmond 
Theatre on the 26th was Diderot’s The Father, followed by The Bleeding Nun, both shows which 
were scheduled for the 23rd. 
 Carter then recounts a popular past time for Richmond’s young adults. The inclusion of 
this activity continues to subtly invoke the supernatural narrative tropes that would come to 
dominate memory work about the fire:  
Some of the young people went around in the disguise of old-time mummers and fortune-
tellers, which occasioned much amusement. But when they would have told Sally 
Conyers’s fortune with cards she shrank from it with an almost superstitious dread, 
saying that she had always had a horror of having her fortune told even in jest.90 
  
 Of course, whether Conyers did maintain a “superstitious dread” of having her fortune told 
is almost impossible to prove one way or the other, but it’s worth remarking that her “refusal,” 
according to this story, only has any meaning because of the fire. If Conyers’s dread was, indeed, 
real, and the fire never occurred, this refusal never would have been worth noting; it has meaning 
only because it points to the notion of the predestined nature of the tragedy in an ironic and 
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discomforting way; the predestination of the tragedy was a common narrative tool of religious 
responses to the fire.  
 Carter describes the families planning to gather together for dinner at The Hermitage on 
December 26th, the house of Colonel John Mayo: 
At breakfast, James remarked that he would not be able to go, having important business 
to attend to. He appeared so restless and uneasy that my mother inquired if he were not 
well. 
 “You will all laugh at me,” he answered, “when I tell you that I have had a horrible 
dream. I could not have believed that a mere dream could so impress one.” 
 Mother said something about nightmares, and father remarked that sailors were 
proverbially superstitious, but that he would never have expected James of that 
weakness.91 
 
 When Elizabeth (another sister) and Mary beg him to recount his dream, he acquiesces, and 
Carter-via-Weiss provides this narrative: 
He seemed, he said, to be standing before a closed door, about to enter, yet conscious of 
the presence of some vague lurking horror within. Something seemed urging him to keep 
back; but seeing the door slowly open he stepped in and found himself in in [sic] a great 
hall, dark and entirely empty. After advancing some steps he turned back, when he saw 
behind the door a face - a man’s face - standing out of the gloom as if illuminated with a 
pale, lurid light, though all around was profound darkness. The eyes were intently fixed 
upon him, and he at once felt himself seized with an indescribable and overwhelming 
horror. He would have escaped, but the door closed in his face, shutting him in with that 
awful presence. Starting from his sleep, he found himself bathed in a cold perspiration 
and under the influence of a horror such as he had never before conceived of. He added: 
“I have had that dream before, though when and where I cannot recall. But it seems to 
haunt me.”92 
 
 Note the recurring images in the dream, and how they serve as narratively satisfying 
symbols of the fire: closed doors, darkened great halls, and eerie lighting effects. Later, when 
Carter sees Gibbon with Conyers, she recounts that, 
I heard my brother telling Sally that he would not be able to attend, and I fancied that she 
looked a little piqued, as well as disappointed. She seemed to consider the excuse 
insufficient, and that on this last day he should be willing to sacrifice everything of the 





 Again, the word choices foreshadow the coming tragedy, specifically the use of the terms 
“sacrifice everything,” and the invocation of Gibbon’s time as a sailor: “duty above all other 
considerations.” Given where Carter’s narrative is going, these terms are loaded with irony and 
significance: it is an obvious foreshadowing that Gibbon, in his militaristic sense of duty, will 
sacrifice everything for Sally.  
 When, later, at the Mayo house for dinner, Conyers is asked to play a song for the 
assembled, she responds with a 1790 poem by Louisa MacCartney Crawford: 
We parted in silence, we parted by night,/ 
On the banks of that lonely river, / 
Where the flagrant lines their boughs united;/ 
We met, and we parted forever!94 
 
 Although Carter attributes only the first half of the first stanza to Conyers’s voice — “at 
the fourth line, her voice faltered” — it may be worth noting that the poem itself is a sad 
goodbye to those we love who have gone on.95 Of particular interest is the second stanza: 
We parted in silence, - our cheeks were wet/ 
With the tears that were past controlling;/ 
We vowed we would never, no, never forget, / 
And those vows at the time were consoling;/ 
But those lips that echoed the sounds of mine/ 
Are as cold as that lonely river’s;/ 
And that eye, that beautiful spirit’s shrine,’ 
Has shrouded its fires forever…96 
 
 The obvious imagery of the flame of a “beautiful spirit’s shine” being “shrouded forever” 
link together the themes of a lost love and death, both central themes underpinning the 
Gibbon/Conyers story. That the poem takes place “on the banks of that lonely river” only 
reinforces its narrative applicability to Richmond, which sits upon the James River.   
 Gibbon begged Conyers to stay with him, but Conyers, apparently upset with Gibbon’s 
refusal to attend the play, accepted the invitation of a young British soldier to attend the theatre 
at his side. Understatedly, Gibbon told Conyers he “did not want to deprive her of any pleasure, 
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at which her face flushed and her eyes filled with tears,” and made plans, instead, to stay at home 
with his father — this plot point made, apparently, without the memory that the elder Gibbon 
was, indeed, at the theatre that evening, as confirmed by numerous sources.97 It was, then, with 
surprise when “Hamlet” ended, that Carter reported seeing her brother enter the box. “He stood 
by the door with folded arms until someone made room for him behind mother and Miss 
Conyers…Sally blushed and smiled when he bent over and spoke to her; but I saw that her heart 
was full, and that she could with difficulty restrain her tears.”98  
 As the orchestra “commenced an overture to the performance of The Bleeding Nun” — 
apparently skipping the scheduled intermezzo performances advertised in various Richmond 
papers between The Father and The Bleeding Nun — Carter saw Gibbon lean over and whisper 
to his mother “look at that man in the pit — the one who is looking this way over Mr. Adams’s 
shoulder. That is the fact that I saw in my dream.” Apparently upset at this dream vision made 
reality, he told Conyers, “I am going out, but will wait for you outside.”99 There is, of course, 
neither any evidence that Gibbon arrived at the theatre late that night, nor that Colonel Gibbon 
was absent. Lynch gives the account that both were in the box for the entirety of the evening, and 
that, far from Conyers standing and waiting for Gibbon to return to rescue her, it was Lynch and 
Gibbon that grabbed her and began to remove her from the building, until Gibbon told Lynch 
that he could handle saving her by himself, as recounted earlier in this article.100  
 After Gibbon made his exit, Carter dispatches with her narrative of the beginning of the 
fire in the space of a few lines, and notes that when the group made their exit from the box, Sally 
“seemed not to hear or notice anyone. She was standing, very pale, gazing toward the door, and I 
knew that it was James for whom she was looking.”101 Exactly how Carter might have knew it 
was James is a mystery, of course. Carter’s narrative addresses the violence of escaping the 
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theatre, and picks up again once all have made it safely outside, although no one knows where 
her brother or Sally have gone; James, her mother reports, left before the fire occurred, and Sally 
must have been saved by Colonel Botts and his wife.  
 Carter assumes that Gibbon “walked awhile on the Capitol Square, not far off, until he 
heard the alarm of fire,” and dashed back towards the theatre.102 It’s true that the Capitol Square 
was not far off —perhaps a quarter or a half of a mile away — but given the incredible speed 
with which the fire swept through the building, it’s difficult to accept Carter’s description of the 
events as even remotely possible. It is here that the super-heroic abilities ascribed to Gibbon truly 
take root; while we’ve already seen his powers of prescience, we now are treated to abilities like 
super-speed, indefatigable endurance, strength far beyond the ken of mortal men, and 
otherworldly dexterity, as if Gibbon were some kind of 1811 approximation of Spider-Man. 
 Even allowing for a contemporary world-class running speed — although how he could 
have done this while traversing through muddy, snowed-caked, roads is a mystery — it would 
have taken Gibbon around a minute to make the return trip to the theatre, by which time the exits 
would already have been packed and crowded with panicked, crushed bodies. Carter believes 
that Gibbon “[fought] his way like a madman through the crowd,” and “flung…off” those that 
tried to prevent him from re-entering the building in order to “made his way to the pit, and 
thence sailor-like climbed one of the pillars to the gallery floor, where he found [Conyers]…”103 
Carter notes that, the next morning, Gibbon and Conyers were discovered by her father, ”locked 
in each other’s arms,” recognizable “only by the navy buttons and the gold-and-jet beads” the 
couple were wearing.104 
 The presence of soothsayers, prophetic dreams, or mysterious premonitions of dread 
suffuse the mythologies of these fires; in the case of the Richmond blaze, Conyers’ refusal to 
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have her fortune told, and James Gibbon’s nightmare illustrate the anxieties of knowing one’s 
future. However, understood as a narrative device, these are opportunities to create tension 
through dramatic irony — if only they had heeded the warnings! A sermon given by the 
Reverend James Muir about the Richmond Theatre fire may offer the first temporal example of a 
supernatural feeling of dreadful premonition about the fire, and the similarities between this tale 
and the story of James Gibbon are numerous: 
A young man of engaging manners, and tried courage, was deterred from attending the 
Theatre by a dream, that he had been assassinated in the Lobby: in his dream he felt all 
the agonies of death; he awoke in terror, determined to avoid the accursed spot, but his 
resolution was shaken by the keen ridicule with which his apprehensions were treated. In 
the course of the representation, as actor entered with a hatchet in his hand. It threw our 
youth into agony. “That is the man I saw in my dream.” He rose to fly, but was severely 
rallied by his female friends. “Stay, you are going to the spot where you were 
assassinated, stay we will protect you.” He did stay, and when the alarm was given, 
generously afforded his friends every aid, but perished on the very spot, pointed out in his 
dream. Was not his fate foreseen? Were not intimations thereof afforded to him? Who 
could foresee that fate, or afford the intimations but God who does in the armies of 
heaven, and among the inhabitant of the earth what he pleaseth?105 
 
 Muir’s sermon, published in early 1812, seems to provide the framework for Carter and 
Weiss’ traumatic mythologizing, as well as sharing the peculiar quality of reporting knowledge 
which would otherwise be impossible to know: how did Carter know Gibbon walked to Capitol 
Square, or that Conyers, frozen, was mentally begging for Gibbon to rescue her? How could 
Muir know that the young man “perished on the very spot pointed out in his dream”?  It is in the 
lack of details that these stories become problematically vague when used as historical evidence. 
Given the overarching similarities between the Muir sermon and the Weiss article, particularly as 
they interact with regards to prophetic dreams and feelings of dread, when considered against the 
evidence provided by John Lynch, it seems extremely likely to me that the superhero story Mary 
Gibbon Carter recounts in her diary, as filtered through Weiss’ tendency to re-write the truth in 
her scholarship, was extrapolated from Muir’s sermon and applied to James Gibbon’s death. 
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  Most damning to Weiss’s account of all, though, is the note from medical doctor John P. 
Little’s 1851 History of Richmond, reprinted in 1933 from original publications in the Southern 
Literary Messenger: 
When the cry of fire rose, and the flames rushed out, he became perfectly cool and 
composed, and prepared to meet, and escape from, the danger, which, in uncertain 
expectation, had disturbed him. Leading one young lady, and followed by another, he had 
gained the door before the crowd rendered the passage impossible, and then returning to 
save Miss Conyers, perished with her in the crowd of sufferers…He had lost an arm in 
the war with Tripoli, and being thus crippled, was unable to render proper assistance to is 
[sic] charge.106 
 
 Exactly what Little may have meant by noting that Gibbon “lost an arm” in the war with 
Tripoli is something of a mystery: to what extent was Gibbon rendered armless, and which arm 
did he lose? Still, that Gibbon was without the use of one of his arms greatly complicates his 
ability to “sailor-like climb one of the pillars to the gallery,” as Carter-via-Weiss claims. Little’s 
narrative exists somewhere between the evidence provided by Lynch, what was written by 
Weiss, and what was preached by Muir, illustrating exactly how powerful the falsified historical 
narrative had become after the fire. Gibbon, for as much of a hero as he was, was simply “unable 
to render proper assistance” to Conyers and, according to Little, probably was responsible in part 
for her death; if Gibbon had allowed Lynch to aid him in helping Conyers, perhaps the more 
able-bodied man would have been able to guide them to safety. In the end, Gibbon was a hero — 
just not the superhero his sister wanted him to be.  
 Weiss’ article doubtless makes for a good story, but it also directly refutes several 
important pieces of evidence that, when considered, suggest that what Weiss and Carter tells of 
is nothing more than just a good story. What is remarkable about the narratives of the Richmond 
fire collected in the Dispatch and elsewhere is how well they reinforce each other. T. Joseph 
Scanlon argues that, in the conducting historical research of disasters, the constructed web of 
narratives that develops in the post-disaster event paradigm is always strongest when multiple 
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accounts independently verify the same events. Given Scanlon’s insight, added to the fact that 
there is no other confirmation of Gibbon’s super-heroics that evening, as well as the fact that 
Mary Gibbon Carter’s diary record of the event has obvious problems of bias towards 
constructing her brother’s memory as super-heroic, as well as the fact that Carter recounts events 
she could not possibly have known about, it is safe to dispatch her version of the story of Gibbon 
and Conyers’ deaths as mostly fiction. That does not, however, mean that the story — or Weiss’ 
reporting of it — is useless. The goal of Weiss’s narrative, and Carter’s diary, is to construct 
some meaning where the evidence otherwise offers none, to give sense to the tragic deaths of 
two beloved people, and to establish a sense of meaning and order in a disrupted society: 
theatricalized reality as a form of post-traumatic disaster processing.  
 The sociologist Kathy S. Stolley notes that urban legends “are a modern form of ancient 
folklore traditions” and that “just as ancient folklores taught moral lessons, urban legends also 
often provide cautionary warnings about modern society.”107 Understood this way, the 
Gibbon/Conyers story may suggest numerous warnings: not taking love for granted, or paying 
heed to portents of danger. These morals reveal the anxiety Richmonders may have felt at the 
end of 1811, and may also serve as an example of Joseph Roach’s concept of “surrogation” 
insofar as their production in the wake of a disastrous event illustrates “survivors attempt[ing] to 
fit satisfactory alternatives…into the cavities created by loss through death…”108  
 While the stakes of locating traumatic mythologies in the archive and re-contextualizing 
their usefulness as historical evidence may seem negligible, I’d argue that it points to a larger 
problem that marks the post-disaster time period. In the disrupted, unsettled reality, various 
groups of actors struggle with each other to gain purchase on defining the narrative of the event 
and, by extension, how the event will be remembered. This is of particular importance in socially 
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shared disasters like theatre fires because there are always questions that arise in the civic 
investigation of the facts of the fire regarding the assignation of blame for the deaths of the 
victims. In The Long Shadow of Disaster, Celesta Koffman Bos, Susan Ullberg and Paul ’t Hart 
identify the stakes of this question by wondering, “why are some mass catastrophes more or less 
‘forgotten’…whereas others are so vividly remembered in monuments, commemorations and 
public discourse?”109 They argue,  
Our key claim is that the extent and nature of disaster remembrance is not solely a 
question of physical characteristics such as the number of casualties, nor the degree of 
social disturbance they cause at the time of their occurrence; instead it should be viewed 
as a product of a political encounter between grass-roots memory and the elite-level, 
political ‘processing’ of disasters.110 
  
 Disaster, in the case of theatre fires, extends beyond the physical and temporal limits of the 
theatre and into the fabric of reality in the surrounding city, disrupting and redefining time, place, 
and identity. Disaster also disrupts the thin line between truth and fiction; in each of the three 
fires that serve as my case studies, civic responses were immediate; official inquiries were set up 
to conduct interviews, to craft a narrative, to provide answer for the central questions following a 
disaster: why and how? Bos, Ullberg and ’t Hart’s argument suggests that these “elite-level” 
narratives may subvert grass-roots memory through the civic power and weight given to official 
lines of inquiry. These official narrative construction often exclude facts that do not fit into their 
paradigmatic explanation, and Bos, Ullberg and ’t Hart point to the existence of memory-work 
artifacts that were created independently of any “elite-level” civic memorial performances. They 
write,  
Affected communities and victim groups will engage in memory work as part of the post-
traumatic coping process. They will construct shrines, conduct ceremonies, erect websites 
and others things designed to ‘work through’ their experiences, and in doing so they may 
also seek to obtain public attention, respect, and perhaps support for their plight…facts 
and interpretations about the past are put forward that are at odds with those put forward 




 Understood through the lens of disaster sociology, these archival narratives can be 
repositioned as not simply bizarre, fictional outliers, not as quirks of a hastily constructed 
historical record, but as vital contributory performances, undertaken in the post-disaster 
paradigm, towards re-establishing order in a disrupted society on a grass-roots level. The stories 
identify the tensions and ironies inherent in collecting and organizing material about a process of 
remembering that is defined in no small part by its subject matter: disasters disrupt. There is 
symmetry in the notion that the archival materials about these disasters should be equally as 
disrupted, and disruptive. As T. Joseph Scanlon remarks in Rewriting a Living Legend, “dramatic 





Part I, Chapter 3:  The Disaster After the Disaster 
 
Dispute and Negotiation 
 
 The impossible task facing the city of Richmond was immediately clear as the cold, 
cloudless night of December 26th gave way to brutal reality on the morning of December 27th. The 
disaster event had ended, the fire had died down, but Richmond was presented with a slew of 
new problems, the first among which was identifying those who had died. As Bos, Ullberg, and 
’t Hart write,  
The “disaster after the disaster” is often every bit as intense, intractable, and potentially 
debilitating as the acute phase…it is often only after the acute threat has abated that the 
existential uncertainty generated by a disaster begins to show its full significance. 
Disasters tend to generate public anxiety and sometimes extraordinary levels of collective 
stress. Because of the high stakes and pressures involved, they are times to be 
remembered.113 
 
 The “disaster after the disaster” — what I have termed the post-disaster paradigm — does, 
indeed, represent a time to be remembered. However, more important than configuring the post-
disaster paradigm as a time to remember is how memory work undertaken in the post-disaster 
paradigm performatively illustrates the new structures being created to resolve disaster’s 
disruptive effects. In Richmond, the early memory-work was produced within a religious 
context. The immediate construction of religion as a memorial framework “set the stage” for 
how the disaster would come to be remembered long after the disaster process had ended.  
Further, the authors argue,  
Memory work is not a self evident or value neutral activity. In fact, key questions that 
arise in the wake of a disaster — “what happened?”, “why?” and “how did we react?” — 
are likely to be a source of dispute and negotiation. We should therefore explore the 
“entangled process” of political remembrance a little more closely, with particular 
reference to the remembrance of disasters.114 
 
 The “disaster after the disaster” should be understood as a site in which various groups of 
social actors compete for narrative — and so, memorial — dominance and precedence. 
 
 76 
Throughout this dissertation, the terms “elite-level” and “grass-roots” are used to refer to 
survivor communities as organized in two broad groups. For the purposes of explaining the 
essentially contested nature of memory-work in Richmond’s post-disaster paradigm, elite-level 
should be understood to refer to religious institutions, while grass-roots memory work should be 
understood to refer to the smaller, and less effective, survivor communities.  
 The purpose of this chapter, then, follows along from Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart’s insights, 
and attempts to evaluate how the post-disaster paradigm may be treated in a way that produces a 
shift in the processes of creating memory-work that reveal the disrupted social order of the 
Richmond community, how governmental forces legislate in the wake of disasters, how symbolic 
rituals of death are imbricated in the creation of new social identity, how individuals attempt to 
fit their particular narratives into an official description, and how the convergence of these 
numerous methods of memory work unsettle an accepted narrative of the fire constructed solely 
from archival evidence, as I attempted to do in the previous chapter. These processional shifts in 
memory-work can be understood only in historical retrospect, once a new social order has been 
established. This kind of retroactive continuity — a re-writing and re-organization of the material 
of history through the lens of the successful memorial gestures of, in the case of the Richmond 
Theatre fire, an elite-level process of religious memory-work — illustrates how vital the post-
disaster paradigm is for producing culturally powerful narratival tropes that come to significantly 
define readings of the historical event. The methodological insight of broadening the scope of 
evidence to include cultural production about historical theatre fires shifts the reading and 
reconstruction of evidence from an historical/historiographical issue towards what Gary R. Webb 
calls “the popular culture of disaster.”115 
 Webb asks,  
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Is it possible for a single event to permanently alter social life? And, if so, how has that 
event changed things? Does everybody perceive those changes in the same way? Is there 
agreement or disagreement on the desirability of those changes? These questions point to 
an important, but not always appreciate, point about disasters - that they have a 
significant cultural dimension… following catastrophic events, survivors and 
responders…engage in a wide range of cultural production…new rituals are enacted to 
provide order and meaning to their lives, including those surround the handling of the 
dead. Makeshift memorials are created to allow survivors the opportunity to share their 
emotions and remember those they lost. And poems and songs are written in efforts to 
make sense of what happened.116 
 
 Thus, instead of simply recounting the narrative of the memory-work following the fire, 
this section considers how these performances of identity contributed to the construction of 
culture in Richmond in 1812 and beyond in order to demonstrate that what is produced by 
disaster is every bit as important as what is lost. 
A Whole City Bathed in Tears 
 
 In the early morning light of December 27th, a young George Wyeth Munford and his 
friends heard the chatter of stories about the fire at the theatre, and made their way to the spot. 
Where the theatre once stood, they found “a few blackened walls remaining, cracked and 
crumbling by tremendous heat,” and saw “smoking, smoldering ruins, and men with rakes, 
shovels and spades upturning and removing from the immense pile of ashes, where the ill-fated 
staircases fell, the charred remains of the awful dead.”117 This section describes the immediate 
reactions to the fire in Richmond and beyond in order to illustrate the shared nature of grief and 
mourning as essentially social and performative processes. In Richmond, the investigations 
launched by the government, and the inability of the city to remove the bodies from the site of 
the theatre, complicated the successful re-ordering of society to move through the post-disaster 
paradigm towards a new normalcy. The cleanup was a days long process, as Richmonders tried 
to carefully extricate burned bodies from rubble and ash. Identifying the bodies was a difficult 
process, given the burned and consumed remains; many bodies could only be identified by 
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“trinkets,” jewelry, or other markers of identity that survived the blaze. Mostly, the dead were 
identified through their absence; Richmond Mayor Benjamin Tate sent out representatives to go 
door to door in each of Richmond’s three wards, and to the neighboring city of Manchester, 
inquiring with family members if anyone was missing.118 
 The confusion and horror lingered long after the blaze abated, and early responses to the 
event helped to define it as a moment of shared grief, effecting not just victims, but the entire 
city and, eventually, the nation. Newspaper editors reinforced this idea; the American Standard 
wrote that “a sad gloom pervades [Richmond], and every countenance is cast down to the 
earth.”119 Thomas Ritchie’s Richmond Enquirer carried the editorial remarks begging, “Reader! 
Excuse our feelings, for they are the feelings of a whole city.”120  Meanwhile, Mayor Tate’s 
ordinance on December 27th noted “the city having been visited by a calamity…which has 
deprived us of our most valuable citizens, pervaded every family, and rendered our whole town 
one deep and gloomy scene of woe…”121  
 Richmond grieved together; the loss of one was a loss to all. “Within hours,” writes Jewel 
Spangler,  
The dead…began a rhetorical transformation into “citizens" and the mourners into 
“fellow citizens” in everything from private correspondence to news coverage to 
government resolutions. An ostensibly private catastrophe became public business, and 
performances of community grief were orchestrated by the city government, with the 
city’s inhabitants playing key roles as well.122 
 
 One consistency shared between different disaster events is their tendency to re-write the 
spatiotemporal context surrounding the event. The area immediately surrounding the site of the 
theatre was transformed from houses, shops, and churches into hospitals and morgues, the streets 
into the pathways of a funereal procession, clothing into markers of grief adorned by black crepe. 
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This phenomenon informs the construction of grief as shared and socially defined, as opposed to 
individualized. Anne Eyre reinforces this point, writing, 
Grief is fundamentally a social process: many Westerners think of grieving as an 
individual action, and much of grief therapy is individual focused, Yet the mourning 
rituals of many societies are complex, elaborate, spread out over months or years, and 
generally require collective participation.123 
 
 Understanding that the initial feelings of shared social grief stem from the disruption of 
normative social systems suggests that the emergence of ritualized behavior in the post-disaster 
paradigm lends itself to granting citizens a feeling of control and agency while facing enormous 
anxiety, collective stress, and uncertainty.124 This ritualized behavior becomes, through 
repetition, a contributory part of establishing new systems of order in a disrupted social 
paradigm, what Joseph Roach identifies as performance standing in for “an elusive entity that it 
is not but that it must vainly aspire both to embody and to replace.”125 Through repetition, these 
memorial performances become a part of “the invisible rituals of everyday life.”126 
 By noon the day following the fire, the Common Council had empowered Dr. Adams, W. 
Hay, Mr. Ralston and Mr. Gamble to head up the collection of the bodies in order “to soothe and 
allay, as much as in them lies, the grief of the friends and relations of the deceased.”127 Further, 
these men were to transport the bodies of the unidentifiable victims to public burying grounds, 
and to oversee the erecting of tombs and inscriptions “as to them may appear best calculated to 
record the melancholy and afflicting event.”128 All stores were declared shut for forty-eight hours 
in a show of respect to the dead, and all public “show or spectacle, or…any public dancing 
assembly within this city” were strictly forbidden for the term of four months, at the risk of the 




 Mayor Benjamin Tate, meanwhile, convened a meeting on the 27th at the Capitol building, 
no more than half a mile from the theatre, where it was decided that Wednesday, January 1st 
would be “a day of humiliation and prayer in consequence of the late melancholy event” and that 
it would simultaneously serve as the day of the funeral for the dead.130 By Saturday, the 28th of 
December, Richmond’s Executive Committee, under the pen of William Robertson, the Clerk of 
the Common Council, had put forth the first official markers of mourning, writing,  
We feel for the loss of those…worthy and meritorious citizens who fell a sacrifice to the 
flames, in the late conflagration of the Theatre; and that as a tribute of the very high 
respect which we entertain for…their memory, we will for the space of thirty days wear 
crape on our left arms.131 
 
 The Common Council ran into an immediate problem following their edict granting power 
to Adams, Hay, Ralston and Gamble to move the unidentified dead to a public burying ground:  
On the 28th it was represented to the President and Council, that the remains of the 
devoted victims could not conveniently be removed to the public burial ground, 
wherefore it was ordered that the relics should all be interred in the place where they fell, 
and that the ground should be purchased and appropriated accordingly.132 
 
 That is, the fire had made it impossible to remove the bodies because there was no way the 
bones could be separated from the ashes, and thus no way to ensure all of the remains were 
properly disposed. Instead, the city purchased the site of the theatre, and interred the bodies 
there, in what was called a “promiscuous ruin.”133 The site of the theatre, already marked by the 
trauma of the fire, was further cemented as a site of socially shared trauma, because the disaster 
re-wrote the space from a site of learning and social gathering “into one of awful horror and 
desperation that beggars all description.”134 
 The morbid promiscuity of the theatre’s ruination complicated the process of grief. Eyre 
writes, “the need to find, identify, name, and officially dispose of the dead is in part a symbolic 
activity, the mark of a civilized society that seeks through great effort to ensure individual 
treatment of each body.”135 Absent the possibility of individual treatment of the dead, Richmond 
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struggled to move on from the disaster, and the horror of the event continued to suffuse the city. 
There was no symbolic reassurance to the Richmond community that the government could 
handle the challenges of the disaster, especially when the symbolic head of the Commonwealth, 
Governor George Smith, was one of the victims of the blaze. The anxiety and mourning about 
the fire extended well beyond Richmond and Virginia; resolutions were passed in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives that its members would wear “crape on the left arm for 
one month, in terming of the condolence and sorrow” its members felt.136  
 The Committee of Investigation of the fire adequately summed up the anxieties of the 
community when they published their report. Although they had been able to functionally re-
construct the events of the night, they were left with one major question. 
Why, this fatality? Why have so many victims perished on this melancholy occasion? It 
cannot be said, that it was the combustibility of the building and the rapidity of the fire, 
great as they undoubtedly were, which altogether produced this mortality of the species 
— for we cannot believe, if large vomitoria had been erected of the passage of the crowd; 
if there has been doors enough to admit them, that more than one-tenth of an audience 
should have perished on the occasion. It was in the opinion of the committee that this ill 
construction of the Theatre itself, was principally its cause. How numerous were the 
occasions on which it had long before been said, as the crowd was slowly retiring at the 
end of a play, “Suppose the house were on fire, what should we do?” Yet we slept with 
too fatal security over the evil - we trusted and we are ruined.137 
 
 In this passage, the Committee of Investigation implicates the Richmond community-at-
large, and the government in particular, as contributing to the responsibility for the number of 
deaths, an example of how the pre-disaster society knowingly allowed a building already socially 
understood as dangerous to continue its operation. The building was poorly enough designed that 
numerous times before December 26th, people had remarked upon the danger of the space, yet no 
attempts were made to correct any of these oversights. This passage reveals that the theatre 
wasn’t a problem until it became a problem, and that, even though there was a pointed awareness 
of the potential dangers posed by the building, citizens and officials alike continued to attend 
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performances there. The “disaster after the disaster” provided an effective method of 
reconsidering the operation of history and its effect on society: if grief was shared amongst the 
citizens of Richmond, so, too, was responsibility. And if the government couldn’t protect its 
citizens, to whom would they turn? 
 Although the funeral had originally been planned for Wednesday, January 1st, evidence 
suggests it occurred on Sunday, January 5th.138 The procession moved throughout the city to the 
houses of the victims, collecting the remains of the dead, from Edward Trent’s house, up the 
main street towards the bank, to Capitol Hill, and then to the site of the theatre itself.139 The 
procession was led by the body of Elizabeth Patterson, behind whom were clergy members, 
ladies in carriages, the Common Council, Directors of the Bank, members of the Virginia 
Legislature, Court officials, and citizens following on foot and horseback.140 At Capitol Hill, the 
funeral was joined by “the bearers of two large Mahogany boxes, in which were enclosed the 
ashes and relics of the deceased.”141 
The whole scene defies description. A whole city bathed in tears! - - How awful the 
transition on this devoted spot! —  A few days since, it was the theatre of joy and 
merriment — animated by the sound of music and the human of a delighted multitude. It 
is not a funeral pyre! The receptacle of the relics of our friends! — And in short time a 
monument will stand upon it to point out where their ashes lay!142 
 
 The transformative power of the disaster rewrote the layout of the city, the dimensions of 
its population and, as so often happens, reality itself. The theatre, sitting on a former site of 
knowledge, amusement and, finally, violence, was transformed by the disaster into a grave, a 
final resting spot for dozens of unidentifiable bodies of Richmond citizens, an interment spot 
pregnant with significance, a scar on the psyche of the city, significant for its inextricable 
association with death. Owing to the impossibility of separating the bodies from the ashes of the 
fire, the city was not allowed the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the performance of 
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memory that mark post-disaster paradigms, and though Richmond held a funeral for the dead, it 
must be understood, on some level, as a symbolically hollow affair.  
Calamity Was Anticipated 
 
 Jonas Barish’s language addressing anti-theatrical prejudice in the nineteenth-century 
provides a handy metaphor for understanding the power of religious narratives constructed and 
used in a post-disaster paradigmatic reconstruction of reality: “…suspicion of the stage and of 
actors continues to smoulder,” he writes, “bursting out from time to time into sudden and 
disconcerting blaze.”143 Barish’s analogy suggests that anti-theatrical prejudice is not unlike fire 
insofar as the danger it poses to theatre always lurks, unseen, beneath the surface, ready to “burst 
out from time to time into sudden and disconcerting blaze” with only a small spark. This section 
evaluates religious screeds about the Richmond Theatre fire to demonstrate the tensions between 
grass roots and elite-level memory-work. If, as has been established, the post-disaster paradigm 
presents an opportunity for social (re)construction and cultural production, we must accept that 
there are numerous on-going memory-works, and that these attempts may come into conflict 
with one another in ways that productively reveal the operations of memory-work relevant to the 
reordering of social norms.  
 In consideration of how the Richmond society responded to the fire, through social rituals 
and urban mythology, by paying attention to the rhetoric from behind the pulpit, I argue that the 
post-disaster paradigm presented an opportunity for a powerful religious construction of the 
event as evidence of God’s distaste for theatre, and that this opportunism established the 
dominant mode of thinking about, and remembering the Richmond Theatre fire. That the 
Monumental Church that now stands on the spot of the theatre is, perhaps, proof enough of this 
narrative domination. However, the subtle methods through which religious institutions 
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constructed the disaster as inherently Godly, and then created subscription schemes to provide 
for the construction of the church help to deepen an understanding of the techniques of memory-
work undertaken in the post-disaster paradigm by elite-level memorial processing. This section 
also serves as a touchstone for considerations of the shifting relationship between theatre and 
religion, evidenced by similar religious responses to Brooklyn and Chicago, illustrating a century 
long arc in which religion, and religious memory-work, dealt with the ever increasing popularity 
of theatre. 
 The December 28th proclamation declaring the impossibility of moving the victims from the 
scene of the fire further demanded that “the…Committee is hereby authorized and empowered to 
purchase of the proprietors thereof, as soon as may be possible, all the ground included within 
such walls,” and that “the Common-Hall of the City of Richmond hold the funds of the City 
pledged to defray the expenses of purchasing the said Area, and of the enclosure thereof,” giving 
power to the government to purchase and own the new burial ground.144 The power of the 
disaster transformed the location from a theatre, to a funeral pyre, to a burial ground and, 
eventually, to a church. This tendency towards transformation is not merely a rhetorical device in 
the historical records, but illustrates the extent of the influence enjoyed by elite-level institutions 
in the post-disaster paradigm to define the space and, in doing so, to control the memory of the 
event. These early narrative constructions significantly influenced the construction of the 
evidence about the fire, and of how histories of the fire would be written. 
 ”How awful the transition on this devoted spot!” one account wrote, “it is now a funeral 
pyre! The receptacle of the relics of our friends - and in a short time a monument will stand upon 
it to point out where their ashes lay!”145 The Monument Committee, headed by John Marshall, 
began soliciting and accepting donations from Virginians and citizens all over the country in 
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order to defray the cost of purchasing the land and erecting an eventual monument. Marshall’s 
involvement in the Monument Committee is vital for how it implies the importance of reading 
material about the development of the Monumental Church as existing at the intersections of 
law, memory, and religion. As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Marshall’s contributions to the elite-level processing of the disaster inherently suggest that the 
“official” memory-work, which sought to reinscribe the site of the disaster as a Christian church, 
was both legally and morally correct.  
 Jewell Spangler argues, in American Mourning: Catastrophe, Public Grief, and the Making 
of Civic Identity in the Early National South, that the rhetoric of memorial writings on the 
Richmond theatre fire “evinced a shift toward a more inclusive notion of public mourning and 
American belonging,” and that, “what stands out is the thoroughly apolitical nature of this 
moment of national grief. The Richmond victims were not (and could not have been) turned into 
martyrs for a national cause — there was no cause, except perhaps to improve safety standard in 
public buildings.”146 Spangler’s reading of the memorial writing ignores the inherently political 
nature of the church — implied in part by Marshall’s involvement — and the way in which the 
members of the clergy constructed their narratives about theatre in the post-disaster paradigm. 
These narrative constructions contributed significantly to the public’s understanding of the event. 
There absolutely was a national cause for which the victims of the fire were turned into martyrs, 
lest their deaths would have been in vain: the Richmond Theatre fire demonstrated God’s distaste 
for the theatrical, and numerous religious sermons specifically highlighted that point.  
 Behind their pulpits and through their publications, preachers tried to make sense of the 
event for their parishioners. James Muir’s sermon suggests that God may have spoken to some of 
the victims through dreadful premonitions, a trope commonly evoked following a disaster: 
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The calamity was anticipated by some of the sufferers. I do not mean that any had an idea 
that the Theatre should that evening be their grave, but they were uneasy, they knew not 
why; and apprehended an unknown by fatal evil…God, in pity to men, gives secret 
intimations in a manner none can explain, of what he designs that man may prepare to 
meet their god…One very amiable, and had for many years past been solicitous to know 
and to serve her God, felt an unaccountable anxiety for the welfare of her husband, who 
was then absent. Nothing had occurred to excite anxiety, but it was excited, and in a 
degree that she was restless, until she had reached Richmond. Reluctantly she attended 
the theatre, at the importunity of her young friends, declaring that for the last time she 
would tread forbidden ground, and sacrifice her own judgment tot the gratification of 
others. She effected her greater indeed, but so injured that in a few days she expired. The 
hand of God led her to the fatal spot, no doubt for wise reasons, which, for the present, 
are involved in impenetrable mystery.147 
 
 The trope of premonitory feelings of disaster in Muir’s writing suggest the poverty of 
thought associated with being closed off from the influence of the supernatural. Muir’s sermon 
also invokes the dramatic trope of tragic irony when the Young Woman agreed to attend the 
theatre on that fatal night, but said it would be “the last time she would tread forbidden 
ground.”148 The obvious implication of Muir’s insight points to a more easily explicable model 
of the disaster whereby the victim became a victim through faults of her own.  
 Ann Tuke Alexander’s 1812 Remarks on the Theatre argues that the theatre blinded 
Christians from their beliefs, writing that theatre patrons might think, “surely from the place of 
amusement, sorrow and gloom must be banished for ever!”149 However, Alexander writes, their 
thoughts would eventually turn to God: 
In a little while, however, these enraptured beholders begin to give way to a different 
train of reflections. They first query within themselves, Can this gay company be 
composed only of professing Christians? Have those who are now acting their ludicrous 
part on the stage, and those who are entertained at the expense of their time and talents, 
been baptized in the name of Jesus? Have they vowed, or has it been promised for them, 
that they should “renounce the devil and all his works, the vain pomps and glory of this 
world, with all covetous desires of the same, and the carnal desires of the flesh, so that 
they will not follow nor be led by them?”150 
 
 “Let these awful inquiries suffice to awaken the consciences of those, who have felt 
themselves secure within the walls of a play-house,” Alexander writes.151 By suggesting that the 
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audience were “enraptured beholders,” Alexander positions spectacle as the primary contributory 
factor in theatre’s power to hold sway over audience members which, in turn, distracts the 
critical thinking abilities of those audience members to question the Godliness of the players 
onstage. In Alexander’s thought experiment, a critical observer would come to note that, any 
who give of their time to the stage could not have been baptized in Jesus’ name. In Alexander’s 
construction of audience members at the Richmond Theatre, they are following and being led by 
the vain pomps and glories of the world of the stage, by the covetous and carnal desires of the 
performers, and so are engaging in inherently anti-Christian behavior. The implication is that the 
audience, guilty of worshipping another God, deserves the fiery fate that awaits them. 
 Archibald Alexander (no relation) delivered a sermon in Philadelphia to the Medical Class 
of the University of Pennsylvania, on January 8th, 1812, in which he argues that a “morbid 
sensibility has, with many in this age, usurped the place, and claimed the honor, due to moral 
principle and religion,” and that “this morbid sensibility is related to the spectacle of suffering 
humanity,” which “will always excite our sensibility, unless the feelings be blunted by vicious 
indulgence, restrained by prejudice, or extinguished by the long prevalence of malignant 
passions.”152 In tying together the evil of “spectacle” with “suffering humanity,” Alexander first 
advances the argument about spectacle’s allure provided by Ann Alexander, and also subtly 
suggests that theatre — an arena defined in part by its relationship to spectacle — is guilty of 
creating the “morbid sensibility” in which exist “vicious indulgence” and “the longer prevalence 
of malignant passions.” 
 Examples of religiously themed doomsday rhetoric made use of some of the recent events 




O! How can the heart conceive, or tongue express the awful anguish created by such a 
death, but such a parting? None, but God and those who have survived the shock of the 
fire at Richmond! Tremendous as the shock of an earthquake, and by far more fatal than 
all the recent shocks which have been felt in our country, from Maine to Georgia: truly 
the judgments of God are abroad in the earth!153 
 
 Such attempts invoked the shifting of the New Madrid fault lines as a natural phenomenon 
in order to tie a causal linkage between the events, implying that the fire was forewarned, but 
such warning were ignored. In some cases, the fire was evidence of God’s distaste for theatrical 
performances, and proof of the Christian conception of the theatre as a source of social evil, as 
well as the originary point for socially disruptive practices. “No doubt,” one such publication 
reads, “the present prevailing system of Nudism had its origin in the Playhouse, and in the person 
of a prostitute for a player: but who could have supposed that such a mode of dress, or rather, 
undress, would ever have been adopted by virtuous women?”154 The same sources asks, 
Is there a loose, debauched, depraved ungodly man or woman, who, generally speaking, 
does not frequent the theatre? It is the resort of the most worthless characters in 
existence; it is properly the Flesh-market of the city; it is the temple in which the world’s 
trinity reside and are adored — ‘the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of 
life.155 
 
 The invocation and perversion of the Trinity in the above passage illustrates the breaking 
of the First Commandment, denying the presence or worship of other gods over the Christian 
God, and suggests that the theatre was a social space of such worship through its tendency to 
promote a social spectacle of a site in which one could “see and be seen.” Even the more evenly 
tempered responses took a critical approach to the position of theatre in society. William Hill’s 
sermon, delivered in Winchester, Virginia, suggests that the fire was an opportunity to evaluate 
“a very vicious humor, which always raged in the world: that of censuring the faults of others, 
whilst we overlook our own.”156 Hill asks, “are we to conclude that [the victims] were the guilty, 
and we the innocent?,” suggesting that, in the Divine practice of God, it may be possible to read 
moral righteousness, but that the pre-ordinance of the victims of Richmond does not imply either 
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guilt or innocence.157 Still, even this relatively polite approach is problematized by Hill’s 
clarification that,  
While I sincerely commiserate the unhappy victims who have lately fallen at the theatre 
in Richmond…I am constrained to declare myself an enemy to the amusements of the 
theatre…not that I suppose a theatre might not be so ordered and regulated, as to become 
a powerful auxiliary to virtue, patriotism, and literature. I believe they formerly answered 
these purposes in ancient Greece and Rome…I view them, at present, as little better than 
schools of vice.158 
 
 From a religious perspective, the fire offered an opportunity to demonize and vilify the 
theatre on a national level. This was no random confluence of similar ideology, but a 
coordinated, governmentally supported campaign. On the 29th of December, Nicholas Smethen, 
Chaplain to the House of Representatives, gave a sermon to a crowd at the U.S. Capitol Building, 
saying, 
We sincerely wish that every minister of religion in the United States would, with pious 
zeal, embrace this opportunity, which the providence of the Almighty has put in his 
power, to call upon the people to seek that temper and practice of righteousness which 
exalteth a nation, and to forsake to crooked ways of sin, which are a dishonor to any 
people, especially to Americans who are so favored with civil and religious blessings.159 
 
 Smethen may have been speaking in a subtle code, without direct reference to the 
institution of theatre, but the meaning was clear: the sinful wages of theatre were death. The 
religious construction of the disaster was Divine justice, an Act of God, a proper and fitting 
illustration of what fate awaited those who attended the theatre, a den of iniquity and sin. These 
and other religious sermons provided elite-level processing of the disaster event as a distinctly 
religious concern which, in turn, strongly influenced how the disaster would be remembered and, 
eventually, historicized. This influence is most strongly seen in the memorial constructed to the 
dead. The powerful sway reverends held on the imaginations of their congregations, as well as 




Gave rise to the suggestion that besides the monument proposed by the Common 
Council, there should be erected by public subscription, on the ruins of the Theatre, an 
edifice to be set apart and consecrated for the worship of God.160 
 
 On the ashes and bones of the theatre and its victims, Richmond would build a church. 
Spangler’s assertion that “what stands out is the thoroughly apolitical nature of this moment of 
national grief,” holds little weight when one considers the wide-reaching influence religious 
responses had over the socially shared nature of the grief for the victims of the fire.161 
Sociologically, the construction of the Church on the site of the former theatre is extremely 
significant: the remains of the victims were literally written over in service of the political cause 
of the church’s anti-theatrical prejudice.  
 The plan evidently spoke to a need already felt in the city of Richmond for more church 
space, and the “Association for erecting a Church on Shockoe Hill” teamed up with the 
Monument Committee of the Common Council by that February: 
Resolved, That the committee common Hall, in purchasing the whole of the said ground, 
(meaning the whole lot on which the Theatre stood,) and arrange with the said committee, 
appointed in pursuance of the fourth article, be authorized to unite with the committee of 
the most eligible plan on which to appropriate the ground so to be purchased to the joint 
purpose of erecting thereon both the monument and the curt. 
 It is proposed and approved by the members of both the above committees, that forty 
feet square fronting on H street, and in the centre of the Theatre lot on that front, be 
reserved for the monument, to be enclosed by and under the direction of the committee of 
the Common Hall, and that the remainder of the ground be appropriate to the erection of 
a church, under the direction and control of the committee or agents of the above 
mentioned association…162 
 
 By August, enough money had been raised so that the Church Association was able to 
engage Robert Mills to design and construct the building. Mills was an architect of enormous 
renown, a Charleston, South Carolina man who had transplanted to Philadelphia to study under 
Benjamin Henry Latrobe, and who had experience studying under Thomas Jefferson, as well.163 
On August 1st, Mills — known as the “first American architect” — directed the laying of the 
corner stone of the church.164 By late March/early April of 1814, the sum of five thousand 
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dollars, collected via public subscription, was used to pay down the debt on the land on which 
the monument would stand.165 The fact of the public subscription undertaken for funding the 
Church illustrates how religious screeds had successfully dominated the memory-work of the 
early post-disaster paradigm. Just a few weeks later, pews were sold to prominent members of 
the Richmond community.166 By mid-1814, the Church was officially open for business.  
 Anne Eyre argues that “the importance of remembering the past is illustrated post-disaster 
in the erection and maintenance of permanent reminders of tragic events,” and that “such areas 
are ‘sacred’ spaces, that is to say they are set apart as being of special significance and regarded 
as worthy of particular respect.”167 Further, Eyre argues, “permanent memorials may focus on 
the importance of looking forward as well as back to an event.”168 Gary Webb notes, “the post-
disaster time period is a contested terrain in which various groups (victims, the media, and public 
officials) attempt to make sense of the event. In some cases, there is agreement on what 
happened, and in other cases, there is conflict and disagreement.”169 In the “contested terrain” of 
Richmond in the days and weeks following the fire — indeed, because disaster is boundless, it 
may be appropriate to formulate “contested terrain” on a national level — it is clear that religious 
forces controlled the narrative of constructing meaning and memory. This can be seen most 
clearly in the Monumental Church itself, of course; the Church literally surrogates the absent 
theatre, and the victims who died within that theatre. It can also be seen in the quick rush to 
perform symbolically meaningful rituals of entombing and sacralizing the dead. The powerful 
and incendiary rhetoric used by preachers constructed the theatre as a location of vice and evil, 
and God’s involvement in the destruction of the building, and in the deaths of the victims, as an 
act of justice against a house of iniquity. These rhetorical devices, understood as forms of elite-
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level processing of the disaster event, performatively “set the stage” for the Richmond Theatre 
fire to be remembered.  
 Somewhat appropriately, the Monumental Church’s construction pays subtle homage to its 
location’s significance through the architectural style in which it was designed. Mills, perhaps 
referencing the proposed and designed, but rejected, theatrical complex designed by his teacher 
Latrobe in 1798, designed the church in the relatively rare architectural style of Greek Revival. 
While I doubt Mills was purposefully invoking theatre’s past, it’s difficult not to see, in the 
columns and porticos, in the rounded top-level seating, in the way the pulpit provides a skene-
like backdrop to the main playing area, hints of Greek theatre design. The theatricality of the 
architecture of the Church suggests a link between the inherently theatrical nature of the disaster, 
and the memory-work undertaken by religious institutions in the post-disaster paradigm. In the 
fire, the Church saw not just a tragedy, but also an opportunity for creation, a chance to allow the 
“smouldering” suspicion of the stage and actors by religious forces the chance to “burst 
out…into sudden and disconcerting blaze,” and, through that blaze, forge a religious anti-




Part I, Epilogue: 
Monumental: From Richmond to Brooklyn 
 
 As I have argued throughout this chapter, the immediate and most powerful memory-work 
produced following the Richmond Theatre fire was located in elite-level religious institutional 
processing of the event as a form of divine justice. The historical recounting and analysis of 
historical material undertaken in this chapter models the remainder of the dissertation by 
suggesting that, in the disrupted existence of a post-disaster paradigmatic reorganization of 
society, narrative and memory are essentially contested through the struggle between elite-level 
and grass-roots social communities. The prevailing side of this power struggle produces 
significant material that contributes enormously to how the event will be written about and 
remembered. In Richmond, religious responses won the struggle, and the cultural and memorial 
material that was produced — most notably, the Monumental Church — tended to reinforce the 
value of the religious construction of the event. 
 If the initial sociological rhetoric of the Richmond Theatre fire was religiously incendiary, 
another, more subtle strain developed around the importance of never forgetting the event, lest it 
repeat, as evidenced by this passage from Calamity at Richmond: “the scene which ensued out of 
the house, was witnessed by many, and like that within, will long be remembered, but probably 
never adequately described.”171 There is, however, a problem with the religiously constructed 
narrative of God’s divine justice as the defining reason behind the Richmond Theatre fire, 
because such rhetoric implies the inherent moral righteousness of the event. “If an event is 
defined as unforeseeable or beyond human control,” Webb argues, “it is not likely that corrective 
measures will be taken to prevent future occurrences.”172 Because if the occurrence of the 
 
 94 
disaster is beyond the ken of mortal men — if, indeed, it is God’s justice in action — then there 
is no need to remember, and, without memory, no ability to take corrective measures.  
 This point may answer a central question that develops when these three fires are 
considered side-by-side-by-side: if these events were important enough to merit specific calls for 
remembering, why did theatre fires keep “bursting out…into sudden and disconcerting blaze?”173 
It is obvious that no corrective measures were taken, or otherwise, that any corrective measures 
taken were effective only so long as their link to the victims remained significant and visible. But 
memory, like theatre, becomes itself through disappearance. In 1904, Arthur Hornblow, 
responding to the Iroquois disaster in Chicago, wrote, “the disaster is forgotten in a week, the 
theaters do as little as they can, gradually neglecting the most ordinary precautions, the public 
does not give the matter a thought, and everything goes on merrily as before unless a fresh horror 
occurs to teach us another lesson.”174 If there is a “grotesque sameness” about these three theatre 
fires, it may best be articulated not in the disaster event itself, but in the post-disaster 
paradigmatic fading of the disaster’s social significance. 
 Memory is short, and because the elite-level institutional response successfully positioned 
the memory of the disaster as inherently divine, Webb’s insight carries particularly significant 
weight: “if an event is defined as unforeseeable or beyond human control, it is not likely that 
corrective measures will be taken to prevent future occurrences.”175  In 1876, in Brooklyn, New 
York, this lack of corrective measures, the problematic nature of successfully institutionally 
processed memory and history, would prove a fertile environment for a “fresh horror” to occur 
on a clear, cold night in December, not unlike the night the Richmond Theatre burned down.
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Part II, Introduction: 
 
The Conflagration Era: Brooklyn, 1876 
 
 The second case study of this dissertation focuses on the Brooklyn Theatre fire in 1876. 
One challenge I experienced with researching and writing about Richmond was the absence of a 
digitally indexed source of information in the form of newspapers accounts of the event. While I 
was able to secure microform copies of the Richmond Enquirer, in the absence of an abundance 
of readily available reporting on the event, I relied heavily upon disaster books and religious 
sermons for use as evidence. The Brooklyn Fire was easier to research owing to the New York 
Times, New York Tribune, and Brooklyn Daily Eagle archives online. More abundant evidence 
made it possible to produce a more nuanced analysis that foregrounds the interpretive framework 
of traumatic transformation and production as marking the post-disaster paradigm. By this, I 
mean that the memorial and cultural material produced following the fire operated along themes 
of sociopersonal transformation as a productive response to the disaster. This is seen through the 
definitional performances related to the disaster in religious sermons, relief efforts provided by 
the Brooklyn Theatre Fire Relief Association (BTFRA), and how the disaster produced urban 
mythologies that articulated the importance of transformation, most notably around Steele 
MacKaye’s attested contributions to the development of technologies of theatre safety owing to 
his alleged attendance at the theatre the night in burned down, and the disastrously significant re-
writing of Kate Claxton’s past and future. 
 By traumatic transformation, I mean a view of the Brooklyn Theatre fire that constructs the 
meaning of disaster as inherently related to sudden and violent social and physical change. Often, 
these changes are thought of only in the negative terms of destruction and death. Yet disaster 
sociologists recognize the important contributions disaster make to increase the prevalence of 
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performances of social solidarity, as well as the way a disaster event demands response from 
civic institutions to correct negligence and/or apathy in the public. While in Richmond, religious 
responses gained immediate and powerful purchase on the narrative of the event, and so 
dominated the modes of memorial production related to the event, the rhetoric espoused by 
clergy in relation to the Brooklyn fire was considerably more permissive of theatre’s “sinful” 
nature, and focused primarily on encouraging citizens to live their lives as monuments to the 
dead. This illustrates what I mean when I use the terms traumatic transformation and production: 
memory-work created in the disrupted post-disaster paradigm that contains a significant link to 
the disaster as an originary event, which is specifically geared towards re-establishing social 
order. 
  I use these terms specifically in relation to the Brooklyn fire to play upon the productive 
relationship between elite-level and grass roots memory work that marks Brooklyn’s post-
disaster paradigm as unique amongst these three case studies. The attempt to read Brooklyn’s 
fire through this concept of traumatic transformation stems from the developing rhetorical 
devices newspapers and other sources used in discussing the fire, many of which highlighted the 
inherent theatricality of the disaster, and of the responses to the disaster. More information also 
meant a much greater ability to track the development and spread of confabulations that use the 
Brooklyn blaze as originary, including the mythology that developed around Kate Claxton as a 
fire jinx. This kind of traumatic mythology will be understood to be, itself, a form of traumatic 
transformation. 
 The sociological force of contemporaneous events in the rest of the United States in the 
latter part of the 1800s may have contributed to the post-disaster paradigmatic construction of 
memory work through the notion of traumatic transformation. The narrative constructions used 
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in the evidence about 1876 Brooklyn Theatre fire shared significant similarities to traumatic 
transformations that were occurring in the country at large. These transformations were the result 
of sociopolitical tensions produced by the fallout of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and of the 
rapid urbanization and expansion of the U.S.A., constructed and often funded by industrial 
revolution.  
 The industrial revolution played a major contributory role in the what Scott G. Knowles 
terms “the Conflagration Era,” a time in which the urban population and infrastructural density 
of cities made for “an unprecedented crucible for disasters,” in which “modern urbanization itself 
emerg[ed] as a process marked by fires, floods, and the imminent risks inherent in new and 
untested meetings of people, material and environment,” producing “a dialectic of trial and error 
tremendously productive of new disaster knowledge.”1 Knowles’ insight further supports my use 
of traumatic transformation as a perspective through which to understand memorial production 
of Brooklyn Theatre fire: disaster processes generate opportunities for change and 
transformation, and elite-level and grass-roots processing of the Brooklyn Theatre fire made use 
of the rhetoric of transformation embedded within the process of modern urbanization. 
According to Knowles, cities in the Conflagration Era, like performance and disaster, became 
themselves through disappearance.  
 The cultural context of America at the end of 1876 greatly contributed to the disruptive 
power of the fire at the Brooklyn Theatre. Independent of such an historical context, the 
Brooklyn blaze would still be considered a destructive and significant fire in theatre’s history. 
However, the extent to which the fire caused social disruption was greatly magnified by a 
country already struggling with issues of identity and loss, a cultural milieu already disrupted by 
serious and contentious political and economic instability, a country barely a century old that 
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was in a state of perpetual transformation. If the political and social climate in Richmond in 1811 
was tense, then 1876 was a powder keg. Struggling in the middle of the Long Depression, the 
country was also contending with the scars of the Civil War, and a contentious Presidential 
election cycle between the Republican Rutherford Hayes and the Democrat Samuel J. Tilden. 
The election was still undecided by December, while riots broke out in South Carolina following 
the gubernatorial election in that state.  
 The Long Depression was caused by a multitude of factors, but most notably the Panic of 
1873 when the post Civil War economic boom slowed, and the railroad industry, having enjoyed 
unprecedented private and public support, failed to show returns on its investments. Most notable 
was the failure of Jay Cooke’s eponymous bank to successfully market its enormous investment 
in the Northwestern Pacific Railroad to buyers. Cooke’s Bank ended up owing approximately 
80% of the project, and when these liabilities became public, people began removing their 
money from the bank, and the company failed, causing widespread panic in the American 
banking system. As this economic panic rippled outward, other cities struggled to maintain their 
infrastructure as well; notable among those cities were Chicago, which, only two years prior to 
the Panic of 1873, had suffered enormous property loss in the Great Chicago Fire, and Boston, 
which, in 1872, had suffered a similarly destructive citywide conflagration.2  
 The Presidential election between Rutherford and Tilden was controversial, equaled only, 
perhaps, by the widespread corruption in the office of sitting President Ulysses S. Grant, 
including the 1869 Black Friday gold panic, and the 1875 Whiskey Ring, which had damaged 
American trust in the office. Both candidates —Rutherford and Tilden — ran on a platform of 
reform, and each began immediately attacking the other: Rutherford argued that Tilden’s 
Democrats were responsible for the bloodshed of the Civil War, while Tilden suggested 
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Rutherford’s Republicans were morally bankrupt. This political theatre came to a head on 
Election Day, when Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina returned their electoral votes for 
Tilden. These returns, however, were marked with reports of violent threats being made against 
Republican voters among other controversies, and though Tilden had the popular vote, as well as 
a majority of the Electoral vote, the status of who had won the Presidential election remained 
undecided until the Compromise of 1877.3  
 Set against the backdrop of these national tensions, Shook and Palmer launched their 1876 
season on October 9th, with Clara Morris performing in A.E. Lancaster and Julian Magnus’ 
Conscience, a remount of the same production at Union Square. By early November, the theatre 
was advertising Lawrence Barret and Edwin Davenport as the stars of a production of Julius 
Caesar, alongside advertisements for the forthcoming Two Orphans, set to debut December 4th, 
and scheduled to feature “all the magnificent Union Square Theatre Scenery.”4 
 
 100 
Part II, Chapter 4: Memorably Disastrous 
 
Most Liberal and Most Enterprising 
 
 In it’s very short history, from its opening in 1871 to the Brooklyn Building Association 
awarding the theatre to Shook and Palmer, the Brooklyn theatre space was marked by themes of 
transformation: as an enterprise, the building was an attempt to transform the theatrical landscape 
of New York by establishing a theatre in Brooklyn that could rival the first-rate artistic and 
financial success of Broadway. In order to establish this kind of success, the Conways, the 
original proprietors of the theatre, instituted a platform of almost daily transformations of 
productions, loading in and loading out shows with incredible frequency. Finally, the site 
transformed again as it passed from the hands of the Conways, to their daughters, to the 
Brooklyn Building Association (BBA), to Shook and Palmer. This chapter traces the history of 
the Brooklyn Theatre, and of the people who were most closely associated with the construction, 
management, and production practice at the theatre, and of the production of Two Orphans that 
was running on December 5th, 1876 in order to illustrate how themes of transformation were 
already imbricated within the organization of life in of pre-disaster Brooklyn. 
 The numerous political and social stresses wrought by the industrial revolution constructed 
the USA as a nation in flux, illustrated by the contentious Presidential election cycle, the South 
Carolina gubernatorial election riots, the rapid spread and collapse of the railroad industry, and 
the subsequent banking collapse. The industrial revolution was a form of reflexive 
modernization, a series of national growing pains in which the development of new technologies 
simultaneously created greatly enriched environments for disaster. The nation transformed, 
sometimes traumatically. The Brooklyn Theatre fire may be positioned as a microcosm of those 
stresses; Scott G. Knowles writes,  
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Disasters are not external in some magical way to the realities of the human-shaped 
environment or political culture in which they occur. In fact, it is probably best 
understood the other way around. In the patterns of property destruction, in the 
communities damaged and those protected, in the technologies and policies available to 
limit or avoid them, a disaster mirrors the prevailing values of the society in which it 
occurs.5  
 
 Primarily, by illustrating this history, I hope to demonstrate how transformation was a 
theme that was always already embedded within the Brooklyn Theatre via the numerous changes 
in management, production style, and its shifting relationship to New York City, in order to 
argue for transformation as a way to analyze and understand cultural production in the post-
disaster paradigm. 
 The theatre was built in 1871 in Brooklyn, a city that bore the nickname “City of 
Churches.” Richmond in 1811 was a city bereft of Churches, and when the fire occurred at the 
Richmond Theatre, preachers identified an opportunity to construct the disaster as a form of 
divine justice, which, in turn, contributed to the memorial production of the Monumental 
Church. The nickname “City of Churches” would also forecast how the Brooklyn Theatre fire 
would be memorialized. The spatial significance of the theatre and the multitudinous presence of 
churches cannot be underestimated; in the post-disaster paradigm, preachers from around the 
City of Churches contributed significantly to defining the fire as an opportunity for inward 
reflection and outward, positive sociopersonal transformation through their funereal speeches, a 
point I take up in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 The structure was erected for Frederick and Sarah Conway, actors and spouses, and 
originally bore their name. Sarah, born Sarah Crocker in Connecticut in 1834, made her debut at 
the National Theatre in New York in 1849, and met and married the British expatriate Frederick 
Bartlett Conway during their mutual engagement at the Broadway Theatre a handful of years 
later. Conway, son of famous British actor William Conway, had made a name for himself 
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playing opposite Edwin Forrest, but was also noted for his versatility; he could transform 
through serious, dramatic roles to light, comedic roles with panache. Conway struck a figure that 
was described as “thoroughly English,” with a “stout, well-knit figure, not over tall…light hair, 
blue eyes, prominent features, and rich complexion” and was quickly a favorite of the Broadway 
stage following his 1850 debut as Charles Surface in Richard Sheridan’s School for Scandal.6 
Perhaps, however, Conway was unwittingly an even greater favorite of the New York social 
scene; despite not often performing in the city, he was known for his “ludicrous but entirely 
unaffected pomposity…intensified in effect by the spontaneous magniloquence of his speech and 
by his use of an inexhaustible store of orotund epithet and stately marching phrase.”7  
 Sarah Crocker married Frederick Conway in May of 1852, only months after his first wife 
died. Crocker was small, with a thin, expressive face, a graceful body, and a full head of curly 
dark hair to compliment Frederick’s receding hairline. She was noted for her sharp intellect, and 
was described as “of strong analytic power, sufficient to fit out half a dozen leading ladies.”8 The 
Conways acted together frequently, and when Frederick was asked to manage the brand new 
Pike’s Opera House in Cincinnati in 1859, Sarah Conway began to develop an interest in theatre 
management. Following a tour in England in 1861, Frederick and Sarah Conway looked to settle 
down, and they were offered the opportunity to run the Park Theatre in Brooklyn, an area that, 
legally and geographically, was separate from New York, and was lacking in theatre, making it a 
fertile field of endeavor. While Frederick was probably the better actor, Sarah was undeniably 
the better manager, aided, no doubt, by her “strong analytic power.” The Conways replaced 
Gabriel Harrison as manager of the Park Theatre in 1864.  When that building proved too small 
for their theatrical ambitions, the Conways contracted Thomas R. Jackson to build a world-class 
theatre for Brooklyn in 1871. The building of this theatre was, in some small regard, an act of 
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revenge, according to the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, who wrote upon Sarah Conway’s death in 1875 
that the Conways “never forgave New York for allowing them to be crowded out of it. They 
yearned to rival the managers that had slighted them, as they thought, and determined to 
establish a first class theatre” in Brooklyn.9 In accepting the managerial role at the Park Theatre 
in 1864, the Conways began a project of transforming the city into a site of first-rate theatrical 
production. In contracting Jackson to build a brand new theatre, they doubled down on that plan.  
 Jackson was an architect with an impressive and lengthy resume, who had designed 
theaters and buildings all over the country, including the new Wallack’s Theatre in New York 
barely a decade prior, and who boasted three decades of architectural experience. Jackson set 
about to build a theatre that could rival playhouses in New York, contributing to the 
transformation of Brooklyn into a theatrical destination; his design, ambitious and beautiful, was 
constructed over the spring and summer of 1871. The building occupied an L-shaped lot around 
Dieter’s Hotel, with the front doors of the building leading from Washington Street into the 
vestibule and lobby. This portion of the building represented the short side of the L-shape at 
about 27x40 feet; the longer side housed the stage and audience seating, and ran parallel to 
Flood’s Alley, opening up, from a stage door, onto Johnson Street, occupying 127x70 feet, and 
featuring three levels of seating. The parquet and parquet circles on the first floor were designed 
as expensive, exclusive seating for six hundred patrons. The second and third tiers were much 
more accessible in price, seating approximately a thousand patrons between them. The green 
room and music rooms were located under the stage — each had a window leading to the outside 
— and the dressing rooms extended up three stories in each of the wings. At their request, 
Jackson additionally built a private apartment for the Conways above the building; at Sarah 
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Conway’s request, he designed a secret tunnel running underground from the stage to the box 
office, so that she could communicate with her business staff even while performing.  
 Embedded within the shape and dimensions of the theatrical space in the dense urbanity of 
Brooklyn are the themes of transformation that would dominate the memorial and cultural 
production in the post-disaster paradigm. These themes can be uncovered through Urlich Beck, 
Wolfgang Bonss, and Christopher Lau’s term “reflexive modernization.” They argue, “when 
modernization reaches a certain stage…it begins to transform…not only the key institutions but 
also the very principles of society. But this time the principles and institutions being transformed 
are those of modern society.”10 The processes of transformation that created the possibility of an 
urban environment simultaneously contributed to the increased presence of hazards inherent 
within that environment. Beck, Bonss, and Lau’s insight provides significant opportunity for 
understanding the transformative power embedded within the layout of the Brooklyn Theatre: the 
processes of transformation that underlay the opportunity afforded by the theatre to transform 
Brooklyn into a major space of theatrical production also contributed significantly to the 
disastrous problems in emptying the space safely and quickly. In particular, the L-shape of the 
building organized the interior of the theatre and lobby in such a way that patrons in the second 
and third floors had to contend with numerous sharp, right-hand turns in order to descend the 
staircases. In the context of panic, the failure of patrons to safely navigate these turns created 
numerous human pile-ups around the staircases. Understood as an example of reflexive 
modernization, the shape and dimensions of the theatre were used to navigate and stake out a 
location in the dense urban environment of Brooklyn as a performative act of transformation, but 
simultaneously contributed to disastrous loss of life, and to the post-disaster paradigmatic 
framing of the event as transformative. 
 
 105 
 Conway’s Brooklyn Theatre opened in October 1871, with a performance of Edward 
Butler-Lytton’s Money.11 The theatre became the primary performance space in Brooklyn — 
although that was not, perhaps, saying much. Upper-class Brooklyn residents were just as likely 
to ferry over to New York City to fulfill their theatrical desires, and the Conways responded by 
presenting a diverse array of performances, changing the bill almost nightly. The first year was 
“memorably disastrous in theatrical circles” and Sarah Conway often struggled — and failed — 
to pay the rent.12 The theatre continued this way, with barely enough success to keep productions 
running, until Frederick Conway died of heart failure in September of 1874, and Sarah followed 
him in April of 1875, when the management of the theatre fell to their daughters, Minnie and 
Lille Conway, aged twenty-three and seventeen, respectively. While the sisters were fine 
performers, they had little of their mother’s management sense, and their debts began to pile up 
quickly, owing primarily to the back rent they owed the building’s owners, the Brooklyn 
Building Association (BBA), as well as the outrageous salaries they paid actors. When the BBA, 
upon Conway’s death, offered Minnie and Lille the opportunity to erase the remaining debt by 
turning over the lease, the Conway sisters said no, and chose to continue running the theatre in 
their mother’s memory. On July 16th, the Brooklyn Building Association comprised of a 
coalition of wealthy Brooklyn residents, demanded full payment of the Conway sisters’ debts in 
the amount of $10,000. Unable to pay, the theatre was returned to the Association, and was 
subsequently leased, the following month, to the management/producing team of Albert Palmer 
and Sheridan Shook, proprietors of the extremely successful Union Square Theatre in New York 
City.  
 Sheridan Shook and Albert Marshman Palmer were late arrivals to the theatre industry. 
Shook’s Union Square Theatre began life as a vaudeville theatre, in the long, narrow former 
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dining room of the Union Place Hotel. The vaudeville performances didn’t last; after a failed first 
year, Shook appointed bookkeeper Palmer to management of the theatre in 1872, and Palmer 
transformed the Union Square Theatre into a professional production house. Palmer’s major 
contribution was to recruit stars to the Union Square repertory company, including a young 
James O’Neill, Clara Morris, and, in 1874, Kate Claxton as Louise in The Two Orphans. By the 
end of Palmer’s first year of management, he had convinced the near-by theaters run by Augustin 
Daly and James Wallack that they had a competitor of note; by the end of his second year, the 
Union Square was the most popular house in the city.  
 Though Brooklyn loved Frederick and Sarah Conway, there was relief when the dispute 
involving Minnie and Lillie Conway was finished, and pleasure when it was announced the 
successful proprietors and managers of the Union Square had leased the building: “if almost 
uninterrupted success be accepted as evidence of ability,” wrote the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, “the 
success of the Union Square during the last three years would warrant us in believing the 
Brooklyn Theatre has fallen into the hands of the ablest managers in New York. Of one thing we 
may be certain, it has fallen into the most liberal and most enterprising.”13 Upon taking it over, 
Shook and Palmer worked to transform the house into the theatre the Conways had always 
imagined. The lighting that had been installed was considered to be top of the line and 
industrially safe. Additionally, upon their purchase, Shook and Palmer had taken pains to provide 
the house with necessary fire-fighting equipment; Lorraine Rogers, the Theatre’s business 
manager, would report, “I visited the Brooklyn Theater in June, 1874, and saw hydrant, hose, 
axes, and other appliances for extinguishing fire. When I took a managerial position there, in 
Sept. 1876, these same appliances were there.”14 The lights were also provided with the greatest 
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possible means of safety. Hamilton Weaver, the head machinist of the Brooklyn Theatre 
described the precautions taken in regards to the lighting:  
The light was protected by a tin guard in front and a wire guard round in back. It was 
completely covered. If the drop swung back at all it would strike the solid tin guard and 
not the wire. I do not think the tin ever gets hot enough to set the canvas drop on fire, and 
besides, the canvas was not within a foot of it. The tin guard is one solid piece, reaching 
all the way across the stage, each one protecting a border light which is comprised of a 
row of forty burners.15  
 
 Like much of the rest of America, the Brooklyn Theatre was a site in continual flux: as it 
shifted from owner to owner, from production to production, the space was retrofitted with new 
technologies that stood in contrast to some of it’s other physical features. Shook and Palmer had 
retrofitted the Brooklyn Theatre to make use of the latest in gas-lighting technology, but had not 
invested in installing new, more comfortable seating; the theatre seemed to be stuck between 
time periods, marked by its incomplete transformation. While outward appearances may have 
suggested that Shook and Palmer had undertaken every means of providing for a safe and 
pleasurable house of theatrical amusements, what these technological innovations did instead 
was instill a false sense of security. Underneath the polished exterior, the Brooklyn Theatre was 
a disorganized and badly planned mess of a building. Like the Richmond Theatre before it, the 
Brooklyn Theatre stood constantly at the precipice of safety, a tinderbox lacking only a spark and 
a convenient source of fuel. The false sense of security that marked the management of the 
Brooklyn Theatre sociologically mirrored some of the political issues occurring in America in 
1876, including a construction of society and of the theatre as ordered, as opposed to the chaotic 
reality affecting both.  
 Three large doors providing egress into the lobby, which featured, in turn, large doorways 
opening out onto Washington Street, serviced the parquet seating, reserved for upper-class 
citizens. Escape from this area was generally quick, easy, and relatively safe. The second and 
 
 108 
third floors proved a much more difficult area from which to escape. The building had been 
designed for a quick evacuation in a matter of five to six minutes under emergency 
circumstances. Jackson, the architect and engineer of the building, attempted to meet this safety 
standard by providing wide staircases to the dress and family circles for patrons to make safe and 
efficient exits from the second and third floors.  The dress circle, on the second floor, provided 
two exits; one large main door in the center of the building led to a flight of stairs that broke in 
the middle at a ninety degree landing, and continued downward to the lobby. Another, smaller 
exit led to a flight of stairs to Flood’s Alley and Johnson Street, and had a sign hanging over it 
reading “exit to Johnson Street.”16  There was additionally an unmarked third door that 
connected to a landing on the family circle staircase, providing a short, specific exit strategy for 
fire emergencies. About that door, Fire Marshall Keady would later report that he “cannot learn 
from any source that this door had been opened by any one…”17  
 The family circle, on the third floor, had no doors separating the lobby from the theatre; 
curtained partitions provided egress from the theatre onto a balcony overlooking the lobby. 
Audience members on the Washington Street side of the theatre found themselves very close to 
the staircase, and probably could have made a quick escape; those people unlucky enough to be 
sitting opposite Washington Street in the family circle would have found themselves having to 
cross a treacherous strip of increasingly crowded real estate to the only staircase servicing their 
seats. The staircase ascended approximately twenty feet to the next floor, and under normal 
circumstances, provided wide enough passage that exit would be safe, effective and quick. 
Weakened by fire and pervaded by a panicked populace, the staircases, as well built as they may 
have been, wouldn’t last very long. 
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 Although Jackson claimed the building had been designed for quick and easy evacuation, 
it’s clear that disaster events holds powerful transformative purchase on how an audience 
member imbricated within such a disaster process is able to read and analyze the space. The door 
on the third floor, designed specifically for disaster relief, probably remained entirely unopened 
and unused, and the wide staircases could not be designed to take into consideration masses of 
people jostling for space. The disaster traumatically transformed the theatre space itself, and any 
advancement implied by Jackson’s architecture withered and crumbled under the fire’s influence.  
  In the months immediately preceding the destructive fire on December 5th, 1876, the 
Brooklyn Theatre had experienced two flare-ups. The first had happened in November when a 
curtain in the box office took fire; this was quickly extinguished. The second was more serious; 
in late October or early November, stagehand William Dooley saw the rubber hose connecting a 
gas-outlet to the border-lighting fixtures spewing flames. William Salts, a carpenter and fly-man 
of the theatre quickly extinguished this flare-up. These events suggest the commonality of flare-
ups in theatres being understood as a discrete event, unworthy of mention. These events also 
suggest the depth of apathy afforded to fires in theatres; fires were often of this kind and quality: 
easily managed, easily extinguished, hardly worth a mention. Some of the actors of the Brooklyn 
company had even escaped flaming theaters before: Harry Murdoch had been engaged at Pike’s 
Opera House in Cincinnati when, ten years earlier, during a production of Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, the theatre, and several adjacent buildings, burned to the ground in a multimillion dollar 
civic loss. Scott G. Knowles articulates the tolerance of the dangers of fire in the nineteenth 
century “by citizens with relatively low expectations of strong government action towards public 
safety, and high hopes for rapid construction and economic growth.”18 The Brooklyn Theatre 
was a disaster mirroring the prevailing values of the society in which it occurred, a site already 
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marked through its history by the transformational trauma that would come to serve as the major 





Part II, Chapter 5: Grand Transformation Scene 
 
Radical Change and Renewal 
 
 If the Brooklyn Theatre was a space marked by its relationship to constant transformation, 
from its construction in L-shaped spatial organization understood as a product of reflexive 
modernization, to the numerous managerial and artistic changes it went through during its short 
life, it was also a space, like the Richmond Theatre, marked by the ever-lurking presence of 
conflagatory danger. This chapter traces the events inside the Brooklyn Theatre the night it 
burned down. My goal is to create a narrative of the progression of the fire from its inception to 
the collapsing of the walls of the building just before midnight that underscores how the 
historical/spatial relationship between the theatre’s organizational and managerial strategies 
related to the disastrous progression of the fire and how this progression, in turn, contributed to 
the use of narratival and rhetorical tropes of positive sociopersonal development and 
transformation in the post-disaster paradigm.  
 To write this narrative/historical chapter, I collected, analyzed, and recounted a number of 
narratives about the disaster that were published in newspapers, journals, and governmental 
records of the investigation of the fire. While collecting this data, I came to the realization that 
these victim narratives were, themselves, forms of memorial production undertaken in the post-
disaster paradigm. In giving these narratives, survivors were performing a specific kind of 
cultural production, identified in Exploring the Boundaries of Crisis Communication by Timothy 
Sellnow and Matthew Seeger as “a recognition of the inadequacy of the established sense 
making structures” and the requisite need for “new sense making structures.”19 Writing about the 
Red River Valley flood in 1997, Seeger and Sellnow write,  
Traditionally, crisis has been framed as inherently and overwhelmingly threatening, 
destructive, and devastating…within this flood episode, however, may be found 
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important positive outcomes. Floods, as with other natural disasters, are often forces of 
renewal…the crisis removed the assumption of the status quo and created the opportunity 
for radical change and renewal.20 
 
 If disasters are known not simply for their destructive capacity, but also for the opportunity 
they present for “radical change and renewal,” then the logical question is, who defines the terms 
of the disaster as potentially positive? In Richmond, religious forces seized upon “the 
opportunity for radical change and renewal” through controlling the post-disaster narratives as an 
act of God; this religious construction was already embedded within the community of 
Richmond in 1811 itself. Similarly, as I argued in the previous chapter, the destabilization 
wrought by national transformation was already embedded within the country, and Brooklyn, in 
1876. This, in turn, produced disaster narratives that foregrounded the theme of transformation in 
the recounting of the event.  
 This tendency to think about the Brooklyn Theatre fire in terms of transformation is a 
standard trope of disaster narratives. In a broad, multi-decade survey of disaster narratives, 
Phyllis Scott Carlin and Linda M. Park-Fuller identify  “five interweaving performance keys” 
shared by such stories: first, “the recounting of disaster premonitions or lack of them”; second, 
“the moment when the teller in shocked into experience”; third, the “convincing the audience 
that a seemingly impossible situation occurred and that the tellers were in its midst and must now 
describe it”; fourth, “descriptions of experiences in the immediate aftermath”; finally, 
“evaluative assessments of the long-range impact and recovery along with interpretation of 
significance to self, family, community, society and history.”21 Embedded within these five 
performance keys of disaster narratives is the implied relationship between disaster survival and 
radical change and renewal.   
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 With specific relation to the Brooklyn Theatre fire, this tendency for transformational 
narrative construction was perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Kate Claxton’s reporting of 
the event. As she made her successful exit from the burning building, Kate Claxton would hazard 
a glance back, just as the fire burst through the doors and windows in a “sheet of flame.” The 
scene was, it seemed to Claxton, “a grand transformation scene.”22 The invocation of the term 
“grand transformation scene” is illustrative of the same tendency located in Richmond to 
describe the disaster through a theatrical vocabulary, as well as perhaps the first example in the 
record regarding the narrative trope of transformation that came to dominate historical writing 
and memory work regarding the fire.  
 The most popular use of the term is the final scene of the nineteenth-century scripts of 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, wherein the titular character is transported from Earth to the splendor of 
Heaven, allegorically transporting the audience along with him. There’s a useful tension in 
Claxton’s evocation of the term. Typically, the term applies the scene during which Tom’s 
earthly suffering has come to an end, and he is ascending into the comfort and peace of heaven, 
his reward for a lifetime of dutiful service and obedience. Claxton’s invocation must be 
understood in the opposite sense, as if the terror of Hell was made manifest on Earth. The 
presence and practice of the scene from Uncle Tom’s Cabin would have been well enough 
engrained in Claxton’s mind and vocabulary to suggest a purposeful analogy to explain the 
power, intensity, and terror of the Brooklyn fire, as if there were supernatural forces operating on 
the earthly plane.  
The Theatre is On Fire 
 The curtain had fallen on the penultimate act of the December 5th production of The Two 
Orphans at the Brooklyn Theatre to rapturous applause, and the actors hurriedly moved towards 
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their places for the final act while the orchestra played, and the crew shifted the scenery from the 
grim courtyard of the hospital/jail La Salpetriere to La Frochard’s meager hovel on the banks of 
the Seine. It was a difficult and complete shift of scenery, moving from the leafless trees 
surrounding the open courtyard to the completely enclosed hovel, a poor, “dilapidated boat-
house” box set, enclosing the actors from the top as well as both wings. The shift had required 
twelve men during the play’s run at the Union Square Theatre, but since it had moved to the 
smaller space at the Brooklyn Theatre, tonight it was handled by only eight.23  Above the actors, 
a roof, made of canvas, hung. Beyond the boat-house, a drop cloth depicting Paris at twilight was 
moved into place for the scene, and the climactic moment, when Picard, the valet to the 
Chevalier de Vaudry, aided by a group of supernumeraries playing police officers, bursts into the 
hovel, in search of his master’s love, the beautiful and kind Henriette. At the same time, the 
Chevalier himself disarms the evil and malicious Jacques Frochard. The gaslights, rows of forty 
six-foot burners running across the stage high above, dimmed. It would be dark in the hovel, 
atmospheric and dangerous.  
  In the wings, John B. Studley stood with Henry S. Murdoch and Kate Claxton, preparing 
for their entrances. Murdoch was anxious but excited; his widowed mother and his sisters were 
due in town the next night.24 He loved and doted on his family, and was proud to be the only 
source of income for them. Perhaps he winced and tried to stretch his torso; his sides, he told 
company member Maud Harrison, were in pain, a result of either sciatica or pleurisy, a physical 
ailment appropriate for playing the crippled Pierre.25 As the scene shift ended, Claxton made her 
way to the uncomfortable straw bed upon which Louise lay when the final act begins. She was 
the prisoner of the Frochard family, along with Pierre, the virtuous but hated and crippled 
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younger brother of the evil Jacques, the only member of the family to show Louise any kindness. 
Murdoch took his place on a barrel near her. 
 In the house, the orchestra played, and the audience members shifted in their seats, 
uncomfortable. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle had described the seating in the theatre as antiquated, 
“of the old fashioned sofa style,” probably similar to the seats in the pit at the Richmond Theatre, 
decried as, “decidedly behind the present times…in no respect equal either in convenience or 
comfort to those in…other places of amusements.”26 The house was good, but not full, and 
especially not the expensive seats, the parquet seats. The cheap seats, the dress and family 
circles, were fairly full, though, and young men and women enjoyed the contrivances of Two 
Orphans’ numerous fight-and-rescue plot twists. Two Orphans, a prototypical kind of play for 
the Union Square house from whence the production came, which enjoyed showing American 
adaptations of French works, had enjoyed a long, sustained run at Union Square, illustrative of 
its broad, national popularity: Two Orphans was one of the great financial successes of 
nineteenth century theatre, a popular, well-written, mechanical melodrama that played upon 
audience sentiment, featured fearsome villainy, noble heroes, and enormous pathos for the 
suffering orphans. It was the kind of show designed to appeal to popular audiences, and Sheridan 
Shook and A.M. Palmer hoped its presence at the Brooklyn Theatre would help legitimate the 
house to Brooklyn and New York audiences alike. 
 It was 11:20. The curtain rose. Then Claxton heard it. 
 “The theatre is on fire.” 
 Up in the fly space, seemingly unbeknownst to anyone, the veteran carpenter John 
Cummerson was attending his nightly duties among the flies.27 Cummerson had fifteen years of 
experience as a stage carpenter, and had been at work at the Brooklyn Theatre since Sarah and 
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Frederick Conway opened it. He identified the cut-wood drop had caught fire — but how? A 
gust of wind and oxygen from an open stage door? Interaction between the drop and the gas-jet 
lights? The question was moot; Cummerson worked quickly to staunch the flames. Though the 
border lights had been raised and set in properly, Cummerson noted difficulty when he tried to 
lower them: “when I come to let them down,” he said, “they dragged. I tried to put the green 
curtain down and then she broke. Nothing broke before the fire. This was the commencement of 
the trouble.”28 Frustrated, Cummerson cursed the border lights; he had long thought they were 
“too flimsy” and were in want of “new ‘knitting.’”29 
 It is clear that Cummerson had previously identified safety issues with the lights, just as 
William Anderson had identified safety issues in Richmond, and a litany of individuals would 
identify safety issues at the Iroquois in Chicago. The chronological organization of the disaster 
case studies of this dissertation creates an arc of technological spectacle from candles to 
electricity, all of which contribute to the creation of environments of danger onstage, an example 
of the transformative dangers of reflexive modernization that marked the Conflagration Era as a 
time period uniquely suited to disastrous conflagrations. The goal of using these technologies 
should always be understood as progressing towards safety — gas being more controllable than 
candle, and electricity more controllable than gas — but this was rarely the line of thinking of 
theatrical producers and managers. Instead, installing and using the latest technology was 
understood as a way to market the theatre and the theatre’s production of spectacle, always 
undertaken with the concomitant risk of fire. Technologies of theatre production, when poorly 
understood, heighten the potential for devastation. Despite the identification of the shortcomings 
of these technologies, the complacency that marks the time between identifying the potential 
danger and the outbreak of a fire suggests a willful disregard for the safety of the audience 
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members, and a difficult relationship between the progression of technologies of spectacle and 
technologies of hazard mitigation. 
 Cummerson’s remarks also suggest the tendency of disasters to be made worse by the 
very tools put in place to prevent them, another illustration of the inherent dangers of reflexive 
modernization. A disaster’s ability to re-write reality through disruption seems to have its first 
effect on the technologies created to stop or stall the progress of disaster. The elemental power of 
fire to weaken and destroy the mechanisms operating the border lights in the Brooklyn Theatre 
meant that the fire had easy access to the roof. This quickening of disaster had been seen in 
Richmond, and would also be seen in Chicago, when the asbestos curtain failed to lower 
completely to the floor. These reinforce Scott G. Knowles’ argument that, “there is no perfectly 
safe building, only buildings evolving towards safety” and that safety should always be 
understood as illusive.30  
 Claxton hissed up at Murdoch. “Go on, they will put it out; there will be a panic; go on!”31 
Murdoch continued, and Mary Farren made her entrance as the matriarch La Frochard, followed 
shortly by John Studley as Jacques. Farren crossed to Claxton, grabbing her by the back of the 
head, demanding cruelly, “come, get up, my fine lady. No more airs, you must go out and make 
your living.”32  As Claxton’s head wrenched back, she whispered to Farren, “is it fire or not?”33  
Farren was taken aback and both women risked a look above.  
 “I’m afraid so,” Farren replied.34  
 “I saw little tongues of flame licking through the canopy,” Claxton said later. “Mr. 
Murdoch, Mr. Studley, and Mrs. Farren saw them at the same time. Then we heard a horrible 
roaring noise behind the scenery. This alarmed me more than the sight of the fire.”35 Shaken, but 
determined, Claxton and the actors attempted to carry on with the show, but it was not long until 
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the audience’s panic became too great. The last line Claxton managed to recite was, “you have 
starved, tortured, beaten me; but now, feeble as I am, my will shall be stronger than your 
violence! I will beg no more!”36 By that time, the “little tongues of flame” had begun raining 
down upon the stage, catching the canvas roof of the box set in the process and igniting it. 
 Edward B. Dickinson, audience member, was sat in the parquet, accompanied by his wife 
and a friend. “All at once there seemed to be an unusual disturbance among the scene shifters at 
the back of the stage,” he would say later. “The confusion increased rapidly, but still the play 
was not interrupted.” A long time patron of the theatre, Dickinson knew something was amiss: 
“either…one of the workmen had fallen from above while manipulating the ropes, or…the 
theatre was on fire.”37 John Hartman, an employee of the Department of City Works, in 
attendance with his wife and son, described the same thing 
I heard a curious noise on the stage, resembling loud talking between a number of men, 
which I thought very unusual…When they had got about half through the act I noticed 
the same noise again, only it was louder and they seemed to be hurriedly moving in the 
scenes behind.38 
 
 Note the way in which both Dickinson and Hartman’s narratives demonstrate the first of 
Carlin and Park-Weaver’s five performance keys of disaster narrative, “the recounting of disaster 
premonitions,” configured as a natural response to new sensory stimuli: a feeling that something 
was wrong, without direct confirmation, only to have that feeling proved correct.39 The theatre 
was on fire, and the audience transitioned from unease into full-blown panic. Note also the 
confused anxiety Dickinson articulates about the unclear transition from spectatorship to 
participation in the disaster process. This confusion illustrates the failure of successful transition 
from theatre event to disaster process.  
 Perhaps the best known episode of the Brooklyn Theatre fire contributed significantly to 
audience confusion: the report of Claxton, Murdoch, Farren and Studley, standing before the 
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audience and asking for calm. As the danger became pronounced, they abandoned all pretense of 
performance. The fire had gone from smoldering to out of control in scant minutes, and 
backstage attempts to control the fire were proving futile at best, and exacerbating the danger at 
worst. Some in the audience thought they were seeing the latest and greatest special effects, but 
others knew better; the flames had snuck up to the ceiling, and flaming sheets of fabric were 
beginning to fall around the four performers. A cry of “fire!” went up in the house, and the 
audience immediately stood, ready to make a hasty exit.40  
 “Shut up,” came another shout. “There is no fire!” In the confusion, people in the gallery 
stood and hesitated.41 Because of the placement of the fire — above the stage — people on the 
first floor could look up into the rafters and see the burning set pieces; those sat above the line of 
the stage had no such ability to see the fire. As the danger continued to become clear, 
“everybody in the gallery had risen and was rushing for the doors in a solid mass,” reported 
survivor J. P. McKinney, and “men caught hold of those nearest and stripped their clothing from 
their backs.”42 The actors dropped out of their characters and walked down to the footlights.  
 “Do not panic,” John Studley announced, trying to clear the rising din of the audience with 
his voice. “There is no need to panic.”  
 “Will the people keep their seats? We are between you and the fire,” Kate Claxton 
announced. “We will burn first.”43 Some of the members in the parquet held their seats, but 
audience members in the dress and family circles, much more crowded, were not so eager to 
listen to the actors. The family circle, in particular, Fire Marshal Keady would later note, was 
typically composed of “the class of people” who “are the most restless.”44  
 “Sit still,” Murdoch shouted, “there is no danger.” 
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 Charles Thorne was still in the wings. “There is danger,” Thorne yelled to his fellow cast 
mates. “Get out of the theatre as soon as possible.”45  
 One common question a researcher must ask when digging into theatre fires regards 
reasons actors continue to perform, even when they have knowledge of the potential danger 
posed by the flames? It happened in Richmond, and would happen again in Chicago. Nineteenth-
century theatres seemed to be predisposed to destruction by flames; why would they not stop the 
action and encourage the audience to leave in a timely and safe fashion? “The presence of mind 
of the actor in time of the gravest danger has been to the advantage of theatergoers on more than 
one occasion,” William Ellis Horton would later write, “and it is known where actors have held 
an audience in laughter while the house force were fighting a fire on the stage.”46 This was 
Murdoch and Claxton’s plan, was the plan of Hopkins Robinson in Richmond, and must have 
been the plan in Chicago, as well: continue the scene, “hold the audience,” and allow the 
backstage crew the extinguish the fire, as they had at least twice before, never allowing the 
patrons to become any the wiser about the danger they were in. 
 The development and implementation of technologies of spectacle outpaced technologies 
of hazard mitigation, and ultimately this outpacing often created an even greater capacity for 
danger. As disaster processes develop, the technologies built to mitigate those processes, not 
being par with the proximate causes of the disaster, fail spectacularly and, in this failure, increase 
the levels of danger and potential destruction. So, too, does the actors’ response to the 
developing disaster event: when the actors do not stop the show, as they did not in Brooklyn, the 
danger of the environment increases greatly. Just as technologies of hazard mitigation are often 
unwitting causes of devastation, a human, acting in what he or she perceives to be the best 
interests of the audience, may also inadvertently increase the danger posed by a disaster process, 
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a microcosmic form of the reflexive modernization that marked the organization of the Brooklyn 
Theatre itself.  
 The flames spread rapidly, and Cummerson abandoned his attempts to extinguish the fire. 
As he returned to the stairs, he found himself trapped, the fire preventing him from safely 
returning to the floor. He passed Murdoch, who was headed toward his dressing room and, 
Cummerson thought, to attempt to escape via the ceiling. Bereft of other options, and feeling the 
skin on his face and hands crackle with heat, feeling his lungs blacken with smoke, Cummerson 
hurled himself through the second story window into Flood’s Alley. Ida Vernon, a performer 
who had left upon the completion of her final scene, returned to her brother’s apartment, down 
the street from the theatre. She heard the crash of the window breaking, “and an instant later she 
saw a man leap from one of the gallery windows of the theater into the alley in the rear.”47 
Cummerson hit the alleyway, bruised and unconscious, broken but not dead, and was eventually 
transported, by some Good Samaritan, to the Long Island Hospital.  
 By the time the parquet seating was almost entirely cleared, with relative speed and safety, 
the actors still onstage knew they had to make their escape. Performers in the nineteenth century 
were synonymous with their roles, and were known to perform those roles in different 
productions all across the country, an example of what was known as the star system. In support 
of that system were cabinet cards, photographic trading cards of the actors in character that were 
printed and distributed to fans. To that end, actors owned and controlled their own wardrobes. 
Before even viewing the performance, audiences would have a good idea about what the 
characters looked like and actors had to meet those expectations.  
 It’s not surprising, then, that Claxton, Murdoch, and Farren’s first instincts were to return 
to their dressing rooms, against the obvious impulse for self-preservation.  Murdoch in particular 
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would have been wise to make a hasty retreat; his physical ailments must have hindered his 
ability to climb the numerous stairs to his second-floor, stage left dressing room. Nevertheless, 
he limped off in that direction in order to retrieve his clothing and valuables. He had survived 
one fire; what was another? Claxton was fearful: she grabbed Murdoch’s wrist as he limped off 
stage towards the stars, and begged him to escape with his life.  
 “No,” Murdoch replied. He wanted to retrieve his coat.48  Claude Burroughs had the same 
idea, and Van Sicklen, ascending the staircases towards their dressing rooms, saw the two men. 
Van Sicklen told them to stop, to turn around and get out of the theatre, but the men continued 
upwards.49 The instinct to retrieve their clothing may illustrate how lowly these actors regarded 
the threat posed by the fire: faced with the possibility of death, the actors were able to overcome 
the instinctual fight or flight response of the sympathetic nervous system. Just as technologies of 
hazard mitigation, in failing to keep pace with technologies of spectacle, contributed to 
heightening the environment of disaster development, in failing to regard the reality of the 
danger posed by the fire, the actors similarly contributed to the worsening of the disaster process. 
The fire’s ability to traumatically transform extended even to the human body, transforming, in 
the act, the actor into disaster agent. 
A Quiet Termination 
 If disaster is understood as an agent of a process of social change, it must be noted that the 
influence of disaster is far-reaching. This section examines events outside of the theatre as the 
initial carnage of the fire came to an end in order to illustrate the diffusions of the transformative 
power of disaster, and how these transformative powers generate immediate change and, in 
doing so, help to define narrative strategies for writing about the event. In Richmond, the 
immediate responses to the disaster constructed the fire as an act of God, and this mode of 
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thinking created the paradigm in which narrative tropes around that theme were created and 
spread. This section argues that in Brooklyn, the fire’s tendency toward traumatic transformation 
provided the narrative framing that would come to dominate memorial production about the 
event, and that this tendency was powerfully imbricated within the initial physical organization 
of the area immediately surrounding the building; in Claxton’s words, the spectacle of the 
burning theatre reminded her of “a grand transformation scene.”50 
 Murdoch and Burroughs left their dressing rooms and prepared to descend the stairs. 
However, what was once a theatre had transformed into a virtual hell, and walls of fire and ever-
increasing volumes of smoke cut them off from the stairs. They made for the grooves, trying to 
cross the stage on the suspended workers lofts, in hopes that the stairway on the other side would 
be safer. J.W. Thorpe, the stage manager saw them there, on the grooves, trying desperately to 
reach safety. Thorpe was unable to offer help, and had to escape the building himself, lest he die. 
The stairs on both sides of the scaffolding were enveloped, burning heavily, and the platform the 
men were on was weakening. They were trapped. The false sense of security with which they 
had navigated to their dressing room gave way to the horror of the moment.  
 Claxton and Farren had fled the stage to their dressing rooms under the theatre and found 
Maud Harrison there, gathering some of her own valuables. Claxton grabbed Farren and 
Harrison and implored them to “let those things go, and come on, for God’s sake. We must go 
out the front way. The fire is gaining on us now. Look!”51 She pointed at the ceiling, and the 
three actors saw the stage floor above them begin to splinter and crack. The way out through the 
stage door was blocked by fire and debris, and the ceiling above began to threaten to cave in on 
them. Faced with impending doom, Claxton remembered Sarah Conway’s secret passageway.52  
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 Claxton, Farren, and Harrison headed toward the doorway to the narrow, crooked, dark 
passage, its own ceiling splintering and filling the tunnel with smoke, the fire following closely 
behind them. As the women rushed down the hallway, a horrifying thought struck Claxton: what 
if the door was locked?53 Claxton bounded up the stairs towards the door, and listened for a 
moment, hesitating, the terror of the possibility that she had led herself and her two fellow actors 
into a terrible death paralyzing her. “We must really have hesitated only a flash,” she said, “but it 
seemed to me that we stood there for hours.”54 She tried the knob; the door opened, and the three 
women entered into a lobby that had transformed into chaos. The stairs to the family circle were 
blocked at the landing by a large woman whose foot had become stuck; behind her, a human pile 
of bodies were trampling and being trampled upon. Smoke was beginning to fill the lobby, and 
although the doors to Johnson Street were accommodating, they must have seemed tiny and 
impossible as a thousand people struggled to reach them. Claxton and the others began their fight 
out of the box office, into the lobby, and towards the street. In the violence, Claxton was 
knocked down multiple times, and was once brought face to face with another human being upon 
whom she was trampling. “Oh my god, it was a fearful sight,” she recalled later. “I shall never 
forget it.”55 Claxton and the other actors finally made it outside, still in their costumes, with 
Claxton clad in the rags of Louise. They had made it to safety. 
 Disaster operates a powerful ability to re-write, re-organize, and transform spatial and 
temporal significance, an effect similar to theatre’s ability to condense, skip, switch, or otherwise 
alter time and space for the duration of a performance. In the case of the development of the 
Brooklyn Theatre fire, in the short time span between the genesis of the fire and its eruption out 
of the building, the destabilizing relationship shared between theatre and disaster was greatly 
magnified by the fact that two separate spatiotemporal realms existed simultaneously: inside of 
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the building, panic and chaos reigned. Outside, “carriages rumbled as they drew up near the 
entrance,” the New York Tribune reported, apparently under the assumption of “a quiet 
termination of the play.”56  
 In the tension between the simultaneous existences of disaster time and space and non-
disaster time and space, the transformation from normal to disaster proves traumatic, not only 
psychologically, but sociologically and spatiotemporally, illustrating the deep effect disaster has 
upon not only victims, but communities, time and space; what the carriages found was not a 
“quiet termination,” but a bizarre admixture of panic and chaos, of still-costumed performers and 
wailing audience members, and a large amount of hotel furniture. The damage to the theatre 
made it a complete loss, and only half an hour into the blaze, just before midnight, the Johnson 
St. wall collapsed with a creak and a groan, sending embers and sparks dancing into the night 
sky. The streets were dense with thousands of people, victims and curious spectators alike, 
wailing and crying. Once hard dirt, Washington Street had been turned into a muddy swamp by 
the water from fire hoses being sloshed through by the throngs of feet.  
 Furniture and luggage from the adjoining Dieter’s Hotel had been removed from tenants’ 
rooms and brought down to the street, hoping to deny the fire any potential kindling, turning the 
street into a bizarre outdoors living room. Some people sat on the chairs, beds, and couches, 
watching the smoke rise into the night sky, underscoring the inherent and spectacular 
theatricality of the disaster. For a time, lines of identity demarcation were disrupted and erased, 
and “all classes of people composed the assemblage — men, women and children — all drawn to 
the spot by an excitement which leveled all distinctions of race or sex.”57 The chaos of the scene 
juxtaposed the serenity and calm of the evening, lit by the large moon overhanging it all.58 The 
survivors that had made it out of the theatre were in obvious panic, had tumbled out in waves and 
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streams, some bereft of clothing, perhaps trying to unburden themselves, perhaps trying to 
remove the fabric before it seared itself to their skin, “many of the women [were] so terrified that 
they tore their clothes from their bodies and threw them on the street. Many fainted from fright, 
and many others, injured in the struggle to reach the open air, fell exhausted when they stepped 
into the street.”59 There was no accounting for who had survived, but spirits were as high as they 
could have been.  
 After the fire had been contained, Chief Engineer Thomas F. Nevins stepped into the 
“grand transformation scene” of the Brooklyn Theatre. When he first entered, the lobby was dark 
and smoky, and he failed to make out anything in particular, aside from the huge hole in the 
lobby floor and, just beyond that, what he guessed was a large pile of rubbish, probably the 
debris from the destroyed balcony and stairs. The pit was still “of fire and flame,” and was 
emitting “a dense smoke and steam,” and going any further was impossible.60 Nevins had refused 
to venture any further into the building until a complete inspection of the remaining wall of the 
theatre had been completed, but reported that it seemed almost everybody had escaped with their 
life. There would be men going door-to-door throughout the city tomorrow, asking at apartments 
and houses if anyone was missing, but the general feeling in the crowd was that almost everyone 
had escaped unscathed, a disastrous loss of a building, but nothing so grim as what may have 
happened.  
 Day broke, grim and grey: December 6th, and though “there was a gloom in Brooklyn 
which could be felt even in the streets,” reporters’ accounts of the blaze went out in  “the 
morning papers …announcing that only two lives had been lost.”61  Later that day, after the 
horrifying truth was learned, under the rubble of what was once the stage, buried under timber 
and masonry, the broken bodies of Claude Burroughs and Harry Murdoch were discovered, 
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identifiable by their relative position to the other two hundred and ninety-five victims of the fire, 
as well as the “aiguillettes [Burroughs] wore, and the peculiar conformation of his teeth, which 
were examined by a Brooklyn dentist who had previous treated him.”62 The firefighters prepared 
to re-enter the building, to survey the damage, to clear out the few bodies they anticipated 
finding inside. 
 The events at the Brooklyn Theatre illustrate the dangers that marked the reflexive 
modernization of the widespread transformational effects of the Industrial Revolution, as the 
development and implementation of theatrical technologies of spectacle greatly outpaced the 
implementation of technologies of hazard mitigation. Just as themes of fatalism and divine 
justice underscored the social context of the fire at the Richmond Theatre in 1811, themes of 
transformation and sociological change underscored the social context of the fire at Brooklyn, 
and, as I examine in the following chapter, contributed in powerful ways to the memory work 
undertaken in the post-disaster paradigm.  
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Part II, Chapter 6: Safe for the People to Gather 
 
The Hell Mouth of the Brooklyn Theatre 
 
 This chapter focuses on socially shared performances of grief and suffering in the post-
disaster paradigm, understood as performances undertaken to abate the pain and anxiety of 
traumatic transformation. First, I describe the transformative power the fire performed upon the 
city of Brooklyn experienced as firefighters and morticians struggled to meet the effects of the 
disaster, and the widespread transformative power of the disaster as it rewrote the spatiotemporal 
significance of the area surrounding the destroyed theatre into a large scale morgue. Then, I 
consider how the ruins of the building were transformed into a site of shared memory as citizens 
came in the days following the fire to bear witness to the site of carnage. I finish by describing 
the memorial services held through Brooklyn and New York as performances of social values, 
and compare the religious rhetoric to that espoused by the clergy in Richmond in 1811. I 
conclude with an analysis of the history and construction of the monument to the dead that was 
placed years later in Brooklyn’s Green-Wood Cemetery.  
 Significantly, the primary themes of the responses given by Brooklyn’s clergy played upon 
the issues of transformation embedded within the disaster event. Transformation was constructed 
as a way to re-establish disrupted structures of order through enacting positive personal and 
social change.  In The Popular Culture of Disaster, Gary Webb argues,  
Arguably the greatest impediment to effective disaster response in the United States us 
the perpetuation of disaster myths, even among those in the emergency management 
profession. These myths suggest that disasters create chaos, panic, looting and other 
antisocial behavior — that is, complete social breakdown. Of course, 50 years of social 
science research demonstrates that the opposite occurs in the wake of disaster — crime 
rates go down, solidarity increases, and pro-social behavior prevails. If communities are 
actually resilient under stress, why do so many people, including public officials, believe 




 The field of disaster sociology has identified the positive impacts disaster may make upon 
afflicted communities. In Webb’s view, the construction of a disaster event as phenomenal or 
divine contributes to the perpetuation of negative stereotyping of disaster events as chaotic, 
panicked, or otherwise antisocial. Understood this way, Richmond’s distinctly religious response 
contributed to the development of the Conflagration Era’s disastrous environment by attributing 
the disaster to God’s divine justice. The responses to Brooklyn’s fire exemplifies how a 
productive relationship between elite-level governmental and grass-roots community processing 
of the disaster event contributed significantly to disaster’s positive potential through a 
collaborative relationship and a shared central message: we must remember those who died, and 
through that remembrance, must ensure it never happens again.  
 A hell mouth is a theatrical set piece, a constructed entrance to Hell, usually expressed as 
the gaping maw of a horrifying beast. The hell mouth was a popular image in theatrical 
performances and paintings during Middle Ages; in the theatre, this trope found expression 
primarily in liturgical dramas, located stage left, in opposition of a depiction of heaven stage 
right. They were used in biblical cycle plays outside of the church, designed to terrify and inspire 
awe; they depicted sinners suffering for their earthly actions, sometimes boiling in cauldrons, 
and other times being tortured by demons. They served as a nexus of secular ingenuity — the 
spectacle of pyrotechnics and smoke billowing outward through monstrous teeth, upon which 
rested the bodies of the sinful, must have terrified audiences — and violent, otherworldly justice; 
a semiotic of horror, and awe, a warning to the audience: there but for the grace of God go I. 
Nevins probably didn’t make the association with theatre’s history, but the spectacular effect of 
terror and awe that he must have felt, as he stepped back into the lobby of the theatre on the 
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morning of the 6th, was likely similar to that which was experienced by patrons of Medieval 
liturgical dramas. 
 The stairs and the upper balcony had collapsed, plummeted to the floor, and smashed 
through it, leaving a huge, gaping maw of wood, and smoke, and ash. Nevins could enter only a 
few steps onto the shuddering lobby floor before it disappeared into a black pit of wreckage, still 
smoldering with smoke and fire. At the precipice of the pit, her dead, fleshless hands grasping 
hopelessly toward the door, the body of a woman had been seared into place, trapped forever 
between freedom and the lobby’s pit of despair. As he looked down into the hell mouth that had 
transformed from what was once the lobby of the Brooklyn Theatre, Nevins came to a grisly 
realization: that was not simply the debris of stairs and balconies he was seeing, as he had 
supposed only hours earlier. It had transformed into a sudden, brutal, mass grave, filled with 
body parts, with human beings melted together, completely indistinguishable from one another. 
The ticket booth propped another body up casually against the door, as if it were leaning for 
comfort, waiting for someone to save him.64  
 Nevins entered the pit and “was horrified to find that the whole heap of what I had thought 
to be rubbish was a compact mass of human bodies, burned and twisted into the most distorted 
positions. The whole of the cellar under the lobby of the theatre was densely packed with the 
remains of those who, but a few hours previous, had been in full possession of life and vigor.”65 
Every hour, the news inside of the theatre got worse. “At first,” the Daily Eagle reported that 
afternoon,  
It was believed that few, if any lives had been lot. At about 7 o’clock it was known that at 
least twenty persons had been burned to death or smothered. By 9 o’clock the list of 
deaths had risen to seventy. At 11 o’clock ninety victims were counted, and now, at 2 




 Nevins and his crew came to understand the difficulty — almost the impossibility — of the 
task before them. The bodies they found “were bent into horrid shapes, assumed in the struggles 
of death by suffocation and by burning. Nine or ten of the corpses had an arm upraised and bent 
to shield the face,” a condition known in medical terminology today as the “pugilistic stance” or 
“pugilistic attitude,” assumed when, because of intense heat, large arm and leg musculature 
contract and pull in towards the torso or face. Nevins and his workers descended into the hell 
mouth and began removing bodies, extricating bones from other bones and attempting, as much 
as possible, to preserve the twisted corpses. The men located bodies by “the watch chain and 
other jewelry” which, in the artificial light of the lamps brought in to aid the workers, gave off 
“beautiful bright” glints.67 The men converged on these glints, with “opera glasses, chains, studs, 
purses and even watches…found under and on the bodies,” which “were thrown to one side upon 
a spread-out newspaper,” to be collected later and sent along to the morgues for possible 
identification.68 Later, an official would describe the impossibility of speedy removal and a 
process of continual discovery: “as fast as we remove one tier of bodies other appear below 
them, and it is impossible to tell how many remain in that dreadful place.”69 Nevins had his men 
build a wooden ramp into the hell mouth, and upon this ramp, they lowered and raised coffins 
filled with bodies and bones. By nightfall, two hundred bodies had been removed from the lobby. 
Nevins had no idea that, in the dress circle above them, almost one hundred more bodies lay, 
waiting to be discovered. Outside, through the dense crowd, vehicles struggled to arrive at the 
theatre to transport bodies away. The work was slow and brutal. 
 That Claxton called the building “a grand transformation scene” is correct, but she 
probably didn’t appreciate the subtleties of her shell-shocked analysis. The fire itself did 
transform the building, metaphorically and physically. It is in the post-disaster paradigm, though, 
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that the traumatically transformative power of the disaster event becomes most evident, as the 
disaster event strains the resources of the city past their breaking point, what Bos, Ullberg, and ’t 
Hart call “the disaster after the disaster.”70 The morgues and undertakers around Brooklyn began 
sending hearses and boxes immediately, conveying bodies to morgues. The Tribune noted, “the 
Brooklyn Morgue was early overtaxed in affording space for the corpses, and one of the 
unoccupied market places was converted into a temporary morgue.”71 When the morgues were 
full of the deceased, an abandoned meat market and other buildings in the immediate area were 
conscripted into service, transforming the area around the theatre into a giant morgue, similar to 
the transformation of the area around the Richmond Theatre, and to what would occur in 
Chicago in 1903; in the disruption of disaster, spaces became rewritten and re-signified. 
 The site of a disaster event becoming a sort of shrine in remembrance of the dead is not a 
surprise, nor is it unique. The testimonies of George Munford and others, related to the 
Richmond fire, and of the people noted below, reveal the desire for a social closeness to the 
event, a need for participation in the disaster process, and, to some extent, an ownership over the 
disaster. The disaster event crosses over time, physical space, and personal psyche; disaster is 
always a shared experience, and the powerful influence of traumatic transformation affects 
members of the community otherwise unrelated to the event. Anne Eyre writes that the 
congregation of survivors and community members at these sites can be read for their symbolic 
value as a part of new rituals that develop in the post-disaster paradigm. Eyre writes,  
Following disaster, when a fundamental sense of order and security can feel threatened, 
the potential value of such rituals in reestablishing feelings of control, belonging, and 
social solidarity within and beyond one’s immediate community is understandable.72 
 
  In historical narratives of disaster, it is often the absences that are constructed with the 
most interest, whether the absence of a site (a theatre, for instance, or the World Trade Center 
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buildings) or the absence of life. What narratives of absence ignore is the resilience of the 
creation and definition of what I call “disaster space,” newly significant physical and social 
spaces transformed by disaster, where grief can be performed and shared. Eyre writes, “in 
sociological terms, such areas are ‘sacred’ spaces, that is to say they are set apart as being of 
special significance and regarded as worthy of particular respect.”73 The wreckage of the theatre 
became a disaster space for members of the public to gather and grieve together. The Brooklyn 
Market, “disused for some time” was another such place. As bodies arrived to the market 
throughout the day and darkness fell, “candles were inserted in thick slices of turnips and placed 
on the upturned breast of each poor remnant of humanity,” hoping to provide a little light for 
family members desperately searching for their missing, and feared dead, loved ones.74  
 Within the groups that congregated at these disaster spaces, a man and several of his 
friends tried to enter the theatre and help Nevins and the firefighters. Stopped, the man spoke 
aloud to the crowd: “we are in much the same position as the poor wretches who perished last 
night,” he announced. “Only think how they must have felt, knowing the flames were close 
behind them, while they were helplessly involved in the mad rush for the stairway.”75 Faced with 
this insight, those who overheard him “shuddered involuntarily.”76 Eventually, a hush overcame 
the crowd, the size of which continued to increase past 5:00 PM, “continually augmented by men 
returning from business in New York,” by which time “movement became difficult in any of the 
streets leading to the scene of the conflagration.”77 The crowd continued well past the streets, 
and into the buildings surrounding the theatre. Anywhere a view could be had, people found a 
way to get there, and windows and roofs soon became crowded by citizens observing the crew 
transporting bodies out of the building’s husk.78 This treatment of the post-disaster paradigm as a 
shared social spectacle unto itself reinforces an interpretation of disaster as theatrical, and further 
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illustrates that this fire was not an issue solely for the deceased and for victims’ family members, 
but for Brooklyn as a whole.  
 As with the space around the theatre, the morgues themselves became imbricated as 
significant sites of performance, as a procession of people made requests to the Coroner’s office 
to get permits to view bodies, searching for loved ones, the theatrical unreality of disaster 
transformatively re-writing the space into a theatre, the spectacle of traumatic death made into a 
performance unto itself. Although the Coroner’s office tried to control who was allowed into and 
out of these sites, it was impossible to do so with complete accuracy, and not everyone’s 
presence in these morgues was exactly honest. One sources notes, 
A most shameful and vulgar feature of the inroad upon the Morgue was the vast number 
of women who, through mere curiosity, insisted upon entering the building. Women who 
were naturally nervous and hysterical forced their way in and risked good clothing and 
headdress in their wild attempts to hover over the bodies. They began to sob and 
gesticulate long before they reached the hallway in which twenty-three blackened corpses 
were in line on the marble floor. When the women reached this scene, they shrieked as 
though bereft of all their kindred, but the majority of them were forced to admit they 
knew no one among the dead.79 
 
  I would dispute the “shameful” and “vulgar” reading of these events as essentially 
ignoring the shared, social nature of grief. The notion that only victims, or family members of 
victims, could “own” the grief, denies the powerful sociological implication of disaster. That 
these performances, undertaken by “women who were naturally nervous and hysterical” were 
undertaken in a semipublic context suggests a compelling need to share, and through sharing, 
lessen, the unfathomable impact of the grief. Simply pointing to the fact that “they knew no one 
among the dead” suggests their grief as disingenuous and/or inauthentic. Disaster sociology 
recognizes the power and influence of traumatic transformation, not only on the site of the 
disaster, but also on the space around the theatre, and on the sociological functions of the 
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community, and on the individual. As Anne Eyre reminds us, “grief is fundamentally a social 
process,” that “generally requires collective participation.”80  
 This participation, because collective and required, must be understood through the lens of 
performance. Grief expressed through collective participation in newly significant disaster 
spaces implies both actor and audience. In this case, the individual is traumatically transformed 
into a member of a survivor community, no matter how distant — or non-existent — their 
relationship to victims of the fire may have been. This theoretical vista re-empowers these 
performances of grief as vital contributions to the on-going negotiation of sets of disrupted social 
orders, and continues the generalized trend of newspapers and survivors constructing 
transformative narratives through the vocabulary of theatre and performance. 
Internment and Honor of Her Dead 
 
 While the last section focused on the small scale, personal memory work that marked the 
congregation of humans around the disaster site and within newly significant disaster spaces, this 
section analyzes the larger-scale civic performances of grief that developed in the post-disaster 
paradigm, shared and significant rituals that perform symbolic evaluation of the disaster. 
According to Anne Eyre, a consideration of the symbolic power of these rituals shifts the 
rhetorical focus of memory-work from opportunities for the personal of sharing grief through 
social performance to the ways in which such rituals serve as sites of negotiating social loss and 
constructing new identities. Eyre writes about such rituals, 
They highlight that in considering the nature and meaning of disaster rituals, we need to 
look a their deeper significance and purpose, and the transition they mark between one 
state of individual and social being and another. They suggest that disaster rituals might 
also be as much about social and political identity and change as about individual 




 There was significant cooperation between the two levels of memory work in relation to 
the Brooklyn Theatre fire, most of which was undertaken without the tensions that typically 
mark these kinds of memorial operations. As with Richmond, there were some reactionary 
movements against the profession, but these movements were not nearly so pointed or cutting in 
their efficacy; nor were they entirely religious in nature. It seems clear that, by 1876, theatre was 
playing a vital role in the socioeconomic life of the city of New York, and while the disaster no 
doubt inspired a pattern of weak holiday season attendance for producers and managers, it also 
sparked an immediate rise in ticket sales for benefit performances. The Brooklyn Theatre fire is 
something of a success story of the creation of social memory, and this section argues this 
success is the result of a fundamental similarity in the narrative and rhetorical tropes created and 
distributed in the early post-disaster paradigm: everyone was focused on the potentially positive 
benefits of traumatic transformation.  
 Many of the issues the Brooklyn Common Council faced were similar to the difficulties 
faced after the fire at Richmond. By December 7th, the politicians had sprung into action, and the 
Brooklyn Common Council announced through Francis B. Fisher, the President of the Brooklyn 
Board of Aldermen, that the city would bear the cost of burying the dead “with appropriate 
ceremonies,” and that a team of Aldermen had been formed to “ascertain the number of bodies to 
be buried.”82 The New York City Board of Aldermen also adopted several resolutions pertaining 
to the fire and its victims, demonstrating that the grief experienced by the people of Brooklyn 
reached across the river: 
 Resolved, that the Common Council of the City of New York deplores the calamity 
that has recently visited our sister city in the almost unprecedented loss of life in the 
burning of the Brooklyn Theatre on the night of the 5th instant, and particularly 
sympathizes with the unfortunate families who, on the threshold of what probably will be 
an inclement Winter, have been deprived of those upon whom they had, in a great 
measure, depended for their support; therefore, further 
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 Resolved, That his Honor the Mayor be and is hereby requested to call upon our 
citizens to contribute beyond all means in their power to alleviate the distress which will 
surely grow out of this appalling visitation.83 
 
 Theatre professionals were also quick to take action. William E. Sinn of the Park Theatre 
proposed to the Common Council that “members of the theatrical profession in [New York] and 
Brooklyn” would “take steps towards raising $20,000 to aid the authorities in such action as they 
might decide upon.”84 The generosity of the theatrical community did not go unremarked; the 
editor of the New York Clipper published a ripping indictment of clergymen who tried to blame 
theatre’s sinful nature for the disaster, writing, 
One lesson is to be drawn from the recent burning of the Brooklyn Theatre, and it is this: 
the chord of sympathy is touched never so quickly as when calamity falls upon a people. 
This is true, in a measure, of all classes; it is especially true of the stage…If we look back 
upon the long list of misfortunes which have befallen the theatre - and it is a list which 
carries with it a lesson that none can afford to disregard — we shall find that, in every 
instance where disaster or death has thrown a black shadow over the stage, there the spirit 
of charity has prompted a quick and generous response to the necessities of the hour…85 
 
 The theatrical community’s primary response to the disaster came in the form of benefit 
performances that took place all over New York City. Understood as a form of memory work, 
these performances transformed theatre buildings into temporary social memorials to the victims 
of the disaster, and the theatre community undertaking these benefit performances can be read as 
a grass-roots survivor community. These performances began taking place in the run-up to 
Christmas, already a busy time for theatres, which only increased interest and attendance at 
performances. One general ticket would allow the bearer entry to any one of nine theatres putting 
on such performances, and the Times noted the disparity of attendance amongst the houses was 
due to this: “it was quite natural,” the Times reported on December 22nd, “that the purchaser 
thereof should select the houses that announced the most attractive programs.”86  At Wallack’s 
Theatre, where a double bill of Thomas William Robertson’s play Caste and Thomas Haynes 
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Bayle’s Forty and Fifty drew a crowd so large that “the house was literally packed until there 
was no longer standing room.”87 
 Meanwhile, at the Union Square Theatre, a house owned and operated by Brooklyn 
Theatre managers Palmer and Shook, many of the surviving cast members, including Claxton 
herself and Charles Thorne, produced Led Astray. The spectacle of this event, which one 
imagines was informed by the inherent danger of seeing survivors perform in a similar context to 
the disastrous event, caused such a great deal of interest that “hundreds were turned away unable 
to find room, the house being filled to its utmost capacity long before the arrival of the hour for 
raising the curtain.”88 Large interest was also generated at Booth’s Theatre, where the intelligent, 
emotive, curly-haired blonde Lawrence Barrett reprised the titular role of Richard III, bringing in 
“at least three thousand five hundred persons, three thousand of whom succeeded in getting 
inside.”89 All proceeds of the theatrical events went towards the general relief fund for victims of 
the fire.  
 When considered against Richmond’s quickly implemented and long-lasting ban of public 
shows and spectacles, the fact that theatre was used as a way to raise funds illustrates the 
economic importance of the profession to the city. Instead of immediately shutting and 
inspecting all houses for their safety, doors were thrown open and the public welcomed. While 
these benefits were obviously undertaken in the name of good, it is worth noting the irony that 
the popularity of some of these performances caused houses to be dangerously packed, 
reflexively ghosting the packed dress and family circles at the Brooklyn Theatre. This was noted 
in the New York Times on December 21st, when, at the meeting of the NYC Police Board, 
President Smith and Commissioner Erhardt called attention to the fact that at two of the 
performances on Thursday, for the benefit of the sufferers by the Brooklyn Theatre fire, 
the theatre were overcrowded, and the law was violated by the placing of camp-stools in 




 Given that the fire was so recent in spectators’ memory, the potential danger of densely 
packed humans must have played across the minds of spectators and performers alike: the 
spectacle of disaster inherent within the theatrical memory work being produced. An 
interpretation of these contexts through Marvin Carlson’s theory of ghosting provides one 
possible way to understand the seemingly giddy acceptance of danger. Carlson argues that 
theatre is defined by its relationship to memory and the performance of memory-work: “the 
physical theatre,” he writes, “as a site of continuing reinforcement of memory by surrogation, is 
not surprisingly among the most haunted of human cultural structures.”91 That humans would 
willingly return to these spaces, haunted by death from the temporal and geographical proximity 
of the ruined Brooklyn Theatre, suggests that it was this very danger — that the visceral thrill of 
knowingly placing themselves at risk — that formed part of the power and popularity of the 
experience. “Ghosting,” Carlson continues, “presents the identical thing they have encountered 
before, although now in a somewhat different context. Thus, a recognition not of similarity, as in 
genre, but of identity, becomes a part of the reception process.”92  
 The benefit performances put on around Brooklyn and New York must be recognized as 
being ghosted by the deaths of the victims at Brooklyn. In returning to the theatre as a form of 
memory work, patrons illustrated the recursive nature of the powerfully traumatic transformation 
they had experienced. As the people of New York and Brooklyn, traumatically transformed by 
the disaster event, negotiated definitions of self in the post-disaster paradigm, they returned 
eagerly to the theatre in order to participate in these ongoing negotiations of identity, a process 
underscored by the mirroring effect produced in the reflection of constructing self within the 
context of the inherently constructed nature of theatre. This action can be understood through an 
analogy to a similar and contemporaneous phenomenon: the rhetorical indefatigability of spirit 
 
 140 
that developed following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, a performative appeal to 
consequences: if we don’t attend the benefit performances, then the disaster has won.  
 If, as I will argue in the next section, the religious response to the disaster evoked themes 
of positive sociopersonal transformation through encouraging survivors and mourners to perform 
their lives as monuments to the dead, the sociopolitical response was to raise and provide 
financial relief indiscriminately. The Brooklyn Theatre Fire Relief Association (BTFRA) was set 
up near Christmas, consolidating relief efforts of multiple sources into which money began 
pouring, and putting an end to a series of on-going discussions about the proper administration of 
the donations. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle opined, “it would be well for all of the agencies of 
relief to consolidate their work. They will do more and get more, because they will thereby not 
interfere with one another, and they will with one force touch society in all its grades.”93 The 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle published a request from Schroeder on December 11th, asking that,  
The various committees, which have been organized for the purpose of soliciting and 
distributing aid, send one or more representatives to meet at the Mayor’s office at 3 
o’clock on Tuesday afternoon, 12th instant, so that there may be some concert of action, 
and that the work may be properly systematized.94 
 
 That the relief effort was not “properly systematized” suggests dangerous bureaucratic 
incompetence and inefficiency, and the Eagle article also notes “Mayor Schroeder is extending 
relief in all cases where it is immediately demanded.”95 The implication of the article — borne 
out by fact — was that money was being distributed to swindlers, people with no tragic 
relationship to the fire, but who saw in the fire an opportunity to cash in on the good intentions of 
the people of Brooklyn, New York and, indeed, the country. This is, perhaps, the dark side of 
grief as a shared social process: when everyone suffers, it can be difficult to establish with 
credibility who is deserving of the support of civic organizations. The BTFRA worked to find 
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ways to combat this indiscriminate and incompetent distribution of relief funds. Joshua Britton’s 
article Tragedy, Welfare and Reform: The Impact of the Brooklyn Theatre Fire of 1876, argues, 
The privatization of disaster relief in Brooklyn was part of a larger effort by municipal 
reformers in the 1870s to refine urban welfare, giving the administration of aid to upper-
class "experts" with experience managing charitable organizations. Schroeder and his 
fellow reformers feared that if the machine-controlled Brooklyn Common Council were 
given charge of fire relief efforts, "Boss" Hugh McLaughlin would use the funds to buy 
political influence while the "virtuous poor" would be ignored. Given the scale of the 
disaster and the severity of the 1876-77 winter, Schroeder and his colleagues demanded 
that aid efforts be controlled by experienced administrators.96  
 
 The BTFRA put into place a standardized process for doling out money to the bereaved: a 
home visit by a BTFRA representative, and subsequent reporting to the BTFRA of how the funds 
were used once awarded. Still, even this standardized process was not without criticism, and it’s 
likely that attempts to weed out dishonest claims greatly complicated gaining relief for those who 
were actually suffering. Britton argues,  
The very structure of the BTFRA seemed to be skewed against aid-seekers from the very 
beginning. This is perhaps best observed in the rigorous screening process that potential 
relief recipients were forced to undergo. First of all, most men were excluded from 
making a claim unless they could prove that they, through reason of age or disability, 
relied upon the income of their wife or child. Most men who applied for aid were 
summarily dismissed, revealing the BTFRA's lack of understanding of the economic 
structures of families in the city's working class. BTFRA clients needed first to provide 
the BTFRA with a reference attesting to their character and to the fact they lost a relative 
who provided for them and their family. Then, "their family circumstances were 
investigated by case workers who spared no pains to acquaint themselves with the 
character and needs of the numerous applicants and with the merits of their claims." If 
found worthy by the visitors, the Executive Committee would set a biweekly stipend 
appropriate for the family's lost income. Visitors kept copious notes about each home, 
and particular attention was paid to family arrangements and suspicions of alcohol 
consumption. The visitor for each ward would also be able to adjust the biweekly stipend 
at their discretion (and often did). These adjustments most frequently drew letters of 
complaint from aid recipients.97  
 
 Arguably, in the BTFRA’s discriminatory attitude towards male victims, a reading of a 
gendered social structure may be read. Through the indiscriminate and far-reaching disruptive 
power of fire, assumptions about gendered essentialisms are challenged and destroyed. In the 
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post-disaster scramble to re-construct systems of order and meaning, gender is an avenue through 
which those systems are negotiated and re-inscribed, perhaps best exemplified through the post-
disaster re-writing of Richmond’s Lieutenant Gibbon as a paragon of masculinity, even when the 
historical records don’t support such claims. In the BTFRA’s skeptical construction of male 
claims is the re-assertion of masculinity as a functional gender construct, and the implication of a 
weakened and helpless femininity, re-assertions of gendered essentialisms as valuable social 
systems of order held in the pre-disaster time period.  
 Despite the stringent application procedure, the BTFRA’s overall influence for the benefit 
of the survivors was positive, and the committee dutifully doled out money for over two years. 
The group dissolved in late March 1879, and the final report published by Alfred Putnam, the 
Secretary of the Executive Committee, detailed both the “many ingenious attempts by impostors 
to obtain money from the committee, and… the method adopted for exposing the frauds.”98 The 
BTFRA oversaw the distribution of almost $50,000 to sufferers, and took on the cost of 
meetings, investigations, and disbursement themselves. The final report of the BTFRA, coupled 
with the erection of the monument in Green-wood Cemetery, may be seen as a semiotic turning 
of the page, a symbol of the re-establishment of order following the disruption of the fire, a 
signal of the end of the disaster process. And just as the group dissolved, so, too, did concerns of 
the relative safety of theatre buildings in New York and Brooklyn, and beyond.  
 By December 7th, the city of Brooklyn’s plan for internment of the dead was laid forth in a 
proclamation from Mayor Frederick A. Schroeder: 
To the people of Brooklyn: 
 The interment in Greenwood Cemetery by the city authorities of the remains of those 
who perished on the night of the 5th of December in the fire at the Brooklyn Theatre will 
take place on Saturday, the 9th of December. 
 At 12 o’clock that day the funeral procession will be formed on Schermerhorn street, 





3. Hearses and other vehicles containing the bodies of the dead, escorted b the militia, 
under command of Major-general Thomas S. Dakin. 
4. Relatives and friends of the deceased, who will present themselves in carriages. 
5. Officials. 
 It is not expected that any of the relatives or friends will desire to join the procession 
on foot. It is recommended that those who wish to attend the ceremonies and pay their 
last respects to the dead, relatives and friends repair directly to the plot selected for the 
burial on Battle Hill, in Greenwood Cemetery, and there await the arrival of the funeral 
procession. 
 The route of the procession will be:  Starting from the junction of Flatbush avenue 
and Schermerhorn street, through Flatbush avenue to Sixth avenue, Sixth avenue to Third 
street, Third street to Fourth avenue, Fourth avenue to Twenty-fifth street, Twenty-fifth 
street to the entrance of the Cemetery, and thence to Battle Hill.99 
 
 As if in response to the somber and dour mood of Brooklyn, the brutal cold of December 
weather took a nasty turn as the week turned into the weekend, and the funeral processions got 
underway. On Saturday, as the bodies of most of the victims were interred, the storm hit the 
hardest, and powerful gusts of wind blew under an imposing grey sky, “gathering dust, gravel, 
and sifted snow” and “moan[ing] through the hole of the yet standing cupola” of the ruined 
theatre, “now and then tearing down a brick or two, and often threatening the whole of the 
structure.”100 The gray weekend was marked entirely by Brooklyn “devot[ing] herself to the 
internment and honor of her dead.”101 In honor of the dead, the city was shut down on Saturday 
during the funeral, between 1 and 5 PM.  The buildings in the city were physically transformed, 
as if the city itself were mourning along with its citizens: “the City Hall, Court-House, Post 
Office and other public buildings bore heavy drapings of crape. The theaters and many private 
establishments were also festooned with tokens of mourning, and flags at half-mast were to be 
seen in all parts of the city.”102  
 The city had identified “seventy-six unrecognized bodies, all of which would be buried in 
the plot at Greenwood,” and an additional twenty-five bodies that were “recognized, but not 
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removed” from the wreckage of the theatre.103 Fifteen other bodies, identified by family 
members, who “were absent or too poor to bury them were allotted separate graves, and interred 
at the city’s expense.” In addition to the “one hundred stained pine coffins with mountings of 
German silver,” “a considerable number of dead were buried privately by their friends of 
relatives.”104 These bodies, representing all of the dead, were prepared for burial in Brooklyn’s 
Green-Wood Cemetery.105 The fire had destroyed any ability to reliably read identity on the 
bodies of the victims, aside from superficial readings that focused on possible racialized 
differences. The New York Tribune reported this difficulty, writing, “it was very difficult to 
distinguish the remains of a white man from those of a colored person. The lips and hair, if any 
had been left, were about the only different features.”106 As in Richmond, the only possible 
answer to the difficult question of burying the dead was through a “promiscuous grave” into 
which all of the available ashes, and the bones of the unidentified, would be placed.  
 The funeral procession “did not move until an hour after the appointed time,” owing to 
delays with prepping the bodies at the morgue, and it was closing in on two o’clock when, 
The band of the 23rd Regiment began the funeral march, the sound of the weird, sobbing 
chords of the dirge caused tears to gather in the eyes of many men and women. The dread 
reality which the funeral embodied was felt with new force, as if the music had lifted a 
veil from the hearts of the spectators and a close bond of sympathy was established 
between the mourners and the crowd.107 
 
 Hundreds lined the streets against the brutal and rising storm as the procession made its 
solemn march towards Green-Wood. “The number of people who were present.” Reported the 
NY Tribune,  
Was large, and showed what a mighty hold upon the city’s heart the terrible calamity had 
taken. How large the crowd would have been had the air been more genial it is difficult to 
estimate; many think that the spectacle at the Lincoln and Greeley funerals would have 




 As the wind whipped brutal snow and cold around the grounds of Green-Wood Cemetery, 
crowds gathered to watch as the victims were laid to rest. Green-Wood Cemetery was 
established as a National Historic Landmark in 2006, and was the brain-child of Henry Evelyn 
Pierrepont. The location, before the cemetery was established there in 1838, was most famous 
for being the location of the Battle of Long Island in August 1776, on what is known as Battle 
Hill. The site was, then, already marked by its association with death and carnage by the time the 
funeral procession reached the gates around 2:45 PM. As the procession neared the gates, 
“people who could not find standing room about the grave claimed the adjoining slopes, and 
even stood upon graves in their eagerness to see the procession,” enter the cemetery grounds.109 
The winter storm was so bad, and the wind blew with such force, that “the sermon at the grave 
was omitted and the other exercises were shortened to some extent on account of the suffering 
caused by the cold.”110 The bodies were laid to rest amongst the sounds of the howling winter 
winds and Brooklyn’s German societies singing, according to the New York Tribune, “Kullak’s 
‘Abendlied,’ beginning ‘under the greenwood there is peace.’”111 
 The monument that marks the significance of the loss at the Brooklyn Theatre fire stands 
today in the Green-Wood Cemetery. Erected and dedicated in November 1880, the monument 
stands at the center of the mass grave. When they were laid to rest that brutal December day, “the 
coffins were placed in a double row with the heads pointing inwardly,” in a “radiating double 
circle around” what is now the base of the monument.112 That the city of Brooklyn was intending 
to build a monument was plain in the days immediately following the blaze: Mayor Schroeder 
and the Common Council were already announcing plans to construct the monument during the 




 In my initial research into the monument, I came to the Green-Wood Cemetery website, 
which lists the designer of the project as “unknown.” Through my research, I have identified the 
designer and architect. It’s worth noting that the contract to build the monument was awarded by 
the Brooklyn Common Council twice, indicating that the process of memorializing the dead was 
not an easy one. A December 2nd, 1879 article in the New York Times notes “Robert F. McKellar 
was awarded the contract yesterday by the Common Council for erecting a monument over the 
grave of the victims of the Brooklyn Theatre fire…the Monument is to cost $3,839.”114 For 
reasons I am unable to identify — although I suspect that it was primarily a dispute about the 
cost — this deal fell through in relatively short order. By February, another call for builders was 
advertised in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, which read, in part, 
MONUMENT IN GREENWOOD CEMETERY - DEPARTMENT OF CITY WORKS, 
Municipal Department Building, Brooklyn, February 5, 1880. Sealed proposals will be 
received at this office until Wednesday, the 18th day of February, 1880, at 11 A.M., for 
furnishing and erecting a monument in the plot of ground owned by the city in 
Greenwood Cemetery. All proposals to state a price for the monument (steps included) 
and a price for the monument without steps… 
 By order of the Common Council. - Dated Brooklyn, January 19, 1880.115 
 
 In March, it was announced in the New York Times that the contract had been re-awarded, 
this time to “ex-Alderman D.S. Arnott, which was the lowest bidder” at “$2680.”116 This notice 
reinforces the idea that the original plan for the monument was abandoned due to financial 
issues, because the figure Arnott and the Brooklyn Common Council settled upon must have 
been the result of some negotiating back-and-forth. A Brooklyn Union-Argus report, published 
February 10th, 1879, on a Brooklyn Aldermen’s meeting, states,  
The lowest bid for erecting a monument to the Brooklyn Theatre fire victims in 
Greenwood was $5,830, which the appropriation is only $2,000. Is enclosed a 
communication from D.S. Arnott, the second lowest bidder, claiming that as he drew 
plans by order of the Engineer and was entitled to pay, or that, he was therefore the 
lowest bidder…the Board of City Works was directed to readvertise for bids for the 




 For as tragic as the fire was, there was very little attention paid in the news to the building 
and dedication of the memorial, and one of the only examples of newspaper coverage of the 
event is a brief mention in The Herald in November 1880: “the citizens of Brooklyn have erected 
in Greenwood cemetery a handsome monument to the memory of the victims of the Brooklyn 
theatre fire. One hundred and five unrecognizable bodies were buried in one lot in the 
cemetery.”118  
 Initially, I could find very little about David S. Arnott, who seems to have been a career 
politician, holding office in Brooklyn as the Assessor, in addition to his time as an Alderman. 
The passage in the Union-Argus confirms that he was the designer of the monument, as well as 
the contractor of its building and installation. When I located the above sources that provided 
information for the designer and architect of the memorial, I passed that information along to Jeff 
Richman, the resident Historian at the Green-Wood Cemetery. In a subsequently published blog, 
Richman provided considerable biographical information about Arnott, who ran a company with 
his nephew called “Monument Works” which was located near the Cemetery. Other information 
I was able to find helps to contextualize the design and construction of the monument. 
 The monument is huge, and stands upon a dark gray “tooled granite” pedestal consisting of 
“a plinth, sub-base, base, die and capital.”119 On this pedestal stands a large obelisk, and the 
entire construction raises thirty feet in the air. As it rises into the air, there are “stenciled bands of 
polished stylized leaves and vines” that run across the structure.120 On each of the four sides of 
the base of the memorial are plaques that provide a stark narrative of the fire. Once, “a fence 
consisting of stone posts and a metal railing encompassed the plot,” where the unidentified 
bodies were laid to rest, which “provided a visual symbol of protection and repose within Green-
Wood for those who perished,” but this fence no longer exists; it had been the source of some 
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vandalism before the cemetery removed it.121 Arnott was an active member of the Free Masons 
in the Brooklyn area, a member of the Greenwood Lodge.122 Given Arnott’s association with 
Free Masonry, it is difficult not to read a Masonic, and, following the trail of history, an Ancient 
Egyptian, context into the Brooklyn Theatre fire monument.  
 It is generally believed that obelisks in Ancient Egypt were primarily built in honor of 
Ra, “the quintessence of all manifestations of the sun-god, permeating the three realms of the 
sky, earth and Underworld.”123 Worshipped primary at Heliopolis — literally “Sun-City” — Ra 
is usually depicted “wearing the fiery disk of the sun on its head. The disk is surrounded by the 
body of the cobra-goddess, ‘coiled one,’ symbolizing the god’s power of delivering instant 
death.”124 However, Ra’s power is not simply over death; Ra is also the creator, the one who 
“[came] into being at the beginning of time.”125 Ra is also sometimes known as “the weeper” 
which refers to his creation of mankind, explained by means of a play on words in the similarity 
of the phonetics of the Egyptian words for “tear” and “man”: “the sun-god wept and from the 
tear (Egyptian ‘remy’) that fell to earth, there sprang man (Egyptian ‘remet’).”126 In addition to 
their religious significance, some scholars suggest the obelisks served the practical purpose of 
indicating the passage of the hours of the day.127  
 Benu is another Egyptian god, closely linked to Ra. Usually depicted as a bird, Benu was 
similarly worshipped at Heliopolis, and similarly self-generated into existence. It is often noted 
that Benu is a living manifestation of Ra’s ba, or soul, the essence of the sun-god. Benu’s named 
“appears to [mean] to ‘rise in brilliance’ or ‘shine’.”128 It is through the Greek historian 
Heterodotus, who visited Egypt in the fifth century BC, that Benu’s more popular identity comes 
to us: Benu is the Phoenix, the mythological flaming bird that participates in a perpetual cycle of 
life, death, and resurrection. Free Masons date their fraternal association to stone mason guilds, 
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but identify the skill of Ancient cultures in the precise building of impressive projects, and the 
use of specific building tools by those cultures, as part of their heritage. John Weisse wrote, in 
1880,  
No Mason can look at the attitude of this group of Grand Master, Guide, Candidate, and 
Assistant, without realizing that, if there are Masonic institutions now, there were similar, 
if not identical ones, about four thousand years ago, in the land of the Pharaohs, and that 
modern Freemasonry had its prototype in the Masonic Temple of Set I and Rameses II, 
where applicants were initiated as Oriental and Occidental Masonic orders initiate 
now.129 
 
 Given that Masons link themselves to the builders of Ancient Egypt, and that the Ancient 
Egyptians linked the obelisk to Ra and, by association, Benu/Phoenix, the obelisk at Green-
Wood is a strangely fitting monument to the victims of the Brooklyn Theatre fire. It rises over 
the grave of over a hundred unidentified victims of the blaze, a grim semiotic of Ra’s divine 
power over life and death, and yet simultaneously promises that life will continue through the 
obelisk’s association with the similarly fiery blaze of the Phoenix. I would also point to the 
possibilities of comparing this memorial to the Monumental Church in Richmond in order to 
suggest a way to read the shifting influence of religion over everyday life in America in the late-
19th century.  
 Anne Eyre argues, “permanent memorials may focus on the importance of looking forward 
as well as back to an event.”130 It’s difficult to read these simultaneous visions of the future and 
the past in the Richmond Theatre fire’s Monumental Church, given the metaphorical and 
physical existence of the monument literally covering up the bodies of the dead. Understood 
against the fire and brimstone anti-theatrical rhetoric preached by clergy all over the country 
following the Richmond blaze, which necessarily insinuated that those who died in the fire of the 
building probably deserved it, given the inherently sinful nature that defined the theatre space, 
the Monumental Church seems best understood today as an example of an elite-level success in 
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controlling the narrative of the disaster. Brooklyn’s monument to the victims of the fire, in 
comparison, seems almost subversive. For David S. Arnott, to memorialize the victims of the 
Brooklyn Theatre fire meant to construct a monument that demanded a temporal double vision, 
looking both backwards and forwards. The monument is a nexus of fire, and death, and the 
inevitable passage of time, and the transformative promise embedded within resurrection, on a 
blood-stained hill where a battle for the identity of the United State of America was fought. 
Noblest Monument We Can Build 
 
 Concurrent with the civic funeral procession described in the previous section, a host of 
memorial services were held around Brooklyn — often identified as the City of Churches — in a 
variety of buildings, including traditional churches, like at the services for Murdoch and 
Burroughs, held in the Church of the Transfiguration, a popular religious spot for actors 
otherwise known as the Little Church Around the Corner. Because of the publicly shared nature 
of the grief of the citizens of Brooklyn, other buildings also had to be transformatively 
conscripted into religious use, and many theatres and music halls were also used to house 
services.  
 On the whole, these sermons can be read for their tendency to issue a challenge to the 
shortsighted religious narratives developed by clergy in the wake of the Richmond disaster. 
Theatres, and the disaster at the Richmond Theatre particularly, were constructed as “the resort 
of the most worthless character in existence,” and the institution of religion had to identify itself 
as an “enemy to the amusements of the theatre.” While before God spoke specifically to 
survivors to warn them of the calamity, now the focus of the clerical responses tended to call for 
civic mindfulness, and often issued critiques to the systems of reflexive modernization that 
contributed to the allowance of such an event to occur. The shift is not merely rhetorical, but can 
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be understood to reveal the transforming nature of the relationship between theatre and religion. 
In 1811, theatre was a den of iniquity, a waste of time that could be better spent praising God, 
and those themes, embedded in the fabric of society, operated powerful influence upon how the 
event was defined and remembered. By 1876, theatres were vital and contributory parts of the 
New York (and, indeed the American) economy and identity. Theatre had transformed itself, 
over the preceding sixty-five years, into the everyday lives of the rich and poor alike, into the 
fabric of the country itself, and, as such, the rhetoric of transformation powerfully suffused the 
memory-work of the Brooklyn Theatre fire.  
 Much of the rhetoric espoused on the nature of disaster, identity, and memory bears 
similarity to Paul Ricoeur’s notion of the historiographical relationship between death and 
history: 
At first sight, the representation of the past as the kingdom of the dead seems to condemn 
history to offering to our reading no more than a theater of shadows, stirred by survivors 
in possession of a suspended sentence of death. One escape remains: considering the 
historiographic operation to be the scriptural equivalent of the social ritual of 
entombment, of the act of sepulcher.131 
 
 In Ricouer’s concept of history, the act of writing history is the “scriptural equivalent” of 
entombing the dead; that is, to “do” history is to identify and participate in the analogical 
relationship between life and death, and the past and present and, in the act of participation, to 
transform the representation of the past through the social ritual of entombment; to be 
transformed by the sociological rituals relevant to the perpetual remembering the past and the 
dead. Brooklyn’s religious remembrances called upon citizens to live through the act of 
remembering, to live as monuments to the victims of the fire.  
 The Brooklyn Academy of Music was the center of the memorial services, and attracted 
five thousand mourners.132 The service was opened by Mayor Schroeder, who announced that 
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the money raised for the relief of the survivors would go towards erecting the eventual 
monument on Battle Hill in Green-Wood Cemetery. Richard Salter Storrs and Joseph T. Duryea 
over saw the services, and their words were “received with outbursts of applause indicative of 
the feeling of the audience.”133  
 Storrs, heavy-set, with thinning salt-and-pepper hair and voluminous white muttonchops, 
delivered a sermon specific to the idea of memory and identity, and of constructing disaster and 
the subsequent grief as shared social phenomena. He began by remarking upon the Brooklyn 
Academy of Music itself, stating “for the first time I believe in the history of this building it is 
filled by an assembly gathered by a great public disaster in the city in which we live. Henceforth 
it will have to us new associations, and it will seem to hang with funeral draperies.”134  Storrs 
recognized the powerful effect of disaster to extend beyond the time and place of the event into a 
paradigmatic way of constructing meaning around newly significant disaster spaces and newly 
ritualized performances, to destabilize and transformatively re-write the reality of time and space 
around the event. 
 “We are not here to eulogize them,” Storrs told the assembled,  
But to address ourselves to the work which is to be their real commendation. It is not to 
be in the monument that is to be erected in Greenwood. Erect that; let its foundations be 
solid; let its superstructure be of chase and elegant and solemn architecture, and let it tell 
to the eyes of the thousands who shall come after us in succeeding generations the story 
of the suffering, and the story of the love of the city called out by that suffering. Yes, but 
remember what the great German said, that the noblest monument we can build to our 
beloved is to wipe the tears of others, not to shed tears ourselves; and the greatest garland 
we can hang upon that monument is a garland of good deeds, and not wreaths of cypress 
and of flowers. Let us build a monument in our own hearts, in our large gifts, in our 
future lives to those who have died so suddenly, so sadly, and so heroically in the midst 
of us…Let us resolve that this shall be no passionate, spasmodic impulse passing away 
with the instant occasion, but that there shall be a liberality in our hearts and in our gifts 




 Storrs recognized the opportunity the fire presented the people of Brooklyn, not (or not 
only) to construct the narrative of the disaster as a result of God’s Divine judgment, but also as 
an opportunity to live God’s grace through action and, through these embodied actions, to create 
a monument beyond the bounds of physical time and space: a monument of human compassion.  
“Another monument which we are to build,” he continued,  
Is in our own character, remembering, as we are reminded by the writing upon the sky, 
the uncertainty of the present life and the open door, which, through Christ, is reserved 
for us into glory of the life beyond, and to live, everyone of us, nobler, more unselfish, 
more devout, and more divine lives, by reason of the tremendous impression of this event 
on all our households and on all our hearts. God grant that the city itself may take the 
impression of it and carry that through its future years. Man never is great really and 
morally until made so by the discipline of pain. A city never has achieved its perfect 
moral greatness until it bears suffering and profits by it, when the lessons of disaster enter 
into its moral life and make it serious, humane, and devout.136 
 
 By suggesting a trajectory of the city of Brooklyn towards “perfect moral greatness” 
through the act of suffering traumatic transformation, Storrs asks the people to note and abide by 
the transformation that could potentially occur within each of them. Storrs seems to recognize 
the traumatic impression caused by the Brooklyn fire, which, by dint of its destructive capacity, 
paradoxically left a “tremendous impression” upon the houses and hearts of Brooklyn’s people. 
In the tensions between presence and absence, Storrs argues that the fire can contribute towards 
Brooklyn’s moral trajectory when the people negotiate their identity through the lens of 
traumatic transformation. 
 When he stood to deliver his own sermon, Joseph T. Duryea must have struck the audience 
as youthful in comparison to Storrs. At 44, Duryea was clean-cut, clean-shaven, lantern jawed 
and serious looking. Duryea attempted to speak across religious lines and along themes of 
humanism and social responsibility. It must have been difficult for him to set aside his 
Puritanical beliefs in the sinful nature of the theatre, and it is not hard to imagine the tension in 
his voice as he announced,  
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I speak not now as a minister of the Gospel. I speak not now as a Puritan, but this I say, 
that no man should open a place of entertainment of the people until he makes it safe for 
the people to gather in it. If we cannot have any sort of entertainment except at the peril 
of life, however inspiring it may be to the intellect, however exciting to the sensibilities, 
however ennobling to the character, we cannot afford to purchase it at the price of life.137 
 
 However, in setting aside the beliefs relevant to his religious role, Duryea demonstrated 
recognition of the sociological implications of theatrical role playing, identifying himself not 
through his role as minister or Puritan, but as a human. This was obviously not a problem for the 
clergy members who responded with religious vitriol to the Richmond Theatre fire, and 
illustrates recognition of the potential for traumatic transformation to make significant 
contributions to a newly re-ordered society through the self-conscious election of performing the 
self. 
 At Hooley’s Opera House, a performance space owned and operated by Richard M. 
Hooley in Brooklyn, David Inglis and Henry Ward Beecher offered sermons to a large and 
attentive audience.138 Inglis noted that the disaster would, like all events, soon fade into oblivion, 
“just as the sea covers over the engulfed ship and leaves no sear upon its surface, so already the 
graves have received or are receiving their dead…” Far from forgetting the victims, though, 
Inglis echoed Storrs’s sentiments on the relationship between disaster and personal and social 
transformation, saying, “let us embalm in our hearts the imperishable memory and the 
ineffaceable lessons of this dark and tearful day.”139 In calling for the people of Brooklyn to 
“embalm in our hearts the imperishable memory” of those lost in the Brooklyn blaze, Inglis can 
be understood, through Ricoeur’s insight, to be asking the people in attendance to performatively 
live their history and, in living, to negotiate a path around the inevitable covering of the disaster 
by the metaphorical sea, to participate in the “social ritual of entombment” and, in the act of 
participation, to ensure a historical remembrance of the significance of the disaster.140 
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 It must have been the venerable Henry Ward Beecher, though, that most of the audience 
came to see, every bit the celebrity as anyone onstage at the Brooklyn Theatre the night of the 
fire. In the years leading up to the Civil War, Beecher made himself known for riding through 
the Bleeding Kansas terrain, buying and freeing slaves, and selling abolitionists rifles, 
sarcastically called “Beecher Bibles.” He was well known as a public speaker on national lecture 
circuits, and spoke with ease and humor. He was handsome, if a little-strange looking, somewhat 
bug-eyed and soft-jawed, Beecher swept his thinning, though still long, gray hair back behind his 
ears and deployed a penetrating stare.  
 Beecher began by noting the inherent (and ironic) meta-theatricality of the religious service 
taking place in a theatre, discussing the resultant tensions in terms of the visible markers of 
spatial transformation. “This is an unusual place for such an audience as this,” he joked lightly, 
This is a place for amusement. These are strange actors on this platform. No such play 
was ever set upon these boards before. To-day we devoted to tragedy rather than frivolity, 
and no other place more befits it than this, for it celebrates that other tragedy in that other 
place of public amusement where, while they were attempting to amuse the passing 
hours, and refresh those overtaxed and burdened with care, behold! There came moving 
upon the stage the giant and fiery features of the tragedy which has filled the world with 
amazement.141 
 
 While other responses placed blame on the engineers and operators of the theatre, Beecher 
was more generous, and attributed the tragedy more to the idiosyncrasies of human behavior in 
disastrous contexts. “Let me say, in the first place,” he said,  
My heart has no blame for the builder nor for the proprietors of the building…my friends 
spoke as though churches, theaters, and public buildings could be constructed so as to 
avoid the possibility of the loss of life. Find me a man that has control of human nature, 
that can restrain human nature, and I will believe such a building may be made; but you 
throw a thousand men upon the open prairies and let a panic arise, and regardless of 
everything but their own safety they will, many of them, trample each other down. You 
may broaden your stairways, you may make every window a door, you may open the dry 





 Still, Beecher, allowed, the people of Brooklyn should accept responsibility for the things 
they could do, the transformations they could make to building codes and designs, but admitted 
that, as much as they could do, “we cannot do everything.”143 
 While many of these responses seem considerably more measured that the invectives 
leveled against the theatre in the post-disaster paradigm of 1811 Richmond, not every religious 
response was as polite or productive, as revealed by a December 16th article in the New York 
Clipper, which noted, 
The appalling calamity which took place at the Brooklyn Theatre on the night of 
Tuesday, Dec. 5, when that house was destroyed by fire, and some three hundred lives 
were lost, is still the all-absorbing topic here and elsewhere, and it has already afforded 
the pulpit the opportunity to point a moral, seeing that the disaster occurred in “a 
playhouse” and our pious friends are apt to term the theatre.144 
  
 The Clipper further argued that the fire would continue to be co-opted by clergy as an 
illustration of the sinful nature of the theatre, and of the ultimate fate that awaited all who 
attended theatrical amusements, whilst simultaneously identifying the hypocrisy of the clergy to 
not apply the same logic to church fires; the article references the brutal 1863 Church of the 
Company fire in Santiago, Chile, which was often used as a counter-point to religious arguments 
about the Brooklyn Theatre fire being an example of God’s justice: 
That [the Brooklyn fire] will serve many a similar purpose hereafter may be accepted as 
true; for, while fire and loss of life are liable to occur in the church as well as in the 
theatre, but little comment is made when the former is the scene of conflagration or 
disaster; and yet, by a similar calamity to that which was thrown a gloom over Brooklyn, 
some two thousand lives were lost during an alarm of fire and subsequent panic in a 
church in South America a few years ago.145 
 
 An article a week later detailed stage folks’ tendency towards generosity in times of 
disaster, and argued, 
It strikes us that, in the light of what has happened during the past two weeks, those 
bilious expounders of the gospel who have hitherto delighted in denouncing the 
playhouse as the legitimate off-spring of the devil might learn a lesson of lasting value. 
We remember how, not many months ago, a certain preacher over in Brooklyn, whose 
 
 157 
theology is of that strongly gymnastic type which flourishes best, if not exclusively, in 
the City of Churches — we remember how this harlequin of the pulpit stood up and 
brazenly declared that every man and woman who trod the boards was doomed to 
everlasting torments in the world to come. Precisely where or when this preacher 
possessed himself of such momentous information does not appear; but that he was 
morally certain of the truth of what he proclaimed we have no doubt…The open-handed 
generosity of stage-people has become proverbial. And it is to be remembered that this 
generosity is not beyond any means confined to the necessities of their own associates. At 
the burning of the Richmond Theatre, which, with the single exception of the recent 
terribly calamity, resulted in a greater loss of life than was ever known in this country 
from the burning of a ‘playhouse’ — at the time of that sad occurrence, the quick and 
generous response which went from theatre-circles was a matter of general comment and 
surprise.146 
 
 While it seems clear that, in the sixty-five years separating the Richmond and Brooklyn 
fires, the relationship between theatre and religion was improved, it’s similarly clear that such 
improvement was an on-going process. The disaster, for a short time, offered actors and clergy 
alike the opportunity to bridge the gap between their separate existences as a way to re-establish 
an order in a disrupted life. This, obviously, wasn’t always successful. 
 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle remarked upon this tension on December 9th, writing, 
The work of memorial service and the work of charitable relief are proceeding within the 
same time but at an unequal pace in this city. We are secular, and, if the reader pleases, 
cynical enough to believe that the work of charitable relief is the most important in its 
object, the most commendable in the spirit which characterizes its arrangements, and the 
most felicitous and representative in the propositions it makes to the public, as well as 
altogether the most impressive in the clientage it appeals for. The credit for such progress 
as the work of relief has made must be assigned by the facts in the case to the theatrical 
people, and to the citizens who have acted with them.147 
 
 The same article goes on to accuse Schroeder of not acting quickly enough to call for 
political fundraising for the relief of the victims and sufferers of the fire, and notes the tension 
inherent in the spectacular performances of mourning the dead. “The thing to do,” the article 
argues, “is to relieve the living, not to arrange for a spectacle over the dead…the gospel of work 
is needed much more than the gospel of words.”148 Embedded within this argument is the 
Eagle’s recognition of the necessity of following the trends of transformative social change that 
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resulted form the disaster: in calling for a shift of focus from throwing money at a lavish funereal 
process towards providing relief to the survivors, the Eagle furthered the interpretive framework 
of transformation as significantly marking the Brooklyn disaster process. 
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Part II, Chapter 7: Direct Results of This Experience 
 
Genius of the Theatre 
 
 While narratives of the Richmond fire ascribe the occurrence to God, as noted above, 
instead of the fire and brimstone rhetoric of God’s justice being done to the sinful patrons of the 
theatre, most responses to the Brooklyn Fire concentrated on the themes of positive social and 
personal transformation. The theme of transformation was most often understood as providing a 
trajectory toward a humanistic approach to re-establishing order in the wake of the disaster: to 
live one’s life as monuments to those lost in the flames meant to contribute productively to the 
newly ordered society. The use of transformation as a post-disaster paradigmatic way of 
constructing meaning contributed significantly to what evidence would be accepted into the 
historical records about the event, even when such evidence was identifiably false. In this 
chapter, I provide two examples of the blurring of the lines of fiction and reality in the claims 
made relevant to the Brooklyn Theatre fire. 
  First, I analyze claims made by the MacKaye family about Steele MacKaye’s alleged 
attendance at the theatre the night it burned down, and how this experience contributed to his 
professional interest in technologies of hazard mitigation and fire safety. Next, I consider how 
the fire stuck to and defined Two Orphans star Kate Claxton’s life and contributed to a re-
organization of her personal history that has passed into accepted fact about the fire. These urban 
mythologies, I argue, come to be accepted as fact through their tendency to abide by and 
reinforce the themes of positive perosnal transformation that marked memory-work of the 
Brooklyn Theatre fire, in a way that mirrors (and provides a generalizable pattern for) Susan 
Archer Weiss and Mary Gibbon Carter’s re-writing of James Gibbon’s actions the night of the 
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Richmond Theatre fire to better suit the religious and fatalistic rhetoric that dominated 
Richmond’s post-disaster paradigm.  
 In Re-Writing a Living Legend, T. Joseph Scanlon notes some “accounts are credible 
because one meshes with another…other accounts do not mesh so easily.” The story about 
MacKaye’s attendance is one such story that does not mesh so easily; the preponderance of 
evidence about the Brooklyn Theatre fire leaves little room for belief of MacKaye’s attendance. I 
argue that MacKaye was most likely not present at the theatre that night, and that the purported 
inspirational link between the Brooklyn Theatre fire and MacKaye’s invention of the fold-down 
chair is an example of a kind of traumatic mythologizing unique to the essentially contested 
nature of cultural and memorial production in the post-disaster paradigm. Theatre disasters are 
particularly susceptible to the creation, injection, acceptance, and use of fictional narratives as 
evidence, owing to the fact that theatre is always already imbricated in a blurring of the lines of 
reality and fiction. 
 However, I am not arguing that, when these traumatic and fictional mythologies are 
identified in the historical records, they should be dismissed. Rather, understood through the 
interpretive lens of disaster sociology, these kinds of fictional narratives prove useful in 
providing a method for understanding the sociological impact of disaster’s memory-work. 
Viewed this way, traumatic mythology can be positioned as making a substantial contribution to 
understanding “the political encounter between grass-roots and elite-level, political ‘processing’ 
of” the disaster event.”149 It is not, then, the relative truth or fiction of Steele MacKaye’s 
presence or absence at the Brooklyn Theatre that concerns me, but what the inclusion of the 
account of his presence in records about the event reveals about the politics of memory in the 
post-disaster paradigm. What inspired the creation of this fictional account, and how did it pass 
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into accepted history? As T. Joseph Scanlon argues, “the fact that something is not credible does 
not make it useless,” and, “dramatic events inspire fiction, some of it autobiographical.”150 
 Numerous scholars, owing at least partially to the fact that Steele MacKaye’s son wrote it, 
have called into question the primary source claiming MacKaye’s presence at the Brooklyn 
Theatre the night is burned down. Epoch: The Life of Steele MacKaye, Genius of the Theatre, 
also provides what appears to be the sole piece of evidence of MacKaye’s attendance at the 
Brooklyn Theatre the night it burned down: a letter from the composer Edgar Stillman Kelley. 
Percy MacKaye reports, 
 …In December of 1876, my father barely escaped with his life from a terrible fire 
disaster which shocked the whole country - the burning of the Brooklyn Theatre with 
tragic loss of human lives: an event which stirred him to devote much time to the 
invention of various devices for fire-safety in theaters, used and perfected later in his own 
theaters and productions. Of this experience, Edgar Stillman Kelley, the Americana 
composer, has written this account.151 
 
 There are examples of problematic claims and factual misinformation in Kelley’s 
description of the theatre. Kelley writes, “A most startling tale was told to me by Steele 
MacKaye of the burning of the Brooklyn Theater. He related how, in order to hear Kate Claxton 
in the Two Orphans (the house being sold out) he had obtained a seat among the musicians in the 
orchestra.”152 That Steele MacKaye would have been unable to purchase a seat — “the house 
being sold out” — is simply untrue. The parquet had plenty of available seating, a fact reiterated 
by numerous witnesses, including Edward B. Dickinson, who was sat five rows from the stage, 
and who reported that, while the family and dress circles were quite packed, “the lowest part of 
the theatre was not more than half full.”153  
Other claims made by Kelley that strain credulity given the preponderance of evidence 
provided by survivors include the failure of members of the orchestra to note a non-musician 
sitting among them. Kelley writes that, noticing the fire, MacKaye, “retaining his presence of 
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mind…stepped over the rail and proceeded quietly up the aisles to notify the ushers to keep 
perfect order and dismiss the audience at once. But he was anticipated by a yell from somewhere, 
and an uproar ensued in which he soon found himself without a coat.”154 Lengthy and intensive 
investigations into the fire produced no survivors’ reports about a man walking calmly up the 
aisle to ask ushers to dismiss the audience.  
Kelley relates MacKaye’s memory of the fire: “’In an instant,’ said he, ‘an insidious, 
stifling gas penetrated our lungs, creating a desire for air and freedom, and a struggle for animal 
existence forced the weaker to the wall.”155  The description of the sudden onset of “an insidious, 
stifling gas” penetrating the audiences’ lungs ignores the fact that four of the actors of Two 
Orphans stood onstage and loudly and repeatedly implored the audience to remain calm and 
quiet for several minutes after the fire was discovered – a significant length of time for a fire that 
lasted approximately thirty minutes – most of whom were able to make their way to safety.  
Additionally, most sources agree that exit from the parquet seating area was quick, effective, and 
relatively safe, with few or zero deaths, as opposed to the “struggle for animal existence,” 
described by Kelley. The majority of violence and death that occurred took place in the lobby, 
and on the poorly designed stairs, as family and dress circle patrons tripped and created a deadly 
logjam of humanity. 
Finally, there is the point that, in early December 1876, Steele MacKaye was devastated 
over the death of his sister Sarah MacKaye Warner, just two days earlier on December 3rd, 
something that might have made him disinclined to attend a routine melodrama. These points, 
taken together, cast a great deal of doubt on Kelley and Percy MacKaye’s argument that Steele 
MacKaye was attendance at the theatre that night.  Still, Kelley argues that “As MacKaye was a 
rare combination of the artistic temperament and the practical inventor, one of the direct results 
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of this experience was his invention of processes to fireproof scenery, as well as his folding 
safety-seat of theaters.”156 This is a claim repeated by J.A. Sokalski’s 2007 Pictorial Illusionism: 
The Theatre of Steele MacKaye, as well as Richard Mangrum’s thesis on MacKaye, Steele 
MacKaye: Inventor-Innovator.157 Sokalski writes,  
the destruction of the theatre by fire, his own good fortune to escape, and the great loss of 
life inspired MacKaye to invent practices that would not only prevent such accidents but 
also convince people that safe theatres could be built. His initial foray into this area dealt 
specifically with the control and avoidance of fire…158 
 
He cites MacKaye’s article in The National Review, “Safety in Theatres” as evidence of 
MacKaye’s newfound interest in theatre safety.159  
 Perhaps the most convincing argument of MacKaye’s absence from the theatre that night is 
his own silence on the matter. In the aforementioned article, Steele MacKaye makes reference to 
the Brooklyn Theatre, writing,  
Such terrible catastrophes as the burning of the Brooklyn Theater, and the Opera Houses 
at Nice and Vienna, sufficed for a time to direct the attention of fire departments to the 
faulty interior arrangements of theaters, but the earnestness of this attention has been so 
transitory, and the investigations that have followed have been so superficial, that it is 
very doubtful if there exits to-day a single place of amusement in the United States 
devoid of danger from fire, or one where safety, if fire occurred, would not prove due to 
good luck far more than to any proper preparation on the part of the management, for the 
accidents that fire is too liable to cause.160 
  
 He later writes extensively about the fire, but none of what he writes seems informed by 
anything more than a careful study of newspaper articles. If MacKaye was, indeed, in attendance 
that night, he completely extricates himself from any narrative of the disaster. He writes that the 
fire “illustrated with appalling power the horrible possibilities that may overtake a crowd in 
buildings devoted to amusement.” He contends the blaze, “converted over three hundred gay and 
joyous men and women into charred and horrible corpses,” and that the flames “burst through the 
proscenium arch, pouring vast volumes of smoke into the auditorium, where the audience, 
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imprisoned by the pack in the aisles, and by the obstructing barricades formed by the seats, were 
suffocated before they could reach the doors, where air might have been obtained.”161 These 
claims are verifiable by cross-referencing other sources about the event, but, given the argument 
that MacKaye witnessed the disaster process unfold first-hand, these claims are also extremely 
vague. It is, at the very least, curious that MacKaye wouldn’t offer any first person account of the 
fire if indeed he had been there.  
 That the Brooklyn blaze affected him is doubtless; he refers to it as “a revelation of the 
dangers prevalent in our own community.”162 And the fire may indeed have been the inspiration 
for his penchant for theatrical innovation to spark. MacKaye was no doubt interested in 
developing new technologies to increase safety in theatre, and to increase the feeling of customer 
safety while attending theatre. However, while he paid heed to the danger fire could cause, his 
primary concern was not related to the kind of sudden conflagatory disaster modeled by the 
Brooklyn Theatre. MacKaye was centrally concerned with the more insidious long-term dangers 
of poorly ventilated, and poorly managed theatres: 
 It is a fact worthy of special emphasis, that the immediate cause of death in disaster 
of this kind is asphyxiation, the flames not reaching the victims until a comparatively 
long time after they have fallen waiting and lifeless from the inhalation of smoke. 
 The primary danger at the Brooklyn Theater lay in the inflammable nature of the 
scenic department, behind the proscenium wall, but this danger was enormously 
reenforced by the character and arrangement of the seats, and the insufficient number of 
aisles allowed for the exit of the audience.163 
 
 In the same article, he writes that, immediately following the fire, he “assisted [Dion] 
Boucicault in making certain experiments in the fire-proofing of scenery at Mr. Wallack’s 
theatre.”164 A December 20th article in the New York Tribune confirms the experiment, although it 
does not mention MacKaye’s involvement: 
 Lester Wallack on Monday sent a communication to the Fire Commissioners, making 
them to witness an experiment which he proposed to make at this theater buy saturating 
the scenery with some incombustible material and then applying fire to it. He declared 
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that the light scenery would not ignite. The Commissioners, in reply, expressed the fear 
that there might be some danger to the building in the experiment through possible 
accident, but stated that if they were assured to the contrary they would place no obstacle 
in the way of the trial. Mr. Wallack then offered to put the experiment under the charge 
of the Fire Department, and stating that a preliminary test would take place at his theater 
yesterday afternoon.  
 The Commissioners visited the theater about 3 p.m. yesterday and found Dion 
Boucicault, who has been making a study of preparations for rendering stage machinery 
fire-proof, in readiness to show them the result of his experiments. Two pieces of scenery 
had been prepared by being previously wetted with the solution adopted by Mr. 
Boucicault. A large hose had also been attached to a gas-pipe, and the flame which came 
from the nozzle was nearly a foot in thickness, and over five feet long. This flame was 
directed against the prepared scenery, which do not ignite. The fire was then held steadily 
against one portion of the scenery until it crumbled under the intense heat. When the 
flame was removed, a circular hole remains, but the edges still refused to burn. The 
Commissioners expressed much satisfaction with the result. A public experiment will be 
tried at 1 p.m. To-day, when a larger number of city officials and many citizens are 
expected to be present. In conversation with a reporter yesterday afternoon Mr. 
Boucicault said that he had endeavored to introduce fireproof scenery into the London 
theaters 16 years ago, but was unsuccessful in his attempt owing to the lack of interest 
which the plan aroused.165  
 
 Of course, MacKaye’s absence from the reporting of this act does not mean he was not 
involved in the experiment in some form, and it similarly does not mean that he was entirely 
absent from the private display of fire-proofing technology.  
 In these transformative reality reconstructions is the revelation of the desire to construct the 
disaster as valuable through suggesting that the deaths of three hundred people were not in vain. 
If MacKaye (and, indeed, others) learned something and applied such learning through the lens 
of disaster, and, through the application of new knowledge, increased the safety of theatre for 
play-goers, the disaster could become a vehicle for social value. This idea points fundamentally 
to the sermon delivered by Richard Salter Storrs, in which he called for survivors to live their 
lives as a monument to those who died. Perhaps MacKaye’s longest-lasting, and most influential 
invention that (ostensibly) shares its genesis with the flames of the Brooklyn Theatre fire is the 
1884 invention of the folding chair. “There is not one [theatre], at present, in which the 
arrangement of the seats themselves is not a source of danger,” MacKaye wrote,  
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For the real difficulty in emptying a theater is not caused so much by the limitation of 
space allowed for the exits as by the fact that the passage to the doors is blocked by the 
seats themselves, and by the wedging of the crowd, in their haste to escape through the 
aisles…for in the rush of a crowd many are crushed to death, or rendered insensible by 
being pressed against the present immovable rows of chairs or benches.166 
 A simple contraption designed to “provide a broad aisle in every director when the chair 
was folded and to provide a seat just as comfortable and stable as an ordinary chair,” this device 
has revolutionized theatrical space, and the audience’s experience within theatrical space.167 
While the device was much more complicated than contemporary folding chairs, the function 
would be more or less the same: when the chair was empty, the seat and arms would lift and fold 
themselves against the chair-back portion; when it was inhabited, the weight of the spectator 
would depress the chair until it was “held in place by a lock device until it was released by a 
patron.”168 This device ensured the creation of much wider aisles of seating, allowing, in turn, for 
much quicker egress in the event of a disaster.  
 The arguments MacKaye makes in Safety in Theatres are strong, common sense points for 
ensuring patron safety, and would have value without any direct, personal connection to the 
Brooklyn blaze. He advocates proper training and organization for stage employees and for 
legally required installation of water sprinkler systems; common sense, effective measures to 
prevent the spread of theatre fires. It may have been enough to identify the fact that MacKaye’s 
interest stemmed primarily from his own financial interests — the Brooklyn fire, it is said, “had 
the effect of, for a time, almost emptying every place of amusement.”169  
 It is through the rhetorical and narrative tropes constructed and used by elite-level religious 
processing of the Brooklyn fire that fiction becomes accepted as fact: if MacKaye learned 
something and applied such learning through the lens of the Brooklyn disaster, if he participated 
in increasing the safety of theatre for play-goers, then the account of the inspiration and 
invention of the folding chair can be understood as memory-work undertaken in accordance with 
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the post-disaster paradigmatic environment of sociopersonal improvement. By positing 
MacKaye’s creation as a monumental act inspired by the disaster at Brooklyn, the fiction of 
MacKaye’s attendance did not challenge, but re-enforced, the elite-level processing of the post-
disaster paradigm and, through the act of re-enforcement, entered into official historical 
narratives about the event. In this example, the memory work of traumatic mythology served to 
illustrate the political encounter between elite-level and grass-roots memory work. By 
reinforcing the prevailing rhetorical tropes of positive transformation used by religious responses 
through the act of creative inspiration undertaken in the context of disastrous destruction, Steele 
MacKaye, against compelling evidence to the contrary, despite the lack of factual correctness in 
his narrative, suddenly found himself at the Brooklyn Theatre the night it burned down. 
 At least, that’s what he says. Because, after all, MacKaye was a theatre artist of 
considerable talent and renown, and even if he wasn’t at the theatre that night, isn’t the story of 
his inspiration for the fold-down chair more satisfying if he was?  
Kate Claxton: Fire Jinx! 
 
 Kate Claxton may have escaped the Brooklyn Theatre with her life, but it’s fair to say that 
she never truly escaped the Brooklyn Theatre. The disaster stuck to her and colored the 
spectatorial reception and interpretation of her body for the remainder of her career. However, 
the fire also had the bizarre effect of transforming her past, as well: a considerable amount of 
writing about Claxton and the Brooklyn fire tries to assert a link between her forebears and 
theatre fires as a way to identify a pattern within, and make sense of, the traumatic 
transformation associated with the destruction by fire of a theatre. A December 30th article in the 
Chicago Tribune articulated this unfortunate effect of the disaster, writing, “the name of Kate 
Claxton will be inseparably connected with the Brooklyn disaster.”170 J.K. Curry’s 2003 article 
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Kate Claxton: Fire Jinx re-enforces this idea: “Claxton’s every theatrical success was 
intertwined in the public imagination with her connection to the catastrophic Brooklyn Theatre 
fire.”171 This section examines how the theme of traumatic transformation that was advanced 
early in the post-disaster paradigm, and which came to define the production of memory related 
to the Brooklyn Theatre fire, re-wrote Kate Claxton’s body as a nexus of fiction and reality. 
 Born in 1848 as Kate Eliza Cone, Claxton’s paternal grandfather was Spencer Houghton 
Cone, the well-known Baptist preacher who had once served as Chaplain of the United States 
House of Representatives, and who had enjoyed enormous popularity and influence as a man of 
God. Like Murdoch, acting was in Claxton’s blood: that same preacher grandfather had spent 
much of his youth in the American theatre circuit, beginning at the Chestnut Street Theatre in 
Philadelphia in an 1805 production of Mahomet, alongside some of the most important actors of 
the era, including Joseph Jefferson. Cone later called this enterprise “a moment of desperation” 
and wrote that his stage career was “inimical to the wishes of my mother…in direct opposition to 
my own feelings and principles; but it was the only way by which I had a hope of extricating 
myself from my pecuniary embarrassments.”172  
 Her father had some stage experience, as well; Spencer Wallace Cone was a poet, a lawyer, 
and a Civil War officer, but had also dabbled in amateur playwriting and even occasionally trod 
the boards himself. Kate followed in the paternal family’s profession, but her looks favored 
Josephine Martinez, her Spanish mother: pretty, broad faced and full figured, with a prominent 
nose, Claxton, in the course of only six years, had become one of the better recognized and 
respected actresses’ on the stage. She was the undisputed star of The Two Orphans; Louise, the 
blind, pathetic, rag-clad titular orphan girl, was her signature role, one she had originated two 
years previous at that play’s American debut on December 21st, 1874 at the Union Square 
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Theatre, where it had run continuously until recently being transferred to Shook and Palmer’s 
Brooklyn Theatre.  
 Reports differ as to what happened to Claxton after she escaped the burning theatre. The 
Daily Eagle asserted that Claxton, 
Had been hurried into the [police] station house by an Eagle reporter, who plucked her 
from the crushing throng. She was in the stage costume of the blind girl. Her light brown 
hair was wildly disheveled, the stage paint was on her cheeks and brow, giving her a 
ghastly pallor in her fright that worked sympathetically on those who saw her. She 
shivered in a patched and tattered skirt, and in a slightly waist, through which her arms 
hung bare. She was taken into the Captain’s room and given a seat. Her manner was 
distracted, and it was sometime before she could find words. When she had been partially 
calmed, she said eagerly, “Where is Murdoch? Has anyone seen Murdoch?” No one 
had…her next outburst was “Oh, my seal skin sacque, I wish I had taken that…173 
 
 A report from the New York Herald later places Claxton at the Pierrepont Hotel, to which 
she made her way following her short stay at the station house, where she received the reported 
“courteously, and signified her willingness to tell the readers of the Herald all she knew of the 
circumstances surrounding the calamity.”174 The New York Times suggests that Claxton was 
there with fellow performer Ida Vernon and, contrary to the Herald report, notes that Claxton 
was “extremely agitated by the scenes [she] had witnessed,” and only managed to “control 
herself sufficiently to tell the…story, in a somewhat disjointed fashion, but with a great deal of 
unconscious dramatic force.”175 Other sources suggest that Claxton was found in the very early 
morning hours of December 6th wandering City Hall in Manhattan, badly burned and unable to 
recall taking the ferry from Brooklyn.176 
 Immediately following the fire, Claxton and the other actors that had lined themselves 
across the stage were hailed as heroes of the fire, but this narrative, too, changed as time went on. 
A December 6th article in the New York Times quotes Claxton as saying “the body of the house 
was not very well filled, but the gallery was crowded. I am convinced that our action prevented a 
panic, and enabled people near the doors to get out without being pressed upon by those from the 
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front seats.”177 Just under a decade later, Claxton reflected upon her actions in a very different 
way:  
We thought we were acting in the best in continuing the play as we did…but the result 
proved that it was not the right course…the audience should have been calmly informed 
that indisposition on the part of some member of the company or some unfortunate 
occurrence behind the scenery compelled a suspension of the performance, and they 
should have been requested to disperse as quietly as they could.”178 
 
 Claxton’s presence began to make audiences uncomfortable. A matinee, Christmas-day 
performance of Two Orphans in Washington, DC at the National Theatre was interrupted when 
audience members misheard a cry of “fight!” for “fire!” “The doors were opened and many 
rushed from the building,” the New York Tribune reported. “Three or four persons were bruised, 
but no one was seriously hurt.”179 The Chicago Tribune’s December 30th article on the event in 
DC sensationalizes the event even further: 
In the twinkling of an eye a panic was created by the greater portion of the men, women, 
and children in the audience jumping to their feet, crying and screaming, and but for the 
presence of cool heads and brave hearts a general stampede would have occurred, and a 
frightful loss of life ensued…Louise, the blind girl, regained her sight for a time, and, 
with outstretched arms, appealed to the audience to keep their seats.180 
 
 When Claxton appeared before the curtain to explain what had happened, “deafening 
applause greeted this announcement, and order was again restored.”181 Only adding to Claxton’s 
inability to extricate herself from the disaster was her continued unlucky relationship to fires in 
public buildings. Less than six months after the Brooklyn blaze, on April 11th, 1877, Claxton 
found herself staying at the luxury Southern Hotel in St. Louis when it, too, burned to the 
ground. Her identity as “fire fiend,” “fire witch,” or “fire jinx,” was fixed.182  
  Joke cycles that develop in the post-disaster paradigm can come to operate powerful 
influence on the writing of history. In Claxton’s case, the joke cycle that developed around her 
unfortunate relationship with fire disasters played out in the press as cartoonists and journalists 
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began to crack jokes at her expense. One of the first examples of this comes from a May 1877 
article in the Chicago Tribune, which read, 
A New York writer, improving upon some of his predecessor, says that Miss Kate 
Claxton was in the Richmond Theatre when it burned in 1811. She may have been there 
in spirit, as she doubtless was at the burning of London and the firing of the Ephesian 
dome, somewhat earlier; but, as the gallant defenders of woman’s rights in respect to 
their age, we deny that she was bodily present at Richmond in 1811. She confesses only 
to thirty summers.183 
 
 This passage reveals that the joke cycle about Claxton was already well-enough underway 
that the Tribune could report upon it with the understanding that the reader would be “in on the 
joke.” Given that the tone of the short piece is jocular, it seems obvious that the comment was 
meant in good fun. However, Curry argues that, from this short remark, a transformative re-
writing of history sprang up around Claxton as “later writers attempted seriously to add it to 
Claxton’s dossier through the story of her grandfather, Spencer Houghton Cone, who had been a 
professional actor for a short period before becoming a Baptist minister.”184 Curry further notes 
that the primary antagonist of this trend was Joseph Daly, who, while writing a biography of his 
brother Augustin, suggested “it was the singular experience of her grandfather in a similar 
disaster, the burning of the Richmond Theatre in Virginia, had turned him from the stage to the 
pulpit.”185 Indeed, this mythology shows up in many narratives of Cone’s development from 
player to puritan, even though there is no other evidence for it, and plenty of evidence against it.  
 The Brooklyn fire and a nasty sense of humor followed Claxton for the rest of her life. The 
fire was often used as a tool for contextualizing her public romantic struggles. When she 
separated from her husband, Isidor Lyon, in April 1877, a report read, “Miss Kate Claxton 
escaped from the Brooklyn fire in gauzy apparel, and from the Southern in light attire, and the 
ground of her husband’s suit for a divorce is said to involve similar misfortune of dress,” 
suggesting sexual impropriety on Claxton’s behalf.  When she was subsequently married to 
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Charles Stevenson, and became pregnant, another report joked, “the story that Kate Claxton’s 
baby is marked with the figure of a rotary fire engine is probably a base falsehood.”186 That these 
jokes gained considerable cultural and historiographical purchase on Claxton’s life reveals the 
powerful social fears and anxieties that contributed to the effective transformation of the 
spectacle of Claxton’s body and identity. It must have seemed unthinkable that so much 
conflagatory violence could converge around one person. Joke cycles, like the ones that 
developed around Claxton, suggest the danger of taking anything too seriously — including a 
disaster itself.  
 When Claxton died on May 5th, 1924, articles covering her death linked her directly to the 
Brooklyn Theatre fire. When the New York Times wrote about her death, they called her “the 
famous actress of a generation ago,” illustrating that Claxton had long since passed from the 
public’s memory. The funeral service for Claxton was held at the Church of the Transfiguration 
in Brooklyn, the same Little Church Around the Corner where Burroughs and Murdoch were laid 
to rest, and she was buried in Green-Wood Cemetery. That Claxton followed in the same path of 
death travelled by her Two Orphans co-stars, and the other victims of the Brooklyn Theatre, 
seems appropriate: although she had successfully and boldly escaped from the Brooklyn Theatre 
on the night of December 6th, saving, in the process, the lives of Maude Harrison and Mary 
Farren, Claxton never truly escaped the blaze. It disrupted her life, transformed her past and 
future, re-wrote her body, and defined her for the rest of her career, for the rest of her life, until, 




Part II, Epilogue: Hoax 
 
From Brooklyn to Chicago: An 1875 Forward to the Iroquois Disaster 
 
 If tracking the historical record of theaters in America (and, indeed, around the world) in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has illuminated anything, it is that popular culture 
and contemporary, professional histories emphasized the potential danger of attending the 
theatre. Shoddy and quick construction; non-existent, inadequate, and/or unenforced fire codes; 
attention to aesthetics over function: all were cited as reasons for the danger. Despite a litany of 
theatre fires, illustrated herein by two of the most destructive — Richmond and Brooklyn — 
theatres refused to transform.  
 Chicago was obviously a city aware of the potential ravages of fire, given that a large 
swath of the city was consumed by conflagration in October of 1871. The particular fears 
associated with theater fires were specifically given form by the Chicago Times on February 13, 
1875, when the Saturday edition of that paper’s bold and brutal headline read: “BURNED 
ALIVE.” Readers were treated to a gruesome and truly horrifying story about a theatre in 
Chicago going up in flames during a performance, an eerie parallel to the Brooklyn fire that was, 
at that time, just under two years away. It would take a sharp-eyed reader to identify the legends 
in the article that noted the story was simply a “Description of a Suppositious Holocaust Likely 
to Occur Any Night.” 
 Chicagoans were not amused by the Times hoax, and the Tribune became a sounding 
board for anger about, and mockery of, the story. James McVicker, the owner and operator of the 
Syndicate rival McVicker’s Theatre — the one the Times intimated had burned to the ground, 
killing hundreds — suggested, in an editorial, that the article was an example of ”Can-Can 
journalism,” purposefully abusing the First Amendment for the sake of sales and circulation. 
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“The press must have its way,” McVicker lamented, “and there is no corresponding vehicle, with 
equal spread, through which to cope with it.”187 
 The Times hoax was incredibly convincing, and stories abound that, because the Times 
created a false, but convincing list of the dead, people in Chicago and around the country 
panicked upon seeing their family members’ names in the paper, with one such story ending in 
physical violence for a Times reporter when a man, seeing his last name in the paper, presumed 
his wife had died, and returned at once from St. Louis to Chicago. Upon finding his wife alive at 
home with their children, the man ventured to the Times office with a whip, and “attacked the 
journalist with the ferocity of a tiger.”188 Yet the article almost predicts what would happen at the 
Iroquois, and helps put into context precisely how salient the danger posed by theatre fires was in 
the closing days of the nineteenth century. 
  When the Brooklyn Theatre burned just under two years later, the newspapers followed a 
trend that had existed since at least Richmond’s blaze in 1811; they went out and asked theatre 
owners and operators to vouch for the safety of their buildings. L.D. Cleveland, the Chicago City 
Building Commissioner at the time lamented to the Tribune that he “[did] not consider any of 
[the theaters] to be absolutely safe,” and that he was powerless to enforce codes upon the 
buildings and their owners. “It has been pretty hard times with the owners of halls and theaters,” 
he explained, “and they don’t want to go to the expense of making any changes.”189 Although the 
Brooklyn Theatre fire’s themes of traumatic transformation would succeed in contributing 
productively to transformations at the personal and social levels, it failed to inspire a 
transformation in managerial and legal fervor with regards to the enforcement of fire safety 
codes. Perhaps the true tragedy embedded within the Brooklyn Theatre fire disaster is that, for all 
of the rhetoric of traumatic transformation that influenced the cultural memory work in the post-
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disaster paradigm, the memory of the disaster faded as new paradigms of sociocultural 
interactions became normalized through repetition.  
 Theaters in Chicago simply were not safe in 1876. And, despite almost thirty years of 
relatively safe operation, they were no safer by 1903, and the administration of the city was well 
aware of it. In April of that year, before construction on the Iroquois had even began, George 
Williams, the City Building Commissioner, flat-faced and severe, undertook an investigation 
“with the object of learning how permits have been issued to allow of extreme violations of the 
building ordinances in the district just without the Union loop.”190 The primary focus of this 
investigation concerned the lack of fire exits built onto buildings of three stories or higher, all of 
which had been built under permit from the city. “I shall see to it that this thing of issuing 
permits right and left is stopped,” Williams told the Tribune.191 What his investigation 
uncovered, however, was monumental governmental incompetence: Williams “found that 
several inspectors had no definite idea as to the territory they are supposed to cover and that 
some had paid practically no attention to the fire escape order.”192 
 By October of 1903, Williams was prepared to issue 1,500 notices to owners and 
managers of such buildings, mostly residences.193 At the same time, Williams’ office was 
undergoing a review of all of the theater buildings in the city, and was in the process of preparing 
a report for the Mayor’s office. Between the start of his investigation in April, and the delivery of 
the report at the end of October, his office had reviewed, accepted, and issued a permit for the 
construction of the Iroquois Theatre, under the management of the Theatrical Syndicate, formed 
in 1896, which had risen rapidly, and which would open in just a few short weeks. 
 Memory is short. When the Iroquois burned down at the end of 1903, reporters ventured 
to New York theatre managers asking about the safety of their own buildings. By this time, the 
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transformative power of the Brooklyn Theatre fire faded, and, despite the obvious structural 
deficiencies at the “absolutely fireproof” Iroquois Theatre, New York theatrical managers were 
quick to reassure their patrons. “’It could not have happened in New York,’ said several 
managers.”194  
 It already had
   177 
Part III, Introduction: 
No Perfectly Safe Building: Chicago 1903 
 
If the Iroquois Theatre Fire in Chicago on December 30th, 1903 demonstrates anything, it is 
that memory is short. The remarkable similarities between Chicago and the two major fires that 
preceded it, Richmond and Brooklyn, suggest that any attempt to ensure the safety of the 
audience would have resulted in considerably fewer deaths than the six hundred that are 
attributed to the Iroquois. The fire at Richmond was inevitable, and emblematic of the fate of 
cheaply, poorly constructed theaters in nineteenth-century America: if this disaster had not 
occurred in Richmond, it would have happened in another city. The Brooklyn fire was probably 
avoidable with a more refined understanding of, and respect for, the technologies of spectacle in 
use in the space, as well as a more careful consideration of the architectural and engineering 
choices made in the design and construction of the building, but can also be understood as, in a 
sense, inevitable, given the fire’s temporal location in the Conflagration Era, and the reflexive 
modernism that marked the rapid expansion of dense urban environments during the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 Jonas Barish argues that,  
Nineteenth-century attacks on the theater… reflect an abiding tension in our natures as 
social beings. On the one hand we wish to license the fullest mimetic exploration of our 
own condition — for self-understanding, delight, and self-mastery. But to do so through 
the medium of other human beings like ourselves means licensing the liberation of much 
that we wish ultimately to control…so long as we seek to render the quality of our 
existence in voice, gesture, and color, the simple integrity to which we all at heart aspire 
will continue to haunt us. To this integrity the antitheatrical prejudice will continue to pay 
its wry tribute, preserving our awareness of the corruption we risk in the very act of 
attempting to express and subdue it.1 
 
 That is, religious anti-theatrical prejudice stems, in some major portion, from the theatre’s 
ability to reflect back at the audience the ugly truth of their own “insatiable narcissism” and 
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“quenchless exhibitionism” through the medium of the human body.2 Understood through this 
insight, the analysis of post-disaster paradigmatic personal, social, and governmental responses 
to this trilogy of American theatre fires illustrates how each fire’s socio-theatrical self-
referentiality informs our understanding of the memory-work produced in the contested terrain of 
the post-disaster paradigm, how that contested terrain contributes to powerful rhetorical and 
narratival attempts to gain purchase upon the disaster event, and how disaster and memory make 
us face the “abiding tension in our natures of social beings.”3  
 In Richmond, the sinful construction of theatre embedded within the young country 
mirrored the tropes used by religious actors to respond to the disaster: the practice of theatre was 
condemned for it’s sinful and evil nature, and though some of the victims of the fire may have 
been more or less virtuous in life, the context of the theatrical space of the disaster redefined 
their bodies in death, effectively destroying their pasts, their identities. The fiery rhetoric 
espoused behind the pulpit suggests the level of fear and uncertainty generated by the destructive 
fire, especially when considered as participating in a year of bizarre phenomena. However, in the 
act of preaching against the theatre, the clergy used theatrical tools, “preserving [the] awareness 
of the corruption [they] risk in the very act of attempting to express and subdue it,”4 The 
memory-work of the Richmond Theatre, then, was always already taking place in a community 
seeking understanding and social re-organization through its religious convictions and beliefs. 
 In Brooklyn, the rhetorical focus was placed on constructing oneself as a living monument 
to the dead, asking society to perform an act of surrogation by attempting to fill in the voids 
created by loss through death.5 The theatrical context redefined the area surrounding the theatre 
much more effectively than it did the practice of theatre itself, and the focus given to production 
stemming from loss, and the continued, but more visible trend of using theatrical vocabulary to 
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discuss memorial strategies suggests an awareness of the allure and power of performance. 
Where Richmond’s religious responses worked to villainize the theatre, the Brooklyn responses 
to the disaster played upon the themes of transformation embedded within the reflexive 
modernization of urban existence in the Industrial Revolution by encouraging survivors to live 
their lives as monuments to the dead. 
 The Iroquois should have been an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past, to 
give meaning to the deaths in Richmond and Brooklyn, to change the reflection in the mirror. 
The owners and operators of the theatre, members of the Theatrical Syndicate, understood this, 
and the techniques they used to market the theatre tied the Iroquois directly to Richmond, 
Brooklyn, and other theatres destroyed via conflagration: the Iroquois Theatre was advertised in 
playbills, newspaper postings, and word of mouth across the city as “absolutely fireproof.” 
William J. Davis, the manager of the Iroquois, and the man who would be made to deal with 
navigating most of the legal burden relevant to the Iroquois disaster, maintained a particular 
interest in assuring the building was, indeed, “absolutely fireproof.” Wilma Dryden notes that 
Davis’s “fear of fire was warranted, born of haunting experience. The Columbia Theatre, which 
he and Harry Powers managed many years for Klaw and Erlanger, had gone up in flames in 
fifteen minutes three years before at 1:00 pm on March, 30, 1900.”6 It took only six weeks for 
the Iroquois to burn in spectacular fashion.  
 Relevant to this case study, the narrative tropes used to construct meaning in the post-
disaster paradigm of the Iroquois fire were powerfully influenced by the public outrage against 
the civic and managerial institutions that were, ostensibly, created to keep citizens safe. Of the 
trilogy of American theatre fires that constitute this dissertation, the Iroquois fire is the one with 
the richest evidence of post-disaster paradigm contestation, and it is this contestation that forms 
 
 180 
the primary framing device for evaluating cultural memory work. To read historical evidence for 
contention is to illustrate how certain institutional forces work to disenfranchise, or otherwise 
displace and replace, victim narratives. This section tells the story of the Iroquois, and of 
remembering and forgetting the Iroquois, by focusing upon the sort of ironic contestation 
embedded in it’s marked status as “absolutely fireproof” and the disastrous reality of its 
conflagatory condition.  
 The Iroquois, I argue, was marked as ironic and contested from the day its cornerstone was 
laid and, just as the embedded religious and transformational contexts marked the memory-work 
produced in the post-disaster paradigms of Richmond and Brooklyn, the themes of contestation 
and dispute informed how elite-level governmental processing of grass-roots communities 
struggled to gain purchase on defining the disaster. Ultimately, the contestation and dispute that 
marked memory-work in the post-disaster paradigm was productive to how elite-level processing 
of the disaster successfully manipulated the city of Chicago to forget the Iroquois. This is 
centrally owed to the fact that the governmental and corporate institutions fundamentally failed 
to ensure safety for the patrons of the Iroquois through their incompetence and lawlessness. In 
the act of remembering the disaster, then, such failures would be memorialized and reinscribed; 
it was in the best interest of the government and of the producers/owners of the Iroquois to 
manipulate the narrative of the event through a process that Paul Ricoeur calls “the phenomenon 
of ideology,” which he defines as “the intervention of a disturbing and multiform factor that 
insinuates itself between the demand for identity and the public expressions of memory,” a 
process that is simultaneously “hidden” and “extremely complex.”7 In working to control the 
narrative of the Iroquois disaster, institutional forces like the Theatrical Syndicate, or the City of 
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Chicago, insinuated themselves into the process of recreating identity following a disruptive 
disaster via public expression of memory.  
 The ironies embedded within the evidence about the Iroquois disaster illustrate the 
productive nature of contestation and dispute as frameworks for understanding memory-work 
produced in the post-disaster paradigm. Such ironies and disputes were centrally used in 
reporting on the Iroquois disaster via a theatrical vocabulary. A New York Times blurb about the 
disaster read, 
The elements of tragedy — pity and fear — are blended in the account of the destruction 
of the Iroquois Theatre in Chicago, and of the lives of so great a part of its holiday 
audience…the emotion the news excited is compounded of those two elements. Pity for 
the victims, fear lest the reader or hearer of the tale may himself be involved in a like 
disaster, as helpless and as doomed as the victims of Chicago…it is almost the proverbial 
destiny of a theatre to die by fire. When one burns up empty and harmless a sigh of relief 
from those who read of it testifies the instinctive apprehension which a building of this 
class excites.8 
 
 Even the Chicago city Coroner John Traeger was self-conscious in his adoption of a 
theatrical vocabulary. “There was something rotten in Denmark,” Traeger told the Tribune, “and 
we want to make somebody responsible. We will not tolerate this throwing of the black back and 
forth like a shuttlecock.”9  
 Jonas Barish wrote, “as [the nineteenth] century advances we begin to encounter not only a 
tolerance for the theater, and an enthusiasm for the theater, but a cult of the theater — if not for 
the theater as an institution, at least for theatricality as a mode of existence.”10 That Traeger and 
the New York Times demonstrate an awareness of the theatrical as a mode of existence — that is, 
the inherent theatricality of the disaster event — points out that there was an immediate and 
powerful understanding, even if subconscious, that the struggle in the wake of the Iroquois 
disaster would be a struggle to control the narrative of the event. 
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 By positioning the disaster as inherently theatrical, and theatre as inherently dangerous, as 
existing on a fatalistic line towards destruction — by invoking the Aristotelian definition of 
tragedy — the Times suggests that the Iroquois disaster can be read as marked by it’s own 
theatricality. In unpacking the development and use of tools of theatre as forms of response to 
disaster events, I argue that, just as theatres in the Conflagration Era were marked by the 
reflexive modernization that transformed urban life in the Industrial Revolution, theatre-based 
disaster processes and the resultant memory-work are marked by a reflective theatricalization, 
whereby the re-organization of social systems of order can be understood for their tendency to 
reveal the negotiation of disrupted identity through performance analysis. Traeger’s words, 
meanwhile, suggest an awareness (or at least the suspicion) of an institutional conspiracy. In both 
cases, the suggestion of reading the fire through the lens of a theatrical structure — tragedy, as 
understood by Aristotle and Shakespeare — suggests there are ironies and flaws that must be 
unpacked in order to achieve a deeper appreciation of the text of the disaster, and of the resultant 
struggle to define the disaster.  
 This trend would be picked up and furthered by Wilma Dryden, who wrote,  
The irony is that of Aristotle’s peripeteia. A dramatic reversal turns the expected good 
fortune to grief beyond measure. Because of his experience of fire at the Columbia, 
[Davis] is determined to fireproof the Iroquois. Yet in the “safest theatre in the world” six 
hundred people are burned to death.11 
 
 The fundamental truth of the Iroquois Theatre fire — of all theatre fires — is summed up 
in a brutal sentence by disaster researcher Scott G. Knowles: “there is no perfectly safe building, 
only buildings evolving towards safety.”12 Chicago serves as an illustration of the monumental 
struggle for the sociopolitical right to remember, and how the elite-level narratives, empowered 
by the legal assuagement of guilt, overwhelmed and subsumed counter-narratives and counter-
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memories of survivor communities and victims alike, propelling the Iroquois’s “rapid 
slippage…into a historical past…”13 
  This is a story of what happens when everything goes wrong. 
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Part III, Chapter 8: Absolutely Fireproof 
A Fireproof Structure 
From the earliest whisperings of the Iroquois, the theatre was the site of contesting interests. 
These oppositions were expressed nowhere so readily as in the long process of preparing the site 
for construction and the theatre for opening to the public in November of 1903. Before that time, 
the building had already suffered its share of bad luck since Benjamin J. Marshall, the architect, 
submitted his plans to the city on July 4th, 1902.14 It had taken almost a year to begin 
construction, and the New York investors — the thin-faced, mustachioed Marc Klaw, and his 
squat, round, bald-headed partner A. L. “Abe” Erlanger of the powerful and influential 
Theatrical Syndicate — had been pressuring Chicago Iroquois managers William J. Davis and 
Harry J. Powers to get the building open in time for the beginning of the new theatrical season. 
This chapter tracks the protracted and difficult history of building the Iroquois Theatre, and the 
production of Mr. Blue Beard, in order to illustrate how the themes of disastrous negligence and 
bitter dispute that, I argue, defined the cultural production of memory work in the post-disaster 
paradigm, were strongly prevalent in the pre-disaster history of the theatre.  
 The Syndicate’s investment into the Iroquois was a major step in expanding their 
considerable influence across the country. They were making friends with notable Chicago 
businessmen to invest in the venture, while simultaneously purchasing other buildings in the 
Loop district of downtown Chicago. Otto Young was one such wealthy local, and was in deep 
negotiations to purchase the land on which the theatre was built during the summer of 1903 for 
half a million dollars. Klaw and Erlanger had purchased a lease down the street from the theatre 
at 85 and 87 Randolph Street, and were in negotiations to purchase the remainder of the property 
there, with the intention to construct an enormous hotel that would be financially attached to the 
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theatre. The deal with Young must have fell through, and the space was eventually rented from 
its owners, Arthur T. Lyman, George R. Harris, and A. Lawrence Lowell.15 Still, the potential 
deal spoke to the investment fervor occurring in the Loop, at the center of which would be the 
Iroquois: this theatrical operation was poised to turn a huge profit, and re-invent Chicago as the 
premiere theatre tourist destination in the world.  
 The Iroquois Theater was to be the greatest, most modern marvel of a theatre ever 
created, a shining beacon in windy Chicago, a challenge to the theaters along Broadway: 
“anything you can do, we can do better.” New York took notice, and the New York Times began 
reporting on the Theatrical Syndicate’s latest plan: “promoters say [the theater] will be the finest 
in America. The location is one of the best, being near all street car lines.”16 A 1902 Times article 
on the Syndicate completing negotiations for the site of the theatre provides, perhaps, the first 
note of contestation that would come to define the disastrous history of the Iroquois Theatre: 
It is provided that the lessees are to erect a fireproof structure covering a part of the 
property, the building to be used exclusively for the theatre and to remodel some of the 
other buildings on the premises, all to be completed by May 1, 1904…present plans, 
however, contemplate having the theatre completed by Sept. 1, 1903.17 
 
The September 1st deadline was overly ambitious, and even under the best of circumstances, 
it was nearly impossible for the theatre to open so early. The Times blurb illustrates the on-going 
dispute between the corporate-minded Syndicate’s desire to open the theatre as soon as possible 
and the reality of constructing the building. The cornerstone for the building wasn’t even placed 
until the end of July 1903.  In attendance at that dedication were Davis himself, Powers, 
Marshall, and a host of other Chicago note-worthies, including Colonel Jack Haverly, a theatrical 
manager and Davis’ former boss.  
 “A leaden casket,” the New York Times reported, “was hoisted into place” into which 
David deposited several items.18 These items included copies of the city’s major newspapers, 
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pictures of Will and Jessie Davis, and their son, William, Jr., pictures of Harry Powers, theatrical 
magazines, and United States coins. Perhaps the most bizarre inclusion was a box of cigarettes 
alongside a photograph of Lucy Page Gaston, founder and operator of the Anti-Cigarette League 
of America. Though the effect was probably intended to be of good humor, the placement into a 
“casket” of both cigarettes and an image of Lucy Page Gaston, items understood to be in 
diametric opposition, suggests a framework of foundational contestation for reading the Iroquois 
disaster process: the Iroquois was literally built upon irony and dispute, and Davis had cemented 
himself to that legacy. 
It Takes a Disaster To Make One Cautious  
 When it was produced for the first time at Theatre Royal, Drury Lane in 1901, Mr. Blue 
Beard, a Christmas pantomime, appealed to families and children. Consequently, as part of the 
marketing of the production, an illustrated children’s book, retelling the tale, was published. An 
interesting point emerges in the preface of the children’s book, written by the authors of the 
Drury Lane script, Arthur Collins and Jay Hickory Wood: “Blue Beard has no nationality, such 
as would satisfy an income-tax collector or a parish receiving officer,” they argue. “…As 
Lascelles Campbell said in ‘The Great Millionaire’: ‘I belong to the new nation — the nation 
that’s born as old nations mingle and die…I’ve lived in the world, and I know what rules the 
world - Money. That’s my nation.”19 The authors’ identification of Blue Beard as belonging to 
the Moneyed nationality provides a way to think about the construction problems Davis, Powers, 
and their Syndicate partners ran into during their attempts and delays to open the theatre.   
 This section tracks the production of Mr. Blue Beard that would open the theatre. If the 
long and difficult process of constructing the Iroquois helped to define the intense and bitter 
contestation between elite-level and grass-roots memory production in the post-disaster 
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paradigm, the production of Mr. Blue Beard helped to advance those same themes through the 
considerable use of technologies of spectacle at the expense of the use technologies of safety and 
hazard mitigation. The production and the theatre existed within a neat symbiosis of disastrous 
negligence, the former mutually reinforcing the strength of the latter. Reading reviews of the 
show evidences that the show relied heavily upon spectacle to astound, amaze, and distract from 
the poor writing of the script, the production focusing instead on the sheer size and spectacle of 
the theatrical event. Given the emphasis on spectacle, runs of the show also often featured 
accidents and dangers to the performers, stories that converged upon the production. This point 
becomes of particular importance through its distinct relationship to the Iroquois; if the building 
was, as advertised, “absolutely fireproof,” the regular dangers inherent in the production of Blue 
Beard would not have caused so much widespread death and destruction; conversely, if Blue 
Beard were not so centrally spectacular, the theatre’s extant, if poor, hazard mitigation and safety 
technologies may have been enough to keep the people safe. The confusion over assigning blame 
for the disastrous consequences of the symbiotic negligence, I will argue later, stemmed from 
this “chicken and egg” style argument. Theatre fires were a nebulous concern in the public’s 
minds, easily silenced when they went to be entertained, despite the destruction at Brooklyn only 
twenty-seven years earlier.  
 Backstage was a very different story, however. In a spectacle like Mr. Blue Beard, when 
aerialists were ballet dancing through the air, when the electrical lines couldn’t properly meet the 
needs of the lighting demands, every performance was a tightrope walk between life and death. 
The evidence included here also represents much of what remains in terms of descriptions of the 
production. A music book with a handful of songs from the production represents one of the only 
records of the action onstage during Mr. Blue Beard; no extant copy of the 1903 J. J. McNally 
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script exists, only a copy of the 1901 Drury Lane script. Reviews about the production, then, 
provide some of the only information about what transpired onstage during a normal production 
of Blue Beard. 
 The wearing construction of the Iroquois was a fiscal brutality to Davis and Power, Klaw 
and Erlanger, and Philadelphia owner/investors/Syndicate partners John Frederick Zimmerman 
and Samuel F. Nixon. The theatre was built at enormous cost during a summer and early autumn 
of labor unrest in the city of Chicago, further cementing the building’s legacy to themes of 
dispute and contestation that underlay its construction. The longer it took to open the building 
and start selling tickets, the more money the Syndicate lost. The newly re-christened Mr. Blue 
Beard, Americanized by lawyer-turned playwright John J. McNally, and featuring a slew of new 
songs by J. Cheever Goodwin and Frederic Solomon, was not a cheap show.20 When Klaw & 
Erlanger imported the show to America from Drury Lane in January 1903, the New York Times 
wrote that the show was “monstrously splendid and dazzling,” and suggested that the star of the 
show “was the constantly shifting scenery, the thousands of gorgeous costumes, the floods of 
kaleidoscopic lights, and, most of all, the hundreds of young girls and young women that lent 
flesh and substance …to the fine frenzies of the costumer and the limelight man.”21  
 Following it’s New York premiere run at the Knickerbocker Theatre — it closed in May — 
Klaw and Erlanger announced they were putting Mr. Blue Beard on the road, and that they were 
keeping the star and principal attraction of the production: the rubber-faced, gravel-voiced Edwin 
Fitzgerald, Jr., known more popularly as Eddie Foy, playing the raucously comedic part of the 
Ping-Pong playing, clog-dancing Sister Anne, attired in ludicrous drag. Rehearsals for the 
production re-started in mid-August, and the show opened in Pittsburgh in late September at the 




Stupendous is the word that best describes the production. Massive and gorgeous scenery, 
and immense crowd of pretty girls, magnificent costumes, colored lights, plenty of fun 
were the elements that made up the entertainment.22 
 
 From Pittsburgh, the show made stops in Boston, Indianapolis, Cleveland, and St. Louis 
en route to its stay at the Iroquois. Staging Mr. Blue Beard’s house of horrors was something of a 
horror in and of itself, a $200,000 musical spectacular, requiring “100,000 square feet of 
sheeting, 26,000 square feet of gauze, 8,000 board feet of braces and battens, and 11 miles of 
hemp rope, ” all of which helped comprise the placement and use of almost 300 set pieces that 
hung in the fly loft.23 The show required over a thousand costumes, hundreds of chorus girls and 
other supernumeraries, and employed the famous Grigolatis Troupe of Aerialists — Klaw & 
Erlanger favorites — most notably the Premiere and Grand Corps de Ballet Nellie Reed, for 
some particularly impressive moments. Perhaps the most spectacular moment came near the end 
of the second act, when Reed “sailed smilingly over the heads of the audience to the top gallery 
rail scattering roses in her ascent.”24  
 That the show did not always run smoothly can hardly be a surprise given the enormity 
and complexity of the technical elements, and reports about the dangers posed by the play began 
to appear quickly. The most particular account comes from the New York Clipper, and appears 
just weeks after the show’s opening at the Knickerbocker, in a theatrical gossip column: 
After several encores of the “Hamlet” song, Foy’s next bit of business is a very much 
disjointed soliloquy, after which he lies down upon a trap door nearly the length of his 
body, repeating: 
 “I die, Mother, I die —I die!” (“Three dies is your cue,” he said to the musical 
director the other night.) 
 At this instant the trap disappears with Foy, and lurid flames burst forth from the 
opening. A moment later he reappears from the fiery grave with a fireman’s hat upon his 
head, and a scroll in his hand which he unfolds so that the audience may read: 
 “No room down there.” 
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 Evidently this exciting bit of business is attended with some little danger of accident, 
for the other night, after his fiery bath, Foy came up from the trap afire. His wreath and 
ruff had ignited, while his boys’ sized kilt skirt showed signs of a bad scorching. This he 
did not notice himself until an assistant stage manager rushed upon the stage and 
enveloped him in a coat which smothered the flames. 
 Never for an instant losing his presence of mind, Foy looked out at his audience and 
exclaimed: 
 “You never can kill a bad actor," after which he made a hasty exit, followed by the 
cheers of the audience.25 
 
 The same column describe another harrowing experience had by Foy: 
  
 One night last week another hitch attended his trap door scene. When he emerged 
and the trap was quickly shut her found that the aforementioned kilt skirt was securely 
fastened, holding him an unwilling prisoner in a sitting positioning the center of the stage. 
 Mr. Foy, not at all disconcerted, gave his next line in that position, after which he 
succeeded in wrenching this garment free and proceeded with the business of the scene as 
though this contretemps had been a rehearsed part of it.26 
 
 But perhaps, in hindsight, the most damning brush with danger came during the company’s 
stop at the Cleveland Opera House in Cleveland, Ohio in early November. Foy recalls the 
electrical demands of the show’s many spectacular tableaux required too great a strain on the 
theatre’s grid, writing, 
It was well known to the electricians of the company that in order to obtain the desired 
lighting effects, they were carrying much too heavy a load of power on the wires…one of 
the big lights…blew out its fuse. That was what had caused the Cleveland blaze…27 
 
 Reports of the fire suggest something eerily close to what would eventually occur at the 
Iroquois. “A flame spurted…and touched fire to a flimsy piece of drapery at the side of the 
stage,” reports Nat Brandt.28 An electrician employed by the Syndicate would later add to this 
narrative. “I inspected the electrical apparatus when the company reached [Cleveland],” he 
reported. “Fully one-third of it was deficient and I condemned it and ordered that none of it be 
used in Cleveland.”29 
 Dunn, another theatrical electrician, reports that there were two fires that occurred in 
Cleveland, adding to Foy’s account an experience when, while powering on the lights for a 
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matinee performance, wires were crossed and “every lamp in the piece was smashed to bits and 
the scenery about it was set afire.”30 That the fires amounted to nothing, and went unreported at 
the time, is unsurprising, given the frequency of small flare-ups noted elsewhere in this 
dissertation; besides, in the wake of theatre fires there always appear narratives of the numerous 
fires that have occurred silently and without notice by the audience, which are managed and 
snuffed by the cast and crew members backstage. “I had been playing in theaters for so long 
without any trouble with fire that the incident didn’t give me much of a scare,” Foy wrote later. 
“It takes a disaster to make one cautious.”31 
All the Work Had Not Been Completed 
 As Blue Beard travelled, it enjoyed extended stays in many cities. Good ticket sales were 
obviously one reason, but another was probably that the Iroquois simply wasn’t ready to open to 
the public yet. Chicago was anxious to have it’s brand new, state of the art, top of the line theatre 
open for consumption; New York was beginning to get sassy. “…Will J. Davis’ Summer of 
hustling,” the New York Clipper reported, “has almost gone for naught.”32 Another article 
exposited, tiredly and pointedly, about the opening of Mr. Blue Beard at the Iroquois, “this is the 
latest of a series of announcements which have, of necessity, been cancelled because of delays in 
completing the interior furnishings” of the theatre.33  This section describes the layout of the 
theatre, and the incomplete state of the theatre when it opened in November 1903, in order to 
advance the argument that themes of irony, dispute, and contestation were always already 
embedded within a sociological understanding of the Iroquois. As noted in the conclusion to the 
preceding case study, Building Commissioner George Williams had submitted “a bulky report on 
the theaters” to Mayor Carter Harrison, Jr. at the end of October.34 The content of Williams’ 
report was sensational: every theatre in the city, it claimed, was in gross violation of civic fire 
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codes, and Chicago would issue no more permits to run theaters until every house had undergone 
costly alterations. “Either the ordinances must be revised or the theaters must be altered,” 
Williams told the Tribune.35 The report was sent to the judiciary committee,36 and the issue was 
effectively tabled. The gross violations of the fire code at theaters across the city continued 
unabated.  
 Finally, after months of delays, wrangling with the unions, and navigating the murky 
pathways of City Hall, the Iroquois was ready to open. The date was set: November 23rd, 1903, a 
Monday. Demand for tickets was understandably high. Eddie Foy was in high spirits about the 
announcement. He was returning home, to the city that he loved, and that loved him in return. 
Days before the company arrived in Chicago, Foy sent a letter to a Chicago real estate office 
comically announcing his impending presence. “Lease me the swellest house on the Lake Shore 
drive ruing the run of ‘Mr. Bluebeard’ at the Iroquois,” he wrote. “My artistic temperament 
won’t stand for Chicago hotels. House must have a commodious bar attached, as I am fond of the 
ponies…being forced to live even for an hour in the Annex might be seriously detrimental to my 
artistic temperament.”37  
 Like the Brooklyn Theatre, the Iroquois was built in an L-Shape, turning the corner from 
Randolph to Dearborn Street, “wrapping itself around what was once known as the Real Estate 
Exchange building on the corner.”38 As in Brooklyn, this spatial configuration was obviously an 
attempt to make the most of the urban landscape, but the fact that the “absolutely fireproof” 
theatre was haunted by the design philosophy of a theatre that had already catastrophically 
burned down suggests another example of MacKay’s “grotesque sameness” between theatrical 
conflagrations. The facade of the theatre on Randolph was a truly impressive sight, “the most 
imposing and attractive facade to be seen in this city of modern structures…”39 Built in the 
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French renaissance style with a strong suggestion of classic Greek architecture, the facade stood 
eighty feet high and sixty feet wide, composed of Bedford stone. But all attention was drawn 
upwards towards the arch and the pediment. Fifty-two feet high, enormous stone and marble 
columns on either side that disappeared into pilasters supported the arch above the doorway 
adorned with advertisements for the current amusement showing at the theatre. The pediment 
had images of Comedy, given the form of a jester, and Tragedy, given the “semi-recumbent 
figure of a woman heroic in size.”40  
 The real attraction was the Iroquois Indian bust that stood silent sentinel beneath the 
pediment, and over the doors of the building, donated by Davis from “his large library of 
Americana.”41 The name and image of the Iroquois came from Davis’ long-standing interest in 
the Native American tribe, as described by Edward Freiberger in his essay From Sauganash to 
Iroquois, found in the Iroquois commemorative program. “Mr. Davis’ devotion to the history of 
the Indian has been constant,” Freiberger explained, “and he was deeply impressed by the fact 
that in the early days they were led by the Iroquois…so this theatre, designed to be a leader, was 
named the Iroquois.”42 The facade was meant to frame the American qualities of exceptionalism 
— this was the finest theatre ever built; individualism — the theatre rose over the stubborn 
demands of various unions; and expansionism — the theatre was designed as one of the largest, 
most opulent houses in the world. Jane Barnette offers a fourth possible framing device: “the 
threshold to the Iroquois,” she writes, “provided a luxurious framework for patrons to display 
their fashionable frocks, reassuring visitors that they were in a respectable part of the city where 
safety could be expected.”43 Barnette’s suggestion that the theatre was built to frame the private 
body inculcated in its own public performance of self is reinforced by Nixon’s essay. “To see 
and be seen,” he wrote, “is the duality of advantage presented for the patrons of the Iroquois.44 
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To these four framing devices provided by the Iroquois’ facade — exceptionalism, 
individualism, expansionism, and self-as-performance — I will add the insight given to Anthony 
Hatch, author of Tinder Box, by a young reporter who was on the scene when the fire occurred. 
Charles Collins was reporting for the Chicago Inter-Ocean, and mentioned to Hatch that a rumor 
about the building had been whispered amongst architects, engineers, and builders: the facade 
“looked, except for minor details, almost exactly like a monument erected in Paris to 
commemorate the deaths of one hundred and fifty people who lost their lives in a horrible flash 
fire in the city’s 1897 Charity Bazaar.”45 Thus, the Iroquois framed its patrons' experiences in 
meta-theatrical and oppositional ways, suggesting simultaneously the greatness of American 
architectural and engineering ingenuity, and the mortal dangers inherent in arrogance, greed, and 
theatrical spaces.  
 The theatre was gorgeous. Walking through one of the “five pairs of wide mahogany doors 
with glass panels,” a patron would find themselves in an elliptical room 20x40 foot, with an 
eighteen foot high ceiling beamed with marble.46 At the west end of this room, a patron could 
purchase tickets; decorated iron stairs at the east end led up to the administrative offices for 
Davis, Powers, and others. Walking through a set of swinging doors led to the grand foyer, sixty 
feet wide and eighty feet long, adorned by pillars holding up a sixty foot ceiling, and designed 
with sight in mind: the Iroquois was a social event as much as a house of theatre. High above, 
skylights seemed to glitter, “delicately tinted in cloud forms, studded with jewels,” the skylight 
gave the impression of stars glittering in the night sky.47 Grand staircases, dotted with landings 
and benches, led to seating on the second and third floors. 
 Inside the auditorium, ninety feet wide by seventy-one feet deep, Marshall had kept line of 
sight in mind, and there were no bad seats in the house. The theatre sat 1,724 people; 744 seats in 
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the parquet, 24 box seats, 465 seats in the dress circle with two boxes holding sixteen people, and 
475 seats in the balcony, with “plenty of good standing room on each floor.”48 Painted in a deep 
American Beauty red, with slight tints of gold, silver and green throughout, the auditorium gave 
way to a “well-blended sky effect done in soft greens, cerulean blues, and mauves, with clouds in 
grays and pearl tints” on the ceiling, which was ringed also by “a frieze illustrating the history of 
the Chicago stage, from the relatively primitive Rice Theatre to the ultra-modern Iroquois.”49 
The theatre was roofed by an artificial sky, and patrons were kept constantly under the gaze of 
the past. The enormous stage of the Iroquois was 110 feet wide and fifty-three feet deep, and 
could be covered by two equally enormous curtains, the act drop, “a study rich and mellow in 
autumnal tints” and the asbestos curtain, showing “a summer scene on the Mohawk River,” 
painted by the French artist St. John Lewis.50 Trainer & Co., a Massachusetts company, provided 
the asbestos curtain.51 Backstage were dressing rooms attended to by an elevator on one side of 
the stage, and underneath an area for supernumeraries, and high above it all was the rigging loft, 
seventy-six feet above the stage floor, where the hundreds of backdrops for Mr. Bluebeard would 
be stored, and from which the Grigolatis aerial dancers would be manipulated by the fly crew.  
 The grand opening of the Iroquois on November 23rd was an unmitigated success, a lavish 
affair befitting the opulence of the building. “A playhouse so splendid in its every appointment, 
so beautiful in its every part, so magnificent and yet so comfortable, Chicago has heretofore not 
been able to call its own,” the Chicago Tribune reported.52 Making up the members of the 
gushing audience were some of the biggest names in the city: Mr. And Mrs. William Vernon 
Booth, owners of the five-and-a-half million dollar fish firm A. Booth Company were present; 
railroad executive Samuel Morse Felton, Jr. attended with his wife Dora, and their daughter; Dr. 
H. H. Brown, he of shoe company fame, attended with his wife. John G. Shedd, President of the 
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local Marshall Field & Company, sat in a box among family and friends, and, of course, Will 
Davis, Harry Powers, Samuel Nixon — operators of the Iroquois and members and employees of 
the Syndicate — and Benjamin Marshall, the theatre’s architect.53 Conspicuous by their absence 
were Marc Klaw and Abe Erlanger; perhaps they were in New York, busy with their production 
of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, or dealing with the mounting “war” with David Belasco.54 
  Following the second act, which ended with Nellie Reed flying out over the audience to 
the balconies, scattering carnations over the crowd, calls went up for Davis and Powers from 
audience members. Davis responded, bringing Benjamin Marshall in front of the curtain to 
receive the audience’s approbations. Marshall “announced that the Iroquois was the creation of 
western talent, abilities and enthusiasm, and that western appreciation and encouragement were 
all that were desired.”55 When the cries didn’t abate, Powers stood from his seat in the gallery 
and gave the credit to the people of Chicago; when Samuel Nixon joined his partners onstage, 
Davis assured the audience the Philadelphian was proof of his statements about western 
ingenuity; Powers was, it had to be said, a Hoosier.56 But the people really wanted to see their 
guy, the one they called by his first name: Eddie. As cries went up for him, the orchestra struck 
up a tune, and the show continued. The Iroquois was a marvel. The opening was a hit. Things 
were terrific. And the words were splashed across every advertisement in the city: the Iroquois 
was “absolutely fireproof.” But Davis had lied to Klaw and Erlanger, and the opening night gala 
marked the Iroquois as a space of dispute between disastrous reality and the representation of 
safety. The theatre was not ready to open. Harry Powers would later confirm the building was 
accepted from the Fuller Company in a state of incompleteness: “…all the work had not been 
completed,” he testified. “Now, what constitutes acceptance of the building from the building 
company, I don’t know from a legal standpoint. I know we had not received final statements 
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from them, and that we had not paid them in full.”57 Gary Webb notes that the opening of the 
Iroquois may illustrate a trend in disaster mitigation in complex urban sociopolitical systems. 
Webb writes, 
Several recent studies argue that cultures that exist in bureaucratic organizations produce 
mistakes and disasters. These organizations often value profit over safety, misperceive 
risk, and produce “fantasy documents” that give the public the sometimes misleading 
impression that things are under control.58   
 
 The events that led up to the opening of the Iroquois, and to the fire six weeks later, were 
marked by the same tensions that would define the production of memory-work in the post-
disaster paradigm. Disputes between labor unions and the Theatrical Syndicate, the pressures 
placed upon Davis to open the theatre by Klaw and Erlanger, the evident dangers in the 
production of Mr. Blue Beard, and the tension between the gorgeous design and construction of 
the theatre and the poor (or absent) fire and hazard safety technologies point to a linkage between 
the narrative and rhetorical tropes used in the writing of the Iroquois’ history, and the 
embeddedness of the tropes of irony, dispute, and opposition within the disaster site and event 
itself. The production of memory in the post-disaster paradigm results in some degree from the 
history that precedes it, the disaster event not being “external in some magical way to the 
realities of the human-shaped environment or political culture in which [it] occur[ed].”59  
 In the case of the Iroquois, given the numerous and pervasive problems that marked the 
design and construction of both the building and the production of Mr. Blue Beard as being 
imbricated within a context of dispute and opposition, and given that these disputes led to the 
theatre being opened without all of the work having been completed, contributing in proximate 
ways to the carnage at the Iroquois, the memory-work produced by elite-level and grass-roots 
communities would necessarily use these themes to negotiate the disrupted spatiotemporal 
context of life in Chicago post-Iroquois Theatre fire.  
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Part III, Chapter 9: A Playhouse So Splendid 
Standing Room Only 
 This chapter tracks the events inside of the Iroquois Theatre on the afternoon of 
December 30th, 1903, in order to develop a narrative of the disaster event. Reading the various 
and numerous survivor narratives that entered the historical record through their contribution to 
the official inquiry into the event primarily developed this narrative. While many of these 
narratives reinforce each other, many of them also contradict and refute each other, and this 
tendency, I argue, contributes to the narrative tropes of dispute, opposition and contestation in 
the post-disaster paradigm. As an example of this kind of dispute of fact, there is some tension in 
the relative financial success of the show at the Iroquois: although the Tribune noted in its 
December 13th edition that “there is little evidence of any marked abatement of public interest” in 
Mr. Blue Beard, Klaw and Erlanger had made the call to move Eddie Foy and company out of 
the Iroquois in order to install another spectacular in the space: Ben-Hur, set to open January 
11th, 1904.60 Noting, illustrating, and examining the tensions between such disputes implies the 
development and use of a theatricalized fiction within the context of reality, reinforcing the link 
between post-disaster paradigmatic memory-work, and theatre’s “inherent constructedness.”61  
 On Wednesday, December 30th, a large audience braved the brutal cold and slushed 
through the snowy remnants of the last week towards the large, marble facade of the “playhouse 
so splendid.”62 So large was the audience that the house — confirmed to fit 1,724 people safely 
— was undoubtedly over packed, and filled with “standing room only” ticket holders. One 
patron, Josephine Perry, had struggled to the top floor of the theatre after arriving late, and was 
surprised to find that “people were standing four deep behind my seat.”63 Robert D. Laughlin 
reported “women and children were sitting on the steps of the aisles and that in entering the 
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theater he was hindered by the people in the aisles.”64 Most reports place attendance that 
afternoon between 2,000 and 2,100 people. Stage right, sitting on a platform several feet above 
the stage, William McMullen had noticed a spot light on the bridge wasn’t operating correctly, 
and had left his normal light to tend to it.65 McMullen was new to operating theatre lights, but 
had made notice of several problems with the lighting in the theatre, specifically concerning the 
large flood light in relation to the frilly borders that hung backstage: “the draft used to carry it 
down towards the proscenium wall at times,” he would later report.66 “The drapery of the 
proscenium arch hung so close to my lamp that it often brushed against the hood of the clamp.”67 
 There is some dispute as to the specific light that began the fire in the Iroquois. Many 
sources agree the lamp was a calcium light, though many others say it was a carbon arc flood 
light. In either case, the light was designed to wash a large area of the stage. The lamp functioned 
by running a spark or an electric arc through the carbon/calcium rods in the bulb, producing 
enough heat to vaporize the element, creating a profound brightness, directed by the bell-shaped 
reflector in which the bulb was installed. As a byproduct of this luminance, the vaporized 
carbon/calcium simultaneously produced an incredible amount of heat: upwards of 6500 degrees 
Fahrenheit. The heat was vented through the top of the device via several small slits in the 
reflector panel. McMullen had learned the hard way to avoid the heat vent, as his calloused and 
burned hands testified. Though he had seen the arch drapery shift in the breezy backstage 
towards the light, he evidently gave this no concern as he went to work on the burned out 
spotlight. He had done his due diligence: “I complained to Electrician Dunn on Klaw and 
Erlanger’s company that it was dangerous,” he’d say later. “But he never fixed it.”68 Dunn had 
mumbled something in return. “Dunn is a rather hard man to understand,” McMullen said. “He 
said something about seeing to it.”69 
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Just a Little Bit of Flame 
 Madeline Dupont was born Adeline Josephine Curtis to the shipbuilding Curtis family in 
Brooklyn, and after a lifelong love affair with theatre, had managed to land a role in the chorus 
line of Eddie Foy’s company at the age of nineteen. She was backstage waiting with the other 
members of the double octet, preparing to enter for the number Let Us Swear It By the Pale 
Moonlight when she “first saw just a little bit of flame” on “the first drop of the curtain. It was 
just above the lamp that was reflecting on the moonlight girls.”70 Gertrude Lawrence, the leader 
of the women’s octet, confirms this timeframe: ‘I was…going to meet my partner when I first 
saw the flame. I went on working as usual, down to the front, and paid no more attention to it 
because I thought it would soon be out.”71 But the show went on: as the octet entered, Dupont 
recalled that the assistant stage manager, William Plunkett had placed the call for the asbestos 
curtain to come down.72 Plunkett had likely made this signal using “a light switch, which, when 
pulled, turns on a light in the flies. This light is a signal to the curtain man up there to run down 
the fire curtain.”73 
 McMullen stood on the bridge when he looked up and “saw the curtain fluttering over the 
other lamp and catch fire.”74 Precisely what initiated the fire remains a mystery, and numerous 
reports from cast and crew conflict. McMullen suggests it was either “a spark from the carbons 
or from the heat,” meaning that it was either an electrical issue with the carbon-arc lamp itself, or 
that a curtain got too close to the incredible heat the lamp generated. Later, McMullen would 
claim to have seen “a spark” shoot up and catch the bottom of the curtain above it.75 In his 
autobiography, published years later, Foy suggests that “in spite of some slight conflict of 
opinion, there can be no doubt that one of the big lights high up at one side of the stage blew out 
its fuse,” and, in doing so, shot superheated electric sparks onto the drapery around the lamp. Foy 
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is quick to note “that was what had caused the Cleveland blaze” and that the electricians of the 
company knew they were placing a strain on the electrical capacity of the building.76 W. H. 
Ladridge corroborates Foy’s account, as well as McMullen’s account of the electrical spark 
beginning the blaze. Twenty feet above the problematic lamp, Ladridge had left his duty as a 
spotlight worker to watch the Pale Moonlight double octet number when he “noticed a flash of 
light where the electric wires connect with the calcium light. The flash seemed to be about six 
inches long,” and the curtain only caught fire after it has swayed against the already burning 
lamp.77 McMullen identifies it as a carbon-arc lamp, while Ladridge identifies it as a calcium 
light, another example of the contestations that would come to mark memory-work within the 
post-disaster paradigm. The various and contesting attributions of the particularities of the lamp 
demonstrate the struggle to successfully and reliably identify proximate causes for the fire and, 
so, to efficiently operate the post-disaster process of assigning legal guilt and promote the 
institutional re-establishing of trust in the political systems that provided for the creation and 
sustaining of the disaster-prone environment.  
 “Softly give the signal for the ladies to appear,” the men sang, following with a whistle.  
“Just a little louder boys, in case they didn’t hear.” And again, they whistled, louder. The male 
octet members “walked four steps and danced eight, bringing the members to the center of the 
stage,” reported “Jack” Strause, one of the male octet members. Backstage, William McMullen 
struggled to put the fire out, and William Sallers, the house fireman, joined him. McMullen 
began trying to “crush it out with my hands,” while Sallers grabbed a tube of Kilfyre to sprinkle 
on the flame, and found it to be utterly ineffective as a fire retardant. Sallers shouted for someone 
to sound an alarm to the fire department, but there was no alarm box in the theatre. An employee 
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left the theatre, and headed towards the nearest alarm box at Dearborn and Lake Streets, two 
blocks away.78  
 The members of the double octet, finishing up the first verse of the song, were aware of 
the fire, but kept going so long as they could, not wanting to cause any disturbance or panic in 
the audience, an echo of Claxton’s decision twenty-three years earlier in Brooklyn, and of 
Hopkins Robertson in Richmond ninety-two years earlier. “I thought it would soon be out,” 
Gertrude Lawrence explained.79 Herbert Dillea, the conductor, saw a flash of red out of the 
corner of his eye. “The moment I saw the red glare I knew there was a fire, and in whispers I 
ordered the other members of the orchestra to play as fast as they could, as I thought the asbestos 
would be lowered.”80 Edith Williams, another chorus girl, broke the fiction, cried out, and fell to 
the floor. Strause, her partner, caught her and set her upright, but she collapsed again. Strause 
swooped down to pick her up and saw that the fire had continued to grow, and that the asbestos 
curtain had begun to drop. 
 And then it snagged. 
 In the same way that the type of lamp provided a source of contention, the status and 
quality of the asbestos curtain was similarly marked by dispute. When, the day after the fire, the 
members of Coroner John Traeger’s jury made an examination of the theatre, the asbestos 
curtain served as the focal point of a great deal of debate and contention, and would remain so 
for years following the fire, simultaneously contributing to, and serving as a metaphor for, the 
post-disaster paradigmatic tropes of dispute that influenced how the event was remembered. 
There were three prominent theories relating to the curtain: first, that it was made of poor quality 
asbestos, and so was burned up in the fire; second, that the curtain was not asbestos, and so was 
burned up in the fire; third, that Davis and Powers had known that the curtain was not asbestos, 
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and would not stand up to testing, and so had removed the curtain from the building following 
the fire. The quality, condition, and presence of the asbestos curtain were a serious point of 
contention in the courts and in public discussions about the blaze.  
 The afternoon following the fire, Coroner John Traeger had arranged a jury of men to 
investigate the remains of the theatre. The Tribune reported, “the coroner and the jury could find 
nothing that had the least semblance to even the remains of the fireproof drop. There were half a 
dozen rods that might have belonged to the curtain, but no one could find a trace of the sheet 
itself.”81 
 The Tribune also noted that, 
No vestige of the asbestos curtain remained save for a few pieces that were bound into 
the clasps that connected it with the supporting wires on both sides of the proscenium 
arch. Where the rest of the curtain has gone to no one knew yesterday, although it was 
generally declared that it had crumbled up with the intense heat.82 
 
 The company who provided the curtain, Trainer & Co., was the lowest bidder by $56.00.83 
C.W. Trainer, head of the company, said, 
The one we made for the Iroquois theater did not contain the wire insertion, but it was of 
a good grade of cloth, and would compare favorably with the majority of such curtains in 
use today. Wire adds to the tensile strength of the cloth, and of course it is calculated in a 
degree to prevent a curtain from ‘bellying’ as did that in the Iroquois…While the curtain 
was not of the best quality, I cannot credit the report that it was entirely destroyed or 
burned to bits. An asbestos theater curtain is not calculated long to withstand the attack of 
a great fire. It is designed more as a shield, and I have not a doubt that if promptly 
lowered it would have held the flames in check long enough to have allowed every man, 
woman and child to leave the theater in orderly fashion with plenty of time to spare.84 
  
 That the curtain may have “crumbled up with the intense heat” — and that Trainer couldn’t 
“credit the report that it was entirely destroy or burned to bits” — led to speculation that the 
curtain was never treated with asbestos at all, a theory argued with particular force by Gustavus 
J. Johnson, a member of the Western Society of Engineers: 
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 “I had a chance to examine a piece of this curtain after the fire,” he said, “and put it 
under a microscope. There was no difficulty in telling what it was made of. It would not 
have stood a fire. A good asbestos curtain has to be made with a wire netting backing, 
otherwise it will not hold together. They are expensive, not only on account of first cost, 
but because pure asbestos soon disintegrates and they have to be renewed. 
 It has been discovered that by mixing wood pulp with the asbestos fiber the life of the 
curtain is prolonged, the cost is cheapened, and the wire foundation can be dispensed 
with. It results in a curtain that may get inside the city ordinances, but is of no value in a 
fire… 
 Asbestos is only soluble in hydrochloric acid. Wood pulp is soluble in water if you 
leave it there long enough. Asbestos will withstand intense heat for a time. Wood pulp is 
highly inflammable.”85 
 
 A particularly conspiratorial rumor insinuated that Davis and Powers had provided for the 
removal of the curtain from the building during the cleanup phase of the disaster recovery. 
Another set of rumors the developed regarding the curtains pertained to reports from Iroquois 
survivors insist that it was never the asbestos curtain that lowered at all. Most particular are the 
accounts of Emma Schweitzler and Eva Gibson, who were in the fifth row of the orchestra circle. 
Schweitzler made it out of the theatre just fine, but Gibson was badly burned in the blaze. “The 
curtain that was run down,” Schwietzler said, “was the regular drop curtain painted with the 
‘autumn scene’…It was the same curtain that was lowered before the show started and the same 
one sued during the interval following the first act…as soon as the drop curtain came down it 
caught fire.”86  Schweitzler’s story is backed up to some extent by a description of the act drop in 
the Iroquois souvenir program as “a study rich and mellow in autumnal tints.”87  
 A January 8th, 1903 Tribune article posits the same argument as Schweitzler: “the 
‘asbestos’ curtain, intended for another purpose than for use in such an emergency, failed to 
drop. Another curtain, which had been dropped instead, caught fire and burned…”88 The 
presence of the asbestos curtain would be a sticking point in the post-disaster paradigm because 
of stories like these, and though it is generally accepted that the asbestos curtain did, indeed, 
partially lower that afternoon, the problematic nature of conflicting accounts illustrates how 
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quickly stabilized definitions of reality were challenged during the disaster event and resultant 
post-disaster paradigm, and how the viral spread of misinformation can powerfully influence the 
historical record regarding disasters, making room for urban mythology and insinuation to 
appear alongside established fact.  
 The main problem with the asbestos curtain, though, is one that could be more generally 
applied to all asbestos curtains: there was no proper way to test their efficacy. A friend who had 
lost two nieces in the blaze asked John Ripley Freeman, an engineer and civic safety expert, to 
go to Chicago and “investigate means for rendering such fearful disaster impossible.”89 Freeman 
wrote to John Howard Appleton, the city manager of Rochester, New York, about the difficulty 
of testing the effectiveness of asbestos curtains: 
I have not yet found any satisfactory tests of fire curtain designed for use on theaters. It 
has been quite common to simply apply a flame from a plumber’s gasoline torch to one 
or two points on the curtain and to conclude that it was fire proof if it did not burn up. 
Such a test is totally inadequate to what the action of a curtain is likely to be when 
subjected all over to the fierce heat of a general stage fire.90 
 
 Freeman’s point gets to the vital question of the illusion of safety in theatres. Even the 
highest-quality curtain degrades through use, so it is possible to re-construct any asbestos curtain 
as contributing to the mythology of safety in a much more significant way than the actuality of 
safety. The curtain at the Iroquois probably contained asbestos, but it was not a sturdy, well-
constructed device, and the asbestos was likely of an inferior quality. However, Freeman’s point 
suggests that, even if the curtain were the finest kind, the inability of a disinterested third-party to 
rigorously and regularly test the quality of the asbestos in a standardized way suggests that the 
curtain was most effective as part of a narrative construct of safety in the minds of the audience.  
 Eddie Foy heard the commotion in his dressing room, and rushed onto the stage, half 
made-up. He had been preparing to return to the stage as Sister Anne. Some reports suggest that 
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Foy’s return was being made in preparation for the skit entitled “Sister Anne and the Pet 
Elephant,” which involved Foy’s Anne parading around the stage with a two-person elephant 
costume, although the program of scenes lists the elephant scene as occurring precisely before 
Pale Moonlight.91 Most likely, the mistake was made because of Foy’s bizarre half-human/half-
elephant attire, as he had likely been removing the elephant costume when the fire began to 
break out.  
 As he came onstage, Foy extolled the audience to “keep very quiet. Don’t get excited and 
don’t stampede.”92 He turned to Dillea in the orchestra pit. “Play something, anything,” he 
demanded, and Dillea, “white as a ghost” struck up the overture to Klaw and Erlanger’s 
spectacle from the previous season, Sleeping Beauty and the Beast.93 Foy stood onstage, 
Chicago’s favorite son, and what audience members remained began to applaud him for his calm 
demeanor.94 The fire spread quickly and remorselessly, catching the grease paint on both the act 
and asbestos curtains, igniting the miles of hemp rope and scenery in the loft. Burning pieces of 
cloth and fabric began to rain down upon the stage, and Foy saw the fire “spread with a series of 
explosions.”95  
 William Carleton, the Stage Manager, later reported that Foy’s pleas with the audience 
were “useless,” and that the theatre had been plunged into darkness before Foy even made his 
way to the stage. Carleton’s memory of the fire presents another example of the kind of 
contestation that defines the Iroquois disaster. In addition to claims that the theatre’s lights had 
all blown out — a point I deny later in this chapter — he also claims that the elevator backstage 
that serviced the dressing rooms “was one of the first things to go wrong, and attempts to use it 
were futile.”96 Most other testimony agrees that the elevator ran well into the development of the 
fire, its operation providing one of the most heroic and unknown stories of the Iroquois. 
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 Survivors described Robert Smith most often as “a little elevator boy.”97 In the darkness 
created both by the smoke and the burned out electrical fuses, Smith made at least three trips up 
and down the floors of the Iroquois. Badly burned and with lungs full of smoke, Smith “wrapped 
wet towels around his hands and about his head, and kept his post until every girl was saved.”98 
As he travelled up and down in the elevator, chorus girls begged him not to leave them behind. 
“Keep cool and stay where you are,” he replied. “I will get you on my next trip and you will get 
out all right.”99  
 At the bottom of the elevator shaft, at stage level, men formed a human chain through the 
darkness to safety; J. R. O’Mally, Archie Barnard, Arthur Hart and William Price were among 
the men using their bodies as guidance, even as their clothes and hair began to burn.100 Chorus 
girls blindly groped their way along the flesh and sinew of this chain until they found rescue in 
the cold, fresh December evening.101 The first two trips went relatively smoothly, but Smith put 
himself at enormous peril during the final trip, venturing out into the dressing rooms in smoke 
and darkness, finding the girls and dragging them back to the elevator.102 Through three separate 
trips, the young elevator boy travelled into and out of darkness, collecting performers along the 
way, until he became so faint that he was bodily grabbed out of the elevator, and taken to safety 
himself. “It was hard work to keep it going,” he said. “I made as many trips as I could.”103 
A Pillar of Fire 
 This section recounts the two events within the disaster process that produced the greatest 
dangers, the disastrous back draft that blew a giant fireball into the audience, and the scramble 
for life over Couch Alley. Each of these events illustrates the architectural and managerial 
shortcomings that contributed to the severity of the disaster at the Iroquois and, in turn, 
contributed to the necessity for the post-disaster paradigmatic manipulation of memory-work by 
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elite-level forces through tropes of dispute. More so than Richmond or Brooklyn, the Iroquois 
Theatre disaster demonstrates that disaster remembrances are best understood through what Bos, 
Ullberg and ’t Hart identify as “a product of a political encounter between grass-roots memory 
and the elite-level, political ‘processing’ of disasters.”104 Relevant to the memory-work of the 
Iroquois Theatre, the processing of the disaster was marked most clearly by the numerous 
disputes about causes, effects, and, ultimately, about the legal assignation of guilt which, I argue 
in the next chapter, was never meaningfully achieved.  
 Onstage, the environment had grown too dangerous for Foy or the orchestra members to 
stay any longer. The orchestra made their escape under the stage through a special door, while 
Foy went for one of the stage doors. As he went, he was joined by many of the Grigolatis girls, 
and they made their escape. As Foy exited, the stage loft “collapsed and tons of fire poured over 
the stage.”105 The sound was deafening, “like the booming of great guns” and “thunder bolts.”106 
He later wrote,  
As I left the stage the last of the ropes holding up the drops burned through, and with 
them the whole loft collapsed with a terrifying crash, bringing down tons of burning 
material - and with that, all the lights in the house went out.107 
 
 Other accounts reinforce Foy’s point. Tony Hatch writes,  
 
With a roar that reverberated throughout the building, tons of wood, rope, sandbags, pipe, 
pulleys, lights, rigging and nearly 280- pieces of blazing scenery crash to the stage…with 
the force of a bomb, instantly knocking out the electrical switchboard and plunging the 
auditorium into darkness.108 
 
 The wreckage of the rigging left “debris…a foot thick…twisted together, imbedded [sic] in 
a yielding mass of half burned scenery.”109 It was most likely at this point in time that the stage 
was plunged into darkness and not, as Carleton remembered, before Eddie Foy made his way to 
the stage to plea for calm from the audience.  
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 The large stage door had been thrown open, although precisely who did it remains a 
mystery.110 The opens doors provided a convenient source of fuel to the fire that had, to this 
point, been largely contained to the stage area of the building. A backdraft is among the most 
perilous events a fire and rescue worker might face, occurring when oxygen is rapidly re-
introduced into an oxygen-depleted environment. Lacking oxygen, combustion slows down 
while combustible fuel gases and smoke remain at temperatures above the ignition point. 
Technologies of fire safety are designed to work in tandem to create this environment of oxygen 
starvation, the goal being not the prevention of fire, but the mitigation of the danger of fire.  
 “My god man,” an employee shouted as the doors were opened. “What do you mean by 
opening those doors? This draft is as strong as a gale and the fire will be on top of the audience 
in a minute.” Though attempts were made to close the door, the effort was impossible, as “chorus 
girls made a mad dash for the exit and crowded the entrance.”111 All accounts of the Iroquois 
agree that, onstage, the smoke was dense, black, and suffocating. Further evidence shows that the 
skylights installed above the stage area, which were designed to allow smoke to vent through the 
roofs in just such an event, “did not work on the day of the fire,” having been “fastened shut on 
the inside with wire lashes, and on the outside with a scantling brace.”112 This oversight 
produced a perfect, oxygen-starved environment in which the fire could burn and smolder hotly, 
but not spread beyond the brick proscenium wall, and certainly not beyond the asbestos curtain, 
if it had worked correctly.  
 Badly untested, the technologies of safety that had been installed at the Iroquois failed in 
such catastrophic and cooperative ways that it almost defies logical or reasonable description. 
First, the asbestos curtain had failed to fall correctly. Thomas Delaney, a light operator in the 
theatre, testified, “in the scene just preceding the moonlight one, in which the fire broke out, we 
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had the trough of border lights swung out. It was at right angles with the wall, and when in that 
position, the curtain could not drop.”113 The lights were designed to, “when not in use, [to fit] 
into an excavation on the wall.”114 The curtain stopped about “fifteen to twenty feet above the 
stage” on the north side of the stage, stage right. Some accounts state that the curtain had also 
“bellied out” because of a gust of wind from the stage door being opened.  
 In the house, events had conspired in a perfect storm of disaster. Although the skylights 
onstage did not work, ventilation slots above the audience were operating, and working properly, 
providing a source of cool oxygen into the house. Weeks after the fire, Alfred C. Mace, the vice 
president of Coats and Burchard public appraisers, discovered a hollow chamber in the ceiling of 
the auditorium housing an electric fan.115 Mace’s theory suggested that the fan had been placed 
there to provide air circulation for the theatre, and had been running on the afternoon of the 30th. 
The fan’s enormous power helped suck the fire from the stage into the house, and upwards 
towards the ceiling, as evidenced by “the iron leaves of the fan melted in places.”116 
 Through the “yawning space of many feet” beneath the asbestos curtain, among “dark, 
gloomy, smoke concealed chaos,” the oxygen rich blast of air from open doors gave new life to 
the smoldering fire, blasting it like “a horizontal volcano” from the stage into the house.117 Those 
in the first few rows who had remained seated patiently were instantly consumed by the eruption, 
which had branched from the stage “in a semi-circle…scarcely the distance of thirty feet.” The 
upholstery of the chairs was ignited and destroyed.118 Beyond that area, responders would find 
groups of people unburned, but dead in their seats: the blast of fire was so powerful that it had 
sucked the oxygen out of their lungs, asphyxiating them in a “mass of flame,” a “withering blast 
of death.”119  
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 Of all of the horror inside the building, none is so grim as what transpired in Couch 
Alley. The scene would become the focal point of numerous urban myths about the fire. Alice 
Kilroy, like many in the audience, a schoolteacher, was one of those jammed four-deep in 
standing-room only, house right, three or four seats in, with her sister. At the first signs of fire, 
Kilroy whispered to her sister through the darkness “even if there is no fire, let us go out in the 
exit.”120 The immediacy of Kilroy’s narrative underscores precisely how quickly the fire got out 
of control: by the time she and her sister had reached a fire escape, the heat had already grown so 
intense they could not bear to re-enter the building, and when they couldn’t make their way 
down the stairs, they found re-entry into the theatre was blocked by people trying to get out. 
Escape was impossible — the double-doors installed on the fire escape were arranged in such a 
way that the outer doors swung outwards at ninety degrees to the limn, so people on the third 
floor could not get past the open door on the second. A later investigation undertaken by the 
Coroner’s office would suggest that the “doors are much too small, they should have been three 
times as large,” according to Juror Finn, and required an ordinary sized man to stoop to pass 
through.121 Further, “the level of the floor” of the theatre is “two feet above the platform at the 
escape,” the Tribune reported. “Not knowing that this drop exited, the women and children fell 
as they tried to step out. Others trampled on them.”122 
 Stuck for almost six minutes on the fire escape, Kilroy reported water began to fall on 
their heads — perhaps snow on the roof melting due to the intensity of the flames — refreshing 
them and providing some relief from the heat. Across Couch Alley stood the Tremont building, 
owned by Northwestern University. That afternoon, students and painters alike were at work in 
the building. Fred H. Rea, a Northwestern student, corroborates Kilroy’s account. “I saw at least 




But they were unable to do so, because at the second landing from the top the doors were 
not swung clear back against the wall. The doors were at right angles to the wall, and 
through the exit smoke was pouring and part of the time flames.123 
 
 When they became aware of the mortal peril of the people on the fire escape, painters 
“pushed ladders and boards across the gap to rescue those trapped on [the] fire platform.”124 
About a dozen people made it across safely — Kilroy claims she was the last — before “a pillar 
of fire” shot out of the Iroquois and “dashed itself against the wall of the university building.”125 
Many accepted their fates, and “jumped voluntarily” into the alley, smashing against the ground 
below, while others were pushed over the railings in the jostle for position on the tiny iron 
platform.126 This grim cascade of bodies grew quickly and violently, blood gushing, bones 
snapping, and lungs constricting under the weight of dozens of other bodies, until the pile of 
dead reached almost ten-feet high.127 At this height, survivors reported, the pile reduced the 
distance to the platforms to “an easy distance of six feet,” and other victims of the fire began to 
use the dead as a cushion to safety.128 
 The fate of patrons inside was no better. Audience members searched for an exit, many of 
which were hidden behind red curtains, so as not to disturb the aesthetic of the design of the 
theatre. Others remained stuck by the difficulties trying to use a European-style lock with which 
Americans were unfamiliar, slowing progress and egress. Ushers, badly trained — if, indeed, 
trained at all, as many claimed they were not — had abandoned their posts at the first sign of 
danger.129 Perhaps the deadliest design flaws were the inward-opening doors. As patrons 
struggled with the locks, panicked crowds of victims behind them smashed up against the door. 
Bodies were trampled as the crush of humanity tried to move ever forward, a grim meeting of the 
immovable object and the unstoppable force.  
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 Most egregious, however, were the padlocked iron gates blocking off hallways leading 
from the second and third floors to the foyer; George M. Dusenberry, Head Usher and 
Superintendent of the auditorium, would later testify that the “four to five feet high gates” were 
removed in the hours following the fire.130 The gates folded up, accordion-style, between acts to 
allow patrons to attend to their needs during act breaks, but otherwise were in place to prevent 
those in the “cheap seats” from sneaking down into the orchestra seating section. Dusenberry 
himself had been the one to lock the gates. 
 The doors, the gates, and the alley were the three biggest sites of death at the Iroquois, 
although the stairways in the magnificent foyer, as with Richmond and Brooklyn, were just as 
problematic. Although the stairways did not collapse under the weight of humanity, the designs 
caused incredible problems for those trying to escape. Instead of separate staircases servicing the 
different levels of seating, the left and right staircases came together at right angles on a landing 
in the middle of the foyer at the second level, and from there extended upwards in either 
direction to the third floor. The staircases were obviously designed with the philosophy of 
“seeing and being seen,” in order to benefit the Iroquois’ position as the social highlight of the 
city, and not in providing the readiest and most opportunity for escape. 
 Drawings of the lobby, as well as photos published in the Tribune, show that each grand 
staircase was composed of no fewer than five landings leading from the ground floor to the dress 
circle, each of which had benches. At the dress circle, patrons could walk three or four steps 
upwards into the auditorium, or hang a ninety degree turn and ascend three or four more stairs to 
the second floor balcony. From the balcony, there was another set of stairs leading to another 
clearing, and then a final set of stairs to the gallery seating. Again, in order to enter into the 
gallery seating area, patrons had to climb a final, small set of stairs — two or three steps. The 
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aesthetic effect was symmetrical and beautiful, but the logistics of these stairs were nightmarish. 
As with the fire escapes, the small set of stairs leading into the second and third floor seating 
caused numerous people to lose their footing as they rushed out of the auditorium, and into the 
lobby, bodies piled en masse. 
 The architectural design by Marshall contributed to the severity of the disaster through the 
poor safety considerations undertaken in the design of the lobby, the proper operation of the 
skylights, and the extremely poor construction of the fireproof escapes. Choices made by the 
management, including the installation of padlocked iron gates on the second and third floors, 
the purchase and use of the ineffective fire retardant Kilfyre by house fireman Sallers, and the 
covering up of exits to preserve the aesthetic beauty of the building, made obvious and powerful 
contributions to the severity of the disaster that unfolded in the Iroquois. Such choices implied 
institutional guilt, and it was the job of John Traeger, Chicago Coroner, to lead the investigation 
that would work to identify the guilty parties. However, his work was greatly complicated by the 
governmental and corporate interests of the City and of the Theatrical Syndicate. In the post-
disaster paradigmatic reconstruction of the event, the long, contentious, and bitter legal disputes 
that played out over the course of many years profoundly impacted grass-roots attempts to keep 
the memory of the Iroquois alive, issues explored in the following two chapters.  
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Part III, Chapter 10: Terrible Catastrophe Which Has Befallen 
Like Grass After a Storm 
 The Iroquois disaster shares rhetorical similarities with the fires at Richmond and Brooklyn 
insofar as the disaster’s disruptive influence was understood to extend beyond the walls of the 
theatre and into the normal systems of order that defined life in Chicago. This chapter identifies 
the tropes of dispute and contestation that were used in the immediate post-disaster by religious, 
social and civic actors. Primarily, this chapter argues that the lengthy and bitterly contested legal 
struggle between managers of the Iroquois, the city of Chicago, and advocates for victims of the 
blaze, which resulted in a mostly failed attempt to assign guilt, served as the primary agent in 
defining the initial the memory-work of the disaster as marked with dispute and contestation. 
This first section identifies religious negotiations of the event through analysis of sermons 
delivered in the city immediately following the fire.  
 As in Richmond and Brooklyn, the fire re-wrote the space immediately surrounding the 
theater, reconstructing it from a fashionable, profitable bastion of Chicago’s social life into a 
large-scale morgue and, eventually, into a site of shared performances of grief. There’s an 
interesting parallel here to the action onstage in Mr. Blue Beard; as a New Year’s Eve article in 
the Chicago Tribune put it, recognizing the capacity of disaster to re-write reality, “Bluebeard’s 
chamber of horrors suddenly became a reality…it is the quick change from laughter to 
unutterable terror and woe which makes a theater fire so terrifying.”131 
 The fire lasted approximately fifteen minutes. “In those few minutes,” a report in Lest We 
Forget states,  
Obscure people had evolved into heroes; staid business men drove out patrons to convert 
their stores into temporary hospitals and morgues; others converted their trucks and 
delivery wagons into improvised ambulances; stocks of drugs, oils and blankets were 
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showered upon the police to aid in relief work and a corps of physicians and surgeons 
sufficient to the needs of an army had organized.132 
  
 Note that the report begins to play upon themes of tension and opposition by describing the 
disaster’s disruptive powers to transform “obscure people” into “heroes” and describing 
normally “staid business men” throwing out customers. Downtown Chicago had no hospital to 
service the victims of the fire, so all of downtown Chicago became a hospital; over a hundred 
medical students from Rush University Medical College, armed with equipment, made their way 
downtown by street car and police wagon; clergy and other medical officials made their way, as 
well, prepared to offer help or, failing that, last rites to the dying.  
 The early response to the disaster was chaotic and unorganized, as “all manner of vehicles 
were given freely for the removal of dead and injured.”133 As bodies were transported out of the 
wreckage of the theatre, they were removed to buildings in the Loop that were converted into 
triage centers and morgues. Thompson’s Restaurant, “adjoining the theatre,” was turned into “a 
charnel house, with its fumbled heaps of corpses…bodies were everywhere.”134 Marshall Field’s, 
a major Chicago department store, was made “an improvised hospital.”135 The Sherman House, a 
hotel, was “thrown open to fire victims, and all the injured taken in were provided with rooms 
and medical attention.”136 The disruptive power of disaster is evident in these responses. The 
buildings became spaces other than what they had been in the minutes before the disaster 
occurred, newly significant shrines to public suffering. When those buildings were too full, or 
the methods of transportation not quick enough to account for the removal of bodies from the 
Iroquois, bodies were, instead, simply piled on “the sidewalk in front of the playhouse.”137 
 This chaos of the rescue efforts was not helped by the dark and miasmatic interior of the 
theatre, “dark and still as a tomb,” with “water dripping everywhere,” standing “inches deep.”138 
The priority was finding survivors, if there were any. One of the worst areas was the balcony, 
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where bodies were “so terribly interwoven that it was impossible at first to take any one out.”139  
William Townsend, the Second Assistant Fire Marshall, went into the building to join the men of 
Engines 134 and 40. “I entered the parquet with those engine companies and put that fire out,” he 
would testify later, 
I then discovered the fire in the first and second balconies, and put the fire out up there, 
and I found several bodies…on the first balcony the bodies were piled up all along the 
passage behind the back seats and at the exits on what we call the south side of the 
building…They were crowded in the door, lying on each other three or four deep. They 
were also outside the door in the entrance as we went into the gallery. We found a man 
and a woman in the passageway that extends behind the entrances to the gallery. The 
door proper was crowded with them on the inside, and in the passageway behind the 
seats, and we found bodies in all of the aisles.140 
 
 The Chief of Police, Francis O’Neill, described the scene at the balcony with a brutal 
lyricism: “if you ever saw a field of timothy grass blown flat by the wind and rain of a summer 
storm,” he said, “that was the position of the dead at the exits of the second balcony.”141 Similar 
to O’Neill’s use of natural imagery, the Chicago Tribune evoked images of natural disasters in 
order to bring an understanding to the fire at the Iroquois, comparing it to a whirlpool, playing, 
again, upon the rhetorical tropes of opposition and contestation that were embedded within the 
social context of the disaster environment by juxtaposing the inherent opposition between fire 
and water. They went so far as to term the crush of humanity on the balcony “the contrary tides.” 
The paper described,  
The raging tide of humanity pouring out of the east entrance of the balcony during the 
panic had met the fighting, struggling crowd coming down the stairs from the third 
balcony at right angles. The two streams formed a whirlpool which ceased its onward 
progress and remained there on the landing where people stamped each other under foot 
in that mad circle of death…In a short time the blockade in the fatal angle must have 
been complete. Then into this awful heap still plunged the contrary tides of humanity 
from each direction. Many tried to crawl over the top of the heap, but were drawn down 
into the grinding mill of death underneath. The smoke was heavy at the fatal angle, for a 




 In the chaos, as doctors and police officials tried to control the flow of bodies — both dead 
and alive — into and out of theatre and into and out of makeshift medical centers. It was 
impossible to account for everyone, as the dead were transported to any building in which there 
was space to hold them in “patrol wagons, ambulances, trucks and delivery wagons.”143 Bodies 
went missing, demonstrated nowhere so well as the story that, several days later, a man in 
Evanston sought a burial permit, after having “wrapped the dead body of his wife in his overcoat 
and carried it to Evanston, many miles away.”144 
 The team of first responders, aided by a group of reporters, formed an assembly line to deal 
with the dead. “It was necessary first to take the dead from the top of the pile,” described Chief 
O’Neill, “then the rest of the bodies were lifted easily and regularly from their position, save as 
their arms had intertwined and clutched.”145 Whenever a fireman would hear moaning or sense 
shifting in the mass of bodies, he would work quickly to extricate the body. The Tribune 
describes,  
The workers fell back and the fireman crawled over the heap and was helped out. He ran 
down the stairs three steps at a time to get the child to a place where help might be given 
before it was too late. Then other firemen from inside the theater passed out more bodies, 
which were handed from one policeman to another until someone on the outside of the 
heap could take the dead and carry them downstairs.146 
 
 G. Frank Lydston, a Chicago area urologist and writer, had answered the call for help that 
afternoon. Lydston arrived at the theatre “only a few moments” after the fire had erupted and 
panic had prevailed, the air in the theatre only “barely breathable.” Lydston followed “several 
firemen groping their way up one of the marble stairways.”147 The air still smoke-filled, and with 
the acrid scent of burning flesh lingering, Lydston and the firemen reached the top of the stairs, 
“on the landing just outside the only door that was open in the front of the theater,” and found “a 
sold, monstrous cube of human bodies, as high as one could reach.”148 Unobstructed on two 
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sides, the mass was propped on one side against the wall of the stairway, and behind it by 
another pile of bodies of “human beings who had tried to climb over those in front and failed,” 
which reached from the lobby to “the lower balcony rail within the theater.”149 As firefighters 
climbed the heap and tried to extricate individuals, they found the task both gruesome and 
impossible: the bodies were practically fused together by pressure and heat. Many patrons in the 
second and third levels had accepted the inevitability of their deaths, and, rather than face the 
human crush, opted to take their own lives, or the lives of their children, illustrated by the fact 
that, “mothers in frantic despair threw their babes over the balcony railing to the main floor 
below.”150  
 In the theatre, the men worked tirelessly, until all of the bodies had been excavated and 
removed, and the smoky miasma had cleared. “The awful scenes of the Iroquois Theatre had 
been wiped away,” the Tribune reported, “except in the memory of those who beheld them.”151 
That, however, wasn’t true; the bodies may have been removed, and the physical damage may 
have been cleaned, but the awful scenes of the Iroquois Theatre would continue to haunt public 
memory for years to come. Indeed,  “the awful scenes of the Iroquois Theatre” that “had been 
wiped away” proved to greatly complicate the legal struggles for memory between elite-level 
forces and grass-roots communities when the time came to assign guilt and responsibility for the 
disaster. The earliest emergency response to the disaster, and the reporting of that response, was 
already beginning to pick up on the tensions inherent in the tropes of dispute that marked the 
Iroquois Theatre, between attempting to re-construct the space of the theatre to a pre-disaster 
status and the impossibility of a successful re-signification of the space. These tropes would 
come to define the resultant memory-work of the disaster, played out most visibly in a lengthy 
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and contentious series of legal battles, but also in the immediate negotiation of the disaster in 
newspapers and public statements by Theatrical Syndicate employees.  
Moral and Civic Responsibility 
 In the early stage of re-constructing the disaster event for the sake of memorializing the 
dead, condolences began to pour in from all over the world, assuring Chicagoans that they were 
not suffering alone.152 President Teddy Roosevelt sent his personal condolences on behalf of all 
Americans to Mayor Harrison: “In common with all our people throughout this land I extend 
through you to the people of Chicago my deepest sympathy in the terrible catastrophe which has 
befallen them,” he wrote.153 The Iroquois disaster was constructed as shared not just by 
Chicagoans, but also by the entire world. This section identifies the initial performances 
undertaken by individuals and civic institutions in response to the disaster, and illustrates how 
the memory-work began to be marked by institutional contention rather than social solidarity, 
resulting in a highly politicized re-construction of the Iroquois disaster, which would contribute 
to the ways in which the fire would be remembered and forgotten. 
 Significantly, the Iroquois Theatre fire’s post-disaster paradigm moved quickly from public 
performances of shared grief to contentious legal investigations of the event. Where Richmond 
and Brooklyn saw a rise in social solidarity, empowered by publicly-funded social rituals, like 
funeral rites, Chicago’s initial response was considerably less public and shared: funerals were 
mostly private affairs, and the Mayor and the Coroner began a fairly public argument about what 
to do with victim’s bodies just days after the fire, which played out in letters published in the 
Tribune. This section illustrates the funeral rites and the beginning of civic influence on the 
memory of the event, arguing that elite-level actors operated immediate and significant influence 
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on memory-work through their public disputes between each other, contributing to a construction 
of the disaster as essentially and significantly contested.  
 The disaster completely re-wrote what would otherwise have been a typically bawdy 
Chicago New Year’s celebration. Mayor Harrison issued a proclamation to the city requesting 
solemn peace and quiet:  
 On each recurring New Year’s Eve annoyance has been caused to the sick and infirm 
by the indulgence of thoughtless persons in noisy celebrations of the passage of the old 
year. 
 The city authorities have at all times discouraged this practice, but now, when 
Chicago lies in the shadow of the greatest disaster in her history for a generation, noise 
making, whether by bells, whistles, cannon, horns, or any other means, is particularly 
objectionable. 
 As Mayor of Chicago, I would therefore request all persons to refrain from this 
indulgence, and I would particularly ask all railway officials and all persons in control of 
factories, boats, and mills to direct their employees not to blow whistles between the 
hours of 12 and 1 o’clock tonight. 
 CARTER H. HARRISON, Mayor154 
 
 The proclamation was probably superfluous; it seemed unimaginable that the pall cast over 
the city would rise anytime soon, and Chicagoans entered the New Year of 1904 in solemn 
reflection. The New York Times reported on the 1st of the New Year that Chicagoans followed 
this request: “overwhelmed by the extent of yesterday’s disaster in the Iroquois Theatre, the 
stricken citizens of Chicago to-night are allowing the old year to go and the new to come without 
any traditional manifestations of joy.”155  
 The funeral processions were almost entirely private affairs as opposed to the shared 
mourning rituals performed in Richmond and Brooklyn. This had the effect of contributing to the 
construction of grief not as shared and social, as in Richmond and Brooklyn, but as private, 




Moving forward from disaster physically and symbolically is about more than 
acknowledging suffering and giving survivors an opportunity to tell their story through 
commemorative rituals. It is also about establishing legal and political processes to 
address objectively, openly and honestly the causes of events and the accountability of all 
involved. This is a necessary condition for the learning of lessons and mitigation of future 
risks.156 
 
 Eyre’s insight ties together the sociological importance of public and ritualized 
performances with the legal processes that result from disaster events. Understood through her 
insight, the privatization of the funeral processions conflicted with the need to define “legal and 
political processes” in a way that ensured victims and survivor communities had their voices 
heard. In the privatization of the funeral rites, then, it is possible to identify a performance of the 
tropes of dispute and contestation between elite-level and grass-roots survivor communities that 
marked the memory-work of the Iroquois Theatre. The lack of highly public and visible 
performances of shared grief contributed to what Eyre identifies as the manipulation of memory 
“for the purposes of socially constructing a community’s past and the design of its future.”157 In 
this case, the manipulation of memory was undertaken as the result of the city’s association with 
guilt through incompetence and failure to ensure safety for Iroquois Theatre patrons. 
 “Funeral corteges…moved through” the snow-covered streets from house to house, 
carrying their grim loads. “Such a New Year’s day of mourning Chicago never before had 
known, and the saddest scenes were found in the homes where funeral services were held.”158 As 
the corteges plodded through Chicago’s streets, some families continued their search for their 
missing loved ones: 
Of all the heartrending scenes attending the claiming of Chicago’s dead, the most mutely 
pathetic was reserved for New Year’s day in the coroner’s office in the Criminal court 
building. Until long after midnight the halls echoed to the tread of the stragglers of the 
army of the stricken — the remnant of the unfortunate throng so luckless as to find no 
familiar feature among the dead, and who had come at last to tracing the missing by a 
process of elimination among the forms charred beyond recognition…When a sob or a 
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groan sounded from out the press of visitors it was a sign that for some poor soul the 
quest had ended.159 
 
 Unlike Richmond and Brooklyn before it, the Iroquois disaster did not produce an 
enormous amount of unidentifiable bodies, a rare point of departure from the dispute that 
otherwise marked the fire. A January 3rd article in the Tribune suggests that, by that day, Mayor 
Harrison, Coroner Traeger, and Henry Foreman, President of the Board of Cook County 
Commisioners met to “formulate [plans] for a public funeral to be held this week in the 
Auditorium or other suitable hall over the remains of the dozen or less victims still 
unclaimed.”160 The same article notes that “it is proposed that the unidentified be interred in 
some prominent cemetery and a monument erected to mark the spot.”161 “Vastly different from 
the Iroquois horror,” one article read, considering the comparison between Chicago and 
Brooklyn, “most of the victims of the Brooklyn Theater were burned beyond recognition.”162 By 
January 5th, “all but four of the Iroquois theater victims had been identified.”163 There was no 
need for a large-scale public funeral similar to the ones held by Richmond and Brooklyn and, 
thus, a reduced opportunity to participate in the shared and social negotiation of grief via the 
disaster’s tendency toward reality disruption and reconstruction.  
 There were some rhetorical attempts to create opportunities for performing grief publically. 
Dr. Emil G. Hirsch, a Luxembourg-born Professor of Rabbinical studies at the University of 
Chicago, was busy as 1904 dawned, providing solace to victims’ family members at private 
funerals. “We must be brave and try and bear our misfortune,” he told parents and family 
members. “Hundreds of hearts are weeping today, but the dead cannot be brought to life. Be 
strong, dear parents. Others are suffering today and we are all sorrowing with you.”164 Hirsch 
identified solidarity and love as the primary lessons that could stem from the disaster, while 
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cautioning against the arrogance that he identified creeping up in the years since the Great 
Chicago Fire: 
 Why, O God, in your infinite mercy, did you choose our fair city to be the scene of 
this devastating blast of fire? Was it to teach us that we have not yet won our boasted 
victory over your almighty forces of nature? Was it not to teach us to lean to you for 
protection and to abandon our own resources in the fight for life? 
 In his inscrutable wisdom, my friends, God has sent us this messenger of death with a 
mission. Not for naught was the song turned into the sob, and the voice of mirth into the 
cry of mourning. 
 Our fair city has been clothed in the sackcloth and ashes of sorrow. Let these 700 
lives be consecrated as a lesson from above. May it teach us how small, how infinitesimal 
is the hand of man. Let it show us how frail is his wisdom, and how restricted his power. 
 This common grief, this one cloak of mourning that covers us all, will teach us to 
love one another. It will make us kind to the poor and merciful, to the needy. If this is the 
true prophecy, these poor young souls will not have departed in vain.165 
  
 Hirsch’s insight about the power of commonly shared grief to form new communities is 
one echoed by disaster sociologists. The performative aspects of the civic commemoration rites 
produce an environment for the creation, growth and sustenance of social solidarity. Such 
memorial practices demonstrate an inscription of institutional value to the lost lives of the 
victims: you matter to us, and we will remember you. Civic funeral processions allow mourners 
to come together and express grief and solidarity, to construct, as Hirsch said, a “common grief”; 
no such civic commemorative practice occurred in Chicago after the Iroquois. Owing to this, in 
comparison to the large-scale civic funeral services that accompanied the preceding 
conflagrations, the Iroquois Theatre disaster had a much smaller window of opportunity for the 
development of disaster related civic solidarity, which contributed to the quick shift from 
mourning the departed to the dominant memory work involving legal investigations into 
identifying causes, effects, and assigning blame. The desire — indeed, the need — for a civic 
commemoration of the victims was lost on political and corporate machines preoccupied with 
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their own safety and sustenance as the public’s furious sentiment came into focus through 
Coroner Traeger’s investigations.  
 That Chicagoans needed an opportunity to share their grief is perhaps nowhere better 
illustrated than when, six months later, the final, unidentified body of the Iroquois victims was 
laid to rest in Montrose Cemetery on Sunday, June 12th, 1904. The woman — approximately fifty 
years old at the time of her death — had been held in the county morgue while “many an anxious 
seeker after a lost mother or relative…looked at the body and turned away with a shake of the 
head.”166 “That it is possible for an individual to pass from earth without being missed by a 
single friend of acquaintance illustrates the tragedy of life in a great city,” lamented a May 29th, 
1907 article in the Tribune, writing about the Iroquois Memorial Association’s plans to construct 
a monument at her grave.167 The woman, the Tribune reported, was “unknown, but not 
friendless”; her last rites were attended by five hundred people, the closest approximation to an 
opportunity for civic solidarity and shared grief Chicagoans would get in the immediate post-
disaster paradigm.168  
 This whiplash, from disaster to funerals to political machination, was helped, no doubt, by 
the speed with which Traeger began his inquest and, in doing so, politicized the disaster 
powerfully. A throwaway line of description in a January 2nd Tribune article notes that “the 
coroner was hastening the work of disposing of the dead,” and by the 3rd, the Tribune was 
reporting that Traeger had written the following to Harrison: 
At this time, after a careful examination of the situation, I am of the opinion that the 
remains of some of the victims of the Iroquois theater disaster are disfigured in a manner 
that will prevent recognition by relatives and friends, and, consequently, will be left 
unclaimed. 
 Knowing the heartfelt sympathy of the people of our city and the entire world toward 
those who have so suddenly been bereft of their loved ones, and especially towards those 
who may be compelled to bear the added grief of being unable to recover the bodies of 
those dear to them. I feel that it would be fitting to have the city of Chicago take charge 
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of the funeral of the unknown victims that they may be borne to their last resting place by 
the loving hands of a sympathetic people. 
 With that end in view, I would respectfully request that you cooperate with me in the 
appointment of a committee of citizens to take charge of the funeral arrangements, and 
would suggest that you advise me at once of your action in the matter.169 
 
 In his letter, Traeger identified the need, and the lack, of an opportunity for Chicagoans to 
participate in the symbolically vital ritual of attending and participating in a shared performance 
of grief. In doing so, however, Traeger politicized the memory-work of the post-disaster 
paradigm; it is difficult not to read a kind of bitterness in the letter about the lack of elite-level 
response to the disaster. For his part, Carter Harrison responded with resistance to Traeger’s 
request, equally contributing to the politics of the disaster, and marking the memory-work as 
significantly contentious. Harrison wrote, 
I shall cooperate with the coroner in any way that will be possible. We should wait as 
long as possible before burying any unidentified person. Probably a large proportion of 
them were strangers passing through Chicago. Their deaths may not become known to 
their friends for some time, as they were traveling. The bodies should not, in my opinion, 
be buried before it is absolutely necessary.170 
 
 The fractious internal tensions of elite-level government officials concerning the handling 
of victims, and the lack of socially shared performances of grief contributed powerfully to a 
sociological construction of the disaster as Harrison denies Traeger’s suggestion that Chicago 
take responsibility for the dead. This is by way of suggesting that the dynamic between elite-
level and grass-roots narratives may, itself, be understood as a product of dispute, contestation, 
and negotiation. The Iroquois disaster — and so, the memory of the disaster — became the 
subject of contention between a grass-roots victim community through the Iroquois Memorial 
Association, and the elite-level negotiations of the proximate and legal causes of the disaster 
between John Traeger, his jury, and the management of the Iroquois Theatre.  
The Vicarious Atonement 
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 Contributing greatly to the use of themes of dispute, opposition, and contestation were the 
responses by members of Chicago’s clergy. Religious responses to the Iroquois disaster 
specifically identified the government as responsible for creating the environment in which the 
disaster process could develop with terrible severity. While the civic and social portion of the 
blame game played out in the pages of newspapers, religious figures offered invective suggesting 
the contributions human and institutional greed had made to the disaster. In Richmond, the 
religious response revealed a deep-seeded anxiety towards, and hatred for, the practice of theatre. 
In Brooklyn, the religious response was gentler towards the institution of theatre, primarily 
focused on encouraging the citizens to live their lives as a memorial to the dead. In Chicago, the 
religious response was a forthright condemnation against governmental institutions. The fire 
wasn’t the result of God’s will, it was a reflection of the “official negligence and civic 
lawlessness” that had created the lax and money-mad environment in which the obvious 
structural defects of the building could be overlooked.171 In this way, religious responses to the 
Iroquois disaster served the interests of grass-roots victim communities in a way unseen in 
Richmond or Brooklyn. 
  “Out of this cruel event, we are already beginning to see some rays of hope,” preached 
William Robson Notman. 
It has given a staggering blow to a type of brutal commercialism which is the blight of 
our fair civilization, inasmuch as it values dollars much and human lives little. For what 
does it matter in the eyes of our soulless speculators whether human lives are jeopardized 
or not, provided a few dollars are made or saved? …What shall it profit a man, or a 
corporation either, if the whole world be gained and the soul lost and what will a 
corporation give in exchange for its soul? This catastrophe may help to reverse our 
standard of values, and men may never again be rated higher than dollars…for years our 
innocent and trusting citizens have been spending their evenings in veritable deathtraps. 
They have been doing this on the assumption that those in authority had safeguarded 




 The “brutal commercialism” Notman identifies suggests that Blue Beard — and, by 
extension, members of the Theatrical Syndicate — was indeed defined by membership of the 
Nation of Money. Notman’s critique, based on the economic valuation of a human life, reads as 
almost prescient in a contemporary society where corporate personhood is a matter of public 
debate. Further, Notman suggests the evil of the Iroquois management was at least partially 
because the implied contract patrons make with the theatre was entered into without fully 
informed consent and transparency of the potential dangers in which the patrons would place 
themselves. 
 Samuel Fallows — who had offered his aid at the site of the disaster — made it clear that 
justice needed to be served as swiftly as possible, but that the citizens of Chicago had to take it 
upon themselves to ensure justice continued to be served long after the disaster process had 
passed: 
In the name of these disfigured and departed hundred who were “martyrs by the pang, 
without the palm,” and for the sake of the hundreds of thousands who will flock to places 
of public rest, the demand of the world today is “let no guilty man escape.” It is not for 
me to sit in judgment upon any one. The legally appointed investigators will render their 
verdict in due time. But when punishment has been meted out and this fearful occurrence 
becomes a memory only, shall we criminally forget the past? Shall we relax our 
vigilance, and through negligence, or greed, or bribery permit death traps to remain or to 
be erected in apartment buildings, manufactories, hotels, or theaters? God forbid.173 
 
 Notably, Fallows later authored the foreword to Lest We Forget, the disaster book 
published in response to the Iroquois fire. His writing there provides an opportunity for a cross-
temporal conversation with himself. This conversation illustrates a subtle shift in his feelings 
towards, and interpretation of, the fire. Specifically, Fallows considers the implications of calling 
the victims of the fire “martyrs by the pang, without the palm,” a suggestion that their deaths 
were in vain. He would later write,  
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…I said in my haste, “you all are martyrs by the pang without the palm.” I do not say it 
now. Martyrs indeed they were, by the criminal neglect of recreant man. But the palm is 
theirs. They have saved others, themselves they could not save. Thousands, perhaps 
millions, will in the future be secure in their places of resort, because these went on that 
fateful day to their inevitable doom. Mayors, architects, fire-inspectors, managers, stage 
carpenters, electricians, ushers and chiefs of police in every city have had their duty 
burned into their inmost consciousness by this consuming fire.174 
 
 The shift in Fallows’ thinking illustrates how meaning is destabilized and recreated in the 
disruption of the post-disaster paradigm. Whereas, in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, 
Fallows angrily suggested the victims’ deaths were in vain, he would later come to recognize the 
productive contribution they made through death towards rousing an apathetic society to demand 
more strict enforcement of fire codes. This small act of definitional shifting handily illustrates 
how themes of dispute and contestation served to write and re-write grass-roots memory work 
related to the disaster.  
 Frank G. Smith suggested that the fire was, indeed, God’s justice, but that the justice was 
directed not at the victims, but towards those whose “greed and carelessness” had caused the fire 
to occur. Fire, he argued, was not always inherently marked by its relationship to danger and 
disaster, and served many useful purposes. Instead, it was the environment of apathy that 
allowed the disaster to occur. Further, Smith argued, the disruption provided by post-disaster 
paradigm was an opportunity for God-fearing citizens to ensure their own justice be done: 
Perhaps the greatest blessing this city enjoys today is the blessing of fire. It is that small 
fire around which our 100,000 poor huddle today that keeps them from freezing and 
death. But it is greed and carelessness that tramples upon God’s great laws given for our 
good and the fire darts forth and a world is shocked by the great truth that judgment is 
automatic and that the penalties of divine law, ruthlessly broken, are self-registering.  
 It is but right that the hand of justice should be laid upon every man who is in any 
way responsible for this tragedy. 
 I believe this morning that our love for God and men should tighten the grasp and 
that men should be taught that the laws of God and the state and the municipality cannot 




 Similarly, William O. Shepard noted that the fire offered a metaphorical opportunity to 
cleanse corruption from the city. While Fallows struggled to construct meaning from the 
massacre, Shepard was quick to identify that the victims of the blaze had not died in vain, 
because their deaths would ensure greater safety for those who remained: 
Those who mourn today suffer vicariously, that other may gain. We may not be able to 
understand how fully we shall be gainers, but it is to be hoped that the entire city will be a 
cleaner city — in official and citizen — because of this calamity. Such a disaster can 
never occur again. Our lives will be safer because these lives have been lost.176 
 
 While most clerical responses tried to define God’s relationship to the fire, Frederick C. 
Preist went so far as to deny God’s presence in the event at all. Instead, Preist argued, the fire 
was the inevitable result of humans operating their own free will. The argument Preist creates 
here is similar to Smith’s in that it casts guilt on humanity for their contributions to creating the 
environment that allowed the disaster to occur: 
Do not ascribe the calamity to the Almighty. He did not do it. Indeed, he did all he could 
do, consistent with human freedom to prevent it…Ascribe it to men. Ascribe it to men’s 
disregard of law. Ascribe it to the indifferent and vicious disregard of human and divine 
requirements, which, to the shame of Chicago, we must confess is much too common 
here…. Every citizen of Chicago who has sympathized with or shown unreasonable 
leniency towards the law breaking classes in the city bears a share of responsibility for 
that disregard of law and its awful consequences. He has encouraged men to believe that 
they could flagrantly disregard the mandates of law, human and divine, without serious 
danger.177 
 
 Dr. Cleland B. McAfee noted the irony of the government’s closing of seventeen theatres 
in the wake of the disaster, suggesting that such an action only reinforced the notion that the 
government had failed to properly safeguard those buildings against potential disaster: 
There is a sad irony in closing seventeen theaters for a defect which is so well known that 
the evidence on which they are closed is simply the files of the department charged with 
responsibility. We are already seeing the dreary spectacle of one man, or one department, 
or one agency pointing to another and saying, “It is your fault”…lives were committed to 




 Taken together, these religious responses illustrate a radical shift over one hundred years in 
the relationship between religion and theatre. By placing the blame for the disaster on 
governmental and managerial institutions, the religious leaders of Chicago deny any inherent evil 
in the practice of theatrical production, and suggest instead that the evil existed in a city rife with 
corruption and graft. In the moment of extricating God from the event, the religious response 
argues that man and man alone is responsible for the disaster, and that man and man alone must 
find a way to overcome the traumatic loss of life. The contentious and confrontational tone of 
these responses is clear: religious leaders centralized dispute as a tool for moving forward, 
arguing that “the indifferent and vicious disregard” that served to create a disaster-rich 
environment must be fought against to ensure such a disaster would never take place again.  
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Part III, Chapter 11: A Lamentable Lack of Force 
Willfully and Maliciously Endeavoring 
“The paradox of disaster politics in democracies,” write Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart,  
Is that as more and more information about disasters becomes public as assertive victim 
communities and other stakeholders work the democratic process and employ its checks 
and balances on government power to investigate, it becomes harder instead of easier to 
arrive at some form of joint remembrance and consensual history writing, and thus create 
some space for society to “forget”.179 
 
 The difficulty of the kind of joint remembrance and consensual history writing Bos, 
Ullberg and ’t Hart identify stems from my central argument that narrative tropes are employed 
at each level of a social strata in order to operate control over descriptions and memory of the 
disaster event, meaning that disasters are essentially contested terrain. The contestation in 
defining the disaster begins to occur immediately in the post-disaster paradigm, and operates 
broad influence over how a disaster will be remembered. The writing of disaster histories is 
inherently fraught with political and sociological dimensions, and the contestation and dispute 
between narratives of the disaster problematize or prevent “joint remembrance and consensual 
history writing.” This chapter is concerned with the processes underlying the contestation of 
political and sociological dimensions of memory relative to the Iroquois blaze through 
examining how blame was assigned, shifted, and negotiated by various groups of actors through 
the pages of newspapers, official inquiries into the fire, and, finally, the failed attempts to place 
blame. These failures, I argue, played upon the themes of dispute and opposition, and, ultimately, 
served to “create some space for society to forget.” Significantly, while Boss, Ullberg and ‘t Hart 
suggest creating space for forgetting is a good thing, in the case of the Iroquois Theatre, I argue 
that the created space must be understood as what Paul Ricoeur terms an abuse of memory, “a 
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concerted manipulation of memory and of forgetting by those who hold power,” owing to “not 
enough memory, hence an abuse of forgetting” by elite-level forces.180 
 In Chicago, the initial public and political responses to the disaster event were swift and 
furious. Immediately, blame was placed on Iroquois management and on the non-enforcement of 
civic fire safety codes. A January 2nd article in the Tribune laid out every law they could identify 
as having been broken, and how those broken laws directly contributed to the slaughter. “Had the 
building laws of Chicago been strictly complied with in the Iroquois theater the loss of life 
should have been comparatively small, if there had been any loss at all,” reads the article.181  
An examination of the burned building made yesterday showed numerous violations of 
the laws… 
Among the sections to which no attention was paid were those providing: 
That a theater must have direct fire alarm connection with fire headquarters. 
That all lights must be protected so adjacent material cannot touch them. 
That suitable fire extinguishing apparatus be on the stage. 
That all exits shall be suitably marked with large signs. 
That all galleries shall have independent entrances and exits. 
That the number of auditors in a theater shall be limited by the size and number of its 
exits. 
That no auditorium seating over 1000 persons shall be connected with any building not 
entirely fireproof. 
That automatic sprinklers shall be used over all stages. 
That a suitable flue be in the roofs of all stages to carry out smoke and fire. 
That the apparatus and fittings of all stages and rigging lofts be fireproof. 
That all theta errs must face on three open streets.182 
 
“If theater managers,” opined another Tribune article, 
 
Miserably parsimonious, will not pay for the services of the firemen, the city must stand 
the expense and charge it to the life saving account…the only atonement that can be 
made to these hapless victims of negligence is to make the theaters of Chicago absolutely 
safe…The city must deal with the theaters now as it should have dealt with them long 
ago. Had it been more mindful of its duty in the past there would have been no mourners 
today. The community which refuses to enforce measures for the protection of life must 
admit itself guilty when life is lost because of that refusal.183 
 
 This civic anger extended from the top of the Theatrical Syndicate — Klaw and Erlanger 
and Davis and Powers — all the way down to the stage crew and performers. In an attempt to 
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extricate themselves from possible guilt, Davis and Powers — the aforementioned “miserably 
parsimonious” theatre managers — shot back at their critics in a December 31st statement: 
 So far as we have been able to ascertain the cause or causes of the most unfortunate 
accident of the fire in the Iroquois, it appears the one of the scenic draperies was noticed 
to have ignited from some cause. It was detected before it has reached an appreciable 
flame, and the city fireman who is detailed and constantly on duty when the theater is 
open noticed it simultaneously with the electrician. 
 The fireman, who was only a few feet away, immediately pulled a tube of Kilfyre, of 
which there were many hung about the stage, and threw the contents upon the blaze, 
which would have been more than enough, if the Kilfyre had been effective, to have 
extinguished the flame at once; but for some cause inherent in the tube of Kilfyre it had 
no effect. The fireman and electrician then ordered down the asbestos curtain, and the 
fireman threw the contents of another tube of Kilfyre upon the flame, with no better 
result. 
 The commotion thus caused excited the alarm of the audience, which immediately 
started for the exits, of which there are twenty-five of unusual width, all opening out, and 
ready to the hand of any one reaching them. The draft thus caused, it is believed, before 
the curtain could be entirely lowered, produced a bellying of the asbestos curtain, causing 
a pressure on the guides against the solid brick wall of the proscenium, thus stopping its 
descent. 
 Every effort was made by those on the stage to pull it down, but the draft was so 
great, it seems, that the pressure against the proscenium wall and the friction caused 
thereby was so strong that they could not be overcome The audience became panic-
stricken in their efforts the reach the exits and tripped and fell over each other and 
blocked the way. 
 The audience was promptly admonished and importuned by persons employed on the 
stage and in the auditorium to be calm and avoid any rush; that the exits and facilities for 
emptying the theater were ample to enable them all to get out without confusion. 
 No expense or precaution was omitted to make the theater and fireproof as it could be 
made, there being nothing combustible in the construction of the house expect the 
trimmings and furnishings of the stage and auditorium. In the building of the theater was 
sacrificed more space to aisles and exits than any theater in America.184 
 
 Davis and Powers attempt to blame the victims in this case: the city fireman and 
electrician, Iroquois employees both, struggled to extinguish the fire; the dry chemical 
extinguisher was marked as bearing guilt owing to “some cause inherent in the tube of Kilfyre”; 
the audience was “admonished” to be calm and avoid rush, but it was in their rush to exit, and 
the opening of the numerous exit doors, that the audience caused the draft of fresh air to ignite 
the smoldering backstage area. These narrative tropes are examples of the kind of elite-level 
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narrative processing of disasters that demonstrates how corporate and governmental institutions 
attempted to control memories of the event, in spite of the evidence that was already 
accumulating against their narratives. 
 While Davis and Powers tried to mitigate public outrage in Chicago, Klaw and Erlanger 
faced similar sentiment in New York, and similarly tried to distance themselves from ownership 
and management of the theatre and the Blue Beard production, in spite of the continual pressure 
numerous news reports noted in the summer preceding the Iroquois’ opening. A January 5th 
editorial by Klaw and Erlanger, published in the New York Times, reads, 
 A paper in the city is willfully and maliciously endeavoring to create the impression 
in the public mind that this firm is the responsible owner of the Iroquois Theatre, 
Chicago. The facts, which are easy of access to any one, are that Marc Klaw and A.L. 
Erlanger each own 12 1/2 per cent of the stock of this theatre, and never owned any more. 
 We have every faith in the integrity and competency of Messrs. Will J. Davis and 
Harry J. Powers, who are also stockholders, and the resident managers of that house, and 
we believe that when calmer counsels prevail and the proper investigation is completed, it 
will be found that nothing was left undone that could have been foreseen to safeguard the 
public from that lamentable disaster.185 
 
 The Tribune pointed towards the institutional failure of the government to ensure the 
building was constructed according to code, as well as the “miserably parsimonious” nature of 
theatre managers; Davis and Powers placed blame on the audience, suggesting that, had they not 
panicked, they would have been able to escape quickly and safely; Klaw and Erlanger put the 
blame on Davis and Powers, saying that, as stockholders and resident managers, it was on them 
to safeguard the public. Reading these series of responses illustrates the reality disruption created 
by the disaster, and the urgency various parties felt to disentangle themselves from the 
assignation of guilt in the case of the Iroquois conflagration, creating and framing the disaster 
through the tropes of dispute and contestation.  
The Danger Point in a Theatre 
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 Earlier, I quoted a Tribune article that described the thorough cleaning job undertaken by 
the combined forces of the Fire and Police Departments. The Tribune had written that “the awful 
scenes of the Iroquois Theatre had been wiped away, except in the memory of those who beheld 
them.”186 The immediate response was to return the space to something approaching normalcy: 
in the rush of the post-disaster paradigm, the first instinct was to “fix” the space by re-
establishing its correct order. However, this greatly complicated the duty of the Coroner’s jury, 
as no notes had been taken about what bodies were discovered where, nor in what condition as 
they were removed. The jury could only comment upon the physical condition of the building, 
and of what remained — or what was absented from — inside.  
 As the jury began to hear testimony, working to see if anybody could be held responsible 
under the law, it was clear that, despite popular public sentiment, it would prove extremely 
difficult to establish guilt. It is through this ongoing legal contestation that I argue elite-level 
processing of the disaster “create[d] some space for society to ‘forget’” and, in that created 
space, came to operate control upon the memory-work of the Iroquois.187 
 What the jury had was loads of circumstantial evidence and the emotional support of a 
bereaved city; what they had was numerous structural problems that contributed in approximate 
ways to audience members’ deaths. These problems stood at cross-purposes to each other. The 
Tribune noted,  
…If it can be proved that any one of the several contributing causes of the disaster is in 
itself responsible for all the death, and can further be determined who is criminally 
responsible for the one cause, then the question of indictment is simple. If the closing of 
the skylights and ventilators on the stage roof was responsible for all the deaths, then the 
man who is responsible for the closed lights might be held. But that would let out the 
persons responsible for the locked exit. The moral responsibility for the disaster might be 
easily fixed, and the fixing of the civil responsibility might also be easy, but the grand 




 Too much went too wrong at the Iroquois to pin blame on any one individual, and though 
public sentiment was clearly and powerfully geared towards an indictment of the highest levels 
of governmental officials and of the theatre’s management, the disaster at the Iroquois had as 
much to do with those elite-level forces as it did with the tendency of responsibility to filter 
down the chain of command to the lowest level employees of the building. As witnesses began to 
testify, it became clear that the court would play host to a long form legal struggle, marked by 
conflict and dispute. The Tribune reported,  
Yesterday’s inquiry developed a conflict between the employees of Klaw & Erlanger, 
who owned ‘Mr. Bluebeard,’ and those of the theater. Each appeared to be trying to show 
that the others were responsible. They contest was brought out forcibly in the testimony 
of Max Mazzonavich, stage carpenter for the show company, whose statements 
contradicted the testimony of William McMullen, the light operator, who testified that it 
was the fault of Electrician Dunn of the show company that the flood light was placed so 
close to the drapery as to ignite it.189 
 
 This struggle played out particularly between the management, and the housing and fire 
departments, and the main arguments came down to interpretations of the letter of the law, and 
between trying to establish what party was telling the truth in moments when testimonies 
contradicted each other.  Powers claimed he was “passive in the conduct of [the Iroquois’s] 
affairs,” and that responsibility should be borne by Davis and the employees of the theatre “who, 
he said, did not perform their full duty.”190 “Davis,” Powers told the jury, “told me about 
engaging Mr. Sallers on Campion’s recommendation. I said nothing to Sallers as to what should 
be provided for fire protection, nor did I do anything else toward procuring or seeing about fire 
protection appliances. I understood that those orders were given by Mr. Davis.”191 
 Chief Musham testified that it was not his, nor his department’s responsibility, to enforce 
fire safety ordinance. “His duty,” the Tribune reports about his testimony, “lay only in the 
inspection of apparatus after it had been installed…were no apparatus installed, as was the case 
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at the Iroquois, it was no concern of his.”192 “The ordinance requires,” he repeated a dozen times, 
“that I inspect the apparatus after it is installed.”193 Davis, meanwhile, laid the blame at the feet 
of his employees like Head Usher George Dusenberry, testifying, ”I trusted everything to my 
employees and supposed that the theater was fully equipped and the safest in the world.” These 
employees turned around and pointed the finger right back at Davis.194 It came out in court that 
the Iroquois had been the site of a fire only weeks before the deadly conflagration, in an eerie 
mirror to the fires that preceded both Richmond and Brooklyn, when Joseph Dougherty, the man 
in charge of the curtain, contended that,  
Two weeks before the big fire there was a blaze. It was slight and was put out at once, but 
it was sufficient to cause an alarm and a call for the asbestos curtain. The curtain started 
down, but it caught after coming about fifteen to twenty feet above the stage, the same as 
it did the day of the big fire. It fell the same distance on both occasions.195 
 
 One of the most damning pieces of evidence concerned a set of iron gates installed outside 
of the doors on the second and third floors. Fire Department Attorney Monroe Fulkerson spoke 
pointedly to the jury about the iron gates: they were “in a battered condition” when he had 
inspected them the next morning, suggesting that victims had died trying to beat the gates down. 
Most damningly, Fulkerson’s investigation turned up that the management installed the gates 
privately after the building commission had already accepted designs for the building:  
With reference to those iron gates…they are no part of the building or the stairway as 
turned over by the builders and were not a part of the plans of the same, but a feature 
installed by the management after the stairways were finished and accepted, and no 
permit was obtained from the city building department to place the gates there. They 
proved to be the gates of death. Until this time they had been overlooked in the general 
investigations and silence has been maintained by the fire department of the purpose of 
clinching the evidence concerning them this was rendered necessary through the fact that 
those best qualified to tell of their danger gave up their lives in acquiring that knowledge. 
They were gathered from behind the deadly barriers and now lie in eternal silence beyond 




 Even Benjamin Marshall admitted to having changed the designs of the building. “The 
plans were changed in some matter without consulting the building department,” he testified, 
although made the point that the changes were made for safety reasons.197 Fulkerson grilled 
Dusenberry about metal gates found in the hallways on the second and third floors. Fulkerson, 
jowly and wide-set, got Dusenberry to admit to the lack of training of Iroquois employees in 
court; Dusenberry said he “had never received any instruction for any of the owners or managers 
of the theater as to what to do in case of a fire,” and that Davis had told him “to instruct the boys 
in their duties and ushers and make them familiar with the house.”198 The “boys,” in turn, roasted 
Dusenberry’s management; Willard Sayles, one such usher, reported that ”during my period of 
employment the fire escape exits at the alley side of the house were always kept locked,” and 
that “the only time we got instructions was the Sunday before the house opened; Mr. Dusenberry 
called us all down there and told us to get familiar with the house.”199 
 Traeger’s initial inquest ended on the 26th of January, and he expected that they would 
debate all night before passing a verdict the next day. The jury had read, by the estimate of the 
New York Tribune, almost 750,000 piece of evidence, and had heard testimony from almost four 
hundred individuals. When they came back immediately with a verdict, assigning guilt to a 
number of elite-level governmental actors, Traeger admitted to being surprised. The jury’s 
verdict listed out the reasons for the fire, argued who they believed should take responsibility for 
the disaster, and finally argued that there was enough compelling evidence to send the case on to 
a grand jury for criminal prosecution.200 
 In particular, the jury found cause to bring six individuals associated with the theatre and 
the government of the city of Chicago to trail. When it came to assigning blame, the jury held 
Will J. Davis,  
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As president and general manager, principally responsible for the foregoing violations in 
the failure to see that the Iroquois theater was properly equipped as required by city 
ordinances, and that his employes [sic] were not sufficiently instructed and drilled for any 
and all emergencies…201 
 
 Carter Harrison was held responsible because, 
 
He has shown a lamentable lack of force in his efforts to shirk responsibility…heads of 
departments under the said Carter H. Harrison following this weak course have given 
Chicago inefficient service, which makes such calamities as the Iroquois theater horror a 
menace until the public service is purged of incompetents202 
 
 George Williams, Building Commissioner of Chicago, was held responsible “for gross 
neglect of his duty in allowing the Iroquois Theater to open its doors to the public when the said 
theater was incomplete, and did not comply with the requirements of the building ordinances of 
the city of Chicago,” while Building Inspector Edward Loughlin was held “responsible for gross 
neglect of duty and glaring incompetency in reporting the Iroquois theatre ‘O.K.’ on a most 
superficial inspection.” Chief Musham was found responsible “for gross neglect of duty in not 
enforcing the city ordinances as they relate to his department, and failure to have his subordinate, 
William Sallers, fireman at the Iroquois Theater, report the lack of fire apparatus and appliances 
as required by law.” Sallers, meanwhile, was found responsible “for gross neglect of duty in not 
reporting the lack of proper fire apparatus and appliances,” while William McMullen, the 
operator of the light, was found responsible “for gross neglect and carelessness in performance 
of duty,” and James Cummings, the stage carpenter, was held responsible “for gross carelessness 
and neglect of duty in not equipping the stage with proper fire apparatus and appliances.”203 The 
jury further demanded immediate civic change, calling for stricter regulation of existing 




 “The stage,” wrote the Tribune, “always is recognized as the danger point in a theater, and 
the desire is to have it cut off from the auditorium as thoroughly as possible.”205 The stage may, 
indeed, always represent the danger point in a theatre, but in the case of the Iroquois, the poor 
design, bad management, and incompetent civic oversight of the building profoundly heightened 
the intrinsic danger of the stage. As Traeger and his jury worked to affix blame of some kind, 
competing narratives of the event were contested and played out in court; each witness attempted 
to pin blame onto someone else. These legal struggles, concomitant with the lack of shared 
performances of grief, greatly challenged the development and spread of grass-roots memory 
work. Establishing this challenge is significant because, in attempting to assign legal blame for 
the fire, Traeger’s job required him to construct a consistent, sociologically accepted, official 
narrative of the disaster, and to use that narrative to assign guilt for the fire. In doing this, 
Traeger effectively, though perhaps inadvertently, silenced grass-roots memory work, and 
contributed to the construction of memory of the Iroquois as deeply rooted in opposition and 
dispute. 
No Color of Excuse 
 This section tracks the long and protracted legal battles that surrounded the Iroquois 
Theatre disaster following the Coroner’s jury’s verdict, with focus on the governmental agents 
identified therein, and on Will J. Davis. In this section, I advance the argument that these legal 
battles served to distract public sentiment from the horror of the disaster through a series of legal 
performances that played out in the court room and on the front page. The individual government 
and theatre officials were cast in roles as representative of the failure of the government as a 
whole. In failing attempts to find any of these individuals guilty on charges of negligence, 
malfeasance, and/or corruption, the government, and Will Davis, found themselves similarly free 
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of guilt. In this freedom of guilt, the elite-level processes of memory-work were empowered to 
wrest control of the narrative of the disaster from any grass-roots efforts undertaken by victim 
communities.  
 The city as a public institution was fundamentally acquitted of any guilt when, in July 
1904, Judge Holdom handed down a decision “which is of general interest as fixing the legal 
responsibility of a city for personal injury or loss of life in fires like the Iroquois Theater 
holocaust,” as brought by Eva Catherine Gibson.206 Gibson claimed “the theatre was a public 
nuisance and the municipality was liable because of the dereliction of its officers in issuing a 
license before the theater had complied with the ordinance.”207 Holdom’s opinion was that the 
city was not guilty on those grounds; “and further that the city would not be liable even if the 
theater had been a public nuisance in the legal acception of the term.”208 This opinion meant that, 
in private or semipublic spaces, where the individual enters of their own free will, “the city’s 
interest in and control over private enterprises are too limited to render the city liable for any 
personal injury which may come through such enterprises.”209 This had the effect of functionally 
dismissing almost one hundred other similar cases.  
 One of the targets of the harshest criticism was Chicago Mayor Carter Harrison, especially 
when considered in the context of the report delivered to the Mayor’s office only a few months 
prior by Building Superintendent George Williams, as explained in the Epilogue to Part II. 
Harrison, Jr. was Chicago’s first city-born Mayor, son to the wildly popular Mayor Carter 
Harrison, Sr. A stout, portly man, Harrison’s mustache and hair were silver-peppered, and 
though he may have looked like Chicago’s grandfather, Harrison’s tenure as Mayor was marked 
by his tolerance of vice, as well as issues of graft in local city politics. When the jury convened 
to establish guilt in the case of the Iroquois fire, Harrison was one of their primary targets. The 
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jury had an opportunity not only to place blame, but also to expose corruption at the highest 
levels of Chicago’s government. They hoped to do this by highlighting the April 1903 report that 
Commissioner Williams had submitted to the Council detailing the lack of safety measures being 
enforced in theatres around the city. Under Traeger’s examination, Harrison admitted in mid-
January 1904 that “he had no color of excuse in the ordinance for his action in shifting to the 
council the responsibility for action on Commissioner Williams’ report.”210 The outlook in the 
case was fairly damning for the Mayor, and rumors began to float in Chicago’s political hallways 
that he had even demanded the issuance of a permit to the Iroquois despite the unsatisfactory 
nature of the building, effectively insinuating that the Theatrical Syndicate had paid off 
Chicago’s top official. Williams squashed this rumor himself: “Anybody who says the mayor 
forced me to sign the permit recommendation has forgotten how to tell the truth.”211  
 Suddenly, in early February, new evidence emerged which exonerated the Mayor, despite 
his earlier admission that he had “no color of excuse.” Four employees of City Hall testified that 
Harrison had called a conference on Williams’ report, which was attended by Williams and 
themselves: City Clerk Fred Bender, Harrison’s assistant Edward Lahiff, City Collector Edward 
Lahiff, and Deputy Collector J. F. McCarthy. At this meeting, they testified, Harrison had 
instructed Bender and Lahiff to suspend licenses for theaters that did not abide by the city 
ordinances. The Tribune’s report on the exoneration gave voice to feelings of incredulity about 
the Mayor’s aides suddenly remembering new information that benefitted Harrison. Harrison, the 
paper reported,  
Owes his escape in a great measure…to the testimony of four of his subordinates, who 
gave evidence before the grand jury that was not developed at the coroner’s 
inquest…even the mayor’s own testimony before the coroner did not show that he had 
taken any action in regard to ascertaining the condition of the Iroquois before the theater 




 Sallers, meanwhile, was served by the Grand Jury a “no bill” in his trial in mid-February. 
The Tribune speculated that this return was evidence that “the jurors have already decided that 
the duty of inspecting the theater lay with the building commissioner and not the fire 
department”; this return also pointed to the fact that Chief Musham would, in the coming days, 
see a similar result.213 
 Neither Williams nor Laughlin were ever prosecuted. The final mentions of the trial of 
George Williams, the Building Commissioner — and by April 1907, the lone governmental 
representative with charges stemming from the Iroquois fire remaining against him — appears in 
the Tribune on April 9th and 10th,1907. The April 9th article notes “unusual interest attaches to 
this case from the fact that it is destined to bring either the final curtain in the legal drama or the 
first real hearing of charges on their merits.”214  Along with Williams, Edward Laughlin, the 
building instructor, was charged with “malfeasance” — sometimes stylized as “misfeasance” — 
of duty. By 1907, Laughlin had “died last year before preliminary hearings of the Davis 
indictment,” leaving only Williams to face to brunt of the legal system’s fury.215  
 Though he was the last remaining government representative, “the maximum punishment 
that can be meted out to Williams,” notes the Tribune,  “is a fine of $1000. For this and other 
reasons, it would not surprise those who have followed the litigation if the state did not press the 
case,” because it would not be worth it for them to do so.216 The Tribune seemed aware of the 
almost farcical nature of the series of trials, and noted that, because the state had been unable to 
get charges to stick to Davis, “it is futile to attempt further to fix the responsibility for the fire 
and its results. The case against Williams has always been considered of minor importance…a 
possible conviction would be of less corrective value than if the qualification of an existing 
official were in question.”217 An article published the next day announced that Williams’s trial 
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“was continued [until April 25th] by Judge Kavanagh…through the inability of Attorney Moritz 
Rosenthal…to appear.”218 This seems to have been the final mention of Williams’s trial, and 
though James J. Barbour, the State’s Attorney vowed to “push the case to a finish,” it seems 
evident that the court dismissed the charges sometime in the following two weeks.  
 Most effort was spent on attempts to convict Will Davis. Davis floated in something of a 
legal limbo for three years as a series of court decisions circuitously affirmed and denied his 
culpability in the Iroquois case. Necessarily colored by contention and dispute, the legal 
proceedings around Will J. Davis also invoke numerous rhetorical devices of metatheatricality, 
especially with regards to his lawyer, Levy Mayer. Mayer’s brilliant legal mind, and his use of 
the tools of theatre to successfully gain purchase on defining the Iroquois blaze, completed the 
post-disaster paradigmatic construction of memory work about the Iroquois as dominated by 
elite-level government processing.  
 Levy Mayer started representing Davis in September 1904. Mayer, a preternaturally 
brilliant legal mind who had graduated from Yale’s School of Law at eighteen years old, was the 
driving force behind Davis’s eventual exoneration. By September 1904, Mayer, just weeks shy 
of his 46th birthday, had already cemented his status as a powerful and fearful lawyer with 
specific interests defending large corporations against anti-trust litigation. Mayer’s involvement 
in the Iroquois case came as a surprise to the state’s attorneys; on the same day he announced, in 
court, his representation of Davis, he also petitioned the court for a change of venue to ensure a 
“fair and impartial hearing,” citing widespread public antipathy towards Davis. The State’s 
Attorney’s office “had had no intimation that Mr. Mayer had been retained in the case.”219 In 
calling for a change of venue, Mayer demonstrated recognition of the powerful relationship 
between space, memory, and disaster, and the tendency for disaster to effectively mark time and 
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space through memory-work. By September of 1904, the city of Chicago would have been 
moving quickly towards the first anniversary of the fire, and Mayer recognized the sociological 
influence anniversaries carry for citizens to re-mark the disaster event as socially significant, a 
point taken up in the following chapter. 
 Mayer understood the power and efficacy of theatricality, and to back up his claim of 
prejudice against Davis, his timing was specific and instrumental to his argument: in addition to 
the upcoming anniversary of the fire, the Iroquois Theatre had just been re-opened to the public 
under the operation of Hyde and Behman, and Mayer argued the reopening of the building had 
caused “‘inflammatory articles’ to appear in the newspaper.”220 To back up his claim, Mayer 
sought to have “five volumes and 2,800” copies of such newspaper articles entered into 
evidence, and “150 affidavits,” although Mayer claimed he could easily procure up to “150,000” 
affidavits for the purpose of moving the trial.221  
 Barnes took the bait, and issued Mayer a challenge: “be sworn, Mr. Mayer, and tell me 
under oath how long ago it was that you first began to present this petition for a change of 
venue.”222 Mayer “sprang to his feet. ‘I accept your challenge,’” he declared, 
The…affidavits recited in detail the history of the fire and the growth of the alleged 
prejudice on the part of the community. It was stated that this feeling of prejudice had 
been fostered by the newspapers and by the Iroquois Memorial association and other 
organizations, even of school children…The affidavits then set forth that this prejudice 
apparently had died out at the time of the indictment on Feb. 2 and until Sept. 19, but that 
on the latter date the Iroquois theater was again opened for amusements, whereupon the 
public protest and against the operating of the theater recalled the horrors of the fire and 
aroused the passion and revived the prejudice of the inhabitant of Cook county.223 
 
 The brilliance of Mayer’s legal maneuvering is that it played upon and used the tensions of 
memory, performance and public outrage. Mayer specifically attacked the memory-work being 
undertaken by the Iroquois Memorial Association, explored in greater detail in the following 
chapter, and advanced that charge all the way down to school children; all were participating in 
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creating an unfair, impartial environment for his client. By arguing these claims — whether true 
or not — Mayer simultaneously evoked the memory of the hundreds of young lives lost in the 
fire for everyone present in the court room, while also pointing out that the narrative of the 
Iroquois had, more or less, passed from history into a state of shared memory. If it had not been 
impossible before his performative utterance to hold a “fair and impartial trial” for Davis, it 
certainly was now. Barnes was essentially tricked by a superior legal mind into giving Mayer 
precisely what he wanted: a stage upon which to recall the tragedy, to re-awaken the feelings of 
public anger, to politicize these memories, and to ensure Davis’ trial would be moved. 
 In June of 1905, Mayer presented the court with a series of riddles — “when is a theater 
owner not a theater owner?…When is an ordinance not an ordinance?”224 — and argued that, 
whether the theater would have been safer had it been properly equipped with fire safety 
apparatus was “theoretical.”225 More importantly, Mayer argued,  
 The statute doesn’t specify whose the responsibility is, or whose the duty is. It is one 
of the omissions that occur commonly in legislation. I would suggest that in the matter of 
permanent precautions against fire the duty fall to the owner of a theater; but that the 
responsibility for installing movable apparatus fall upon the shoulders of the manager. 
 If Mr. Davis had undertaken to discharge the duties of a manager, he would have 
become a manager. But even if he promised to do what the law could not compel him to 
perform, he cannot be held criminally responsibly. Unless he is charged exclusively with 
a certain office, the failure to fulfill which results fatally, he is not indictable.226 
 
  The next year, in June 1906, Mayer continued his metatheatrical streak, continuing to fight 
for a change of venue for Davis, when he revisited his affidavit performance from September 
1904. Mayer,  
And his assistant, Alfred S. Austrian, appeared in the courtroom and at the head of a 
small army of clerks and messenger boys bearing “the documents in the case.” These 
consisted of twenty-seven volumes of bound affidavits of the 12,045 persons who swore 
they did not believe Davis could be given a fair trial in this county, a dozen volumes of 





 The message of the performance was clear: if it took an “army” of persons delivering 
documents about the impossibility of Davis’s guaranteed right to a fair and impartial trial, the 
evidence was so overwhelming as to assure a change of venue. The trial was eventually moved 
to Danville, IL, and interest in the case was, indeed, reawakened. This is illustrated in a February 
19th, 1907 article in the Tribune, following Davis’s plea of “not guilty,” which claimed, “eager 
interest in the approaching trial was manifest around town. Bets of 2 to 1 in favor of acquittal 
were made freely in the courthouse square.”228  
 Davis’s trial began in early March of 1907 in Danville, and if it felt like he would no 
longer be able to squirm out of the firm grip of justice, Mayer betrayed no hint of it, attacking the 
charges against his client with ferocity and, in the first days of the trial, succeeded in ensuring 
Davis’s release on what can only be called an issue of semantics; the Tribune called it “a trump 
card.”229 Mayer waited until the jury had been selected, and the first witness — Maud Jackson, 
the mother of Viva Jackson, a young victim of the fire, whose death had been selected by the 
State Attorney to build their case around — had been called to present his argument: the building 
ordinances under which Davis was being charged void and meaningless. “The ordinances are 
void,” he argued,  
Because of the uncertainty in requiring that certain appliances shall be present in all halls 
or other places for the purpose of accommodating large numbers of people, and that the 
term “large numbers” of people is so indefinite as to render the ordinances void. 
 That the statutes of the state of Illinois, under which the city of Chicago derives 
power to establish fire limits, merely give the city power to prohibit the erection of 
wooden buildings within such limits. There is no power lodged in the city to do anything 
else in the way of regulating buildings within the fire limits.230 
 
 Mayer’s canny legal argument illustrates how the themes of dispute and contestation were 
powerfully influential even years after the disaster event, disputing the very legitimacy of the 
city to enforce its own code. Davis, Mayer argued, could not be charged because he hadn’t 
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broken any laws, because Chicago had no power to enforce building codes. The ordinances 
specifically stated that the only power of fire safety granted to the city was the ability to 
“prohibit the erection of wooden buildings” within its limits. “This indictment is based on a law 
which might go in China, but which has no place in this land of constitutional liberty and 
privilege,” Mayer argued. “This defendant is happy here in an atmosphere where neither 
vengeance nor spite has justice by the nose.”231  
 Mayer continued, giving a brief rundown of the complicated legal history that had led them 
to this place; a girl in the audience was heard to remark that Mayer was “horribly polite,” 
suggesting a calm, reasoned performance of his argument.232 Mayer argued,  
This building ordinance in no way declares whose duty it is to put in flues and sprinkler 
systems. Would you put these things on the owner, or say every tenant must attend to the 
flues, fire escapes, etc.? Yet this ordinance does not say whose duty it shall be. Your 
judicial conscience would be compelled to declare such an ordinance void even if some 
other concurrent judge upheld it. Your honor will not hide behind the battery of some 
associate judge. There are two questions which in the opinion of all the counsel for the 
defense are vital and make the existence of the ordinance in the case impossible. I think 
the court concedes the ownership question. Mr. Davis was no more owner of the theater 
than Samuel Felton was owner of the Chicago and Alton railroad because he happens to 
be its president.233 
 
 It was, Mayer contended, “the hand of God that brought about the loss of 596 lives in the 
Iroquois theater fire,” and that, “Will J. Davis was no more responsible for their deaths than if a 
hurricane had lifted off the roof of the theater.”234 In this argument, Mayer unwittingly issued a 
dispute to some of the religious constructions of the disaster event as inherently godless. Mayer 
even successfully invoked the death of young Viva Jackson in his defense of the Iroquois, 
effectively ruining any emotional impact her mother’s testimony may have provided. “Suppose,” 
he argued,  
 I opened a theatre on the south side of Seventy-fifth Street. There was no flue or vent, no 
expert fireman, no program. Viva Jackson attends. There is a horrible holocaust. Six 
hundred lives are lost. I am not guilty. I have violated no ordinance. On the north side of 
 
 250 
the street I would be guilty of manslaughter. The fact is, there had been a great municipal 
blunder. The city has no power to differentiate.235 
 
 It took two days to exonerate Davis of guilt. Ultimately, it was a technicality of the 
Chicago building code that gave Davis his freedom. Judge Kimbrough released Davis; although 
he noted, “that Davis might be morally guilty,” he allowed, “Davis was not legally guilty.”236 
Mayer was able to successfully convince the court that the disaster was akin to a natural disaster, 
resisting the narratives of greed and negligence constructed by Chicago’s clergy and victim 
communities immediately following the fire.  Davis continued to manage theatres in Chicago 
until his death in 1919.  Ultimately, the efficacy of Mayer’s arguments exists at the intersections 
of semantic and rhetorical legal dispute, contestation, and deconstruction, a brilliant and creative 
legal mind, and an appreciation for the power of performance. Perhaps it was this appreciation 
for performance that led Mayer to become involved with the Theatrical Syndicate, a relationship 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 While I’ve focused here almost exclusively on the criminal liability, it is worth mentioning 
the civil cases that were brought against the various parties relevant to the Iroquois Theatre. A 
major complication of these cases is addressed by the Illinois Law Review, noting the involved 
parties’ tendencies to request demurrers, dismissal of the charges on legal grounds as opposed to 
factual grounds. These requests were mostly successful, and by 1907, “only a small proportion of 
the cases that were commenced [are] still pending.” About sixty of the 175 charged against the 
George Fuller Company were among the cases that remained, and none of those cases were 
appearing on any of the court’s docket calendars.237 “It may ultimately be held that the Fuller 
Company is liable,” argue Frederic Woodward and Frank Smith, “but the lawyer whose 
compensation is contingent upon success, as is probably true in nearly all of these cases, is likely 
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to conclude, unless he has a sufficient number of cases to repay him for a long and bitter 
struggle, that the game is ‘not worth the candle.’”238 
 I doubt the colloquial invocation of the flame was accidental. The Fuller Company was, 
indeed, eventually found liable in 1908, and the company settled out of court with the 
survivors.239 Thirty-nine claimants settled for a grand total of $29750 — $750 each, or, 
approximately fifty dollars for each victim who died in the theatre on December 30th, 1903. It 
would be difficult to prove that the long and protracted legal and civil processes of assigning 
guilt were purposefully elongated and protracted by the legal representation of the Iroquois 
Company, because it can take a long time for justice to be served. In the case of the Iroquois, 
however, it seems that justice never was served, and that was due primarily to a technicality 
embedded within the letter of law. This lack of justice had a profound impact on grass-roots 
memory work by playing upon the essential contestation of post-disaster paradigmatic re-
constructions of systems of order.  
 After disasters, societies band together in order to re-assert order in a disrupted, dis-ordered 
world, and ritual processes, including funeral services, and the burial of the dead, play vital roles 
in this re-assertion of order. One facet of those ritual processes must be the legal proceedings that 
seek to give answer to citizens searching for a meaningful, “official” narrative in a disastrous 
occurrence. All of these ritual processes tend to empower the ability of a society of actors to “let 
go” of the disaster and “move on” from it. That the legal proceedings around the Iroquois took so 
long suggests that the wound of the Iroquois never quite healed correctly, and it remained, if not 
a fresh burn on the skin of the city, a maddeningly itchy scar of deadened nerve endings. The 
memory of the Iroquois was not fresh and vital by 1907. What had seemed a clear cut case of 
moral and civic guilt at the beginning of 1904 devolved into a series of rhetorical legal squabbles 
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that resulted in “more and more information” about the disaster becoming public, and greater 
pressure being placed upon elite-level processing of the disaster by victim communities, making 
it “harder instead of easier to arrive at some form of joint remembrance and consensual history 
writing.”240 Whereas in Richmond and Brooklyn, where there were levels of cooperation 
between elite-level forces and grass-roots communities, this kind of productive relationship was 




Part III, Chapter 12: Sacred to the Memory 
A Vaudeville House in the Graveyard 
 On a mild January morning in 2013, 109 years after the Iroquois Theatre burned to the 
ground, my friend Jane and I walked through Montrose Cemetery, well north of downtown 
Chicago, where some of the 602 people who perished in the fire are laid to rest. In the cemetery 
stands an imposing diamond shaped memorial, gray, ten feet tall, weathered by age and exposure 
to nature, with words carved into its face: “Sacred to the Memory of 600 people who perished in 
the Iroquois Theatre Fire Dec. 30, 1903. Erected by the Iroquois Memorial Association.”  As we 
studied the marker, Jane, a Chicago transplant and a font of knowledge about Chicago ephemera, 
asked me “so, wait. I don’t know the story. What exactly happened?”  
 It is easy to see, from a temporal distance, that the city and the social systems of order 
operating in Chicago, as well as the managerial shortcomings of Davis and Power, contributed, if 
not in proximate ways, then in approximate ways, to the disaster at the Iroquois. In the previous 
chapter, I detailed the long and winding road from the Iroquois disaster toward re-establishing a 
form of social order through attempts to assign blame via legal processes, an analysis of the 
historical evidence undertaken to argue that it was through the protracted and complicated legal 
process that the Iroquois passed from the public memory into the realm of forgetting, an 
illustration of elite-level memory work to control and define the social experience of a disaster 
process. This chapter explores the numerous difficulties encountered by the Iroquois Memorial 
Association to perform grass-roots memory-work to provide for a memorial to the victims of the 
disaster, in order to illustrate how contestation between elite-level institutions and grass-roots 
communities creates space for forgetting.  
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 One of the problems faced by the city of Chicago after the fire was what to do with the 
remainders of the building. While the damage to the performance and audience space was 
catastrophic, the building itself — the lobby and exterior in particular — remained in pretty good 
shape. In his seminal article Between History and Memory, Pierre Nora wrote about “the 
acceleration of history…an increasingly rapid slippage of the present into a historical past that is 
gone for good, a general perception that anything and everything may disappear.”241 “There are,” 
Nora argues, “lieux de memoire, sites of memory” — monuments and memorials — “because 
there are no longer milieux de memoire, real environments of memory.”242 Read through Nora’s 
framework, the cities of Richmond and Brooklyn grieved their losses in productive, socially 
shared ways, and the buildings, being near or total losses, allowed the space of the disaster to be 
“written over.” In Richmond, this writing over was done through a specifically Christian 
operation, tied to the religiously-dominated narrative following the fire. The site became both a 
literal grave and a church standing in memory of those who were lost. In Brooklyn, the site of the 
theatre was turned over to Haverly’s Theatre in 1879, but before that, the building was a 
complete loss, transformed into a hell mouth, no longer signifying as a theatre. In other words, 
the absence of the buildings contributed to allowing the citizens of those cities to move on. In 
Chicago, the building continued to stand as a chilling reminder of the violence of December 30th, 
1903, and became a site marked by the bitter struggles of a variety of parties trying to wrest 
control of the memory work in the post-disaster paradigm. This section focuses on the physical 
building of the Iroquois Theatre, and how it became a contentious nexus for various social 
performances of the tensions between remembering and forgetting.  
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 This tension is perhaps nowhere better identified than in Arthur Hornblow’s 1904 article in 
Theatre magazine, which accurately predicts, based on readings of theatre fires past, what would 
occur in the months and years following the Iroquois blaze: 
It is the usual experience that disasters of this kind are followed by great public 
excitement, the newspapers demand reform, the theaters suffer from lack of patronage, 
the authorities display great activity and the managers show themselves eager to remedy 
defects. But the show of zeal never lasts. The disaster is forgotten in a week, the theaters 
do as little as they can, gradually neglecting the most ordinary precautions, the public 
does not give the matter a thought, and everything goes on merrily as before unless a 
fresh horror occurs to teach us another lesson.243 
 
 “This time,” Hornblow begs, “let us not forget.”244  
 The earliest call for a memorial to the fire came on January 6th, 1904, from the Washington 
Post: 
Use of the Iroquois Theater site as a memorial through the erection of a suitable church or 
memorial building to replace the present seared, scarred structure was suggested to-day. 
The idea is to emulate the people of Vienna, who, in memory of the 800 lives lost in the 
Ring-strasse Theater in 1881, have erected a magnificent church on its site.245 
 
 That the Washington Post’s call to build in the stead of the “seared, scarred structure” a 
church ignores the people of Richmond, VA in the early 1800’s, who similarly “erected a 
magnificent church” on the site of a ruined theatre illustrates the tendency of theatre fires in the 
United States of America to slip into the “irretrievable past.” In Chicago, survivors and victims' 
family members formed the Iroquois Memorial Association, the first reference to which 
appeared in a January 14th, 1904 article in the Tribune. The article reads, 
The aims of the organization are set forth in the report of the executive committee, which 
was adopted: 
 ‘First — to establish a suitable memorial to perpetuate the memory of those who lost 
their lives in the Iroquois theater fire on Dec. 30, 1903. 
 Second — to extend aid to those made destitute through the loss of relatives. 




 Fourth — to assist in and compel the enforcement of existing and any future 
ordinances and statues [sic] enacted for the purpose of safeguarding human life in public 
assemblages.’246 
 
 The IMA was specifically imagined and constructed as a survivor community for 
advancement towards establishing a memorial, and towards developing an assurance that such a 
tragedy would never happen again. “I do not think we are here for revenge,” said Henry M. 
Shabad, who lost two children in the fire, “we could not ask the state of Illinois to grant us a 
charter for an organization whose main object would be revenge…we want justice, it is true, and 
we are going to have it, but let our deliberations be tempered with judgment and not warped with 
passion.”247 The IMA was officially incorporated on the 23rd of January, when “more than 200 
relatives of victims of the Iroquois theater fire attended the meeting,” of the IMA. They adopted 
a constitution and an executive board. The first and most pressing matter for the IMA group was 
moving forward toward the erection of a suitable memorial: 
 We feel it is our duty to take the initiative in this matter, and with the help of the 
public to erect a memorial that will be a worthy tribute to the dead, a useful and 
instructive institution for the living, and that not only will remind but point out to the 
authorities the duties to the public in the protection of human life. 
 It is intended also to provide a fund to care for all those who may have been left, 
through the loss of relatives, in destitute circumstances.  
 We propose that this organization shall devote its time and energies towards causing 
a higher value to be placed on human life by those responsible for its safety.”248 
 
 Somewhat strangely, the Tribune noted that at the meeting, “a clause” to the constitution 
adopted at the meeting “prohibits participation in lawsuits resulting for the disaster.”249 I suspect 
the reason for this inclusion is owed to the statement quoted above: “we propose that this 
organization shall devote its time and energies towards causing a higher value to be placed on 
human life by those responsible for its safety.” Perhaps the IMA foresaw the difficult legal 
struggles that would come to define the memory-work about the Iroquois fire. Perhaps the IMA 
understood that individual legal cases might have ended in value being assigned at differing 
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levels to victims’ lives. Perhaps the IMA anticipated that legal entanglement would result in the 
organization being mired in the contentions and disputes that colored memory work in the post-
disaster paradigm for years to come, and they preferred to focus on creating productive memory 
work in an positive environment to help move on from the fire.  
 Quickly, Arthur E. Hull, one of the executive board members of the IMA, made the 
announcement that he would offer the sale of the land under the theatre to the IMA, “on which to 
build a memorial to the victims of the fire.”250 The announcement was a surprise. “Mr. Hull,” the 
Tribune reported, “refuses to say who authorizes him to make the offer, further than that it is one 
of the foremost surgeons of the city.”251 The site was to be given over by “the heirs to the estate 
of which the site is a part,” who “have agreed to convey it, with all leaseholds, to the 
association,” according to Hull.252 This was a bit of political performance on Hull’s behalf, 
perhaps seeking to force the owners — Arthur T. Lyman, A. Lawrence Lowell, and Arthur 
Lyman — to abide, in the name of good publicity, by his fictional contract. Hull never had any 
contract, and, in reality, Lyman, Lowell and Lyman would not sell the land under the theatre 
until 1907, a transaction discussed later in this chapter. Understood as a form of political 
performance, Hull’s declaration demonstrates how deeply the use of theatrical rhetoric to 
respond to the fire became embedded into the social construction and deployment of narratives 
of dispute and contention about the event, while simultaneously illustrating an understanding of 
the importance of controlling the spatial significance of the theatre in order to gain a measure of 
control of the ability to construct memorial narratives.  
 The suggestion of a memorial church to take the place of the Iroquois was dismissed 
quickly, and Richard Teller Crane, a multimillionaire industrialist, founder and vice president of 
R.T. Crane & Brother, who lost two nieces in the blaze — and who had hired John Ripley 
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Freeman, noted in the previous chapter, to undertake a study of the particulars of the fire — 
announced on the 9th of January his plans to begin a fund to finance a memorial hospital, “as a 
lasting memorial to those who perished in the Iroquois theatre fire…designed particularly for the 
care of women and children,” and who started donations with a hefty check for $5,000.253 Crane 
suggested that the hospital “might be erected in or near the downtown district,” so that “it might 
be available in case of similar disasters.“254   
 In making this suggestion, Crane re-enforced Hull’s identification of the importance of 
(re)defining the terms of the space of the disaster. A semiotic analysis of the geography of 
Crane’s plan reveals a desire to highlight and reify the physical violence caused by the event and, 
in doing so, to never allow the event to slip into the irretrievable past. Crane’s hospital would 
signify the haunted space’s necessary relationship to the violence of the Iroquois disaster event in 
much the same way that the Monumental Church signified the religious dimensionality of 
memory in Richmond. By “writing over” the space of the Iroquois disaster with an emergency 
hospital, Crane’s plan would link the successful medical treatment of emergency cases, 
particularly “women and children,” to the abject failure of providing a safe social setting for 
women and children. Implicitly, Crane’s hospital would perform the kind of doubly-significant 
role that Anne Eyre notes many memorials perform. Eyre writes, “permanent memorials may 
focus on the importance of looking forward as well as back to an event.”255 The hospital may 
also be understood as an example of an environment of memory insofar as it promises to live the 
values and standards of the community by ensuring that any future emergencies in the downtown 
area would have immediate access to proper, systematized medical care. The hospital, then, 
would stand as a spatiotemporal link to the past and the future, a constant reminder of the 
violence of the Iroquois disaster, and a constant promise of “never again.” 
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  Crane’s plan was met with approval by Alderman William M. Butterworth, who 
furthered the suggestion by calling for “the conversion of the Iroquois theater into the seat of a 
memorial emergency hospital.”256 The idea of a memorial emergency hospital captured the 
public imagination. A March 20th article claimed “many aid [the funding of a] new hospital” and 
noted that “progress has been made during the week by the committee having in charge the 
raising of funds necessary,” while an April 6th article wrote of the “energetic work” being 
undertaken for the funding of a new hospital, and explained that “the organization of children 
will, it is believed, add to the popularity of the movement.”257 However, the business interests of 
Chicago’s theatre owner-operators in the Iroquois began to peak, as well, and the space became 
marked by a contest between remembering the victims of the Iroquois and moving forward 
through the production of theatre. The question at the heart of this dispute for Chicago was: how 
will we construct our future?  
 Before Levy Mayer had originally insinuated himself within the Iroquois proceedings as 
the representative of William Harris of the Boston area theatrical firm Rich & Harris in late May 
1904. Rich & Harris were considering purchasing the building to launch a vaudeville house, and 
Harris had toured the remains of the building in late March of the same year. “The arrangement 
of the theater, its location, and highly ornate foyer pleased” Harris. James J. Reynolds, the 
President of the IMA, was skeptical of the plan and of Harris: 
I found out the kind of people they are last winter when I approached their representative, 
a Mr. Harris, with a warning that the house would not be supported by the public if he 
insisted upon running a theatre. 
 “Don’t be too sure of that,” he answered. ‘“If I should advertise that fifteen men were 
going to jump off the Masonic temple this afternoon I would have the biggest crowd you 
ever saw.” That is the sort of curiosity these people are trudging for. If they decided that 




 By mid-April, the building was purchased for use by Hyde & Behman. In many ways, 
Hyde & Behman’s interest in the Iroquois provides an eerie parallel to the interests of the 
Theatrical Syndicate only a handful of years prior. Hyde & Behman went into business, in 1900, 
with a collection of other vaudeville theatre owner/operators, including Rich & Harris, under the 
collective title of the Vaudeville Managers Association. Just as Klaw and Erlanger had sought to 
turn the Iroquois into the western equivalent of the finest theatres in the world, so, too, did Hyde 
& Behman seek to turn it into the premiere vaudeville house of the west, and just as the 
Syndicate had planned to use the Iroquois as the center of its Midwest touring circuit, the VMA 
saw the potential for a similar use. Harris, a member of the IMA argued, had served as a 
“representative” for Hyde & Behman, although it seems that there was considerable back-and-
forth before the sale was finalized.259 Several weeks later Harris sent Mayer to City Hall with a 
brand new set of plans for renovating the building.260 Mayer met with Iroquois architect B.H. 
Marshall and explained the new plans.261 It seems likely that this was the first time Mayer took 
an interest in the Iroquois, but, as I described in the previous chapter, his association with the 
building, the space, and the disaster would continue for years.262 
 The plans Mayer brought dealt with some of the fundamental inadequacies of the original 
construction, including the modification of “the steep pitch of the gallery,” and the installation of 
“fireproof walls…in the rear of the main floor of the balcony and of the gallery.”263 Hyde & 
Behman planned to re-open the building as a low-priced “10-20-30” vaudeville theatrical house, 
and the IMA resisted them throughout the late-spring and summer of 1904.264 Chicago’s 
government took the stance that the theatre would not re-open until all of the modifications were 
made to the satisfaction of the city building commissioner — until, it must be noted with some 
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irony, the “law had been exactly complied with” — and by late May, things were coming to a 
head.265  
 The Tribune reported that the sticking point on the theatre’s adherence to city ordinance 
was about whether the Iroquois, re-modeled, counted as a new theatre, or an extant one. This 
identification of the contention of the status of the building as new or extant clearly articulates 
the anxieties that Iroquois survivor communities were experiencing about the space. If the 
physical modifications to the space were sufficient to completely re-define the space as 
fundamentally new, then a significant link to the Iroquois disaster would be lost, in a manner 
similar to the re-writing of the spatial context of the Richmond Theatre into the Monumental 
Church. If, however, the physical modifications could not be said to constitute an entirely new 
space, the building would be forever haunted by its connection to the blaze, and would provide a 
public and shared space that would mark downtown Chicago with the violence and disaster of 
the past. Philosophically, the struggle between the elite-level governmental memory-work and 
the grass-roots memory-work is an example of Theseus’ Paradox, and when re-cast in this way, 
the question inherent in defining the space provides a cross-temporal resonance with Mayer’s 
1907 questions to the jury members dealing with Will Davis’ case:  “when is a theater owner not 
a theater owner?…When is an ordinance not an ordinance?”266 When is a theatre not a theatre? 
When is new not new? This philosophical paradox demonstrates how deeply the contentions 
surrounding the space penetrated into the public imagination. 
 On the 28th of May, George Williams — still in his role as building commissioner — 
refused to grant a license to Hyde & Behman for the reconstruction of the Iroquois, although 
Mayer and Marshall seemed confident the refusal would not last long, as they “announced…that 
the city will be compelled to give the permission” on the promise of a lawsuit by the members of 
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the VMA.267 Mayer and Marshall’s confidence proved correct: on May 31st, Judge Edward 
Dunne identified the social tensions inherent in the case between victim communities and 
corporate interests. He ruled that the case was “a question of law, not of sentiment,” and argued, 
Suppose a man owned a private graveyard: he would have a right, if he complied with the 
ordinances, to run a vaudeville house in the graveyard. The owners of the property have a 
right to do anything he sees fit if he complies with all the laws of the states. If he does 
comply with them he has a right to run vaudeville in that charnel house.268 
 
 The ruling understandably upset the IMA, finding itself imbricated in the kind of legal 
struggles it had wanted to avoid. J.J. Reynolds, the President of the IMA, told the Tribune “I do 
not believe the general public wants to see the theater reopened and I still have doubts that it ever 
will be reopened.”269 By September of that year, 1904, the building was, indeed, re-opened. JEO 
Pridmore, a renowned architect and member of the IMA, toured the building in mid-September, 
prior to its opening, and reported “this theater complies with the city ordinances in all except two 
particulars…there is a good deal wrong with the ordinance, however.”270 In a remark dripping 
with irony, Pridmore, in discussing how many exits should be made available to patrons in the 
result of a fire, remarked, “the stage is the great danger point. Everyone must run away from 
it.”271 Though he was discussing the fact that the stage contained the most propensity for the 
creation of a disaster environment, it is tempting to read into Pridmore’s statement that the stage 
— a synecdoche, here, for the practice of theatre generally — is sufficiently dangerous enough 
that everyone must run away from it and, by association, from Hyde & Behman’s. 
 The IMA did not despair, and “issued an official condemnation for the project and 
protested against the city’s licensing the theatre under the new management.”272 Reynolds 
argued, 
I for one will fight this theater all the rest of my life. It is the disgrace of the city. No 
other community ever would allow it to open…No one but a morbidly curious person 
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ever would enter that theater. The men who bought the playhouse are relying on that 
curiosity.273 
 
 If “morbid curiosity” wasn’t precisely the truth behind Hyde & Behman’s professional 
interests in the building, no one told the Tribune. Upon the occasion of the reopening of the 
theatre under the Hyde & Behman name, the Tribune commissioned Northwestern Professor 
Walter Dill Scott, a pioneer in the field of applied psychology, to offer his analysis of the 
“Iroquois” audience in attendance the afternoon of September 18th, 1904. “Crowds, panics, 
stampedes, and all abnormal environments serve to emphasize some characteristic of the human 
mind which otherwise might escape our attention,” Scott wrote. “The Iroquois fire might thus 
have furnished a valuable experiment, showing the effect of terror upon a crowd.”274 Scott’s 
analysis provides an interesting read about the temporal process of memory and forgetting 
relevant to the Iroquois, and the performative aspects of such remembering and forgetting: 
In the days after the fire it was frequently remarked that it would be forever impossible to 
open the theater again even if the name should be changed. It had been the scene of such 
a horror that it was thought impossible that intelligent beings could ever be induced to 
resort there for amusement and recreation…Why did the public say that it would never 
enter the door of the building, and now why does it crowd through the doors? One answer 
might be that the mind of man is affected more by time than we are aware of. The 
afflicted one believes that he will never again be able to be happy, that he will ever be 
weighed down by the thought of his great loss. As the days go by the burden becomes 
light and finally is nothing but a memory, with but an occasional sigh. Indeed, the sorrow 
itself may be the source of pleasure…We take pleasure in thinking of the hardships and 
afflictions which we have endured. The “luxury of grief” is no fiction…The fascination 
which a calamity has for the human mind has been abundantly exemplified by the events 
connected with the fire which took place within the Iroquois theater. Great throngs 
gathered about the burning building, went from morgue to morgue, and glutted their eyes 
with the sight of the dead. The building was closed soon after the fire and the public was 
not permitted to enter, but everything connected with the awful disaster became an object 
of morbid interest. Pedestrians planned to walk down Randolph Street just to take another 
look at the building. The passersby frequently stopped at the door of the theater and 
peered through a crack in the door, although nothing was visible…This scene of 
destruction and everything connected with it possesses a most remarkable fascination 
over the human mind, and points all too clearly to our descent from lower forms of life, 
in which the instinct to kill was necessary for preservation, but which in civilized society 
needs to be redirected or suppressed. The presence of this bestial predatory instinct in 
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man is the real cause of the morbid interest in the Iroquois theater, and it alone is 
sufficient to explain the thronging of the reopened playhouse.275 
 
 Scott’s argument pinpoints a vital turn in the process of memory work: the point at which 
pain becomes pleasure, which he terms “the luxury of grief.” Through Scott’s lens, the site of the 
Iroquois served primarily to remind Chicagoans not of the disaster, death, and horror, but instead 
of the positive aspects wrought by disaster, the endurance of “hardships and afflictions.” Further, 
Scott takes a stand against Reynolds’ pinpointing Hyde & Behman’s interest in the building as 
fundamentally trading on the deaths of its victims when he writes, “the presence of this bestial 
predatory instinct in man is the real cause of the morbid interest in the Iroquois theater.”276 The 
“morbid curiosity” may be instead understood as a positive suppression or redirection of natural, 
violent urges. Understood through Scott’s analysis, the site of the Iroquois Theatre provided a 
valuable outlet for citizens to work through their dark and violent feelings regarding the blaze. 
Perhaps this was considered necessary owing to the fact that there were no other sites of memory 
— milieux de memoire — through which these feelings could be similarly worked out, and given 
that the civic and social rites associated with grass roots memory-work had given way to a series 
of floundering legal proceedings in attempts to assign guilt. 
 The VMA opened Hyde & Behman’s Music Hall on the 19th of September to an audience 
described by the Tribune as “blasé,” but which, as the performance continued, “lightened up, 
laughed, had a good time.”277 “Never was a theatrical performance given under greater tensions,” 
reads a September 20th article, 
It passed without mishap more serious than the blocking of a curtain — an incident which 
caused the audience a moment of bated breath — but those in a position of responsibility 
did not feel a lessening of the strain until they were assured by the sight of the emptied 




 As part of their redesign, Hyde and Behman had re-decorated the building, with “lights and 
bright colors, mainly brilliant red,” that “everywhere sought to remove the memory of gloom.”279 
Indeed, even the famous Indian bust, provided by Will Davis, which had adorned the outside of 
the building, was replaced by “the head of a woman — a laughing woman with roses in her 
hair.”280 What once signified Davis’s fascination with leadership, and served to frame the 
Iroquois as a world leader in theatre design and experience, now framed an environment of 
mirth, merriment, and forgetting. This metatheatrical performance, the performance before the 
performance — a performance of architectural memory, of the self-conscious design of time and 
space — drew “two audiences” to the theatre that afternoon that stood in opposition to one 
another: 
 One sought the interior and held checks for seats and boxes. It was silent when it 
entered, but afterwards is was [sic] feverishly gay…the other staid in the street, some 
portion of it treading a somber, curious way into and out of the outer foyer of the theater. 
This audience did not have even a superficial interest in the stage scenes of the night. It 
cared only to gaze into the electric lighted cavern of the foyer. Its interest was based on 
studying those who entered and on speculation. 
 All the evening it remained there, varying only slightly in numbers…the outside 
audience was free with its comments. Its manner, however, was quiet. Only one 
emotional outburst marked the evening on the sidewalk.  
 The center of it was a working man. He walked up to the entrance, shook his first 
toward the glare of the lights, and cursed the playhouse, its proprietors, and the city 
officials, blaming the latter for permitting the opening of the house. 
 “My wife and my sister-in-law were burned to death in that place,” he said, with a 
sob in his voice, to the detective who asked him to move on…. 
 A man who declared himself a philosopher said he was glad the theater was open. 
 “No human emotion,” he said, “is so acute but that time, the healer, will soften and 
salve it. It is better so. We could not exist if the memory of pain and sorrow always 
remained keen in our breasts.”281  
 
 The Tribune’s coverage of the opening of Hyde & Behman’s Music Hall continues the 
trend of using metatheatrical vocabulary to discuss and frame the disaster, indicating an 
awareness of the power of performance to hold sway over the construction of post-disaster 
environments of remembering and forgetting. The Tribune explicitly constructs Hyde & 
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Behman’s Music Hall as an essentially contested site of memory where the performances of dual 
narratives of memory work can be read: two audiences, one outside, one inside, both viewing 
performances, both ascribing value to the memory of the dead.  The value is inscribed in 
competing ways, whether by trying to move on through participation in the light comedic 
stylings on the stage of Hyde & Behman’s, or by trying to revive the fading memory of the dead 
through participation in the voyeuristic and objective spectacle afforded by Hyde & Behman’s 
customers walking into the building.  Note also how the Tribune refers to the space alternately as 
the Iroquois and Hyde & Behman’s, suggesting that the space was doubly-occupied by both the 
present Hyde & Behman’s, and the absent Iroquois.  
 Carlson’s term “ghosted” applies, as the building can be understood as “the identical 
thing…encountered before, although now in a somewhat different context. Thus, recognition not 
of similarity, but of identity.“282 The dual audience’s competing readings of the identical, but 
simultaneously different, building reveal important facets of their identity. “Theatre,” Carlson 
argues,  
Has always provided society with the most tangible records of its attempts to understand 
its own operations. It is the repository of cultural memory, but, like the memory of each 
individual, it is also subject to continual adjustment and modification as the memory is 
recalled in new circumstances and contexts. The present experience is always ghosted by 
previous experiences and associations while these ghosts are simultaneously shifted and 
modified by the process of recycling and recognition.283 
 
 The purposefully metatheatrical vocabulary of the Tribune’s coverage of the post-disaster 
period, as well as Carlson’s rhetorical invocation of a thanatological framework, allows for an 
application of Carlson’s point to the reading of the building itself. Operating simultaneously at 
sociocultural and individual levels, the building provided a focal point for the shifting and 
modification of recycling and repetition of the violence of the afternoon of December 30th, 1903. 
In many ways, Carlson’s points reinforce those made by Bos, Ullberg, and ’t Hart, who argue 
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that memory and forgetting are constructed through networks of social interactions, as defined by 
Maurice Halbwach: 
While social or cultural memory has often been understood as the collective sum of its 
individual parts, Halbwach's claims that all individual memory is socially produced, 
insofar that individuals re-script their memories through the recollection of others. 
Networks of sociality thus define what experiences are to be recalled (memory) and 
which are to be forgotten (oblivion.)284 
 
 Through these theoretical insights, I argue that the “ghosting” of historical events must be 
understood within a “network of sociality” that implies a process of memory-work that can be 
constructive and/or destructive, depending largely on the on-going contestation between “a 
political encounter between grass-roots memory and the elite-level, political ‘processing’ of 
disasters.”285 While theatre may indeed be connected with the cultural and personal processes of 
ghosting, theatre history is similarly concerned with those processes. The insight Bos, Ullberg 
and ’t Hart (and Halbwach) provide is that “historical ghosting” — which I define as the reading 
of historical material through the cultural and personal processes of previous experiences and 
associations, and the shifting and modification of those processes undertaken within a network of 
sociality — demonstrates that the (re)construction of disaster memory is a contested and on-
going dispute between the personal and the cultural. Understood within the context of disaster 
sociology, memory, forgetting, and historical narrative are inextricably bound to the 
contestations between the grass-roots memory-work of survivor communities, and the elite-level 
political processing of disaster events.  
The Right Thing to Close 
 Despite the horror that marked the space as significant and potentially memorial, the 
presence and dispute of the two audiences at the theatre that evening revealed that, though the 
IMA and others continued the fight for memory, the battle to preserve the memory of the fire 
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was a losing one, and perhaps it was already lost. The IMA had failed to secure the space for the 
purpose of building a memorial hospital, and although they didn’t drop the hospital project 
entirely, the more pressing and immediate concern for them was the upcoming anniversary of the 
disaster, which they had started calling “Iroquois Day.” The IMA issued requests to all theatres 
to close their doors to audiences during the 30th, in the middle of the lucrative Holiday season 
theatrical run. C. E. Kohl, who owned the Chicago, Olympic and Haymarket Theaters, declined. 
“I do not intend to close,” he told the Tribune, “even if all the other theaters in town do so. I have 
a family to support and I already have lost too much money by the fire of last winter. The only 
proposition I would consider would be to close if all the merchants in the city suspended 
business and the day was turned over to church services.”286 Archie Ellis, who was made 
manager of Hyde & Behman’s, took a softer approach: “Personally,” he said,  
I believe it would be the right thing to close the theater Friday afternoon, but that is for 
Mr. Hyde and Mr. Behman to decide. They will be here on Wednesday, and I believe 
they have decided on some action in the matter. They are peculiar men and might decide 
to hold religious services in the theater for all I know. I believe they will do the right 
thing.287 
 
 The right thing, as it turned out, was evidently to plan to keep the theatre open. “It is no 
more than I expected,” IMA President J. J. Reynolds said in reply. “If Hyde and Behman’s closes 
it will be because they have measured the thing by the dollar.”288 The IMA had appealed to 
Mayor Harrison, who replied he had no control in the matter. “We knew Mayor Harrison had no 
power under the law to close the theaters,” responded J. J. Reynolds. “The mayor is only 
quibbling when he evades the question in that way. I am not surprised, however. It is his way to 
get out of things and shirk responsibility.”289 It is difficult not to read in Reynolds’ response to 
Harrison’s refusal a note of anger about the slightly suspicious way in which he found himself 
acquitted of guilt. 
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 At the last minute, Hyde & Behman closed the theatre for the afternoon of the 30th of 
December, perhaps, claimed the Tribune, as a result of the printing of “the Tribune’s protest in 
word and picture.”290 The first anniversary was a day of sorrow for the city, and an illustration of 
the importance of opportunities for grieving socially. Mourners “wept with each other, grasped 
each other’s hands, and prayed and listened to the hopeful words spoken by three pastors of the 
faith.”291 The anniversary gave new and special meaning to the act of remembering, as 
anniversaries tend to do; nine hundred people attended services at Willard Hall, with three 
hundred persons “packed in the corridors, unable to gain an entrance” to the building.”292 
Meanwhile, at Hyde & Behman’s, “another crowd blocked the pavement before the darkened 
portals of the theater that was the Iroquois. The row of doors was locked as on that afternoon a 
year ago, but this time the crowd that pressed against them was without instead of within.”293 A 
telegram glued to the interior of the door read: “closed during memorial service.”294 The building 
opened back up that evening for its scheduled performance, “one year after the night of that 
terrible carting away of the dead, those agonized rounds of the morgue.”295 
 Hyde & Behman’s lasted less than a year. I argue that, in some measure, this was because 
of a failure to properly redefine the space as anything but the Iroquois, as evidenced by an 
August 1905 theatrical gossip column in the Tribune: 
The Iroquois…is to have another change of name. Having failed…as Hyde & Behman’s, 
it now…is to be re-christened the Colonial…Klaw & Erlanger, however, will supply the 
theater with its attractions, and there is no reason to doubt the firm’s active control of the 
house. By the look of the reputed plans, a strenuous effort is to be made to restore the 
theater to a first class rank. To this end, it is declared that the best that the syndicate has 
will be sent to the house.296 
  
  The placement of this piece of gossip carries with it some irony; directly above this, the 
Tribune reported, “aggressive warfare against the theatrical syndicate has been begun by the 
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organization of independent managers.”297 The Syndicate re-involved itself in the Iroquois even 
as they began to lose their grip on booking power in the United States.  
 On the first day of 1907, a real estate transaction appeared in the Tribune, which read the 
following: 
Levy Mayer bought from Arthur T. Lyman, A. Lawrence Lowell and Arthur Lyman, 
trustees, the fee under the Colonial theatre for $350,000. This, including 110x37.5 feet 
north of the Real Estate Board building, was leased in 1902 to the Iroquois Theater 
Company for ninety-nine years at $24,900 a year. Mr. Mayer’s purchase was on about a 5 
per cent basis.298 
 
 It was Mayer’s brilliant legal maneuverings that assured Davis’s freedom in March of 
1907. It was through this relationship — one that, by the time the trial was finally over in 1907, 
had been three years running — that Mayer must have made the acquaintance of Klaw and 
Erlanger. When, in February of 1907, Klaw and Erlanger “announced plans to enter the 
vaudeville arena” and “declared their goal of uplifting vaudeville from its lowbrow associations” 
through what they called “advanced vaudeville,” it became clear that Mayer was in business with 
the struggling Syndicate.299 By that summer, Mayer was “secretly dispatched…to Europe on 
board the Kronpriz Wilhelm to formalize arrangements with the European managers and theatre 
owners,” and help Klaw and Erlanger expand their operation globally.300  
 The connection between Mayer and the Syndicate grew out of the ashes of the Iroquois, 
and when Mayer purchased the land under the Colonial, it seems obvious, given his growing 
business association with the men, that he did so with the understanding that he could help 
ensure that Klaw and Erlanger took the space back. His creative, theatrical, and impassioned 
defense of Will J. Davis was owed, in some regard, to his considerable financial stake in the 
growing relationship between him and the members of the Syndicate. Mayer’s purchase of the 
building can be understood as an attempt to re-write the history of the location, or at the very 
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least, to advance the history past a civic memory of the fire. The Colonial Theatre continued, 
with some level of success, into May of 1924, when the theatre, again under the management of 
Harry J. Powers, was closed, with plans for the demolition of the building to make way for “a 
new nineteen story United Masonic temple.”301  
 It is this temple that stands in the place of the Iroquois today, although the building’s 
listing in the National Register of Historic Place reads “New Masonic Building and Oriental 
Theatre.” The building opened as a deluxe cinema house in 1926. It is better known today as the 
Ford Center for the Performing Arts Oriental Theatre, one of the major theatre houses in 
Chicago. The Loop today is obviously vastly different from its 1903 configuration. A casual 
walker of the city would have no idea of the significant relationship between the conflagatory 
disaster and the organization of civic space; I walked the streets around the neighborhood that 
same cold January day I visited the Montrose Cemetery marker, trying to feel some of the 
presence of the Iroquois disaster. I walked directly past an unassuming alleyway near the theatre, 
not realizing its significance: Couch Alley remains, primarily as a way for the loading and 
unloading of set pieces into the Oriental, as well as the Gene Siskel Film Center. In Cities of the 
Dead, Joseph Roach identifies the relationship between architectural innovation “and social 
organization” as an example of “what Nora calls ‘places’ or sites of memory,” and to which 
Roach refers as “vortices of behavior.”302 Roach also argues that such social organization creates 
what he calls “kinesthetic imagination,” which he defines as “a way of thinking through 
movements — at once remembered and reinvented — the otherwise unthinkable.”303 Understood 
through Roach’s insight, the re-organization of the space around the spot the Iroquois stood 
creates a physical “vortex of behavior” always already imbricated within the act of significant 
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remembering. That is, in trying to re-organize the cityscape to help forget the Iroquois, Chicago 
may have accidentally developed an invisible way of performing memory.  
 The history of the space of the Iroquois disaster is one of contestation, as victims and 
survivors struggled against corporate and governmental interests to control the narrative of the 
disaster. It seems that, in this case, the corporate interests were better served, and while material 
produced about the Oriental — and, indeed, the Colonial — makes reference to the significance 
of its spatial memory, it is usually confined to only a handful of lines that gloss over the horrors 
of December 30th, 1903. The difficult history of the transforming space following the disaster — 
from charnel house and graveyard to vaudeville and comedy, from the reintroduction of the 
Syndicate to the failure and eventual “resurrection” of the space as a legitimate spot of theatrical 
production — suggests the extent to which memory-work was greatly complicated and defined  
by the disputes between parties with competing interests. It is also worth noting that the 
metatheatrical rhetoric of memory that concerned the space can be read as an agent in 
positioning the space as continually theatrical; that the building itself remains a house of 
theatrical production today was perhaps, given the volatile and interrelated nature of theatre, 
disaster and memory, inevitable: it would always be marked in some way by its association with 
the nature of performance. There is, perhaps, no better way to forget the past then by continually 
reconstructing it in and as present. 
Popular Testimonial of a Popular Sorrow 
 In The Popular Culture of Disaster, Gary Webb asks, “is it possible for a single event to 
permanently alter social life? And, if so, how has that event changed things? Does everybody 
perceive those changes in the same way? Is there agreement or disagreement on the desirability 
of those changes?”304 That the definition and narrative of the Iroquois disaster, and so the 
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memory of the event, was bitterly disputed between several groups is a point illustrated 
throughout this case study. Webb’s sets of questions suggests that the value ascribed to change 
wrought by disaster is equally as contested, and to understand how memory-work functions in 
the post-disaster time period, one must give attention to what is culturally produced: 
Following catastrophic events, survivors and responders also engage in a wide range of 
cultural production. They tell jokes and share stories about the events. Buildings are 
spray-painted with graffiti to convey messages of hope, humor, or frustration. New rituals 
are enacted to provide order and meaning to their lives, including those surrounding the 
handling of the dead. Makeshift memorials are created to allow survivors the opportunity 
to share their emotions and remember those they lost. And poems and songs are written 
in efforts to make sense of what happened.305 
 
 This section covers the numerous “new rituals,” “makeshift memorials,” and the struggle to 
remember through memorialization by the IMA. The Iroquois Memorial Hospital was the largest 
act of cultural production undertaken towards constructing a physical memorial to the victims of 
the fire, and the one most fraught with the most complications and disputes. At every turn, the 
IMA was being resisted in their efforts to fund and open the hospital. Above, I detailed the 
IMA’s failed attempts to claim the space of the fire for their hospital; while they lost that battle, 
they did not give up on either the hospital, nor procuring the space — a December 31st, 1912 
article in the Tribune quotes IMA member Henry M. Shabad as saying,  
Never will Chicago condone the catastrophe until a memorial has been erected on the fire 
site. We cannot sleep at night while knowing that the site where our loved ones were lost 
is devoted to revelry and pleasure. The theater that is now there must be closed and a 
memorial for our dead must be built and consecrated to humanity. As long as there is 
blood in our veins we must strive for this end.306 
 
 The Iroquois Memorial Hospital was funded in the amount of $40,000 by the efforts of 
the Iroquois Memorial Association to “provide instant and free attention to downtown victims of 
accidents, the lack of which, it was said, was the cause of many of the deaths resulting from the 
fire.”307 Because the IMA could not procure the grounds of the theatre to build their hospital, an 
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alternate site was approved at 23 North Market Street.308 The hospital was to be “a popular 
testimonial of a popular sorrow,” according to the IMA.309 It was not until 1908, a year after the 
legal processing of the disaster had finally come to an end, that the drive to raise funds was 
complete. The Tribune remarked upon the city’s acquiescence to build the hospital, writing “the 
long felt need of an emergency hospital in the downtown part of Chicago is about to be met,” but 
noted grimly that “no memorial will ever express the feeling of those whose homes were 
darkened by an awful tragedy.”310  
 Although the funds had been successfully raised in 1908, the cornerstone to the hospital 
was not laid until October of 1910, as “grief and sorrow alternated with joy and happiness in the 
faces of members of the Iroquois Memorial Association.”311 Just as the Iroquois itself was built 
upon a cornerstone filled with various materials, marking the space with irony and opposition, 
so, too, was the Iroquois Memorial Hospital built upon a cornerstone filled with significant 
markers; while they could not procure the actual space in which the Iroquois, the IMA 
nevertheless signified that the Hospital was literally built upon the disaster itself when Samuel H. 
Regensberg, then President of the IMA, placed into the cornerstone “a sealed copper box, 
containing a history of the holocaust, the names of the victims, and a record of facts relating to 
the hospital.”312 J.E.O. Pridmore, who designed the hospital “of brick and stone and of fireproof 
construction,” used the occasion to position the city as guilty of working to dismiss the victims 
of the fire; however, Pridmore’s remarks also played upon the trope of essential contestation that 
defined the post-disaster paradigm of the Iroquois by mentioning the political reform that had 
been wrought by the destruction: 
Other cities have made such places sacred. It is a blot on the ethical standard of Chicago 
that her citizens should seek amusement and pleasure within these walls…yet, after all, 
millions of people are now living more securely because of the negligence that cost 600 
lives. A wave of reform swept the whole world immediately after the fire, and more 
 
 275 
precautions were made for public safety. The site of the Iroquois theater, however, should 
be covered by a fitting memorial to those who died there, and Chicago should not rest 
until this is accomplished.313 
 
 The Iroquois Memorial officially opened to the public on January 16th, 1911. The opening 
day of the hospital was marked by a bout of irony; as if the building needed to live up to its 
namesake, shortly before the doors officially opened at 8:00 AM, “fire was discovered in a pile 
of excelsior in the rear of the place.” Before the fire department arrived, though, “spectators had 
extinguished the blaze,” and the fire was ruled accidental.314 “Some one probably threw a lighted 
cigar into a pile of shavings that were left in the alley following the unpacking of some surgical 
instruments,” explained Dr. Matthew Karasek, who served as the head of the hospital.315 
 As part of the hospital’s memorial functions, the IMA commissioned Lorado Taft to design 
a tablet that would “be placed in the main waiting room of the Iroquois Memorial Hospital.”316 
Although the tablet was dedicated on the eighth anniversary, in 1911, the Tribune published 
word of the tablet’s commission as part of the hospital’s memorial functions in October 1910, 
and an image of the eventual tablet was published in December of that same year.317 A Chicago 
area artist who dealt primarily in sculpture, Taft trained at the École nationale supérieure des 
Beaux-Arts in Paris from 1880 until 1883. When he returned to America, Taft taught at the Art 
Institute of Chicago. Along with his noted accomplishments as a sculptor, Taft is equally well-
regarded as an art historian and critic. His sculptures are located through the world and are often 
constructed with a specifically memorial function.  
 The tablet was officially unveiled around the eighth anniversary of the fire, December 31st, 
1911, by Maud Jackson, the same woman around whose dead daughter the state’s attorney had 
built their failed case against Will Davis. The Tribune described the tablet as “a bas-relief in 
plaster, showing the Motherhood of the World protecting the children of the universe, the body 
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of a child borne on a litter by herculean male figures, with a bereaved mother bending over it.”318 
Taft’s description of his own work, however, provides a more nuanced understanding of the 
piece. Taft explained,  
I chose for the central figure Sympathy, personified by a woman. The worldwide need for 
sympathy and the almost as great desire to dispense it I wanted to introduce by a 
procession of humanity, some of them takers, some of them givers, but all deeply 
impressed by the significance of the dominating figure. As gradually the symbol of 
Sympathy became a living reality to me I began to understand that my main figure was 
another interpretation of the Madonna, and that all former painting and statues of her 
were inspired, like mine, by the desire to grasp the spirit of sympathy.319 
 
  While Taft’s Iroquois Hospital work was a smaller undertaking, it is noteworthy that the 
tablet shares numerous similarities with one of his greatest and most accomplished sculptures, 
1922’s Fountain of Time, located in Chicago’s Midway Plaisance, and started 
contemporaneously with the Iroquois tablet.  Both works of art are concerned with the inevitable 
passage of time, and the detached — one might say dispassionate — observation of the struggles 
of humanity by a figure that dominates the work: Sympathy for the Iroquois, Father Time for the 
Plaisance. In both installations, it is difficult not to read into the struggle of humanity against, 
through, or under forces that operate far above our ability to conceive of them in meaningful 
terms: Sympathy and Time, the Madonna and a scythe wielding metaphor for the inevitability of 
death. As the Henry Austin Dobson poem, The Paradox of Time, which served as inspiration for 
Fountains of Time reads, “time goes, you say? Ah, no! /Alas, Time stays, we go.”320 
 In 1932, it was brought to the attention of the IMA by the city of Chicago that the hospital 
was in a state of serious disrepair and financial burden, and “for the first time in nearly three 
decades the anniversary service” of the Iroquois disaster “was held without a single reminiscence 
of the tragedy, without any of the vestiges of a memorial meeting. The score or more of 
individuals present were too absorbed in the bursting of the verbal bombshell tossed into their 
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midst, too concerned for the future of the institution, to spend discussion on the past.”321 The 
President of the Board of Health of Chicago, Dr. Herman Bundensen, was the one to deliver the 
news: 
 Twenty-nine years after this tragedy, the question is whether to continue this 
memorial hospital or close it. Whether it still is serving a useful purpose or whether the 
city might be better served by shifting its facilities to other hospitals near the Loop, where 
expert surgical services not available here would be provided in the case of a serious 
accident in the Loop district. The solution might be to have a memorial surgical hospital. 
 We ought either to have such a first class surgical institution or realize what is not 
being done here. In the city budget Iroquois is set up as under the supervision of the city 
physician. Actually, we have had no city physician for some years and the mayor has 
asked me to take charge. He wants to do the right thing. As broke as the city is, Mayor 
Cermak is making an honest effort to cut taxes. So what is the board of health to run this 
institution on?… 
 Expert surgical care is needed when there is a bad accident. There is neither 
equipment nor personnel there to provide it. The place is pitifully inadequate as to 
equipment, even rudimentary. Nurses have worked here in twelve hour shifts a day, 
without a single day off for the last year, either Sundays or holidays. The hospital is 
closed at midnight and opens at 8 in the morning. It cannot handle surgical cases and 
sometimes the delay of bringing them here, then taking them onto another hospital means 
the difference between life and death. 
 The question is, even if the finances can be raised, are we justified in retaining this 
institution, or should it be closed or made into a good surgical hospital really adequate to 
handle emergency cases.322 
  
 The IMA was faced with a harsh reality: their memorial hospital no longer served the 
needs of the citizens of Chicago, and the memory of the fire at the Iroquois — as it had been 
since the day it occurred — was inextricably tied up in political and financial concerns. The 
hospital was closed in January 1935, although the building later served as a tuberculosis clinic 
and, during World War II, “the structure was used as headquarters for civilian defense.”323 The 
building was demolished in 1951.324 The fate of Taft’s tablet was a mystery until, in 1967, the 
sculpture was “discovered…in a corner of the City Hall basement,”325 by building engineer 
Frank McDonough, “corroded and covered with dirt.” McDonough estimated the tablet had been 
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stored there for “at least 25 years,” and said “he ha[d] no idea how it happened to be placed in 
the basement.”326 
  It is impossible to determine precisely when the Taft tablet found it’s way to the basement 
of Chicago’s City Hall, although between 15 and 25 years is not a bad guess, if we assume the 
tablet was removed sometime between the 1935 closing of the hospital and the 1951 demolition 
of the building. Either way, the misplaced, forgotten, corroded, dirt-covered tablet serves as a 
strong metaphor for the struggle between the power of elite-level, governmental narratives about 
the disaster and grass-roots memory work. For a city that has performatively marked itself with 
the memory of the Great Chicago Fire — a star on the city’s flag represents that particular blaze 
— the notion of widespread public apathy toward a much more deadly fire setting in after only 
seven years, coupled with the city’s reluctance to allow the construction of the hospital in the 
footprint of the Iroquois, and the city’s treatment of the Taft tablet, demonstrates the rapid 
devaluation of the event. When the city closed the building, and ultimately demolished it, they 
performed the ultimate act of forgetting by burying the primary extant memorial in their 
basement, completing the work of a narrative of forgetting that started in the legal systems: no 
one was guilty and no one would remember. No longer “a popular sorrow,” the memory of the 
Iroquois disaster was misplaced, forgotten, corroded, dirt-covered, and quick to fade; Arthur 
Hornblow’s prescient words proved correct.  
 Today, the tablet hangs in the lobby of City Hall, adorned with a small memorial plaque 
explaining its significance. On that January morning as we took in the memorial, Jane, a Chicago 
transplant and occasional river tour guide — a virtual font of Chicago ephemera — illustrated 
the problematic and troubled nature of the civic memory of the fire when she asked me “so, wait. 
I don’t know the story. What exactly happened?” That the tablet hangs today is a sign of nothing 
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so much as the city of Chicago finally owning up to the institutional contributions they made 
towards, first, creating a disaster-prone environment through lax enforcement of fire safety 
regulations and, second, to forgetting the disaster. 
Like To Forget 
 The IMA’s hospital, and the struggles surrounding the building and administration of that 
hospital, represents far and away the most public attempts at memorial undertaken by the 
survivors of the fire. The hospital was not the only attempt to create a memorial, however. In the 
early absence of a memorial site, other, more esoteric forms of performative memorials 
developed as ways to perpetuate memory of the disaster. The best known example of these kinds 
of  “new rituals…to provide order and meaning” to survivors’ lives was the annual ringing of the 
fire bell that first sounded the alarm at the corner of Clark and Randolph Streets — Box 26. In 
1903, Michael Corrigan was a rookie fire fighter, but as the years passed, Corrigan became the 
Fire Commissioner in 1937, and participated in ringing the alarm at 3:32 PM — the same time he 
sent the alarm on December 30th, 1903 — from the one-year anniversary in 1904 until the 
anniversary alarm was silenced for the first time in fifty-five years in December 1960, owing to 
the fact that, according to the Tribune, “now most of the survivors are dead.”327 Corrigan 
apparently rued this annual performance; by 1949, he told the Tribune “I have a queer feeling 
doing this,” and said in 1960, upon the box’s retirement, “he too would like to forget, but he 
can’t…”  
  As I have illustrated through these three case studies, new behavioral patterns emerge in 
the post-disaster paradigm, undertaken to re-establish a form of order in a disrupted sociocultural 
context. In this section, I provide an illustration of re-vitalizing one such behavioral pattern. I 
argue that there are performed, memorial actions that can be understood through Joseph Roach’s 
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theory of surrogation as an “invisible ritual of every day life.”328 In the disrupted post-disaster 
paradigm, new behavioral patterns are identified through their significant link to the disaster 
event. As these new patterns become firmly established in everyday ritual, they begin to lose 
their significance and, through repetition, become performative facets of a newly ordered 
society. To trace the history of such a ritual is to re-vitalize and re-significate its link to disaster. 
Understood this way, these ritualized performances of everyday life can be understood as 
invisible memorials, small behavioral resistances to the violence done by elite-level memory-
work against grass-roots survivor communities. They are defined simultaneously by their 
physical omnipresence, and the voided absence of their invisible significance.  
 The best illustration of this kind of memorial is the invention and frequent use of the crash 
bar. It’s an action we’ve all done, our arms full as we walk hip-first into a door, depressing the 
flat, bronze bar into its recess, unlatching the door, swinging it outwards, and allowing for a 
hands-free exit. The device is properly called a Von Duprin Device, and its design allows a door 
to remain locked from the outside while simultaneously allowing those inside the ability to leave 
without the necessity of unlocking the door. Imagine the panic gripping Iroquois audience 
members who ran for the door, only to find the doors were both locked, and built to open inward. 
Now imagine hundreds of other audience members, crushing up against each other and the door, 
trampling, smashing and suffocating each other in a desperate attempt to escape. Many of the 
deaths at the Iroquois were preventable with simple changes in architecture and hardware design. 
The invention of the Von Duprin Device was catalyzed by recognition of the simplicity of these 
changes, which became an object of some obsession for Carl Prinzler. 
Following the Iroquois fire, Prinzler, an employee at the Indiana-based Vonnegut 
Hardware Company in 1903, became driven with a desire to ensure that no such horror would 
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occur ever again. This drive was the result of the fact that Prinzler, in Chicago on business in late 
December 1903, had tickets to see Mr. Blue Beard on December 30th at the Iroquois, and was 
called back to Indianapolis for meetings at the last minute. With his neighbor, Henry DuPont, 
Prinzler designed and built the first panic bar exit device, and sold the device to the Vonnegut 
Hardware Company, Prinzler’s employer; the device took the name Von Duprin — Vonnegut, 
DuPont, and Prinzler.329 Within a few decades, installing panic bars in public and semipublic 
buildings was strictly required by fire code legislation worldwide. As this enforcement became 
normalized, it transformed into an invisible ritual, an unconscious citation of the fire and those 
lost. By re-vitalizing this memorial performance, this tragedy, often a footnote in theatre’s 
history can be re-contextualized as a vital part of the material of the theatre itself. Ellen MacKay 
argues “what links fourteenth-century Paris to seventeenth-century London to twentieth-century 
Chicago is a stubborn failure to learn from disasters of the past.”330 Perhaps the greatest 
memorial to the Iroquois Theatre is that we have finally learned from our mistakes.  
 Creating permanent physical memorials to the dead proved a much more daunting task, 
illustrated in some regard by the preceding account of the Iroquois Memorial Hospital. On the 
first anniversary of the blaze, Jenkin Lloyd “Jenk” Jones, a Unitarian minister in the city, called 
upon the citizens of Chicago to shift their reality from mourning towards remembering. “Dear 
friends,” he said,  
It is better our grief should not press too hard. It is well to remember that we live in a 
loving world. There was a time when the breaking heart resented the shining of the sun; 
when the stars seemed to mock our grief. But that time is past. It is now time to gather 
together and rejoice that by our sorrow we are assured that we live in an ordered 
universe, and are part of an order divinely economic, which suffers no waste, no loss. 
Today it becomes us to fit our grief to the growing wants of man. It is a pleasure to learn 
the lessons of grief. A year ago this morning we people gathered here were divided in 
classes and parties and creeds. A year ago tonight darkness settled down over a city 
united in one brotherhood of sorrow. All divisions were swept away; we staggered under 




 Note that Jones constructs this shift in terms of the realization that “we live in an ordered 
universe,” mirroring the disaster sociology argument for defining disaster through it’s power to 
disrupt the systems of order that underlie everyday life. Jones continued, arguing that a physical 
location for memory was the next step in Chicagoans accepting the disaster as passed, and 
society (and the universe) as “ordered.” He couched this call for a lieu de memoire in a critique 
of Chicago as essentially a city that is always forgetting: 
By virtue of the last twelve months, we are confronted with a new opportunity. Alas for 
the country that forgets its annals as some one has said; for the country with no memorial 
days and no conspicuous consecrations. For Chicago this memorial today is a beggarly 
thing. Chicago is poor enough already in landmarks and events that it commemorates. I 
want this community to have common shrines; without, the life of the community will 
suffer. It is a sad story, this disregard of conventions in this city. Once our first churches 
were located in the central part of the town, some of them on free lands. Then at the 
behest of the real estate dealer they had to take unto themselves wheels and move out of 
the way. Thus Chicago has suffered for want of landmarks; thus Chicago has lost in 
spiritual life. Here is your chance to rescue one spot and consecrate it to a higher 
sensibility. Not only may it be consecrated to mangled limbs, but also would I consecrate 
it to the higher life of the community.332 
 
 Jones’s critique proved prescient. The struggle to physicalize the memory of the victims of 
the Iroquois Theatre mirrored the legal battles in length and intensity. To analyze the history of 
Iroquois memorials expands upon the narrative tropes of dispute and contestation that were 
developed in the post-disaster paradigm by elite-level governmental processes of memory 
production. The two phenomena that I have argued are mostly closely associated with those 
tropes — legal application of guilt and social memory — are intimately linked, as illustrated by 
the Taft tablet. The long, protracted, and ultimately failed attempts to assign legal blame for the 
disaster reinforces the “monumental” struggles to create sites of memory; memory is always 
implied by memorial constructions to be an ethical and moral mandate.  
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 In 1908, the IMA finally dedicated a permanent memorial marker at Montrose Cemetery, 
the same one I visited on that cold January morning in 2013. Huge and heavy looking, with moss 
stains and scars playing at its edges, the lettering shallow and difficult to read in the grey 
morning light, the marker sits off Pulaski Street, far enough inside the cemetery ground that you 
have to venture inwards to see it. This is not a joyous celebration of the lives of those lost; this is 
a cold, business-like reminder of the permanence of death. Andrew Kircher, owner and operator 
of Montrose Cemetery, “realized that no memorial had been erected to memorialize the tragedy, 
[and] took it upon himself to do so.”333 The memorial, then, may be read as an attempt to create a 
“social process of remembering” in a very literal sense, as the creator of the memorial was a 
member of society trying to help others remember. However, the location of the memorial 
deserves some consideration, as well; the cemetery implores remembrance and exists to link us 
to our past. The memorial was created with the aid of the IMA, founded by bereaved relatives of 
victims of the fire. The placement of the marker received very little coverage; a December 13th, 
1908 blurb of approximately ten lines is the only coverage it received, letting readers know that 
“on [Dec. 16] the monument erected to the memory of the victims of the fire in Montrose 
cemetery, will be dedicated with a public service.”334  
 Located ten miles from downtown Chicago, the distance makes this memorial 
inaccessible to most of the public. Its placement, so far from downtown, pushed back from the 
road, means a visit must be a conscious act of memory. Though its spatial context — it shares 
cemetery grounds with many of the dead — reinforces the purpose of the memorial, its 
geographical removal from the site of the tragedy and from the crowded, busy downtown 
Chicago area weaken its ability to create an environment of memory. One cannot walk through 
the city of Chicago and see the memorial “traced upon the cityscape.” In this way, the memorial 
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loses its effectiveness to make manifest the lives lost in the fire. And yet, that morning, I saw a 
small set of red, plastic roses had been laid at the base of the memorial, a stark burst of crimson 
red against the granite, no doubt a lingering remainder of the fire’s recent 110 year anniversary: 
someone remembered.
   285 
Conclusion 
History Does Not End So  
 A central goal of disaster sociological research is to analyze evidence about multiple case 
studies in order to identify patterns of occurrence, behavior, and circumstance and, based on the 
identification and analysis of these patterns, to establish generalizable information about 
disasters. Robert Stallings defines the term generalizability as “researchers’ ability to make 
empirically grounded statements describing phenomena and relationships among phenomena that 
hold across all similar events.”1 This conclusion is organized around identifying and 
extrapolating three generalizable principles about theatre fires I have uncovered, in order to 
demonstrate possible productive use of my methodology, and to provide guidance to future 
scholarly endeavors that take place at the intersections of theatre, performance, memory, history, 
and disaster.  
 The first of these three generalizable arguments is that theatre’s focus on developing 
technologies of spectacle outpaced the development of technologies of safety, and greatly 
contributed to the creation and sustenance of disaster-rich environments. The origins of each of 
these three fires can be traced, in some significant part, to the relationship between theatre 
production and the allure of spectacle, and to the development of technologies of spectacle that 
often far outstripped the capacity of extant technologies of hazard-mitigation.  
 It is no mistake that the three major technological advances in theatrical lighting are 
represented by these case studies: candlelight in Richmond, gaslight in Brooklyn, and electricity 
in Chicago. That each case study is marked by a different form of lighting technology illustrates 
the continual threat of disaster; further, it illustrates the danger posed by implementing new 
lighting technology was understood as an acceptable risk in service of creating spectacular 
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staging effects, and in each case, the desire to create spectacle contributed significantly to the 
disaster event. Adding to the danger of spectacle onstage was the spatial organization of 
performers, the audience, the set pieces, and the theatre building. Again, as with the lighting, the 
dangers inherent in the theatre spaces were treated as acceptable risks for audience members. In 
Richmond, the building was reportedly oft-regarded as a potential firetrap; constructed primarily 
of wood, and with weak and narrow stairs and dark hallways that made navigation overly 
difficult, the disaster at the Richmond Theatre was regarded, following the fire, as almost 
inevitable. Increasing the inherent dangers of the layout of space was the poor construction and 
use of technical elements of spectacle: the hemp rope and pulley system used to raise and lower 
chandeliers, and the over-abundance of highly inflammable painted set pieces re-enforce the 
inevitability of the conflagration. 
 In Brooklyn, the use of gas lighting had already created danger for performers and 
audience members when, previous to the fire, gas had ignited and sprayed from a loose hose 
backstage. The backstage area itself was badly cluttered with set pieces from shows past, and the 
action on-stage had required several dozen drop-flies to move the action of The Two Orphans 
around Paris. The numerous levels of seating, and the lack of stairways designed to provide 
access to those specific levels of seating, coupled with the lack of fire exits in Flood Alley, 
meant that the arrangement of the space of the theatre contributed towards creating the human 
panic that transformed the lobby into a hell mouth. Too, the building’s L-shaped layout was 
blamed for causing much confusion for patrons as they attempted to leave the building safely.  
 In Chicago, spectacle operated significant purchase on the audience’s experience of the 
production of Mr. Blue Beard, and of their experience of the theatre itself. The construction 
meta-theatrically positioned itself as a venue for performance insofar as the lobby was designed 
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to afford members of society the opportunity to see and be seen. One notes, too, that, like 
Brooklyn before it, the Iroquois Theatre was built in a L-shape, increasing the potential danger 
for audience members who would try to escape the flames the afternoon of December 30th, 1903. 
Reviews of the Theatrical Syndicate’s production of Blue Beard almost universally praised the 
show’s spectacular performance and technical elements, often noting that those elements were 
more important than the script itself. Iroquois management participated in the creation of 
spectacle by removing exit signs and blocking doors that would denigrate the beauty of the 
interior of the auditorium, and though there were some hazard-mitigation technologies in use, 
they were known to be almost entirely ineffective — the dry chemical Kilfyre — or so poorly 
implemented that they contributed to worsening the effects of the fire, as with the fire escape 
doors that swung out ninety degrees, blocking safe passage for anyone on a higher level. The 
highest concentration of deaths in each theatre stemmed from seating located above the floor 
level. Indeed, most often the floor level patrons cleared out with relative safety and speed. In 
Richmond, most deaths came from trying to navigate from the boxes through the dark, cramped 
hallways; in Brooklyn, most deaths were attributed to the piles of bodies that developed on 
stairway landings; in Chicago, most deaths were attributed to trying to escape from the fire 
escapes and down stars into the lobby area.  
 The desire for spectacle outstripped hazard-mitigation technologies: this is obvious. What 
is less obvious is that the desire to create spectacle extended far beyond the limits of stagecraft to 
the architectural design of the theatre buildings themselves. The design and layout of the theatres 
helped create a spatial environment in which the possibility of disaster was heightened to a point 
of inevitability. Throughout this study, I’ve argued that disaster contributes to the reconfiguration 
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of space, but the inverse is also true: space contributes significantly to the writing of the disaster 
event.  
 The second generalizable principle is that fires were far more prevalent in theatre’s history 
than the archives reflect, and were a common and accepted occupational hazard. The fires I’ve 
identified and written about were selected not for their similarities, which only became clear as I 
compiled research and wrote narratives, but for their status as the three most destructive and 
deadly fires in American theatre history. There are numerous other conflagrations that were left 
out. My intent was not to create a chronological history of theatre fires, but to evaluate how these 
events have been remembered and forgotten, and through what practices memory and forgetting 
were performed. In each case study, I identified the tendency of actors in the performing 
company to ignore the possible dangers posed by the presence of fire. The assumption was 
always that the backstage crew would succeed in putting the fire out quickly, quietly, and 
efficiently, so to alert the audience to the fire would be pointless, and would possibly cause more 
danger by inciting panic. As a generalized pattern of response, this behavior suggests that fires 
were a common and accepted occupational risk in the theatre as a workspace in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  
 Eyre Massey Shaw, a member of the London Fire Brigade, had already identified the 
tendency of theatre buildings to erupt into deadly fires by 1876, when he published a short 
handbook entitled Fires in Theatres. The point of Shaw’s work was to illustrate the breadth of 
the problem and, in doing so, to suggest some ways to improve upon the safeguarding of patrons 
lives. “The subject of preventing the sudden destruction of theatres by fire is one which must 
necessarily force itself on the attention of all who inhabit crowded cities,” he argued, “and 
especially of those entrusted with the protection of helpless masses of persons of the occasion of 
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such catastrophes.”2 Remarkably, Shaw’s book, which predates the conflagrations at both 
Brooklyn and Chicago, already presented a range of generalized information about theatre fires. 
“I am not aware,” he wrote,  
Nor do I believe that any one else is aware, whose business it is [to interfere in such a 
matter as fires in theatres], or whether it is the business of any one; and, in this state of 
utter vagueness and ignorance, I think it better to say what I have to say, and to send it 
forth for what it is worth, than to withhold it now and have to state it afterwards, perhaps 
on the occasion of some great catastrophe.3 
 
 In this passage, Shaw has identified the diffusion of responsibility that marks theatre fires, 
and helps contribute to disaster-prone environments. If, as I noted above, it was known that the 
theatre buildings and production practices far outstripped the development of technologies of 
safety, how could theatre producers possibly allow audience members to enter such dangerous 
spaces?  
 William Paul Gerhard’s 1896 work Theatre Fires and Panics provides statistical evidence 
of global theatre fires that illustrates the regularity of this particular kind of disaster. He writes, 
There are numerous cases in which a fire breaking out in a theatre, on the stage, in the 
auditorium, or elsewhere, is at once extinguished by the stage hands, or by the firemen on 
duty in the building. Many cases of this kind never become known to the public or to the 
press, and no accurate record is kept of them…those fires which break out during a 
performance, when the building is crowded with people, are naturally the ones of greatest 
interest to us.4 
 
 Gerhard’s statistics, which collect data from the 1750s until the 1890s, illustrate not only 
the frequency of theatre fires, but also the frequency of multiple fires occurring at the same 
theatre, demonstrating the bizarre but pervasive tendency of theatres to burst into flames. He 
notes, collectively, 460 theatres that burned over the course of a century, and 523 theatres burned 
total. Among the total number, Gerhard notes there are “37 theatres which were burnt twice, 8 
theatres which we burnt three times, 4 theatres which were four times,” and “1 theatre (the 
Bowery Theatre in New york) which was burnt five times; also one theatre in Spain, which burnt 
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down seven times.”5 Gerhard’s statistics also show that the less time a theatre building has 
existed, the more danger it was in to burn down. “Theatres,” he writes, “as a rule, do not attain an 
old age…For the United States the average life of a theatre is said to be only from 11 to 13 
years.”6 Gerhard attributes this temporally associated danger — one that is born out by the three 
case studies of this dissertation — to the fact that the technologies of production, including those 
related most specifically to spectacle, are “rarely in perfect working order,” and to theatre 
employees who “have not as yet become accustomed to handling [those technologies], and are 
likewise unfamiliar with the rules of management.”7 This reinforces Scott G. Knowles argument 
that  
Disasters are not external in some magical way to the realities of the human-shaped 
environment or political culture in which they occur. In fact, it is probably best 
understood the other way around. In the patterns of property destruction, in the 
communities damaged and those protected, in the technologies and policies available to 
limit or avoid them, a disaster mirrors the prevailing values of the society in which it 
occurs.8  
 
 That is, theatres are prone to bursting into flames specifically because of their existential 
relationship to spectacle. Remarkably, Gerhard’s analysis of the risks of fire to theatre suggests 
that the risk is lessened during the performance, and particularly heightened immediately 
preceding and immediately following the performance. He attributes these fluctuating levels of 
danger to “greater watchfulness…as regards open lights, the sources of heat, and other causes of 
fire,” that occur during the time of performance.9 However, while those might be the times that 
place the physical space in the most danger, mortal danger to the audience is obviously 
heightened during a performance. 
 This is by way of illustrating the point that theatre fires occurred with decided regularity, 
and even more than we know, because of the number of flare-ups and fires that occurred without 
ever reaching the eyes or ears of the audience. Nat Brandt, a reporter, and author of Chicago 
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Death Trap, wondered about the status of the regularity of theatre fires, and how they may have 
impacted members of the Blue Beard cast. He writes about the fire in Cleveland that preceded 
the Iroquois blaze, “the brief blaze in Cleveland was, it can be assumed, bruited about among the 
cast — how could it not be? — But they gave it less attention than might be expected of veteran 
performers.”10 In this question, Brandt has got the issue backwards: the performers gave the fire 
precisely the amount of attention it merited — likely none — because they were veteran 
performers. Gerhard’s statistics illustrates the breadth of the issue of theatre conflagrations, but 
also succeeds in illustrating, through absence, the number of fires lost to history.  
 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in the time immediately following disasters, 
governments and other groups compete to define the narrative of the disaster, resulting in 
archives composed of materials that contradict and challenge each other as much as they 
reinforce one another. In the introduction to this dissertation, I stated that my central purpose was 
to develop and illustrate a methodology to undertake historical research into disasters in 
American theatre history, with a specific focus on a trilogy of case studies involving theatre 
conflagrations. Disaster in theatre’s history is under theorized and understudied. Without a 
careful consideration of the sociological dimensions of cultural production undertaken in the 
post-disaster paradigm, a historian might be tempted to treat the disaster as a discrete temporal 
event, as opposed to the process-based approach I have employed herein. When the disaster is re-
contextualized as an on-going process, defined more by its propensity for de-stabilizing and 
revealing the inefficiencies of theretofore invisible social structures, new sources of evidence 
emerges that provide valuable insight into the contestation of negotiations of memory between 
various groups of social actors.  
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 I have argued that the post-disaster paradigms of each of these three fires can be read for 
their essentially contested nature, as various groups of social actors attempt to gain purchase on 
narrativizing the event and, in turn, on forming phenomenological structures that would come to 
dictate how the events were and are remembered. This contestation was primarily identified as 
the result of the competing narratives of elite-level governmental forces, and the grass-roots 
efforts of victim communities. I argued that, in this essentially contested paradigm, the 
politicization of memory-work should be foregrounded as governments attempted to assign 
blame legally, and survivors attempted to make sense of the carnage of the event through various 
memorial practices.  
 One implication of this point is that cultural production undertaken in the post-disaster 
paradigm is marked by the politics of its contribution towards, or obliteration of, remembering 
the disaster event. Throughout, I have operated under the assumption provided by disaster 
sociology that disaster, as a categorical term, is defined by their capacity for social disruption 
more than for their capacity for death and destruction. Cultural production in the post-disaster 
paradigm — newspaper articles, funeral services, religious sermons, legal struggles, the planning 
and construction of memorials, joke cycles, fiction, and urban mythology — attempts, in some 
regard, to re-establish and re-order society, in order to perpetuate the disaster process towards an 
end.  
 Elite-level governmental memory-work often takes the form of what Shaw identifies as 
“panic legislation,” or laws enacted in the post-disaster paradigm to avoid any further 
conflagrations.11 In Richmond, “panic legislation” took the form of the abolishment of theatrical 
practices, while in Brooklyn and Chicago, panic legislation involved manipulating the 
organization of the auditorium space by widening aisles and installing crash bars. Of course, the 
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problem with panic legislation is that, while it ostensibly suggests the government is looking out 
for the best interest of its citizens, it can also be understood as tacit admission of the 
government’s own shortcomings, which further problematizes reading post-disaster paradigm 
performances of elite-level processing as constitutive of memory-work. 
 On the side of victim communities, reading what was produced in the post-disaster 
paradigm can be best understood as forms of resistance against the hegemony of elite-level 
political practices. Most often, grass-roots memory-work was reactionary in that it often occurred 
as the result of fundamentally disagreeing with how the political machinations of memory 
distorted a survivor community’s version of the truth of the disaster event. It is also the case that, 
as time progressed, grass-roots memory-work took a stronger stance against elite-level 
governmental processing; in Richmond, the political and grass-roots memory-work were almost 
indistinguishable, as citizens of Richmond participated with eagerness in the subscriptions 
competition to raise funds for the building of the Monumental Church. In Brooklyn, the memory-
work was still fairly cooperative, although certain newspapers — the New York Clipper, in 
particular — noted the hypocrisy of some clergy members denouncing the practice of theatre 
whilst not also addressing the various church fires that had occurred over time. Still, the political 
and victim communities involved in the post-disaster paradigm in Brooklyn were generally 
friendly, and significant political support was provided to the Brooklyn Theatre Fire Relief 
Association. Chicago’s Iroquois fire provided the surest and clearest sign of the acrimonious split 
between elite-level political memory-work and work undertaken by grass-roots survivor 
communities, with a long and protracted, and ultimately failed, attempt to assign some sort of 
blame for the fire.  
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 The possible reasons for this evolution of memory-work are numerous. The central 
interpretation of evidence I have used throughout this dissertation illustrates one such reason. 
The flames of these conflagrations themselves directly contributed to relatively few deaths, all 
things considered; much more deadly was the human response to danger. Increasing the 
deadliness of the human response to danger was the design of the physical space of the theatre. 
Just as technologies of spectacle outpaced safety regulations and technologies, the identification 
and use of the tropes and vocabulary of theatrical spectacle outpaced other forms of memorial 
production in the early goings of the post-disaster paradigm. What is significant about the use of 
these metatheatrical tools is that they contributed significantly to how the disasters would be 
remembered. 
 In Richmond, these tools were primarily by clergy to advance an anti-theatrical reading of 
the disaster event through casting judgment upon the victims of the fires. This had the impact of 
marking the Richmond disaster within an explicitly religious memory paradigm, and may help to 
explain why Mary Gibbon Carter and Susan Archer Weiss undertook to re-write the legacy of 
James Gibbon; the implication of the anti-theatrical tone that dominated the immediate post-
disaster moment of the Richmond Theatre fire was that the wages of attending theatre were 
death, and that God’s perfect judgment meant that those who had died deserved such a fate. This 
would have necessarily included the respected war hero, but such a narrative fate did not befit his 
life, and certainly would not have been the way Mary Gibbon Carter wanted to remember her 
brother. It also helps to explain the Monumental Church as the memorial to the dead; just as the 
clergy adopted the language of theatre in order to play with the “inherent constructedness” of 
narrative to performatively cover-up any competing memories, the public subscription-based 
building of the Monumental Church can similarly be analyzed for its performative status of 
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(literally) covering up the dead of the Richmond Theatre fire. The memory of the event is 
forever, inextricably, linked to the religious performances that dominated the early post-disaster 
memory work.  
 In Brooklyn, the use of metatheatricality was positioned to build narratives of social 
awareness, activism, and positive sociopersonal transformation. This was most explicitly seen in 
the rhetoric used by clergy members to call for the people of Brooklyn to live their lives as a 
memorial to the dead. While in Richmond, theatrical performances and social gatherings were 
explicitly and legally forbidden following the theatre fire, members of the theatre community 
reacted immediately to make their performances part of that social activism, and numerous 
benefit performances were put on for the victims of the Brooklyn Theatre fire. The social 
activism that marked the construction of memory and narrative about the Brooklyn Theatre could 
be seen immediately as undertakers and mortuaries around the city began to send hearses to the 
theatre. Most notable, though, is the successful activism employed by the Brooklyn Theatre Fire 
Relief Association, who provided important funds to help provide relief and structure to the lives 
of survivors and victims’ family members for many years, and who additionally provided for the 
construction of the memorial that now sits in Green-Wood Cemetery.  
 The Brooklyn Theatre fire also continued the trend of re-writing reality in the post-disaster 
paradigm, through the confabulations of Steele MacKaye, and through the power of the disaster 
narrative to re-write Kate Claxton’s past and future. These, too, can be understood as examples 
of the dominance of social activist narrative. The story of Steele MacKaye positions his skills 
with theatrical innovation as being related to the Brooklyn fire. Although, as I argued, he likely 
was not present that night, by claiming the Brooklyn Theatre fire as the originary and 
inspirational event that contributed to the design and manufacturing of his fold-down chair, 
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MacKaye heeded the call of clergy in the Brooklyn area to live his life as a memorial. Claxton, 
too, came to embody self-as-memorial, although in her case, this existence was thrust upon her.  
 The memory-work relevant to the Iroquois Theatre fire was marked most specifically by 
the narratives of dispute, opposition, and failure that dominated the immediate post-disaster 
paradigm. As a trope, dispute and opposition were prevalent in the history of the theatre, from 
the laying of the cornerstone to the legal struggles to convict a guilty party to the numerous 
contestations that dotted the Iroquois Memorial Associations’ work to, first, gain control of the 
Iroquois building, and then later, to provide for an emergency hospital in the downtown area. 
The IMA fought for years to gain purchase on the narrative of the disaster with, at best, mixed 
results; this is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than with the Lorado Taft bronze bas relief 
tablet that was commissioned for the Iroquois Memorial Hospital, which was found decades 
following the buildings demolition, dirt-covered, lost, and neglected in the basement of City 
Hall, illustrating the ultimate failure of the IMA’s grass-roots memory work.  
 These three points are inter-related and, when read for their intersectionality, provide a 
response to Ellen MacKay’s contention that “what links fourteenth-century Paris to seventeenth-
century London to twentieth-century Chicago is a stubborn failure to learn from the disasters of 
the past.”12 There are, of course, undoubtedly similarities between each of the three case studies 
I’ve used in this dissertation, and at first, I believed those similarities reinforced MacKay’s point. 
However, I’ve come to believe that what links theatre fires together is not a stubborn refusal to 
learn from the disasters of the past. Such an argument ignores the vital historiographical issues 
embedded within archival narratives about each event. What links theatre fires together as 
historical events that “set the stage for theatre’s history to be told,” are the rhetorical tropes used 
by competing social actors to construct meaning in a disrupted social context, and how those 
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tropes were already embedded within, and contributed to, the society in which the disaster 
process occurred.   
 Theatre is a particularly useful medium through which to consider these new sources of 
evidence for the way the field suggests methods of transmitting knowledge that exist beyond the 
boundaries of the archive. By studying these transmissions of knowledge that resist typical 
archival strategies, the focus on disaster shifts from what is destroyed, to what is created, to what 
rises from the ashes. Another useful facet of theatre as a medium for considering post-disaster 
paradigmatic cultural production is theatre’s inherent constructedness, and how that 
constructedness destabilizes ideas of essential narratives of memory. Theatre as construct 
provides a productive insight because it points to the fact that archives and records abide by a 
similar constructedness. In undertaking this research, and writing this dissertation, my goal has 
been to demonstrate how narratival and rhetorical themes and tropes that were used in the post-
disaster paradigm of these three major American theatre fires to construct, validate, and organize 
social memory, historical records, and disaster archives were already embedded within the 
societies that became sites of disaster events.  
 Less important, then, are the generalizable conclusions an historian can draw about the 
relationship between the ephemerality of theatrical practice and the writing of history. What 
becomes more important is what patterns emerge through research and analysis of the competing 
processes and agendae of memory work undertaken at the elite and grass-roots levels. That there 
are similarities between these events, when understood through the rubric of disaster sociology, 
does not suggest, as MacKaye argues, some sort of causal and historical linkage between them, 
but a linkage of metatheatrical tools that utilize the “inherent constructedness” of the 
disastrous/theatrical space to participate in a sociologically necessary performance of post-
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disaster re-construction and re-stabilization. Disaster, then, not as — or not only as — setting the 
stage for theatre’s history to be told, but as, first, a process through which theatre, communities, 
and socieities becomes themselves and, next, as a paradigm in which identity is disrupted, 
contested, negotiated, and re-constructed anew.
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